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PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

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| CONTENTS | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Lessons of Beijing's Adventure in Vietnam | 1 |
| Policy Line Hostile to Peace and Socialism | 13 |
| Main Aspects of Maoist Falsification of History (M. I. Sladkovskiy) | 29 |
| Kampuchea: Failure of Maoist 'Experiment' (Ye. V. Vasil'kov) | 48 |
| 'Four Modernizations': Preliminary Prospects and Reality (V. I. Akimov, V. I. Potapov) | 62 |
| Reactionary Attack on Rights and Freedoms of Japanese Citizens (V. N. Yeregin) | 78 |
| Shadow of China Over South Asia and the Middle East (Beijing's Calculations and Miscalculations) (S. G. Yurkov) | 91 |
| Role and Place of Overseas Chinese in Beijing Politics (T. M. Kotova) | 104 |
| England in Chinese Foreign Policy (A. G. Larin) | 120 |
| Japanese Economy: Problems Remain (Yu. P. Shipov) | 135 |

| CONTENTS (Continued) | Page |
|---|------|
| Falsification of the History of Research on the Central Tian-Shan for the Purpose of Justifying Beijing's Territorial Claims on the USSR (V. Ye. Irinin) | 148 |
| Beijing: Policy Line of Provoking World War (A. G. Apalin) | 161 |
| Important Document from the History of Soviet-Chinese Relations (M. S. Kapitsa) | 174 |
| Anti-Imperialist 'May 4th' Movement of 1919 in China (V. P. Ilyushechkin) | 182 |
| Problem of Translating and Interpreting a Text (N. T. Fedorenko) | 195 |
| Communist-Internationalist, Loyal Leninist (Commemorating the 70th Anniversary of Wang Ming's Birth) (K. V. Shevelev) | 220 |
| Contacts Between University of St. Petersburg and Oriental Institute in the Beginning of the 20th Century (A. A. Babintsev) | 231 |
| From the Memoirs of a Soviet Specialist (L. N. Kutakov) | 236 |
| Important Reference Works on China (V. K. Zakamenskiy) | 248 |
| Difficult Paths of Chinese Culture (M. Ye. Shneyder) | 254 |
| Fate of Lao She's Creative Legacy (A. N. Zhelokhovtsev) | 259 |
| Polish Edition of the 'Modern History of China' (L. M. Gudoshnikov) | 263 |
| Against Maoist Falsifications | 269 |
| Statement of the Soviet Government | 278 |
| In Memoriam: Vsevolod Sergeyevich Kolokolov (1896-1979) | 280 |

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LESSONS OF BEIJING'S ADVENTURE IN VIETNAM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 3-12

[Text] The aggressive campaign launched by Beijing in February of this year against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as we know, ended in a shameful defeat for the Beijing adventurers. After having to contend with the courage and bravery of the Vietnamese army and people, resolute statements by the Soviet Union and other countries in the socialist community in support of the SRV and enraged protests by the peace-loving public throughout the world, the aggressors retreated without attaining a single one of the objectives they had set for themselves when they initiated this invasion of Vietnam. The brutal 30-day war, which was unleashed by the leaders of China against their neighboring socialist country and which left deep wounds in its flesh, has receded into the past. But the Maoists will not forget the lessons they learned from this bloody adventure; they are just as important today as they were then.

Beijing's aggression against Vietnam showed the entire world the extremely dangerous nature of the Chinese leaders' great-power hegemonistic policy. As L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, remarked in his speech to the voters of the Baumanskiy Electoral District of Moscow on 2 March 1979, "now everyone can see that it is precisely this policy that currently represents the most serious threat to peace throughout the world. Now, more than ever before, all of the danger of any kind of encouragement of this policy is obvious."

China's invasion of Vietnam demonstrated the criminal ease with which the Chinese leadership put weapons to work for the sake of its hegemonistic goals, displaying arrogant contempt for the rights of sovereign states and for the future of the world. Not one state or one race can feel secure while the small group ruling China, with its population of 900 million, conducts a policy as irresponsible and adventuristic as this one. This applies above all to the countries of Southeast Asia, a region where more than 20 million "huaqiao" live, a zone which Beijing sees as a "sphere of its own special interests" and of Chinese political influence. China's aggression in Vietnam, as was correctly pointed out, for example, in the statement of the Communist

Party of Indonesia in connection with the events in Indochina, "is a serious lesson and warning to all Asian people, particularly the people in the South-east Asian countries, and an ominous reminder of the threat to our security and sovereignty emanating from Beijing."

When the Chinese leaders undertook their invasion of Vietnam, they took great pains, with the active assistance of Western propaganda, to conceal the true nature and purpose of their criminal actions from the world public and to understate their danger. For this purpose, Beijing first invented a story, according to which the invasion of the SRV by Chinese troops was an operation "limited in terms of time and scope" and intended to "punish" Vietnam for its alleged "border provocations against China." The absurdity of this story was so self-evident that no one took it seriously even in the West. A more "subtle" attempt to falsify the essence of events in Indochina was also made. The situation was described in such a way that it appeared as though the Chinese troops had invaded the SRV for the purpose of "chastising" this country for the assistance it had given to the people of Kampuchea, who had overthrown the reactionary clique of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, and for its "attempted creation of an Indochinese federation." This lie was taken up on a broad scale by the Western mass media, just as another one: Beijing had supposedly decided to teach Vietnam a lesson for falsely considering itself "the strongest military power in Asia" and thereby challenging the strength of China. Finally, there was yet another interpretation of the Maoists' motives: They, according to this variation, wanted to "take revenge" against their neighboring country for its close cooperation with the Soviet Union.

There is no question that it would have been convenient for the Beijing leaders if their actions had been regarded as a reaction to Vietnam's policies, as this would turn the victim of the aggression into the "guilty party," and the aggressor into something just short of a "protector" of the other countries in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

This explanation of the motives for the aggression substantially diminishes the danger of Beijing's policies for Vietnam, for all of Southeast Asia and for the cause of peace throughout the world, since the "punishment" of a sovereign state by force of arms is an action which certainly warrants condemnation from the standpoint of justice and morality, but it can be depicted as some kind of action that is "limited" in terms of time and consequence, as an "episode" in international politics, which recedes into the past when it is over, threatens no one and can therefore be forgotten. It is precisely in this way that the events in Indochina were described by the many news agencies in the West, reflecting, in some cases, the encouraging attitude and, in others, the conciliatory stand of ruling circles in these countries, dictated by their class interests. With this kind of approach to the matter, there is no need to bother to conceal and eventually eradicate the causes of Beijing's peace-endangering criminal actions.

The actual scales of the danger of Beijing's adventure in Indochina are much more significant. They can only be fully estimated if calculations are based

on the real reasons, and not the false ones, for this aggression, and the actual goals, and not the verbally stated ones, pursued by its initiators. For this, it is exceedingly important to remember Beijing's line in relations with Vietnam, the other countries of the Indochinese peninsula and all of Southeast Asia during the period preceding the attack on the SRV.

As the Soviet Government's statement of 18 February 1979 underscored, "Beijing's aggression against Socialist Vietnam is a direct result of the policy of blackmail and pressure conducted for several years by the Chinese authorities in relations with Southeast Asia in general and Vietnam in particular."

The complete departure of the Maoist leaders of China from socialist principles and their transfer to a stand of great-Han chauvinism caused Beijing long ago to center its foreign policy around its ambition for hegemony and, above all, its desire to politically dominate Southeast Asia. This goal was frankly admitted by Mao Zedong, who was already announcing in 1965 that China "must take over Southeast Asia."

Vietnam, as a Southeast Asian state bordering directly on China, turned out to be one of the first objects of the Maoists' expansionist ambitions.

The plan to gain control over Vietnam, just as the other countries of the Indochinese peninsula, and to turn it into an obedient puppet state without any political independence whatsoever, matured in the minds of Chinese ruling circles for many years. "Beijing," said SRV Premier Pham Van Dong, "has long been entertaining great-power hegemonistic plans for our country and other countries in this region."

We know that a map had already been published in 1954 in China, on which Vietnam, along with Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Nepal and numerous other states, were depicted as "parts of Chinese territory which had been taken over by the imperialists." "What is this if it is not proof that these gentlemen inherited the ancient Chinese emperors' dream of world hegemony?" NHAN DAN, the organ of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Communist Party, asked in 1978.

While they awaited the proper moment to put this plan in action, the Maoists made gradual and leisurely attempts to weaken Vietnam and force it to follow in the wake of their policy. This was already quite apparent in Beijing's actions toward Vietnam in the second half of the 1960's, when the Vietnamese people were heroically repulsing the aggression of American imperialism. The policy of the Chinese leadership in Vietnam at that time was two-faced and hypocritical, based on a combination of "the stick and the carrot," of coercion and assistance.

The Beijing leadership made every attempt at that time to isolate the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from the SRV and the other nations of the socialist community, knowing full well that an alliance with them was the most reliable

guarantee of Vietnam's independence and a source of its strength. This was one of the main reasons why the Chinese leaders rejected all Soviet proposals concerning joint undertakings to assist fighting Vietnam and denied the request of the Vietnamese leaders for Chinese participation in the creation of a worldwide front of solidarity with the DRV.

Moving ahead in its betrayal of the interests of the Vietnamese people, Beijing constantly used various means to interfere with shipments of goods sent by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to Vietnam over Chinese territory. Exposing the purpose of the Maoists' policy, SRV Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thau said the following in a NEW YORK TIMES interview in October 1978: The Chinese "wanted the war to go on forever if possible...but mainly, they manipulated shipments to sever our ties with the Soviet Union."

During the war in Indochina, the Beijing leaders made persistent attempts to control the outcome of the Vietnamese issue and, in the final analysis, the future of Vietnam. Proceeding from this desire, Beijing made a great effort in 1971-1973 and later to prevent, by actually conspiring with the United States, the impending victory of the Vietnamese people, to perpetuate the division of Vietnam and to keep the puppet Saigon regime in power in the South of this country. "Maoist China," Xuan Thieu, secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Communist Party, said in an interview in the Cuban magazine VERDE OLIVO, "actually supported the division of Vietnam and did not object to the presence of the United States in Southeast Asia."

While they were trying to isolate and weaken fighting Vietnam, the Beijing leaders were also soliciting the support of the Vietnam Communist Party and its leaders for the "Thought of Mao" and the practical policies of the Maoists, including the notorious "Cultural Revolution." The firm refusal of the Vietnamese communists and people to follow in the wake of Maoist policy aroused increasingly open displeasure in Mao and his closest associates, and they made this clear to the DRV leadership more than once.

The Beijing leaders always believed that one of the major ways of establishing their hegemony in Indochina and gaining control over Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea consisted in sowing dissension between the people in these three countries and dissipating their strength.

Slandorously accusing Vietnam of "regional hegemonism" in its attempts to create an "Indochinese federation," the Chinese leaders, as a NHAN DAN editorial of 2 September 1978 noted, "are ascribing their own fond desires to others." Throughout the three decades of revolutionary struggle waged by the people of Indochina for the independence and freedom of their country, while Vietnam rigorously remained loyal to proletarian internationalism and fought side by side by the people of Laos and Kampuchea against their common enemy, China "remained aloof, verbally proclaiming 'solidarity and support,' but actually continuing its secret maneuvers with the aim of sowing dissension between the three Indochinese countries."

In an explanation of the issue of the so-called Indochinese federation, which has been distorted and misinterpreted in every possible way by the Beijing leaders and by the particular circles in the West that are still entertaining schemes hostile to Vietnam, the organ of the VCP Central Committee reported that the slogan of "turning Indochina into a zone of independence and promoting the creation of an Indochinese federation" was first voiced by the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930 and was based on the exercise of the right of national self-determination. It answered the needs of the specific situation of the 1930's and 1940's and the interests of the struggle then being waged by the people of three countries-- Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. In connection with the changing situation in Indochina and in the world, the Indochinese Communist Party adopted a decision at its second congress in February 1951, initiated by the Vietnamese communists and supported by the communists of Laos and Kampuchea, to dissolve the organization. The Indochinese Communist Party had completely accomplished its historic mission, and the slogan advocating an "Indochinese federation" became a thing of the past.

Both before and after the total liberation of the country in 1975, the Vietnam Communist Party and the Vietnam Government conducted and are conducting a policy aimed at the development of truly egalitarian, friendly relations and cooperation between the people of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea.

"As for the Chinese authorities," NHAT DAN wrote, "do they have enough courage to answer a few questions?" After the agents of American imperialism organized a coup d'etat in Kampuchea in March 1970 for the purpose of putting an end to its independence and neutrality, a conference of summit-level representatives of the Indochinese people was convened in April of the same year for the purpose of uniting their efforts for victory over their common enemy. "But who deliberately compelled them to hold this meeting on Chinese territory and deliberately informed the world public of the specific location-- in Guangzhou? What did they wish to gain from this if not the certainty of the entire world, including American imperialism, that the cause of the three Indochinese countries was being sponsored by Beijing?" When the idea of holding a second summit-level conference of this kind arose in 1977, "who used the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique to prevent this conference from being held and proposed that a 'conference of five countries and six sides' (China, Korea, Laos, Kampuchea and the two zones of Vietnam) be held instead for the purpose of opposing...Japan?! Why were we advised to oppose Japan at a time when American aggressive imperialism was the enemy directly threatening the very future existence of the three countries? What does this attest to if not an intention to divert the struggle of the Indochinese people from the rightful path, prevent the consolidation of their combat solidarity on the basis of the independence and sovereignty of each of them, draw all three Indochinese countries into the Chinese orbit and earn political capital on the blood of the people of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea in a bargain with American imperialism?"

"But the Vietnamese people did not allow themselves to be drawn into the orbit of the Chinese authorities' hegemonism," the newspaper wrote in conclusion. "They adhered faithfully to their correct line of independence, sovereignty and international solidarity and thereby won a complete victory in 1975."

The victory won by the Vietnamese people in 1975, the reunification of Vietnam and the historic fourth VCP congress, which outlined ways of turning the SRV into a mature and prosperous socialist state, dealt an irremediable blow to the hegemonistic plans of the Chinese leadership for this country, the other countries of Indochina and all of Southeast Asia. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam resolutely began to conduct a principled domestic and international policy having nothing in common with Maoist aims, and to strengthen the SRV's cooperation with the nations of the socialist community, the developing states and all other states in the world. Vietnam not only avoided becoming a satellite of China, but also turned into the main obstacle in the way of Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia. Vietnam's substantial prestige and strong positions in the movement for nonalignment, its principled policy, aimed at strengthening the anti-imperialist nature of this movement, and the consolidation of its cooperation with the socialist world, turned the SRV into a serious impediment to Beijing's intrigues in the non-aligned countries as well.

Under these conditions, the Chinese leadership began to exert stronger pressure on Vietnam in 1975. "Soon after the complete victory of the Vietnamese people," a note sent by the SRV Government to the PRC Government on 17 June 1978 states, "the Chinese side began to conduct a policy which was inconsistent with the traditions of friendship and solidarity between the two countries."

The major phases of this policy, which was in the nature of an overt escalation of pressure on the neighboring sovereign state, are now known to all. Beijing began with measures of economic "persuasion": nonrefundable Chinese aid to Vietnam was canceled in 1975; in 1977 China refused to extend credit to the SRV; various types of artificial difficulties began to be invented in projects which were being carried out in Vietnam with technical assistance from the PRC, and there were deliberate delays in the construction and start-up of facilities. In the spring of 1978 China completely severed economic ties with the SRV, recalled all of its specialists and unilaterally canceled all economic agreements.

The Beijing leaders actively used the large Chinese colony in Vietnam to undermine internal political stability in this country. This form of intervention in the internal affairs of the SRV acquired particularly broad scope in the spring of 1978, when Beijing's agents in Vietnam provoked the mass emigration of tens of thousands of "huashiao" to China, accompanied by the launching of a broad-scale anti-Vietnamese propaganda campaign in Beijing.

The Chinese authorities have recently used their armed forces against the SRV on an increasingly broad scale. After China's seizure of the Paracel islands in 1974, although the Vietnamese Government had repeatedly declared that these islands belonged to Vietnam, constant complications took place on the Chinese-Vietnamese border through the fault of the Chinese side: shelling, the infiltration of Vietnamese territory by Chinese armed subunits and groups of civilians to "search the land," the invasion of Vietnam's air space by Chinese planes and the invasion of its territorial waters by Chinese naval ships. In the last months of 1978 and the beginning of 1979, armed provocations by the Chinese authorities on the SRV border were virtually uninterrupted.

The most massive and political diversion the Chinese leaders were able to organize against Vietnam was their instigation of a fight between Vietnam and its neighbor Kampuchea, which was under the control of the pro-Beijing group of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. As a result of continuous violations of the territorial integrity of the SRV by Kampuchean troops in 1975-1978 thousands of Vietnamese citizens were killed or wounded, numerous settlements were devastated and the economy of the nation's southern provinces suffered considerable damage. As Xuan Thieu, secretary of the VCP Central Committee, said in November 1978, "We have to contend with the military situation on the border with Kampuchea and the hostility of the Chinese side on the north. These two problems are actually only one problem, as both of them have been created by Beijing."

In an attempt to conduct a "divide and conquer" policy in Southeast Asia, Beijing began vigorous propaganda and diplomatic activity which was intended to isolate Vietnam in the region and sever its ties with other Southeast Asian countries. By frightening ruling circles in these countries with the mythical danger of "Vietnamese regional hegemonism," the Chinese authorities are trying to divert the attention of political circles and the public in the Southeast Asian countries away from Beijing's own hegemonistic plans.

China's constantly mounting great-power pressure on the SRV imposed serious losses on this nation and delayed the implementation of the program of socialist construction adopted at the fourth VCP congress. But Beijing was not able to weaken Vietnam's determination to adhere to an independent political course or to destroy the unity of the Vietnamese people and their communist party. On the contrary, this brutal Chinese pressure caused the Vietnamese people to rally even more closely around the platform calling for the defense of the sovereignty and independence of their motherland against the inroads of the great-Han chauvinists.

In January of this year, the Beijing hegemonists suffered a new massive defeat in their attempts to infiltrate Indochina. Revolutionary patriotic forces in Kampuchea joined the United Front for National Salvation, created in December 1977, and overthrew the pro-Beijing regime of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. The assistance received by Kampuchean patriots from Vietnam took the form, as SRV Premier Pham Van Dong said in an interview in the Japanese newspaper ASAHI, of a defensive counterattack against Pol Pot's army near the Kampuchean-Vietnamese border.

The liquidation of the anti-people, reactionary regime of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary in Kampuchea deprived China of a tool of subversive activity against Vietnam. At the same time, the Maoists lost their main beachhead in the struggle to gain control over Southeast Asia. Under these conditions, the Chinese leaders completely revealed their hegemonistic schemes by resorting to the force of arms. Preparations for the invasion of the SRV by the Chinese army were accelerated, and the invasion itself followed on 17 February 1979.

The pre-history of this aggression quite definitely and unequivocally points up its purpose and character and leaves no room for any attempts to falsify or beautify the aggressor's intentions. The Chinese attack on the SRV in February 1979, which was a continuation of Beijing's many years of attempted subjugation of Vietnam, as well as of other Indochinese and Southeast Asian countries, was not launched for the attainment of some kind of "limited" goals, but for far-reaching hegemonistic purposes. It was expected to weaken the military and economic potential of Vietnam, undermine its internal stability, frighten and undermine the morale of communists and other people in these countries and force them to submit to China's dictatorial wishes. The aggressor intended to pave the way to Indochina by force of arms and to turn Indochina, and later all of Southeast Asia, into a sphere of Chinese political control.

When the Beijing militarists undertook their invasion of the SRV, they took pains to gain the approval and support of ruling circles in the Western countries, particularly the United States.

As we know, the Chinese troops invaded Vietnam immediately after Deng Xiaoping's trip to the United States of America, during which the visitor from Beijing openly threatened Vietnam. The Washington leaders who received this visitor made no clear-cut objections to Deng's inflammatory statements and thereby actually aided and abetted Beijing in its aggressive plans.

This, however, was not surprising in the least. Just as the rest of Beijing's antisocialist course, its anti-Vietnam policy has always been based on alliance with the imperialists and calculated for their approval, and it has always won their support. From the time of the talks between Chinese leaders and Nixon in Beijing in 1972, when the United States and the PRC made a joint effort to define, and dictate to Vietnam, the terms of Vietnamese settlement--or more precisely, surrender to the aggressor--to the time of Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States in January of this year, when a "mutual understanding" was reached in regard to China's "punitive" campaign against the SRV--this is the lengthy history of the conspiracy between the Chinese leadership and the leaders of the capitalist world for the purpose of weakening and liquidating the stronghold of socialism in Southeast Asia.

Just as in all other cases pertaining to Indochina, Washington, which was trying this time, judging by all indications, to weaken and humiliate Vietnam with the aid of the Beijing warriors, was extremely shortsighted in its

calculations. By encouraging the Beijing militarists in their aggressive plans for Vietnam, U.S. ruling circles essentially abetted a policy which, in the final analysis, represents grave danger for all of the Southeast Asian states, including those belonging to ASEAN. At the same time, it was inevitable that Beijing's attempt to attain its own objectives in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam by force of arms would end in a shameful fiasco, and this is precisely what happened.

By launching a massive invasion of Vietnamese territory along the entire Chinese-Vietnamese border, the Beijing leaders obviously expected to quickly occupy the northern border provinces of the SRV and then use these as a base for hostilities against the vital centers of the republic, including its capital Hanoi.

The fact that the aggressor's troops had advanced no more than 20-40 kilometers into Vietnam after a month of battle, and even this advance was only made in the particular areas where the main forces of the invading army were concentrated (the cities of Lao cai, Caobang and Langshon), was depicted by Beijing and Western propaganda as proof of the "limited nature" of Beijing's plans, proof of Beijing's "restraint." In reality, however, there was no "restraint," just as the final fiasco of Beijing's aggressive designs resulted from the fact that the Maoists' military adventure was resolutely and rigorously repulsed.

From the very beginning, the hostilities in Vietnam took a turn that was not in the aggressor's favor. It immediately became apparent that the Vietnamese troops were superior to the invading forces both from the standpoint of tactical skill and from the standpoint of the quality of their weapons, not to mention their morale and combat efficiency. The Vietnamese people's army, particularly its border troops, and the militia were able to effectively oppose the plans of their opponents and resist their onslaught while simultaneously imposing heavy personnel and equipment losses on them. According to data published in the SRV, the Chinese aggressors lost 27,000 soldiers, around 200 tanks and large quantities of other military equipment just in the period between 17 February and 2 March. Although the invading troops ultimately numbered a total of 25 divisions, they essentially got stuck and were unable to advance. The aggressors did not realize their plan of seizing Langshon before the beginning of March, although they had initially intended to simply take it "on the march."

One extremely important factor contributing to the failure of the Beijing adventurers' military sortie against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was the strong support given to the just struggle of the Vietnamese people against the aggressor by progressive and peace-loving forces throughout the world.

The aggressive actions of China and the attempts of imperialist circles in the West to take the aggressor under their protection were immediately opposed by energetic and purposeful statements by the governments, public organizations, diplomats and the mass media in the nations of the socialist community, aimed

at exposing the criminal actions of the Maoists against the SRV and at resolute support for the just cause of Vietnam. In a declaration issued by the Soviet Government on 18 February 1979 and in statements by the Soviet leaders, the invasion of Vietnam by Chinese troops was precisely described as aggression against an independent and sovereign country, as an action contradicting the principles of the United Nations and as an outright violation of international law. The Soviet Government, underscoring the peace-endangering nature of these actions by the Chinese expansionists, directed the attention of all governments and all honorable people in the world to the need for decisive condemnation of the Chinese aggression and a demand for its immediate cessation.

The timely and well-substantiated statements by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries against China's aggression in Vietnam contributed to the worldwide wave of protest against the actions of the Chinese expansionists and the broad "Hands Off Vietnam!" movement. The most resolute and energetic statements in support of the victims of Chinese aggression were voiced by communists and workers parties in many countries of the world. Many national and international democratic and pacifist organizations, as well as political figures and the governments of several Asian and African states, condemned the Chinese aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The widespread protest movement against the Beijing rulers' venture into Socialist Vietnam demonstrated that Beijing would have to pay for its criminal actions by enduring more pronounced isolation in the international arena and further self-exposure in the eyes of the world public.

The Chinese leaders had to listen to the serious warnings of the Soviet Union, which firmly declared that it would fulfill its obligations in accordance with the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation.

A particularly significant statement in support of Vietnam was made by L. I. Brezhnev in his speech to the voters of the Baumanskiy Electoral District of Moscow on 2 March 1979: "The Soviet people, along with all other peace-loving people in the world, demand the immediate cessation of Chinese aggression against Vietnam and the withdrawal of all intervention troops, down to the last soldier, from Vietnamese territory," L. I. Brezhnev said. "Our friendship with fraternal Vietnam has been tested in action for many years. Today, in this hour of difficulty for the Vietnamese people, we are totally and completely in sympathy with them. No one should have any doubt that the Soviet Union will be loyal to the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation linking our countries."

The necessary aid moved continuously from the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, guaranteeing reliable defense for the nation, the uninterrupted supply of the army and population and the non-stop operation of industrial enterprises and the transport network.

The steadfast defense of the Vietnamese troops and the firm support of Vietnam by the Soviet Union, other nations of the socialist community and the peace-loving public throughout the world wrecked Beijing's plans. The war unleashed

by the Beijing ruling clique against this neighboring socialist country even aroused protests in China itself, which were reflected, in particular, in the appearance of "dazibao" with an antiwar content in the Chinese capital.

On 5 March 1979, the Chinese leadership had to announce that it would begin withdrawing its troops from Vietnam. By the end of March, the aggressor's main subunits had retreated beyond the Vietnamese-Chinese border.

The Chinese leaders suffered a massive military and political defeat in Vietnam and ended up further away from their goals than prior to the commencement of the aggression. As the American WALL STREET JOURNAL put it, "China came out of the war with a spoiled reputation and a broken nose."

The Vietnamese people, united around the Vietnam Communist Party, are still thoroughly determined to defend their independence and socialist conquests to the end, backed up by close unity and cooperation with the Soviet Union and by friendship and a combat alliance with fraternal countries in Indochina--Laos and Kampuchea. Beijing's insolent actions have strengthened the resolve of the three countries of the Indochinese peninsula to oppose the hegemonistic policy of the Maoists hand in hand. Vivid proof of this could be seen in the signing of the Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea, which, just as the treaty on friendship and cooperation concluded earlier by the SRV and Laos, has become a symbol of the international solidarity and close relations of these sovereign Indochinese states.

This also marked the failure of the schemes of the circles in the West that had linked the Indochinese adventure of the Beijing militarists with their own mercenary calculations, including the hope that a conflict in Indochina and the "involvement" of the Soviet Union in this conflict would undermine the policy of international detente.

Demonstrating good will and a desire for lasting peace in Southeast Asia, the SRV Government expressed its willingness to begin negotiations with China for the establishment of a stable border, the preservation of peace and the restoration of normal relations between the two countries, and it made a number of constructive proposals, aimed at the attainment of these objectives, at these talks, which began in Hanoi in the middle of April. At the same time, it called upon the people and army of Vietnam to maintain vigilance and a high level of combat readiness. "The Chinese reactionary clique has the habit of resorting to deception and fraud after each defeat," reported NHAN DAN on 21 March 1979. "We remember this well. We have won a victory, but the danger of aggression is still serious."

Despite the declarations of Chinese ruling circles in regard to the complete withdrawal of their troops, the Chinese army is still holding on to a number of points and regions in the SRV; Beijing is still concentrating large military forces on the Vietnamese-Chinese and the Lao-Chinese borders. Armed provocations by the Chinese side against Vietnam are unceasing; the Beijing

leaders are again making threatening statements about Vietnam. At the same time, the Chinese delegation at the Hanoi talks is taking every opportunity to avoid constructive dialog. It has refused to discuss proposals made by the Vietnamese delegation and has set forth its own "principles of settlement," which cannot be interpreted as anything less than an ultimatum by the SRV Government. According to the Chinese delegation's demands, Vietnam must pay for the "normalization" of relations with China by renouncing its independent foreign policy, involving itself in the "antihegemonistic"--but, actually, antisocialist--course of the Chinese leadership, betraying its friendship with the Lao-Kampuchean people and giving up part of its territory to the Beijing expansionists. These absurd and impudent demands demonstrate Beijing's intention to make use of the Hanoi talks for the continuous exertion of great-power pressure on Socialist Vietnam and for the attainment of the same goals the Chinese hegemonists were unable to attain by means of aggressive war against the SRV. It is understandable that the Vietnamese Government rejected the Chinese ultimatum and agreed to discuss only the proposals that actually might aid in the just regulation of relations between the two countries.

The facts indicate that Beijing is not only obviously unwilling to agree to any just resolution of issues in relations between China and Vietnam and to take measures to normalize the situation, but it is also not giving up its plans for the further escalation of tension in regions bordering on the SRV and the LPDR as a means of exerting pressure on its Indochinese neighbors. This policy could result in a new and serious exacerbation of the state of affairs in this part of the world.

Under these conditions, the main lesson of the Chinese aggression in Vietnam will retain all of its strength: As long as the people in power in Beijing can move so easily and irresponsibly from the policy of blackmail to the commencement of hostilities and can cross the fatal line separating peace from war, any toleration of their policy will be extremely dangerous. Until the Beijing leadership has renounced its policy of hegemonism and its attempts to place its neighboring states under its dictatorial command, the interests of lasting peace and public security and the safeguarding of sovereign rights and independence will require the highest degree of vigilance in regard to all future schemes and plans of the Chinese leaders and the resolute repulsion of all of their new adventures.

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POLICY LINE HOSTILE TO PEACE AND SOCIALISM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 13-25

[Text] The development of events in China lately shows that the Beijing elite's policy is becoming increasingly dangerous, aggressive and proimperialist. This is graphically confirmed by the policy line pursued by the present Chinese leadership both inside the country and in the international arena. Alining itself with the most reactionary imperialist circles, Beijing is displaying more and more overtly its desire to wreck the relaxation of international tension and plunge the world into the abyss of another world war. This policy of the Maoists has been displayed in its most concentrated form in the unleashing of armed aggression against Vietnam. By attacking Socialist Vietnam, the Chinese leaders have shown once again that they are playing an irresponsible game with the fate of peace.*

The question of the present situation in China and the particular features of the Beijing leadership's foreign and domestic policy line were the subject of another discussion at the PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA editorial offices in which Sinologists from the Soviet Union and a number of socialist countries participated.

An account of the most essential problems of modern China which expresses the agreed viewpoint of the participants in the "roundtable" is provided below.

Question: How can the domestic political situation in the PRC at the present time be characterized?

Answer: The domestic policy line of the present Chinese leadership is entirely geared to solving the task of creating by the end of the present

* For more detail on this issue see the article "Lessons of Beijing's Adventure In Vietnam."

century the domestic preconditions for direct implementation of Maoism's global hegemonist aims. Amendments are being made to certain Maoist theses in the quest for more efficient ways and means of administering the country. Maoism is being adapted to the particularly acute demands of the stabilization of the regime and the implementation of the so-called "four modernizations." This "updating" of Maoism through which the present Chinese leadership is seeking to create new scope for its activity is being implemented by the leadership, so to speak, via a transition from the pseudo-leftwing orthodox Maoism of the "Cultural Revolution" period to an undisguisedly rightwing, extremely pragmatic Maoism. This rightwing Maoism is defined by Deng Xiaoping's motto: "It does not matter whether a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice." It does not disdain any means so long as they help to achieve hegemonist goals. This turnabout from pseudoleftwing positions to extreme rightwing positions reveals in a new way the antiscientific nature and invalidity of Maoism.

The transition from the extremely orthodox version of Maoism to the "modernized" version is exacerbating the struggle within the Chinese leadership and is causing new crisis situations in the country. A new differentiation and polarization of political forces is taking place within the PRC. The Beijing leadership's pragmatic policy line is intensifying not only the intrinsic contradictoriness of Maoism, but also the ideological confusion and differentiation among China's leading cadres and working people's mass. Along with the fundamental unresolved contradictions, new social differentiations are emerging. Let us cite a few examples. The 170 million young people aged 14 to 25 have no clear future. Some of the "educated young people" continue to be sent to rural localities. As a result of the introduction of new admission examinations, young workers and rural young people have almost no chance of entering a university compared with the children of the intelligentsia. It is estimated that there are about 400 million illiterates and semiliterates in China. There is a shortage of cadres with formal economic education. The political and ideological uncertainty among cadre personnel has not only not been surmounted but is even intensifying somewhat as a result of the outstanding issues of the assessment of the "Cultural Revolution," the "three red banners" policy and so forth.

Question: How should the present Chinese leadership's economic policy be assessed: Does it take the Chinese working people's material interests into account?

Answer: The Chinese leadership has mapped out a number of measures aimed at restoring the principles of national economic planning to a certain extent. It states that it intends to strengthen state and collective ownership and advance the process of production socialization. The Beijing elite is making certain adjustments in the field of distribution and is issuing instructions aimed at asserting the principle of payment according to labor. The present leadership expatiates on the need for economic incentives for enterprises and working people in the interests of production development.

Upcoming changes in prices policy and the implementation of wage reform have been announced. Instructions to increase production of marketable output by any means have been issued. An extensive discussion of economic laws and their utilization is under way in the social sciences sphere. Does all this mean that the present Chinese leadership is ready and about to align its economic course with the requirements of objective economic laws?

An analysis of economic policy and practice shows that although certain changes are being made to economic policy its essence and objectives remain unchanged. The Chinese leadership's entire activity is centered on building up military-economic potential in the interests of implementing great-power chauvinist objectives. In this connection the consolidation of the regime's material base for the intensive development of production under the flag of anti-Sovietism, the militarization of the country and preparation for a new war is envisaged.

The present Chinese leadership is attempting to realize its great-power chauvinist, anti-Soviet and antisocialist plans with the aid of a "position of strength" policy. Preparation for war forms the basis of all economic planning. Thus an editorial in the journal HONGQI devoted to the 29th anniversary of the PRC's formation states: "We must see to it that we are ready for the war in every aspect before it begins. The best and fullest preparation is the implementation of the four modernizations." And Defense Minister Xu Xiangqian has demanded that the entire country be transformed into a military camp, stating: "In modern warfare there is no distinction between the front and the rear.... It is therefore essential to transform the deep rear into a strategic base capable of insuring supplies in the course of a protracted war and of conducting military operations independently." The point of departure for the Chinese leaders' policy, therefore, is not the fundamental law of socialism but an aspiration to utilize the "four modernizations" to transform China into a power capable of exerting a dominant influence in the world.

The certain adjustments which the Chinese leadership is currently making to its policy are no more than an enforced measure since the Maoist economic course of the last 20 years has proved incapable of insuring the stable and rapid development of military-industrial potential and has fundamentally disrupted the entire production and reproduction process. The contradiction between Maoist policy and the working people's interests exacerbated to such an extent that it began to seriously inhibit production development. The gap between the PRC and industrially developed states increased even more, calling into question the realization of Maoism's global objectives.

In our view, the current Chinese leadership's new-look economic policy contains three fundamental elements. The first is the modernization of the machinery of Maoist economic policy and the more efficient utilization of existing state and collective property in the interests of the accelerated development of China's present day military-industrial potential. This is the ultimate objective of all the steps to strengthen economic planning and

leadership in the fields of production, exchange, distribution and consumption. It is characteristic, however, that the Chinese leadership, while avoiding mention of the fundamental economic law of socialism, at the same time points intensively but--from a class viewpoint--extremely uncommittedly to other economic laws such as the law of the planned proportional development of the economy, the law of cost and the law of payment according to labor.

The second element in this new look is the manifestation of a pragmatic trend. On the one hand this is reflected in the fetishization of production forces reminiscent of bourgeois concepts and on the other in the outright rejection of the experience of the USSR and the other socialist countries (not counting a lively interest in the Yugoslav self-management system) in the field of planning, leadership and economic incentives. This trend is manifested in an intensifying desire to imitate the experience of the major imperialist monopolies in the organization and management of production.

Finally, the third element in this new look comprises the compromises the Chinese leadership is making implementing its socioeconomic policy. These include primarily the measures aimed at improving the working people's material living conditions to some extent and allocating individual private plots to the peasants.

The Chinese leadership's concessions, which are linked with consideration of the working people's material interests, are intended primarily to boost their production activity again. Thus RENMIN RIBAO's special commentator writes. "If we fail to solve this problem correctly it will have an unfavorable impact on the production activities of the working masses, which will complicate the implementation of the 'four modernizations.'" At least a section of the Chinese leadership has in all possibility come to the conclusion that a corresponding improvement in the conditions for the reproduction of the work force and also the grading of working people by skill [kvalifikatsiya trudyashchikhaya] constitute essential preconditions for the implementation of the "four modernizations" program. At the same time, available information shows that the Chinese leadership, while making concessions to the peasantry, for example, has not as yet abandoned the Maoist concept of people's communes.

An acute and multilevel struggle around the new look economic policy is raging both within the leadership and among the public. There are substantial differences between what is being discussed at a theoretical level and what is frequently recorded in central directives and economic practice. Thus, for example, the introduction of bonuses is still in the experimental stage, while payment according to labor is still being discussed.

It can already be noted that the modification of economic policy is not promoting the resolution of the contradiction between Maoist policy and the objective requirements of the consolidation and further development of socialist elements in the economic infrastructure and the class structure. On the contrary, there is a threat that these elements will be further weakened.

Question: The end of last year and the early months of this year were marked by considerable unrest among Chinese working people. What can be said on this?

Answer: The upsurge of discontent among broad masses of the Chinese people results from the imposition of ways which existed under Mao Zedong and which have been preserved in their main features by the current Chinese leaders.

Recent events in China, including both the "poster campaign" and the peasant demonstrations in Beijing, bear witness to the buildup among the people of a very strong sense of dissatisfaction, one manifestation of which was the unrest of April 1976. The poster writers raised questions which hit not only at Mao Zedong and certain current Beijing leaders, but also at the regime itself. This is evidenced by the posters' description of the system and ways existing in China as "feudal-fascist," "counter-revolutionary," "barbaric" and "draconian."

The posters voiced demands for the democratization of the country's life, the safeguarding of human rights, the observance of legality, a revision of the results of the "Cultural Revolution" and Mao Zedong's historical role, a return to the decisions of the Eighth CCP Congress and so forth. These demands showed the spontaneous anti-Maoist trend, which as yet has not developed into an organized movement but is exerting a certain influence on the entire situation in the country and is eroding to a certain extent the pillars of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship.

The reaction of the Chinese leaders--Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping--to the November wave of posters also testifies that the elite had not anticipated that things would go this far. The publication in RENMIN RIBAO of the texts of interviews given to foreigners by Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian was an extraordinary event for China. Their statements placed the emphasis on calls for "unity and cohesion," condemned critical assessments of Mao Zedong's activity and pointed out the need to defend Mao himself and his "thoughts." Deng Xiaoping forthrightly stressed that "the CCP Central Committee is opposed to criticism of Mao Zedong." This was followed by the appearance of reports on official CCP Central Committee instructions on the inadmissibility of criticism of Mao. Meetings began to be held in Beijing at which the population was told not to put up posters criticizing the country's leaders, to stop demonstrations demanding democratic procedures and put an end to unauthorized contacts with foreigners. The press began to stress the need to "protect and defend unity and cohesion."

All this shows that the Beijing rulers, after "releasing" the pressure of popular discontent to some extent, are tightening down the valve again. They obviously intend to continue to basically preserve the features of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship established by Mao Zedong.

Question: What changes have occurred or are occurring in the apparatus of power and the ideological field?

Answer: Further changes have also occurred in the Maoist regime's power apparatus this year.

The CCP has been activated in the political organization system of society. Organs within the system of local assemblies of people's representatives and the people's political consultative council and judicial organs are being restored. All-China congresses of trade unions, the Communist Youth League and the all-China Women's Federation have also been held recently. Extensive new and diverse events are taking place in scientific and cultural life under the Maoist slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend," which is back in use again.

Do these changes mean that the military-bureaucratic dictatorship is being curtailed and the Maoist regime is being liberalized? Irrespective of how far-reaching the adjustments in individual areas of the superstructure may be (in the field of education and culture, for example), the essence and structure of military-bureaucratic power remain.

Even under the Constitution the army remains both the bulwark of this regime and, despite the purges taking place in it, the most organized and influential force in the country. The apparatus of coercion, including legal bodies, is continuing to expand and strengthen. It is called upon to suppress the multifaceted opposition to the regime. At the same time attempts are being made to combat the increased level of crime and widespread gangsterism (particularly among unemployed young people) and to subordinate the whole of society to fierce control. To this end the so-called "People's Militia" is being reorganized and mobilized. The militia is directly subordinate to the army and thereby augments the contingents of armed forces. At an all-China conference devoted to the work of the "People's Militia" Deputy Chief of General Staff Yang Yong stated "The People's Militia must not only prepare actively for war and is not only the main production force, it is also actively utilized as an instrument for the protection of public order, the suppression of 'sabotage activity by class enemies' and for the strengthening of the present authority."

The present leadership is attempting to give a "democratic" image to the measures to insure the army's leading role and expand the apparatus of coercion. But even the most rabid anticommunists among bourgeois journalists like, for example, (G. Kremp) have concluded that no liberalization of the regime is occurring.

The changes taking place in the apparatus of power are expressed primarily in the expansion and greater sophistication of the system for the political organization of society. The reactionary content of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship is also manifested to an increasing extent at this time in the abuse of certain forms which had previously justified themselves during the period of popular democratic power in the PRC.

These processes are characterized by the development of the Maoist Party. The present Chinese leadership is attempting to boost the party's role as the main ideological-political instrument for asserting its course. Local party organs are being reorganized and mobilized within the framework of the continuing campaign of purging and imposing order. In 1978 party conferences were held at the country and district level in a number of provinces and new party schools were opened. There have been reports of local party committee plenums.

But at the same time it is becoming obvious that leading party figures in a number of provinces are failing to implement, for example, instructions from the center in the field of agricultural policy and policy toward the intelligentsia and, under the influence of orthodox Maoism, are frequently continuing to resist the 11th CP congress' policy line. It has also become clear that representatives of pragmatic rightwing Maoism in the present Chinese leadership have also managed to broaden their positions at the level of the local party apparatus. The very spread of this trend in the party apparatus testifies that the present CCP's petit bourgeois chauvinist essence has not changed in any way.

The same tendency can also be observed in the ideological field, although the processes here are even more contradictory, complex and long-term. This trend is to be found in the social sciences, which have resumed their activity.

The social clashes and theoretical discussions which have occurred and are occurring do not conceal the decisive reason for the profound contradictions and conflicts of present-day Chinese society. These stem from petit bourgeois peasant nationalism and complete dissociation from real socialism. Their point of departure remains the implementation of Maoism's great-power chauvinist objectives. Thus the inevitable need to abandon the practice of pseudoleftwing Maoism is leading to the emergence of its other extreme. A trend toward the codification [oformleniye] of a rightwing-pragmatic Maoist ideology and philosophy has now been observed: Mao's personality is being relativized, a number of Maoist postulates are being abandoned and Maoism as a whole is being noticeably adapted to the demands of the present course.

It is also becoming obvious that the great malleability [manevrennost] of this ideology is giving rise to new contradictions, and renewed differentiation even among the Maoist forces represented in the present Chinese leadership. This is manifested particularly today in the question of the specific correlation between Maoism and objective reality in the interests of maximizing the effectiveness of the great-power chauvinist policy. A process of delineation is currently occurring between the forces inclined toward economism and hence toward a certain de-ideologization of Maoist policy and the forces which, under the slogan of Maoist "class struggle," wish to build up military-industrial potential as the "main element." The debate currently under way over "practice" as the "sole criterion of truth" is possibly a reflection of further headway being made by the rightwing forces and the start of a new phase in this confrontation.

This course of development and the course aimed at the extensive nationalist mobilization of all suitable forces--including the foreign bourgeoisie--to develop cooperation with imperialism at an accelerated rate on the basis of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism in the economic, scientific and cultural fields, and also the field of education, scientific and cultural fields, and also the field of education, objectively provide unprecedentedly broad scope for bourgeois ideology.

Question: With the coming to power of the present leaders in China bourgeois sinologists and propagandists have been intensively developing the thesis of a "de-Maoization" process allegedly occurring in the PRC. What can be said on this?

Answer: Under pressure from the Deng Xiaoping group substantial steps have been taken to "modernize" Maoism and give it a more presentable image. The aim of this adjustment is to remove the ideological restrictions preventing the full development of pragmatism. The previous practice of treating Maoism as a religion is already being condemned and cult worship of Mao has been liquidated. However, the changes do not affect the essence of Maoism--the distorted class views alien to Marxism, the great-Han chauvinism, the anti-Sovietism. Moreover, the new interpretation of individual theses directly serves the ideological justification of the shameless allying of Maoism with imperialism.

Thus, we adhere immutably to the view that there is no reason to talk about de-Maoization. In our assessment, the process which is occurring merits attention for two reasons: First, it is aimed at making the system of Maoist ideas more viable; second, because of the lack of a unified approach to the current adjustments to Maoist policy this process could lead to further fragmentation on a society-wide scale and to ideological delimitation and possibly a new crisis in the leadership, which would provide yet more evidence of the total contradiction between the interests of the working masses and the policy of the entire current Chinese leadership.

The confused nature of the ideological situation, the lack of unity and the exacerbation of contradictions are closely linked with the fact that the leadership has proved incapable of carrying out a "general ordering of the party," despite proclaiming this to be its first-priority task. The paramount organized political force and decisive factor continues to be the army, the struggle for whose support and control continues.

Question: It is well known that the present Chinese leaders devote accentuated attention to the development of science. What influence might this campaign exert on the political situation in China?

Answer: The political aspects of the activation of Chinese science and the higher education system are among the most graphic manifestations of the Maoist domestic political course which China has been following for over 10 years now. The numerous educational reforms and mass persecutions of

figures active in science led to a situation in which a new scientific intelligentsia virtually did not emerge in China. The result of this situation has been that the nucleus of the re-emerging system of science and higher education is made up of people aged between 70 and 80. The vast majority are graduates, research fellows and often even former teachers from American or West European universities and scientific research centers. The curriculum vitae of many currently active and influential Chinese scientists records protracted periods of work in U.S. military research institutes. For example, former U.S. Army Colonel Professor Qian Xuesen, a CCP Central Committee member since 1969, was one of the creators of the Chinese atom bomb.

The complexion of the emerging science and higher education system is strongly, if not decisively, influenced by a group of intellectuals which once supported PRC policy on purely nationalist grounds. This is a group with a clear pro-Western orientation which wants to expand contacts with scientific centers in the United States and other developed capitalist countries. The socioideological complexion of the scientific milieu indicates that it will be striving to implant in the masses' consciousness some forms or other of Chinese nationalism, Sinocentrism and great-power chauvinism. Moreover, it will be combining this content with modern bourgeois ideology. This is a real and very serious danger. In short, the current situation in Chinese science shows us quite clearly the danger of a further rightward evolution in China. This kind of threat must be realistically contemplated and taken into consideration.

Question: A manifest intensification of PRC foreign policy activity has been observed recently. In general, how can Beijing's international activity at the present stage be described?

Answer: Chinese foreign policy is contributing qualitatively new and profoundly negative factors to the development of international relations. This refers not simply to the continuation of the previous Maoist course but to the growing intensification in its most reactionary and chauvinistic features--a process combined with even greater flexibility and even more sophisticated demagoguery. There has been a sharp rightward shift in the Beijing leadership's policy. As is shown by leading Chinese figures' visits abroad, which have become more frequent in recent months, their activeness in the international arena has increased sharply and encompasses all parts of the world. There is no doubt that it is possible to speak quite justifiably about the Chinese leadership's "global antisocialist course" and about attempts to form a "global strategic alliance" with imperialism, primarily U.S. imperialism. This planned development of the interaction between imperialist and Chinese policy is becoming increasingly visible in all parts of the world.

It is clear from all this that the foreign policy activeness of Mao Zedong's successors, like their domestic policy, wholly and completely serves only the buildup of China's might. This intensified foreign policy activity matches the strategy of the accelerated development of China's economic and military potential. It would be shortsighted and dangerous to regard this

activeness as a propaganda maneuver or as an appeal for mobilization which can yield results only in the distant future. The West is spreading slanderous fabrications about the so-called "Soviet threat" and at the same time is not only voicing the legitimacy of the military strengthening of China but is also meeting halfway Beijing's requests for military-scientific and military-technical aid. Thus, not so long ago—on 2 December 1978 to be precise—former U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger, while urging caution in "playing the Chinese card," nevertheless expressed himself unequivocally in favor of "the strengthening of China's defense might" in a report to the Aspen Institute in West Berlin. The thesis of gaining time disseminated by the Chinese leaders themselves must also be approached very cautiously.

There is no doubt that the Chinese leaders' strategy, which corresponds to their Sinocentrist traditions, is a "long haul" strategy. The desire to gain the maximum amount of time before the end of our century because of the poor material backup for their great-power ambitions is dictated by the real state of affairs. But even now the Chinese leadership is already attempting to exploit the complex processes of the worldwide class confrontation between socialism and imperialism to strengthen its international position to the maximum.

The inflammatory policy of provoking an armed clash between the socialist and imperialist countries, and primarily between the USSR and the United States, rejecting all constructive steps in the direction of disarmament and carrying out provocative maneuvers in order to fuel tension and ignite hotbeds of international conflict—both new and incipient—continues unchanged. This is also served by the notorious thesis of the fatal inevitability of a new world war. All this testifies that the current Chinese leaders are continuing to adhere to Mao Zedong's precepts on "building a new world on the ruins of the old."

Question: What can be said about the present stage of interstate ties between the USSR and the PRC?

Answer: The Chinese leaders expatiate incessantly about the Soviet Union's allegedly hostile attitude to the PRC. "This is slander designed for simpletons," L. I. Brezhnev said. "No sensible person could see why the Soviet Union should want to quarrel with China rather than count the PRC among its friends and allies."

The Soviet Union has always advocated the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations. However, it must now be clear to everyone that an equitable approach to this question is not to the Chinese leaders' taste. They are only interested in the great-power objective of securing Chinese supremacy over everyone everywhere. For the sake of this they are prepared to cooperate with the most reactionary forces of imperialism, counting on thereby increasing their military-economic potential as rapidly as possible and securing the possibility of future expansion.

Nevertheless, a question still sometimes posed is: Has the Soviet Union done everything to improve relations between the USSR and the PRC?

In this connection it can be recalled once again that the Soviet Union has persistently and consistently advocated and continues to advocate the normalization of relations with China. On the Soviet Union's initiative Soviet-Chinese talks on a border settlement were begun in 1969 and have not been completed to this day. It is not the Soviet Union's fault that they are not yielding results. The talks have dragged on because of the Chinese side's obstructionist position. A Soviet delegation headed by a USSR deputy foreign minister has been in Beijing for months, but no constructive proposals have been submitted to it from the Chinese side.

In 1970 and 1973 the Soviet side submitted proposals on holding new meetings between Soviet and Chinese leaders at any level—including the highest—to discuss questions linked with the normalization of relations between the USSR and the PRC. The Soviet Union proposed to China the conclusion of a treaty on the nonuse of force in relations between the two countries (1971) and a nonaggression treaty (1973), and has submitted specific proposals on expanding trade and so forth. However, all Soviet proposals have been rejected.

To improve the atmosphere in relations between the two countries the Soviet Union has repeatedly submitted proposals on ending overt polemics. Chinese propaganda has not only failed to follow the USSR's example or reciprocate but, on the contrary, has intensified its slander campaign and hostile attacks against the Soviet Union.

Beijing even crudely rejected such an important initiative as the 24 February 1978 USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium appeal to the all-Chinese people's congress, which contained a proposal on holding talks with a view to formulating the text of a joint statement on the principles governing mutual relations between the USSR and the PRC on the basis of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect for sovereignty and territory integrity and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

The Soviet Union's statements on its readiness to normalize relations with the PRC, including on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, and also its practical actions to achieve this objective over many years have not met with the slightest positive response from the Chinese side. On 3 April 1979 the PRC announced its decision not to extend the 1950 friendship alliance and mutual aid treaty between the USSR and the PRC.

Question: What place does the notorious "three worlds theory" now occupy in Beijing's foreign policy doctrine?

Answer: Since the present Chinese leadership came to power the "three worlds theory" has been intensively expounded in official Beijing pronouncements and propaganda statements. The publication of the editorial "Chairman

Mao Zedong's Three Worlds Theory Is a Great Contribution to Marxism-Leninism" in RENMIN RIBAO in November 1977 merits attention in this respect. This manifestly anti-Marxist article constitutes the "ideological theoretical base" of the Beijing leaders' great-power policy and reflects a true picture of their intentions, arguments and aspirations and their chauvinist and hegemonistic line, which signifies the further militarization of China and an aspiration to poison the atmosphere of international relations and provoke a new world war.

Beijing's "three worlds theory" also has to be examined in this context. It reflects the Chinese leaders' Sinocentrist view of the world. This theory originates in Mao Zedong's attempts in the 1940's to place China in a special position between the two systems, enabling it to rise to the position of a power dominating the entire world. But since these plans were not destined to come to fruition at that time and developments followed a different course, another path was chosen--achieving this objective with the aid of a temporary alliance with the USSR. The results of this policy are common knowledge.

Now that world socialism, relying primarily on the might and influence of the USSR, is increasingly determining the course of history, it has become the main obstacle to the implementation of Beijing's plans for world domination. The Chinese leaders, who think in terms of political domination, have been compelled to acknowledge that world socialism is a force in the ascendancy in comparison with imperialism.

Therefore the main idea of the "three worlds theory" in accordance with the Maoist strategic precept on inflicting "the main strike on the main enemy" boils down to creating a unified world anti-Soviet front. The "Third World," the "Second World" and even the "First World" in the shape of the United States are being selected as allies in achieving these objectives. Contrary to its own theory--in accordance with which the "Third World" is the "main force in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism"--Beijing in practice now prefers imperialism, that is, the "Second World," as its ally. But this contradiction is illusory since it is a question of building up the might of China, which is allegedly "a component part of the Third World." Herein lies the reason why the Chinese leadership joins imperialism in opposing solidarity between world socialism and the forces of the national liberation movements striving in their individual countries for progressive development and occupying anti-imperialist position. Moreover, in pursuing this policy the Chinese leaders are encouraging these forces into the arms of neocolonialism since they regard the latter as less dangerous to their ambitions than an alliance with socialism. This also explains their increased interest in the nonaligned movement and their rabid attacks on those states which uphold socialism's interests within this movement.

However, Beijing's alliance with imperialism has been proceeding so rapidly recently that the Chinese leaders have temporarily muted their propaganda of the "three worlds theory." The Maoists evidently intend to make some adjustments to it and to adapt the "three worlds theory" as far as possible to the tasks of their present course.

Question: It is well known that the African Continent has long been one of the main objects of Beijing's attention. How have the PRC's relations with African countries been developing recently?

Answer: A characteristic feature of Beijing's policy in African countries is China's active support for actions by imperialism and other reactionaries in their desire to isolate the African countries from their natural allies and create on the African Continent an atmosphere of conflict propitious, as the Chinese leadership sees it, for achieving its great power objectives and causing the maximum harm to the forces of socialism and the national liberation movement.

When receiving African delegations in Beijing or visiting Africa the Chinese leaders have attempted to foist their course toward the socialist countries on the Africans, "advised" them to strengthen their ties with the West and striven to call into question the need to hold the Sixth Conference of Heads of States and Government of the Nonaligned Countries in Havana and to put a stop to the growth of criticism of Beijing's African policy. However, the results of the visits showed that the overwhelming majority of African politicians disagreed with the Chinese leadership's views and their interpretation of events in Africa, be it in the Horn of Africa, Angola or the south of the continent. This attitude on the part of African politicians has compelled the Chinese leaders to avoid rude anti-Soviet attacks during their tours of Africa.

At the same time the Chinese leadership has intensified its counterrevolutionary course in Africa and has engaged in further complicity with imperialism in the struggle against the national liberation movement. The Soviet Government statement of 23 June 1978 states: "The Beijing leadership, along with NATO and South Africa, is an active accomplice in fueling tension in Africa. It has joined forces with imperialism and the forces of aggression, reaction, neocolonialism and racism and has thereby placed itself in the ranks of the opponents of not only the socialist countries but also the entire national liberation movement, the unity of the African peoples and the African countries' struggle for independence and freedom and against imperialist domination."

During a visit to the PRC in May 1978 Z. Brzezinski, assistant to the U.S. President for national security affairs, demanded more vigorous action by Beijing in Africa. In response Deng Xiaoping assured the United States that China would do "everything it can to resist Soviet policy in Africa." Deng Xiaoping also expressed dissatisfaction with the "insufficiently resolute" U.S. reaction to events in Africa.

Pursuing a line of practice coordinated with the United States, the Chinese leadership pursued a hostile course toward Angola. Beijing not only attempted to depict the subversive actions of the proimperialist UNITA organization, which enjoys the full support of the Pretoria racists, as some kind of just struggle but also supplied this organization with various weapons. This

policy by the Chinese leaders was resolutely condemned in the Angolan-Vietnamese joint communique on 7 October 1978, which stated that the Chinese authorities, "in alliance with the most reactionary forces of imperialism, are committing aggression and maneuvers...threatening peace and security in Southeast Asia and Africa and throughout the world."

And a declaration by the International Conference for Solidarity with the African and Arab Peoples' Struggle Against Imperialism and Reaction (the conference was held in Addis Ababa in September 1978 with representatives of over 130 organizations from more than 100 countries participating) noted that the conference participants drew after 'on with indignation to the Chinese leaders' cooperation with reactionary imperialist and fascist regimes and condemned their complicity in the aggression against Angola and Ethiopia. Sharp condemnation of Beijing's policy in Africa was contained in the statement of the 1st Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties of Tropical and Southern Africa. Throughout the year such criticism was also leveled by various public organizations in African countries and the continent's press.

While professing to be the friends of the African peoples and opponents of racist regimes the Chinese leaders have at the same time attempted to depict the very existence of the Pretoria and Salisbury regimes as a consequence of the policy pursued by...the USSR and to direct Africa's struggle against the socialist countries. Beijing essentially approved the Anglo-American plan for Rhodesia, supported the Western states' "initiatives" on Namibia and traded with South Africa. According to a report in the New York TIMES of 20 December 1978 there was "mutual understanding" between Beijing and Washington on the problems of southern Africa and Washington had requested the Chinese leadership to persuade certain ZANU leaders to "aline themselves with those white and African leaders who signed the 'internal settlement' agreement in Rhodesia. "Under cover of propaganda fueled by imperialism and Beijing about a "Soviet threat" to the peoples of southern African countries, the United States, South Africa and the PRC have knocked together a southern African alliance designed to help the West preserve its influence in this part of the continent on a neocolonialist basis.

Question: In the past the Chinese leaders used to depict the Chinese-Albanian relations as an example of "fraternal cooperation." What is the current state of relations between the PRC and Albania?

Answer: Contradictions between China and Albania on certain fundamental ideological and political questions led to the severance of party, economic and military ties. After July 1977, China's former ally in the Balkans began to expose the Chinese leadership's "theory" and practice, its ties with imperialism and reaction, its objectives and intentions in the Balkans, China's inequitable relations with small countries and its policy of chauvinism and hegemonism. Interstate ties were reduced to the formal maintenance of diplomatic relations.

Cooperation between China and Albania in the economic field has stopped completely. All Chinese specialists have left Albania and many projects which were being built with their participation have remained unfinished. Trade exchange has stopped. The protocol for 1978 was not signed because the talks were terminated. On 27 September 1978 the Albanian Government halted the activity of the Albanian-Chinese Maritime Transport Company. Chinese flights into Tirana have been stopped. All cooperation in the cultural field has stopped. Many of Beijing's foreign policy actions, particularly its aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, have been subjected to extremely sharp criticism in Albania.

It can now be said that there has been a complete break between China and Albania and that opportunities for normalizing relations in the foreseeable future are nonexistent. At the same time it should be noted that the Albanian leadership is exposing the present Chinese leaders' actions without reducing hostility toward the USSR.

Question: Chinese society has been experiencing a protracted political crisis for two decades now. In your view, where does the path to China's return to positions of scientific socialism lie?

Answer: Under the conditions of the military-bureaucratic Maoist regime the only way out for working people lies in resolute and consistent struggle--political, ideological and economic--against the Maoists' military-bureaucratic dictatorship.

In the political plane this means liquidating the military bureaucratic regime and restoring working people's power and a popular democratic system based on a worker-peasant alliance with the working class playing the leading role. It also means the restoration of the CCP as a Marxist-Leninist type of party.

In the ideological-theoretical plane it means struggling against Maoism's nationalist ideology and asserting the ideas of scientific and proletarian internationalism in the awareness of the working class and all working people.

In the economic plane it means abandoning the policy of militarizing the country, fully restoring the public nature of state and cooperative ownership in the city and countryside and socialist economic methods and subordinating the development of the economy to the fundamental law of socialism--the satisfaction of working people's requirements.

In the international plane it means abandoning the expansionist and hegemonistic course and returning to socialist principles of foreign policy and to friendship and all-round cooperation with the socialist community and all the fraternal states. A program of Chinese internationalists struggling for a socialist future for China could obviously look like this.

Question: What are the main avenues of struggle against Maoism at the present stage?

Answer: Maoism is a serious and insidious opponent. It will be necessary to wage a protracted and difficult struggle with it. It can be said with full justification that Marxist science, sinologists and social scientists in the socialist countries have done a great deal of useful work to criticize Maoism and expose its intrinsic hostility to the Marxist-Leninist teaching, world socialism, the Chinese people's fundamental interests and this great country's socialist development prospects.

This work is bearing fruit. It is promoting a correct understanding of Beijing's policy and what is happening in China.

Coupled with other factors, Marxist criticism of Maoism is compelling the Chinese leadership to make adjustments to Mao's legacy, to shift emphasis and even to abandon some things.

The present situation dictates both further systematic and serious work to analyze various aspects of the Chinese problem on a current basis and substantiated criticism of Maoist policy and ideology in its present form. Here one of the central tasks of new research on China must be intensified and specific criticism of Maoism as an ideology and political practice fundamentally hostile to scientific socialism and posing a threat to the vital interests of all peoples.

The exposure and defeat of Maoism remains a most urgent task, and the more resolutely this is done, the more rapidly the CCP will be restored as a proletarian, Marxist-Leninist party able once again to occupy a firm and honorable position in the world communist movement, the more rapidly fraternal cooperation will be restored between the PRC and all the socialist countries and the more reliably will the Chinese people's real national interests be safeguarded.

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MAIN ASPECTS OF MAOIST FALSIFICATION OF HISTORY

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[Article by M. I. Sladkovskiy, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] Recent international events, particularly China's unconcealed aggression in Vietnam, have completely revealed the adventuristic policy of the PRC's Maoist leadership and the reactionary essence of Maoist ideology, which is based on great-Han hegemonistic ambitions that threaten the peace and security of people. They also provide convincing proof of the exceedingly profound scientific conclusion voiced by L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in his report at the 25th CPSU Congress: "It is no longer enough to say that Maoist ideology and policy are incompatible with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. They are overtly hostile to it."¹ It is precisely this hostility that the imperialist camp is trying to use to turn Beijing into a weapon against socialism, while Maoist leadership eagerly consents to the wishes of imperialist strategists and underscores its loyalty to them in congress resolutions and even in constitutional legislation.

Imperialist circles are trying, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed in his responses to questions asked by the American TIME magazine, "to thoroughly reward and encourage, first by ruses of an economic nature and now, gradually, by shipments of the latest weapons, military equipment and technology as well, those who stand at the head of one of the largest countries in the world and have openly declared their hostility toward the cause of detente, disarmament and stability in the world; those who are making claims on the territory of many countries and are organizing provocations against them; those who have declared that war is inevitable and are energetically preparing for war."²

At the same time, it is apparent that even in bourgeois circles, among those who sympathized with the PRC's Maoist leadership and supported it either as a result of insufficient familiarity with the theory and practice of the Maoists or on the basis of temporary, tactical and, as a rule, antisocialist considerations, people are developing fears and doubts about the benefits of "nurturing" Maoism. This sobering-up process in the camp of Maoist China's devotees picked up speed after the PRC's treacherous attack on Socialist Vietnam.

The Restyling of World History According to the Maoist Fashion

The Maoist leaders are poisoning the minds of the Chinese people with the venom of great-Han hegemonism. They are striving to undermine all of the new revolutionary ideas that originated and spread through China under the influence of the socialist revolution. They have canceled out all of the heroic revolutionary activity of Chinese communists and such prominent figures in the communist movement as Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubai and others.

In spite of the brutal terror and mass repressions launched by Mao Zedong and his followers against the Chinese communist-internationalists who supported the socialist general line during the transition period (1949-1967), adopted at the beginning of the 1950's, the Marxist-Leninist seeds scattered on Chinese soil produced healthy sprouts and the Maoists have still not been able to crush all of them.

The Maoist leaders also cannot ignore the fact that there are no grounds in all of the two or three millennia of China's history for their great-Han arrogance and for their claims to world supremacy.

The Maoist leaders cannot find valid grounds for their great-Han hegemonistic ambitions in China's medieval and modern history, not to mention the revolutionary history of the Chinese people in the 20th century. These ambitions also come into obvious conflict with world history, which summarizes the sociopolitical experience of all people in the world.

For this reason, the Maoists' main objectives in their campaign for the revision of world history consist in falsifying world history, including the history of China, belittling and denigrating the historical achievements and accomplishments of other people, fitting all historical events into a sino-centric framework, depriving the non-Han people living in China and neighboring countries of a history of their own, including them in the "single Chinese nationality" and, on this basis, setting forth historical and theoretical grounds for great-Han hegemonism. These are the strategic objectives set by the Maoist leaders for Chinese historical science.

It was on the basis of ideological tenets of this kind, particularly after the "Cultural Revolution," when the people's democratic social superstructure had been destroyed and military bureaucratic organs of authority had been created, that a broad-scale propaganda campaign was launched in China to affirm the ideology of great-Han chauvinism and to invent theoretical grounds for hegemonistic theories.

The publication of three articles in the journal HONGQI under the pseudonym "Shi Jun" marked the beginning of the latest campaign: "The Study of World History" (1972, No 4), "Another Report on the Study of World History" (1972, No 5) and "The Study of the History of Imperialism" (1972, No 6).

These articles serve as an example of the pseudoscientific methods used by Maoist propagandists to refashion world history and to unceremoniously falsify it. On the one hand, in an attempt to convey the impression that Marxism-Leninism is being "defended," they fill their articles with numerous quotations from the classic works of Marxism, which either do not apply to the subject in question and refer to another period in history or are obviously distorted. On the other hand, they follow each quotation from the classics with remarks by Mao Zedong in an attempt to convince their readers that Maoism is identical to Marxism-Leninism for the purpose of basing all subsequent discussion on the "thought" of Mao. Articles by Maoist propagandists present the following oversimplified view of the worldwide historical process: Asia, Africa and Latin America represent the cradle of ancient civilization. In the 15th century, they began to suffer the effects of the unrestrained expansion, robbery and oppression of the European colonizers and later waged a liberation struggle against the capitalists, imperialists and social-imperialists.

This outline does not contain a word about Europe as the cradle of the revolutionary movement, and it ignores the progressive role of the European people in the development of world civilization. Maoist authors maintain that only the continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America constituted the cradle of world civilization, deliberately reducing the history of mankind to the history of emperors and reactionary rulers. One of Shi Jun's articles contains the following explanation: "Beginning with the end of the 15th century, the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America were subjected for several centuries to robbery and oppression on the part of Western colonialism and imperialism, launched one revolutionary hurricane after another and undertook frenzied attacks on the colonialists and imperialists. A liberation war for the independence of colonies broke out on the Latin American Continent in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Several hundred Negro slaves on an archipelago set an example by beginning the struggle. They fought a war for more than 10 years and gradually defeated the French and Spanish colonial army of 600,000, forcing Napoleon's aggressive army to agree to an unprecedented surrender, which culminated in the establishment in 1804 of Latin America's first independent Negro state, which had rid itself of the domination of colonialists and the slave-holding order. After this, the people of many Latin American countries rose up in rebellion and disintegrated the colonial system of Spain and Portugal in Latin America. In the mid-19th century, the spontaneous awakening of the Asians began; the first revolutionary wave in Asia against capitalism and feudalism stretched from the Persian Gulf and India to China."³

It is not difficult to see that this Maoist outline completely ignores worldwide historical processes and the conflict between individual powerful empires which took turns ruling the world in line with historical material conditions. The Maoists do not say anything about the class struggle or about social revolutions either.

Moving on to the 20th century and mentioning the October Socialist Revolution in passing, the authors of these articles reiterate that the people of Asia,

Africa and Latin America played the deciding role in the revolutionary process. They tried to depict the struggle of these people as one with purely nationalistic aims, separating it completely from the struggle of the working class in the industrially developed countries against imperialism, and they ignored the role of the vanguard of the working class--the communist party.

The anti-Soviet theme occupies a special place in these articles. In the article entitled "The Study of the History of Imperialism,"⁴ the authors present numerous quotations from the works of V. I. Lenin to convey the impression that their analysis is based on these works. The Maoist historians' lack of scruples is quite clearly demonstrated in the fact that they deny the worldwide historical significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution, ignore the division of the world system into two main opposing camps, and essentially twist V. I. Lenin's discussion of the laws governing the struggle against imperialism in the pre-October period around so that they seem to be aimed against the Soviet Union, accusing it of "social-imperialism"--the term Lenin used in reference to the socialist renegades who supported imperialist circles during World War I.

The articles by Shi Jun--the highest level of the Mao Zedong leadership was hiding behind this pseudonym--were of a directive nature, providing the basic parameters of all possible historical "arguments" and compulsory "conclusions." For example, in the article entitled "The Study of World History," the authors expressed the certainty that all "workers studying world history in our nation...will make an effort to write a few concise and clear popular books on general history."⁵

These articles marked the beginning of a broad-scale campaign in China, inspired by people who intended to give the movement for the revision of world history a "nationwide character" and to face historians with a dilemma: Should they bow their heads "to the opinions of the people" or find themselves in the camp of the "capitalist roaders" or "enemies and traitors."

One of the main goals of the Maoist falsifiers of history was to defame the history of the people of Russia and the Soviet Union--"Enemy No 1"--and muffle all criticism of the imperialist countries, including England, although the history of relations with England was a history of imperialist enslavement of the Chinese people. "Additional" premises for the compilation of world history have already been set forth in line with the position of the new, post-Mao leadership of the PRC, which has embarked on the path of direct and open alliance with imperialist and reactionary circles in the world, corroborating its pro-imperialist course in the resolutions of the 11th all-China congress of the CCP (August 1977) and legitimizing it in the new constitution of the PRC (March 1978). In his speech at the 11th CCP congress, Hua Guofeng was quite indulgent of American imperialism. He repeated Mao Zedong's remark that "the United States has certain interests in the world that it is trying to protect," adding his own convictions that "American imperialism is only defending itself."⁶ The struggle against the Soviet Union as China's "chief enemy" was given constitutional reinforcement by the new Maoist leadership.

The Maoist leadership is already enlisting the services of "fundamental" historical science to "correct"--or, more precisely, to falsify--world history in line with the general political course of the 11th CCP congress. Just as in the past, this "correction" begins with the falsification of the history of Russia, the USSR and Russo-Chinese relations.

In 1978 the four-volume "History of the Aggression of Czarist Russia in China" began to be published in the PRC. All facts accepted in Chinese history are falsified in this book, and an attempt is made to "prove" that China has the "inheritance right" to all of its neighboring people, including Soviet nationalities.

On the 'Single Chinese Nationality'

Maoist propaganda is trying to convey the impression that the "revision" of world history undertaken in the PRC is aimed primarily at exposing the historical theories of Soviets and other "revisionists," shamefully keeping silent about its fundamental departure from the ideas of the Chinese Marxist historians. Whereas the "correction of the history" of other states is accompanied by loud Maoist campaigns and newspaper and magazine articles which present all of this to the world public as "refutation of the absurd theory of Soviet revisionists," the "correction of the history" of China is conducted, so to speak, in "short order," either through the silent replacement of individual theories and statements or through their interpretation in the "new," Maoist spirit. They have no objection to admitting that some past historians of the PRC falsified history slightly, but they assign all of the blame for this to the "gang of four." Moreover, this is only admitted in connection with the "distortions" which are useful to today's Chinese leaders in their struggle against the "four." For example, Hua Guofeng declared the following at the 11th CCP congress: "Historiography, which was under the control of the 'four,' arbitrarily falsified history, maliciously praised the 'empresses,' and criticized the 'first ministers' who carried out the duties of the first minister."⁷

Naturally, Hua Guofeng said nothing about the major and fundamental falsifications of world history and the history of China which acquired even greater proportions under the post-Mao leadership than under the leadership of the "gang of four." Articles and statements printed in the Chinese press in the last two or three years have reaffirmed Maoist historiography's complete departure from the conclusions and opinions of China's most prominent Marxist historians, such as Fan Wenlan, Shang Yue and others. Extremely reactionary, racist theories, taken from the imperial and rightist Guomindang archives, are now being popularized.

The Maoist ideas about Chinese history can be found in concentrated form in the conclusions of a conference on the study of the non-Han people of China and in the practical resolutions of this conference (20-22 March 1978).⁸ The main conclusion drawn at the conference was essentially the idea that there is one nationality in China--the "Chinese"--and all other ethnic groups

are only "offshoots" of this single nationality. Conference materials suggest that Maoist "historians" are particularly worried about the Tibetan archives, which are the most extensive and well-documented of all. A resolution was adopted at the conference on the establishment of strict control over the Tibetan archives, particularly the documents reflecting Tibet's relations with China and with other states.

The conference gave "historians" a general order: To prove that Tibet had long been a part of the "motherland," using this term, naturally, in reference only to China.

The current theory of the "single Chinese nationality" and the "traditional harmony and fraternity" between individual ethnic groups inhabiting parts of contemporary China, is not some kind of new discovery. The theory was heralded by no one other than Chiang Kai-shek himself. In the chapter on "The Origin and Development of the Chinese Nationality" in his book "The Fate of China," Chiang Kai-shek wrote the following:

"As for the history of the nationality's beginnings, our Chinese nationality resulted from the intermixture of many clans. In terms of their origins, these numerous clans represented branches of the same race, the same system, which spread to the East from the Pamir plateau between the Huanghe, Huaihe, Changjiang, Heilongjiang and Zhujiang river basins. They have cultural differences which are due to the differences in their geographic surroundings. These cultural differences resulted in the birth of different surnames. For the last 5,000 years, however, there have been numerous contacts between them and there has been constant migration, as a result of which they are always mixing with one another and have become a single nationality. But the prime mover of their merger was culture, and not the force of arms, and the methods of their merger constituted patronage, and not subjugation."⁹

Everyone knows that Chiang Kai-shek was not a Marxist and never tried to pass himself off as one. He took the stand of great-Han nationalism and racism, and we must admit that the author set forth his position quite frankly and clearly. The Maoist historians behave differently. They shamefully conceal the forefathers of their great-Han nationalist theory, and they are still disguising themselves as orthodox Marxists, even though it is completely obvious to any objective researcher that there is not a trace of Marxism in the theory of the age-old monolithic and unified Chinese nationality. The Maoists maintain that it was not the material means of production or the tools of labor, the development of which was accompanied by the division of labor, which is what brought mankind, as F. Engels wrote, "to the threshold of civilization,"¹⁰ but ethnic racial kinship and cultural communication that lie at the basis of the formation of the Chinese nationality "over the last 5,000 years."

But it is precisely the history of the development of the Asian nationalities and states, including China, that serves the perfect proof of the scientific accuracy and truth of Marxist teachings about the development of society. The relations between China, whose economy was based on farming and related crafts,

and its nomadic neighbors, whose economy was based on animal husbandry, were not colored at all by their ethnic and racial similarities or differences, but by their methods of physical production and physical needs. Statements by Chiang Kai-shek and contemporary Maoist historians to the effect that relations between China and the people who now inhabit Chinese territory but had their own sovereign states in the past were allegedly always friendly and that the "methods of their merger constituted patronage, and not subjugation," are completely unfounded and contradict the historical facts. This is corroborated by the history of the formation of the centralized Chinese state under the leadership of Ch'in Shih-huang, whose reign (246-210 B.C.) was accompanied by bloody terror and the merciless extermination of the non-Han people who had their own independent states south of the river Yangtze. We know that Ch'in Shih-huang created a system of public administration consisting of 36 administrative subdivisions and established quite precise state boundaries, bordered by the Great Wall of China on the north and northwest. From that time until the middle of the 20th century, all Chinese historical works divided the country into inner and outer China, which underscored the national differences and separateness of people "beyond the wall." The subsequent history of China was accompanied by many centuries of struggle between the people "beyond the wall" and China, which, for the large part, ended in the brutal defeat of China, and its imperial throne was in the hands of foreigners for 700 of the last 1,000 years of the monarchic order.

The brutal and cruel wars ended, in many cases, with treaties that were humiliating for China.

The "History of China" edited by Shang Yue contains data on the severe upheavals in China resulting from the defeat of the Sung Dynasty's Chinese troops by invading Zhurzhens troops in north China in the 12th century. Signing a peace treaty (Shaohin) with the state emperor Chin Aguda, Emperor Kao Tsung of the Sung Dynasty made the following promises: "I, Kao, declare that the border (between our states) will now run along the Huaishui River. All land located west of T'angchow and Tengchow will be turned over to your state.... If I am shown mercy and I am permitted to become your vassal, I promise to remain loyal forever. I promise to send couriers with greetings and gifts each year on the emperor's birthday and the first day of the new year, and to pay a tribute (suigung) each year in the amount of 250,000 liang of silver and 250,000 lengths of silk."¹¹

The Zhurzhens invasion of China in the 12th century was called an aggressive war by Chinese historians, and the Chinese people still glorify one of the Chinese military commanders in that war, Yue Feya, as a national hero.¹² All of these historically valid facts attest not to perpetual "fraternal harmony" between the Hans and non-Hans, but to antagonism in their relations and to a centuries-old fierce struggle between them. Even in Mao Zedong's articles we find the admission that "for thousands of years...the people of multinational China always fought against foreign oppression."¹³

Today's Maoist historians do not want to openly refute opinions that have become established in science and in the public mind and they are even less willing to officially disavow Mao Zedong. For this reason, they resort to one of their familiar subterfuges--they provide yet another false interpretation of the facts and historical events. As a result of this, the wars that went on for thousands of years between China and the non-Han people in neighboring Asian states are called internal wars by a single Chinese nationality. In February 1979 the Chinese newspaper GUANGMING RIBAO gave the following interpretation to Mao Zedong's remarks about the thousands of years of struggle "against foreign oppression": "This concept is only completely accurate if it applies to the aggression of the capitalist and imperialist powers against China, but it is absolutely inapplicable to the internal national wars." For this reason, the aggression of the Zhurzhens against the Sung Dynasty of the Hans is pointed out as an example of "internal national conflicts and struggle." In this case, the article states, it can be said that the Zhurzhens were waging an unjust "internal national war."¹⁴

This obvious false interpretation cannot be considered the personal opinion of the GUANGMING RIBAO newspaper. It was guided by the premises of that same conference which was held in March 1978 and was attended and addressed by Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping.

History adequately exposes the truly aggressive and brutal nature of the wars declared by the Chinese emperors during the ancient and new eras. Chinese historian Fan Wenlan, in his narration of the history of the Ch'in Dynasty's conquest of East Turkestan, which was "beyond the wall" (the Chinese renamed it Xinjiang Province, which means "new border") and was inhabited primarily by Uighurs, points out the exceptionally bloody and destructive nature of this war of conquest.

In 1876, Fan Wenlan wrote, the army of Tso Tsung-t'ang (a Chinese general of the Ch'ing Dynasty--M.S.) advanced beyond the boundaries of inner China and "launched an offensive in a northerly direction.... When he (Tso Tsung-t'ang--M.S.) entered Sinkiang, he took savage reprisals against the population of southern Sinkiang, committing the same kind of brutalities as in inner China. In 1878 Tso Tsung-t'ang completed his 'pacification' of southern and northern Sinkiang."¹⁵ This historical testimony can hardly be used to corroborate the "eternal harmony" within the "single Chinese nationality."

Maoist historians have apparently not yet elaborated any special "interpretation" of the horrifying crimes and unconcealed genocide committed by the Ch'ing conquerors in their treatment of the native population of what was once East Turkestan. They simply remain silent about all of the historical facts which do not fit into their imaginative outline or which contradict it. It will not surprise us if we hear that the scientific works of classic historians, literary texts and archives have been destroyed as something "harmful" and "evil" invented by the "gang of four" for the purpose of the inheritance of all possessions of the despotic emperor Ch'in Shih-huang by the revered Mao Zedong.

Contrary to Historical Fact

The traditional policies of the reactionary rulers of past and present times do not corroborate the "eternal unity" of the Chinese nationality. On the contrary, history quite conclusively proves that the Chinese state took shape in the midst of a fierce struggle and that a harsh legacy of ethnic equality and oppression was inherited by China. The people's democratic revolution of 1949 should have represented a turning point in the fate of multinational China. But the gains of this revolution and the ethnic equality proclaimed in the PRC Constitution of 1954 were canceled out by the Mao Zedong leadership when it renounced the socialist general line of the CCP in 1958. From that time on, the old great-Han theories inherited from Chiang Kai-shek began to be propagandized once again in China.

The theory of the "eternal unity of the Chinese nationality" deprives non-Han ethnic groups of their uniqueness and their own national history, refutes their centuries of struggle for the preservation of their independence, denigrates their unique culture, language and traditions and attempts to establish the dominant position of the Hans.

This policy, according to the plans of the Maoist leadership, is also supposed to provide "theoretical" grounds for the current great-Han, hegemonistic foreign policy of this leadership.

Maoist historians have recently focused their attention on the Huns (called "xiongnu" by the Chinese). In spite of the generally accepted view in world science that the Huns were an ancient nomadic tribe consisting mainly of Turkic-speaking nationalities which had crossed over to the cis-Ural region from Central Asia, the Maoist "historians" declare: "The xiongnu were one of the small nationalities in ancient China, and not some kind of invaders from outside."¹⁶ Allegations of this kind are made in spite of the conclusions of numerous historians in old and new China. The "History of China" edited by Shang Yue contains a detailed description of the Huns' devastating raids in the late third and early second centuries B.C. as a result of which they occupied the province of Henan and the northern part of the provinces of Hebei and Shansi. As a result of a severe defeat, the Han emperor Kao Tsu (Liu Pang--founder of the Han Dynasty) had to sign a humiliating treaty in 192 B.C. with the Hun leader Modun. According to the terms of this treaty, the "Han" imperial court became related to the Huns (Modun was given a Chinese princess to marry), and tributes were sent to the Huns each year: cotton wool, silk fabric, wine and meat. Nonetheless, the Huns continued to invade border regions of the Han empire from time to time, undermining the economy with their raids, and taking Hans away as slaves.¹⁷

The Maoist "historians," however, call the treaties with the Huns that were so humiliating for China "peace treaties based on kinship" and assert that they "played an indisputably active role in the history of our nation in the development of unity between various fraternal tribes."¹⁸ The Maoist leaders invest opinions of this kind, which pass the humiliation and surrender of the

state off as something positive and something that allegedly contributed to the "unity of fraternal tribes," with profound political meaning. By calling the Huns the "brothers" of the Hans, they themselves become the heirs of all lands conquered by the Huns and possess the "historical right" to follow the routes of the Huns' campaigns into many regions of Asia and far-off Europe.

Even during the years of the Guomindang regime, nationalist Chinese historians were searching for "brotherhood" with Genghis Khan in an obvious attempt to lay claim to the historical legacy of the powerful Mongolian empire of the 13th and 14th centuries. This kind of "fraternizing" with Genghis Khan was objected to by Chinese Marxist historians and certain segments of the revolutionary democratic public in China.

In 1934 Lu Xin made the following ironic comments about nationalist falsifications of history and their "fraternizing" with Genghis Khan: "When I was 20 I heard that the time when 'our' Genghis Khan conquered Europe was 'our' golden age. It was not until I was 25 that I learned that the Mongols had conquered China and we were actually slaves during 'our' so-called golden age. In August of this year I leafed through three books on the history of Mongolia to check up on a few historical facts and it was only then that I realized that the Mongols had conquered Rus' and invaded Hungary and Austria before they conquered all of China. At that time, Genghis Khan was not yet 'our' khan. It seems, after all, that since the Russians were conquered before us, they are the ones who should be saying: 'When our Genghis Khan conquered China, our golden age began.'"¹⁹

The Maoist leaders do not wish to give any consideration to the fact that even if their method is used--that is, if the origins of nationalities and states are to derive not from the physical conditions of public life but from ethnic and racial kinship--it would then be necessary to conclude that it is not the Mongols who are part of the Chinese nationality but, to the contrary, the Chinese who are part of the Mongolian nationality, since the Mongolian people are more representative of the basic anthropological characteristics of the Mongolian race to which the Chinese and Mongols both belong.

The Maoist leaders, however, are not embarrassed by the lack of scientific evidence for their arguments. Moreover, the falsifications to which they resort are not at all the result of ignorance on the part of the "creative groups" recruited for "historical research." This is a deliberate strategy, programmed by the Maoists' "brain trust," and an attempt to force history to "scientifically substantiate" the legality of the intrigues of Maoist strategists and to glorify great-Han hegemonism.

A scientific historical analysis confirms the unscientific and adventuristic nature of the theory and practice of the PRC's Maoist leadership.

Territorial Claims

In the political practices of today's Maoist leaders of the PRC, the theory of the single Chinese nationality and the "harmony and fraternity" of the

people inhabiting China and all other people with a close ethnic relationship to China represents the major foreign policy instrument used to substantiate China's territorial claims on all of its neighbors.

The Maoist leaders have chosen the Soviet Union, as "enemy number one," as the center of their attack on the territorial rights of neighboring states, although they also have a corresponding "register" of claims on other countries as well. The publication of "historical works" began in 1978 with the appearance of the four-volume "History of the Aggression of Czarist Russia in China." The first volume is intended to "substantiate China's rights" to lands which have been "Chinese from time immemorial" in the regions of the Amur and Ussuri rivers; it describes the first appearance of Russians in these regions and their conflict with Manchurian troops, the first embassies of the Russian state and their diplomatic activity. All of the Maoist historians' arguments are based on the same old notorious theory of the "single Chinese nationality" and, on this basis, all of the people in these regions, the ancestors of the Soviet Tungus, Gilyak, Gol'd, Orochon, Yakut, Buryat and other ethnic groups, are called "brothers" of the Chinese, substantiating China's "right" to these lands.

There are no significant differences between all of the historical studies on the ancient colonization of the cis-Amur lands (what is now Soviet Primorskiy Kray). All of them agree that the native inhabitants of these territories were ancient Mohe tribes of Tungus origin, whose descendants established two large states--"Bohai" (694-926), which was destroyed by the Kidani (Mongolian tribes), and "Jin" (1126-1215), which disappeared when the Manchurian region was invaded by the hordes of Genghis Khan.

At the time of the Mongol invasion, Manchurian and Tungus tribal unions broke up and the tribes settled in various river valleys and forests. After the collapse of the Mongol empire and the accession of the Ming Dynasty to the Chinese throne, the Chinese occupied southern Manchuria and established military posts there, but they did not cross over into the cis-Amur and cis-coastal regions.

During all the years that the Ming Dynasty was in power, the Chinese sent only two small expeditions out to explore the Sungari river as far as the lower reaches of the Amur, but, with the exception of the so-called Tyr texts, they left no traces of their stay in the cis-Amur zone. These expeditions were dispatched mainly for the purpose of taking fur and other goods away from the native population.

When the first Russian explorers arrived on the Amur and on the Okhotsk coastline, there was not a single Chinese settlement there, not to mention Chinese officials, and there was no regular contact between the local Tungus population and China.

The Maoist authors of the first volume of "The History of the Aggression of Czarist Russia in China," despite all of their prejudices and biases, could

not present any facts to prove the existence of Han settlements in the Soviet Far East. They had to admit that, "according to historical documents, the ancestors of the Manchurians--the Susheni--were among the earliest inhabitants of the ancient northeastern (Manchurian--M.S.) regions of our nation."²⁰ China's connection with the Susheni is "corroborated" by the Maoist historians with the following information: "As early as the 11th century B.C., they (the Susheni--M.S.) established political contacts with the West Chu, when they presented him with arrows and slingshots as a tribute. When the Susheni brought this tribute to the court in 1016 B.C., the Chu Ch'engwang ordered the dignitary Jung Po to compose a 'Command On the Return of Tributes to the Susheni Tribe.'"²¹

The scientific community knows of numerous cases in which the Han rulers called presents from any state "tribute" and, on this basis, regarded these states as their vassals.²² Consequently, the facts cited by the Chinese historians cannot in any sense be considered proof of the vassal dependence of the Susheni on the Chinese Chu kingdom.

The authors of the first volume break into a long and elaborate narrative about the Russians' military confrontations with Ch'ing troops on the Amur in the second half of the 17th century, ascribing an aggressive motive only to Russia. These authors hashfully conceal the fact that the Russians' armed conflicts were not with the Chinese, but with the Manchurians, who had seized the Chinese throne in 1644 and continued their conquest of China until the 1690's. They do not mention the fact that it was precisely the Manchurians and the Ch'ing Dynasty they established that were regarded as the aggressor by Chinese historians. The Manchurian invasion of China, according to the "History of China" edited by Shang Yue, gave rise to radical changes in internal conflicts in China. "Now the main national conflict has become the conflict between the Manchurians and the Chinese."²³ Maoist historians try to ignore and conceal the Chinese Marxist historians' opinion of the Manchurians.

The second volume of the Maoist historians' "History of the Aggression of Czarist Russia in China" is devoted primarily to Russo-Chinese relations in mid-19th century and the Russo-Chinese treaties that defined the Russo-Chinese state border, which is still in existence. They tried to depict Russia as China's chief enemy, saying nothing about the fact that all Chinese historians, including Mao Zedong himself, regarded England as China's chief enemy at that time, since its "opium wars" had marked the beginning of China's enslavement by foreign capital. Contradicting the historical facts, they tried to distort the actual situation in the Far East in the mid-19th century and falsify the Russo-Chinese Aigun, Tianjin and Beijing (supplementary) treaties.

In reality, however, the situation in the Far East in the mid-19th century was one in which Russia and China, which had maintained friendly relations with one another but were unconnected by any kind of defensive alliance, were faced by common enemies--England and France.

The relations between Russia and its opponents, England and France, were extremely strained by the mid-19th century. Russia's ties with its Far Eastern possessions, which could be only be maintained by sea (expeditions across Yakutsk were extremely limited), could easily be severed by a stronger enemy fleet. The situation became particularly tense after England forced China, as a result of the first "opium war" (1840-1842) and by the terms of the Nanking treaty of 1842, to grant it unilateral benefits and privileges by "opening" five major ports for trade: Canton (Guangzhou), Shanghai, Ningbo, Amoy and Fuzhou. From that time on, the English fleet began to rule the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean, and all sea communications between Russia's European ports and Russian possessions--Kamchatka, the Okhotsk coastline and the trading posts in Alaska--were under English control.

Under these conditions, the question of navigation along the Amur, which had been forgotten due to the incorrect conclusions of several sea expeditions, was reconsidered. The resolution of the Amur problem was accelerated by the Crimean War which broke out in 1853 between Russia and England and its ally, France. When the war began, the English-French fleet appeared at the Russian coastline of the Sea of Okhotsk. In 1854 Russian ships had to take cover in the mouth of the Amur from the enemy fleet, and that same year the first Russian naval post was established here--Nikolayevskiy. The small garrison, however, could not expect to resist the Anglo-French forces for long. Immediate reinforcements from East Siberia were needed.

In April 1854, N. N. Murav'yev, with the approval of his government, advised the Chinese Chamber on the Affairs of "Dependent" Territories (Lifanyuan) of the plan to dispatch Russian troops along the Amur to the Pacific coastline, substantiating these actions by the common incentive of Russia and China to prevent the penetration of the Amur by English ships.

The situation of the Russian troops on the Okhotsk coastline and Kamchatka became critical, and the threat that Anglo-French ships would sail into the mouth of the Amur became imminent. In May 1854, N. N. Murav'yev informed the local Chinese administration on the right bank of the upper reaches of the Amur of a proposed "merger" of Russian troops. Although the local Chinese administration did not express official approval of Murav'yev's plans, it did declare that it was even prepared to assist in supplying the Russian convoys with foodstuffs.

The international situation in the Far East, therefore, was a favorable one for the development of friendly Russo-Chinese relations.

In his description of the status of Russo-Chinese relations in the mid-19th century, K. Marx pointed out the fact that Russia was not involved in the maritime trade which constituted foreign capital's main channel of penetration or in the power struggle which led to the "opium wars"--the struggle to establish control by England (the first "opium war") and then by England in alliance with France and the United States (the second and third wars)--and which marked the beginning of China's metamorphosis into a semicolony--that is, K. Marx did

not equate the position of Russia, which did not have an adequate naval fleet in the Far East, with the positions of England and France.²⁴ It was precisely these "specific" conditions that brought Russia closer to China and made it possible for them to settle many issues in their relations and, in particular, to conclude treaties defining their common state borders.

For more than 100 years the state border between the two neighboring states--then Russia and China and now the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China--was a border of friendly relations between them, and no disputes of any kind arose.

We know that in the very first days of its existence, the government of Soviet Russia canceled certain treaties concluded by Czarist Russia with colonial and dependent countries, according to the terms of which Czarist Russia intervened in the internal affairs of these countries and, together with other imperialist states, imposed puppet regimes on them.

Each time the Soviet state denounced certain Czarist treaties as unequalitarian, the Soviet Government specified the particular treaties to which it was referring. The same kind of specific declaration was made by the Soviet Government in regard to "Czarist treaties" with China as well.

Soviet Government declarations and statements (the "appeal of the RSFSR Government to the Chinese people and the governments of South and North China of 25 July 1919" and others) fully expose the lack of any grounds for the Maoist leadership's attempts to classify the Russo-Chinese treaties on borders as unequalitarian agreements. V. I. Lenin quite thoroughly defined the position of the Soviet Government in regard to the old "Czarist treaties."

In reference to the cancellation of these treaties, V. I. Lenin said: "Secret treaties must be published. All points concerning annexations and indemnities must be repealed. There are various kind of points, comrades--after all, the plundering governments not only agreed on plunder, but also included economic agreements among these, as well as various other points concerning good-neighbor relation.... We denounce all points on plunder and violence, but we happily accept and cannot denounce all points in which the terms of good-neighbor relations and economic agreements are set forth."²⁵

Lenin's analysis provides a clear answer to the question of why the Soviet Government did not include the treaties regulating the state border between the USSR and China among the canceled "Czarist treaties." It is interesting to note that when Soviet ambassador L. M. Karakhan negotiated and signed the first treaty of the new era that gave China equal rights in 1924--the Agreement on the General Principles for the Settlement of Issues Between the USSR and the Chinese Republic--the question of border revisions did not come up. Moreover, the two sides agreed to verify national boundaries by confirming the status quo.

When treaties and agreements were concluded by the Soviet Union and the PRC Government, the Chinese side never made any territorial claims on the USSR, although these documents cover the entire spectrum of intergovernmental relations. The PRC leaders place a high value on the Soviet-Chinese treaties and agreements. "They," Mao Zedong said, "have given us a reliable ally. They have simplified our work in the area of internal construction and the joint opposition of imperialist aggression in the name of lasting peace throughout the world."

On the basis of a treaty on friendship, alliance and mutual assistance signed by the USSR and the PRC on 14 February 1950, specific treaties and agreements were concluded to regulate shipping on border rivers and lakes (the agreement of 21 December 1957), the conditions of trade and navigation (the Treaty on Trade and Navigation of 23 April 1958), et cetera.

Naturally, certain specific issues have arisen along the 7,500-kilometer Soviet-Chinese border--for example, the clarification of a border language or river boundaries.

In accordance with its general anti-Soviet policy, the nationalist leadership of the PRC is exploiting the "territorial question" for political purposes. By breaking off border negotiations, it artificially escalates war hysteria in the nation, frightens the people with the "threat" of Soviet aggression and uses the anti-Soviet atmosphere to take brutal reprisals against opposition forces by calling them "agents of the USSR." The Maoist leadership's provocation on the Ussuri river in the spring of 1969 was the kind of deliberate action that was intended to simplify their escalation of anti-Soviet feelings. The territorial claims of the Maoist leaders link them with the West German and Japanese revanchistes and give them the reputation of a "reliable ally" in imperialist circles in the United States.

If contemporary Chinese historiography continues to carry out the political orders of the Maoist leadership, it will not limit itself to the publication of "historical studies" or to the movement for the "revision" of history--that is, the falsification of world history in the Maoist great-Han spirit will continue. And whereas the Maoists are now focusing their attention on Russian and Soviet history and Soviet-Chinese relations, in the future, judging by their global plans, they will falsify the history of neighboring states, and later even of distant people and states.

The Maoist leaders intend to instill China's population of almost one billion with the spirit of great-Han belligerence and turn these people into fanatics by stirring up feelings of arrogance and superiority to other nationalities. These weaknesses have been present in the Chinese public mind. Their potential danger for China itself was pointed out by Doctor Sun Yat-sen, the outstanding Chinese democrat. "China itself," Sun Yat-sen wrote, "placed an extremely high value on its own achievements and believed that other states were worthless. This became a habit and began to be regarded as something completely natural. As a result, China developed a desire for isolation.

For this reason, when the Chinese carried out reforms, they relied on their own experience and resources and did not try to learn anything from others."²⁶ Speculating on the avenues of China's development, Sun Yat-sen also pointed out another extremely dangerous flaw in the thinking of Chinese rulers--a tendency toward violence, toward the escalation of fanaticism and the cultivation of militarism.

He asked the Chinese people the following question: "Should we organize and unite for war or should we organize and unite for peace?" And he answered this cardinal question in the following way: "Our militarists and reactionaries insist on the former and wish to Japanize China for the purpose of starting a new Boxer rebellion (an anti-imperialist movement of 1900-1901) when the right moment arrives and challenging the civilized world. But, as the founder of the Chinese Republic, I want to see China organized for peace. This is why I am taking up my pen on behalf of the peaceful development of China and I am writing down these plans--plans which will be more effective than the weapon I took up to overthrow the Manchurian dynasty."²⁷

The world public is well aware that Mao Zedong chose and proclaimed the first of these avenues--the avenue of militarism: The transformation of the country into a "single military camp," into a powerful militaristic state, capable of attaining great-Han goals by military means (primarily by means of the provocation of wars between the great powers).

Mao Zedong did not associate the future with the construction of a classless socialist and communist society. When he described the prospects for the next 50-100 years, Mao Zedong called upon the Chinese people to be prepared for "a great struggle, the specific forms of which will differ considerably from forms of struggle in the past."²⁸

It is completely obvious that Mao ignored all of the preceding history of revolutionary struggle by the people for the construction of a classless society and proclaimed some kind of other forms of struggle without making them known to the public, although he always gave priority in his numerous speeches to nationalist, racial struggle and assigned China the leading role in this struggle.

When we evaluate the campaign that has been launched in China by the Maoist leadership for the revision--or, essentially, the falsification--of world history, we can draw the following conclusions:

This campaign has nothing in common with the scientific debates that inevitably arise in the historical community during the discussion of particular events in history. It is being conducted by the Maoist leadership in accordance with a strictly defined political plan--the establishment of historical-theoretical "grounds" for great-Han, hegemonistic expansion and, for this purpose, the elucidation of only those particular historical facts and events in the history of China and other countries which fit into the "Maoist framework," or the deliberately false interpretation of facts and events.

The Maoist historians exclude the possibility of using the method of historical materialism in scientific research and justify their sinocentrism by means of a pseudoscientific ethnogenesis, focusing their research on the Han nationality, as the allegedly main and deciding ethnic group, and regarding all other non-Han people inhabiting Chinese territory and neighboring countries as "offshoots" of the Han nationality.

The Maoist leaders' assertions about the "age-old single Chinese nationality" are supposed, according to their plans, to substantiate the great-Han policy within China, justify the compulsory assimilation of non-Han ethnic groups and deprive them of their own unique national history.

The unscientific concept of the "age-old single Chinese nationality," which is intended to back up Maoist political aims, is used by the Maoist leaders to prove that they are the "legitimate heirs" of the historical legacy of the non-Han people--the "offshoots of the Han nationality." The propaganda campaign that is being conducted in China is intended to include the ancient Huns and Mongols in the "Chinese nationality" as well and, in this way, to substantiate all claims to the vast territories once conquered by the Huns and the hordes of Genghis Khan.

The Maoist falsification of world history is a reflection of the general expansionist policy of the Maoist leadership. It represents a continuation of the Maoists' political struggle against the theory and practice of scientific socialism and cannot leave us uninvolved in the struggle against great-Han hegemonism, which is endangering all of mankind, and not only the USSR and the socialist countries, as the Maoist leaders are trying to convince their imperialist allies.

The heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against Chinese aggression conclusively demonstrated our international solidarity in the struggle against Maoism on all fronts.

The signs of opposition in the Chinese public mind to the Maoist course, although this opposition is not vigorous enough, convince us that the militarist great-Han course and the great-Han theories are unpopular in China even under the conditions of the terrorist Maoist regime. They are not in the fundamental interests of the Chinese people. "We do not associate the statements and actions of the current Chinese leadership," L. I. Brezhnev said, "with the desires, ambitions and genuine interests of the Chinese Communist Party and the entire Chinese population. We are firmly convinced that China can achieve true national revival and guaranteed socialist development through alliance and fraternal cooperation with the USSR, the other socialist countries and the entire communist movement, and not through struggle against them."²⁹

FOOTNOTES

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5. Ibid., 1972, No 4.
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7. See "The 11th All-China Congress of the CCP (Documents)," pp 48-49.
8. GUANGMING RIBAO, 26 March 1978.
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10. F. Engels, "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State," K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," 2d ed., vol 21, p 165.
11. "Essays on the History of China from Antiquity to the 'Opium' Wars," Ed by Shang Yue (translated from the Chinese), Moscow, 1959, p 334.
12. Ibid., pp 327-333.
13. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol II, Beijing, 1969, p 383 (in Russian).
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15. Fan Wenlan, "The Modern History of China," (translated from the Chinese), Moscow, 1955, pp 331-332.
16. Xiao Zhixing, "Peace Treaties Based on the Relationship Between the Han and T'ang Periods Promoted the Friendship and Unity of Various Nationalities in the History of Our State," GUANGMING RIBAO, 9 December 1978.
17. "Essays on the History of China from Antiquity to the 'Opium' Wars," pp 77-78.
18. Xiao Zhixing, Op. cit.
19. Lu Xin, "Works," vol 6, Beijing, 1934, p 109.
20. "History of the Aggression of Tsarist Russia in China," vol 1, pp 8-9 (in Chinese).

21. This even applied to England when the Ch'ing Emperor Ch'ien Lung received the first English emissary, Lord McCartney, in 1793. The emperor called the English king's gifts "tribute" and addressed England as his vassal.
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23. J. K. Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, "On the China Tributary System," HARVARD JOURNAL OF ASIATIC STUDIES, June 1941.
24. Marx and Engels, Op. cit., vol 12, pp 157-158.
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26. Sun Yat-sen, "Selected Works," vol 1, Beijing, 1956, p 190 (in Chinese).
27. Ibid., p 333.
28. These remarks by Mao Zedong were quoted in the report of the CCP Central Committee at the 11th All-China CCP Congress, "The 11th All-China Congress of the CCP (Documents)," p 97.
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KAMPUCHEA: FAILURE OF MAOIST 'EXPERIMENT'

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 41-51

[Article by Ye. V. Vasil'kov]

[Text] Time is an excellent medicine. But no number of months and years can erase the tragedy in Kampuchea from human memory. This country has become one of the first victims of great-Han expansionism and an experimental field for testing the export "model" of the political organization of society according to the Maoist example, for testing the notorious "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in action on foreign territory.

The results of 3 years and 8 months of tests of this monstrous "model" have made the entire world shudder--around 3 million of the 8 million Kampucheans--that is, slightly less than half of the population--died at the hands of the Maoist executioners, and the country was pushed decades backward in its development and brought to the brink of total devastation and chaos.

How could this have happened in Kampuchea--the oldest state on the Indochinese peninsula, a nation with a high culture and a civilization that was highly developed even in the distant past? To find a clear enough answer to this question and to disclose the causes of the Kampuchean tragedy, which ultimately led to a strong revolutionary outburst, to the victory of Kampuchean national patriotic forces and to the declaration of the People's Republic of Kampuchea on 11 January 1979, we must go back a few years into the past.

A Bit of History

Until 1953, Kampuchea (then called Cambodia) was part of the French "Indochinese Union" along with Vietnam and Laos. Kampuchean patriots fought side by side with their Vietnamese and Lao brothers in a selfless struggle against the colonizers for the national liberation of their people.

Until 1951, this struggle was led by the Indochinese Communist Party. By 1951 the situation in Indochina had changed. The national liberation revolutions in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea were in different stages of development,

and this naturally faced communists in the three countries with objectives differing in terms of their nature, scales and means of attainment. In February 1951, a decision was made at the second congress of the Indochinese Communist Party to divide this party into three separate ones. This is how the Vietnam Workers' Party (now the Vietnam Communist Party), the People's Party of Laos (now the Lao People's Revolutionary Party) and the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (now the Communist Party of Kampuchea) came into being.

Established on the basis of the Khmer section of the Indochinese Communist Party and imbued with the spirit of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea consistently served as the vanguard of Kampuchean patriotic forces fighting for the national independence of their country, maintained close fraternal relations with the Vietnam Workers' Party and the People's Party of Laos and fought a coordinated struggle with them against the colonizers.

The Geneva Agreements of 1954 on Indochina, which recorded the joint victory of the people of Indochina in the war of resistance against the French colonizers, guaranteed the independence of Kampuchea. The nation embarked on the path of peaceful and independent development. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries announced their recognition of, and respect for, Kampuchea's declared policy of neutrality, its independence and its territorial integrity.

Armed aggression by the United States in Indochina began in the 1960's. The American militarists regarded neutral Kampuchea as a gap in the chain of bases it had set up on the Indochinese peninsula. On 18 March 1970, Kampuchean right-wing officials carried out a coup d'etat in Phnom Penh with the assistance of American CIA agents. The United States' open intervention in national affairs aroused legitimate indignation in the Kampuchean people. The National United Front of Kampuchea, created in May 1970 by patriotic forces, led the Kampuchean people's armed struggle against the American interventionists and their proteges.

The combat solidarity of national patriotic forces in Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, which never faltered in the slightest in spite of the efforts of the aggressors and their accomplices, was of tremendous significance in the successful outcome of this struggle. The victory of the Vietnamese people, which was recorded in the Paris agreement of 1973, definitely reinforced the positions of national patriotic forces in Indochina. In April 1975, the selfless struggle of the Kampuchean people culminated in a glorious victory. The pro-American puppet regime was overthrown and the National United Front of Kampuchea took over.

The Kampuchean people were presented with the possibility of peacefully building a new life. But events in the nation suddenly began to take a turn contrary to the expectations of the people. A week after Phnom Penh had been liberated, a Chinese plane landed in the capital's airport of Pochentong. Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were on board. That day marked the

beginning of the Maoist accomplishment in Kampuchea--a "Night of St. Bartholomew" that lasted almost 4 years.

Curve of Treachery

Who is Pol Pot? His biography, just as that of any hired killer, is shrouded in mystery. In the only interview he granted foreign journalists in 1977, he called himself a "proletarian" and stated that he had been filled with "revolutionary spirit" since childhood. But here is what former Prince N. Sihanouk, who spent 3 years in Pol Pot's Kampuchea as a prisoner, had to say about him: "Actually the regime was ruled by only four people: the duo of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary and their wives--the sisters Khieu Polnary and Khieu Thirith. All of them called themselves proletarians from poor peasant families, but they were actually bourgeois. Pol Pot and I were in the same class in a school named after my grandfather. Ieng Sary's family also belonged to the grand bourgeoisie."¹ In the interview mentioned above, Pol Pot himself supplemented this information with a story about how he spent 6 years of his youth in a Buddhist monastery, and he even observed monastic vows for 2 of these years.

After Pol Pot had completed his secondary education, he went to Paris on a government grant to continue his studies. There he joined a Trotskyist group and learned the rudiments of the "ultra-revolutionary" science. This resulted in his expulsion from an academic institution for doing so poorly in his studies. Some foreign journalists believe that this is the main reason for Pol Pot's pathological hatred for educated people, who were the first to be exterminated when he came to power in Kampuchea.

Naturally, it would be a sign of vulgar sociology to blame these circumstances of Pol Pot's birth and ideological development for his inclination for butchery that later took such horrifying forms. All of these circumstances of birth and ideological development lose their significance if a revolutionary takes the stand of the working class and of Marxist-Leninist doctrine in spite of them. Pol Pot, however, was never even acquainted with Marxism-Leninism or the principles of scientific socialism. From his earliest years, he was stuffed with a mixture of leftist-extremist slogans and mystical religious beliefs, which were later flavored with Maoist tenets by his Beijing masters.

After the restoration of the peace in Indochina in 1954, Pol Pot returned to Phnom Penh and became actively involved in the work of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea, which was still functioning underground. Pol Pot was more used to urban surroundings than the veterans of the party, who had spent many years in partisan detachments in the jungles, and he was skillful at manipulating ultra-revolutionary slogans. He quickly gathered strength and soon had the leadership of the Phnom Penh party organization in his grasp.

He was then able to involve the party in debates over vitally important tactical questions. Which should be the main form of party struggle after the departure of the colonizers--armed or political? Should the party

support the anti-imperialist policy of the existing government of Prince N. Sihanouk or fight against it? Should the party stay with the United Front of Patriotic Indochinese forces or fight alone under the banner of "independence and self-sufficiency"? Pol Pot had unequivocal answers for all of these questions: Only armed struggle, no support for the government, and only an "independent course" for the party.

The party and its internationalist, Marxist-Leninist wing were then headed by Tusanut, veteran of the communist movement in Indochina. In the beginning of 1959, when the debates started by Pol Pot reached their height, he was murdered under curious circumstances. At that time, the reason for his murder was unknown to party members. Now the Kampuchean communists are convinced that his savage murder lies on the conscience of Pol Pot and his assistants.²

After doing away with Tusanut, Pol Pot soon took his place and began to reorganize party activities in a leftist extremist fashion. In September 1960, the party began to be called the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Pol Pot had someone to rely on for assistance in his work. By the end of the 1920's, the Chinese Communist Party had already established its own cells in Kampuchea, made up of huaqiao--citizens of Chinese origin. It was through these cells that the Maoist leadership of the CCP, which had severed its ties with the international communist movement, later began to exert pressure on officials like Pol Pot and his followers in the Communist Party of Kampuchea. In this process, the Maoists took advantage of the fact that Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were bound to China by ethnic as well as ideological ties, since they also had Chinese blood flowing in their veins.

In the mid-1960's, Pol Pot went to China, which was being lashed by the waves of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." Pol Pot saw the Cultural Revolution as the embodiment of "revolutionary spirit" and found precisely what he had been looking for all of his life. He called the physical reprisals against tens of thousands of people and spiritual mockery of hundreds of thousands "purging the organism of symptoms of illness," and the delirious ideas of Mao Zedong "true contemporary Marxism." He returned to his native land a consummate Maoist and a zealous champion of the propagation of Maoist ideas in Kampuchea. It was precisely then that Beijing apparently decided to put its money on Pol Pot as the most reliable bearer of the Chinese leadership's policies to Kampuchea.

For a short time, Pol Pot tried to conceal his Maoist views and his hatred for the Vietnamese communists and the socialist countries from the majority of party members. Indochina was then the site of a raging war which had been unleashed by the imperialist aggressors and into which Kampuchea was soon drawn. Under these conditions, Pol Pot and his followers needed the help of Vietnam, which had taken on most of the burden of the aggressive strike, and the material and political support of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

At the same time, Beijing emissaries continued to prepare Pol Pot for the role of a Maoist protege in Kampuchea. This work became particularly intensive in 1970-1975. The Maoists took advantage of the fact that the overseas governing agencies of the National United Front of Kampuchea and the Royal Government of National Unity were located in Beijing. Pol Pot patiently awaited his hour. And this hour arrived in April 1975, when national liberation forces in Kampuchea won a victory and the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary group usurped control over the nation and the people.

Medieval Barbarism

The first "radical" action committed by the Pol Pot clique on the liberated territory of Kampuchea showed that hard times lay ahead for the people. On the pretext of "purging society," 3.5 million urbanites were taken out of Phnom Penh and other cities at gunpoint and resettled in rural areas within 72 hours. The people were not even allowed to take their own property with them.

The entire population of Kampuchea was divided into two categories by Pol Pot's assistants: Those who lived in the liberated zone were called loyal, while the inhabitants of regions under the control of the pro-imperialist rightist regime--that is, virtually all of the nation's urban population--were subject, as "hostile elements," to liquidation or "filtration" in prisons and concentration camps. Under the slogan of "uncovering hostile elements," all of those who had any contact, direct or indirect, first with the army or the previous administration and then with Sihanouk's followers were executed. A decree was issued, stating that all members of the exploitative class would be executed or sent into penal servitude. These included the Buddhist bonzes and Muslim mullahs, as well as representatives of the scientific, technical and artistic intelligentsia. Workers and peasants who had expressed the slightest dissatisfaction with the regime and its policies also often fell into this category.

The imprint of medieval barbarism also marked the socioeconomic policy of the Pol Pot regime. The urbanites who had been forcibly evicted from their familiar surroundings and rural inhabitants were herded into "labor armies" and "agricultural communes" patterned on the Maoist model. The atmosphere there of exploitation, oppression and the mockery of human dignity quite quickly proved to them that they had essentially ended up in concentration camps. Personal property was liquidated along with private property--everything, right down to household utensils, was collectivized. People were subjected to corporal punishment for the slightest offense. They were frequently killed on the spot, and in barbarous and highly perfected ways. For some reason, Pol Pot's executioners preferred to kill with hoes and hammers: photographs depicting these evil murders made their way around the globe.

Academic institutions were closed and the buildings were turned into prisons and barracks. There were no movies or television. The population was completely isolated from the outer world and heard only radio reports of "how splendid conditions are now in great China."

What role did the National United Front and Royal Government of National Unity, whose formal chief representatives were N. Sihanouk and Penn Nouth, play in the country? After April 1975 the Front and the Government of National Unity were not even mentioned. Although they continued to exist formally, the population knew only of some kind of secret "Angka"--the organization on behalf of which, as it later turned out, Pol Pot and his assistants were acting. Sihanouk and his supporters actually had no authority whatsoever, but their presence among the powers that be still interfered with the evil deeds of the Pol Pot clique. After all, virtually all of Sihanouk's supporters could be relegated to the second category or, if worst came to worst, to the intelligentsia, which was the chief object of Pol Pot's main strike. But it would not have been so simple to openly get rid of Sihanouk. He had lived in Beijing for a long time and had fairly influential defenders among the Maoist leaders. Therefore, Pol Pot worked out a plan for getting rid of Sihanouk and his supporters in a "democratic" way.

In January 1976, a new constitution went into effect in Kampuchea. Many of its articles were written in deliberately vague phrases and expressions, so as to conceal the essence of the sociopolitical changes taking place in the nation. For example, the constitution compiled by Pol Pot's forces contained an appeal to fight for the construction of a "national community of accord" in Kampuchea. It is not understandable just what kind of sociopolitical order this referred to; apparently, this euphemism was used to camouflage the desire of Pol Pot and his associates to make the entire nation blindly obey their commands. Another section of the constitution stated that in Kampuchea "the plants are owned by all of the workers and the fields are owned by all of the peasants," although the authors of the constitution must have known that all workers in Kampuchea had either been executed or evicted from the cities, while all peasants had been herded into "communes," where they did not even have kitchenware of their own.

But the main purpose of the constitution was to clear a path for the establishment of the dictatorial regime of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. It was declared that a "general election" would be held for the new organ of state power--the People's Representative Assembly (Pol Pot copied not only the Maoists' methods of action, but also their form of government organization).

In the beginning of April 1976, the first (and, apparently, the last, since there has been no word of any other) session of the People's Representative Assembly was held in Phnom Penh. At the session, it was announced that Prince N. Sihanouk and Penn Nouth were resigning from their respective positions as head of the state and prime minister of the Royal Government of National Unity. From that day on, the two of them were actually under house arrest in Phnom Penh, and after a while they were not even shown off to high-level Chinese visitors. The assembly appointed Pol Pot prime minister of "Democratic Kampuchea," Ieng Sary his assistant for foreign affairs, Son Sen his assistant for military affairs and Vorn Vet his assistant for national economic affairs. This quartet constituted the nucleus of the notorious "Angka," on behalf of which the "new order" was imposed on Kampuchea by the gun and by the sword for 3 years and 8 months.

'Socialism' According to the Beijing Recipe

It would be difficult to find another example in the history of mankind when such pains were taken, and on such a broad scale, to forcibly establish a sociopolitical regime so contrary to the developmental requirements of productive forces and so openly contemptuous of the elementary principles of justice and common sense. The regime of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary was even more horrifying than a return to some point thousands of years in the past, to a primitive community structure, since it had elements of the most frenzied fascism. On the whole, "this entire monster," said R. Valdez Vivo, member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, "to the joy of anticommunists, was given the name of 'radical, pure socialism.'"³

It is possible that Pol Pot actually believed that he had "discovered" something, that he would actually teach something to "all of these revisionists" and that he would show them how to "quickly and effectively" build a "classless society." If this was the case, he must not have "noticed" that he was only repeating all of Maoism's old tricks. Moreover, the Maoist experiment took on even more monstrous form in Kampuchea than in China, because the Chinese "advisers" of Pol Pot and his associates were on foreign territory and therefore had absolutely no need to feel any shame about means and methods.

One of Maoism's chief postulates is "the city must be surrounded by rural areas." In Kampuchea, it was implemented with particular zeal.

"Power is born of the rifle," Maoism asserts. And the total militarization of the country and the establishment of a military barracks regime became the focal point of all of the internal political activity of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique.

"Each generation of Chinese must go through their own Cultural Revolution," people in Beijing were constantly saying just recently. The Kampuchean variant of the "Cultural Revolution" surpassed all imaginable scales of evil. The execution of dissidents; the labeling of representatives of the most culturally advanced segment of the population--members of the intelligentsia, student youth and employees--"enemies," with all of the ensuing consequences; the liquidation of the educational system; the eradication of the "legacy of the past," accompanied by the destruction of remnants of ancient culture and the burning of scientific, academic and literary works on bonfires--all of these methods, which had been tested by the Maoists in China, flourished in Kampuchea.

Just as in China, the main brunt of the "Cultural Revolution" conducted by Pol Pot's forces was aimed against the communist party in this nation; the party was destroyed and the democratic leadership of the state by the party was replaced by the terrorist dictatorship of the notorious "Angka," which administered justice and handed out punishments to millions of Kampucheans.

Kampuchea also had its own "Great Leap Forward," which took the form of a campaign launched under the slogan "If we have rice, we will have everything!" As a result of this campaign, the nation's economy was plunged into chaos and pushed decades backward in its development.

Many journalists asked the Kampuchean patriots how they could justify the Pol Pot regime's savagely brutal treatment of their own people and how the following political motto could have made its appearance: "Kampuchea needs no more than 1 million people to build a new society." We thought about this for a long time, the Kampucheans answered, and we finally realize that there could only be one explanation: The purpose of the "merciless extermination of our people was, in the final analysis, the preparation of new 'living space' by Beijing for its huaqiao, and the transformation of Kampuchea into a basis of support for belligerent expansionism in Southeast Asia--a rich part of the world with a population of almost 400 million."⁴

Beijing's Card

The kind of convenient pawn or lucky card the Pol Pot regime represented in Beijing's expansionist "game" in Southeast Asia can be judged from the foreign policy line of "Democratic Kampuchea." From its very first days, the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime resolved to sever the traditional ties of solidarity which connected all of the Indochinese and had taken shape during the course of their lengthy joint struggle against common enemies.

On 4 May 1975, 4 days after the victory of the Vietnamese patriots who had hoisted the banner of liberation in Saigon, armed forces from Pol Pot's Kampuchea attacked the Vietnamese island of Fukuok. On 8 May they invaded Vietnamese territory in different regions between the cities of Hathien and Teinin, and on 10 May they occupied the island of Thotieu. Thousands of civilians in the southern provinces of the SRV became the victims of the Kampuchean militarists' raids. From that time on, Pol Pot's troops began to invade Vietnamese territory systematically and along the entire Vietnamese-Kampuchean border, stretching for more than 1,100 kilometers. In April 1977, regiments and divisions of the armed forces of "Democratic Kampuchea" began to take part in sorties into Vietnamese territory, and a large-scale border war began.⁵

In addition to combat operations on the border, a savage campaign of national hatred for Vietnam, the Vietnamese people and everything else Vietnamese was launched in Kampuchea by the Pol Pot clique. In 1977 and 1978, Phnom Penh radio broadcasts and the headlines of the capital's only news bulletin, documents and leaflets distributed in army units, "communes" and "labor armies" were filled with anti-Vietnamese slogans: "Vietnam is Kampuchea's number one enemy!" "Kampuchean, kill 30 Vietnamese and we will win!" "We are ready to fight against Vietnam for 700 years!" "We are backed up by a billion Chinese." Pol Pot began to make claims on sizable portions of Vietnamese territory, announcing over Phnom Penh radio: "I hope to liberate Saigon within my lifetime."

The government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam constantly offered the Kampuchean side opportunities to settle existing or new issues by means of negotiations and to consent to the restoration of normal relations. All of these constructive proposals, however, were rudely rejected by the clique of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, instigated directly by the Chinese leadership. Chinese military assistance in the form of aircraft, tanks, heavy artillery and rifles came by sea and by air to Kampuchea in a steady stream. The mounting hostilities against Vietnam were directed by the more than 20,000 Chinese "advisers" and servicemen who had inundated Kampuchea. The Chinese had put together an army consisting of more than 20 divisions--a colossal army for a country as small as Kampuchea. By the end of 1978, 16-18 divisions were prominently deployed on the eastern and southern sections of the Kampuchean-Vietnamese border.

Today we can already say with no hesitation that the Kampuchean tragedy was one of the pitiful results of Beijing's general expansionist strategy, which took on a definite anti-Vietnamese character at a particular stage. With the "hands" of Pol Pot's Kampuchea, using it as a blind weapon, the Chinese hegemonists hoped to exert constant pressure on the SRV, blackmail it, put an end to the peaceful and constructive labor of the Vietnamese people who were building socialism and thereby force the SRV leadership to renounce its independent foreign policy and follow in the wake of Beijing policy.

Public Indignation

Recently uncovered facts and the testimony of witnesses provide a fairly thorough description of the monstrous sociopolitical "model" imposed on Kampuchea by the Maoists.

Is it really necessary to prove that the popular masses would never have agreed to put up with this kind of "model" state for any length of time? Revolutionary outburst was inevitable, and it came. The wave of popular revolution swept away the band of usurpers in only 12 days.

The Pol Pot regime collapsed, like a house of cards, during the very first massive strike of the popular revolution. There were virtually no large-scale battles, and most of the cities were liberated without fighting. Revolutionary armed forces entered Phnom Penh without firing a single shot. Even before the fall of Phnom Penh, around 80 percent of the personnel of Pol Pot's army had taken the side of the people or deserted. The Pol Pot regime had discredited itself so thoroughly by losing all support in the nation, had taken on such an evil, inhumane and antinational character and had become so odious within the nation and in the international arena that no one could have saved it.

The struggle against the anti-popular Pol Pot clique began in the very first days after it had come to power.

The inhabitants of Siemreap Province rebelled in September 1975. In February 1977, a mutinous rebellion was staged by 600 soldiers of the 170th division, responsible for guarding Phnom Penh. The rebellion was suppressed. Division Commander Cha Krai was shot, and three other leaders were burned alive in the capital's sports arena.⁶ Massive uprisings also took place in November 1977 and May 1978 in the northwestern and eastern regions of Kampuchea. In the last uprising, a leading role was played by Division Commander Heng Sampin, member of the party committee of the eastern zone, who is now chairman of the People's Revolutionary Council of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Although both of these uprisings were drowned in blood, the rebel cause lived on. After the uprisings, the first liberated regions appeared in rural regions of Kampuchea and grew larger day by day. All of those who had reason to hide from Pol Pot's executioners and all of those who were filled with hatred for the murderers and a desire to fight, gun in hand, for the liberation of the country made their way to these liberated zones. In the middle of 1978, many veterans of the national liberation struggle began to return to their native land for the purpose of establishing contact with revolutionary forces and joining in a resolute struggle to liberate Kampuchea from the tyranny of Beijing's proteges. Powerful forces capable of challenging the anti-popular regime united and gathered strength on the blood-drenched Kampuchean soil. By the fall of 1978, revolutionary patriotic forces had total control over regions in 16 of the 19 provinces.

On 2 December 1978, a congress of people's representatives was convened in one of the liberated regions and announced the establishment of a united front for the national salvation of Kampuchea. The front was headed by true patriots, representatives of the healthy segments of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The congress adopted the declaration of the front, which called upon the entire population to rise up in a resolute struggle to overthrow the reactionary, dictatorial regime, to establish a genuine people's democratic order in Kampuchea and to build a peaceful, independent, democratic and nonaligned Kampuchea with a socialist course of development.

The appeal of the united front met with widespread response in all segments of the Kampuchean population, which saw it as a way to achieve long-awaited relief from a nightmare of tyranny and medieval barbarism. The front was supported by all people primarily because its program stressed nationwide objectives which appealed to millions of Kampucheans who had been smothered by Pol Pot's tyranny; this program gave the people the hope of returning to a normal life, to their families and to their native villages and cities, announced an end to forced labor, the barracks way of life and arranged marriages and declared guaranteed democratic freedoms, freedom of religion, the equality of all citizens and respect for their dignity and individuality.

The front called for the immediate cessation of armed conflicts and provocations on Kampuchea's borders with Vietnam, Thailand and Laos. In contrast to the foreign policy of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, which was of an

aggressive and antinational character, the front declared a policy of peace in the international arena and cooperation with all countries and expressed willingness to establish friendly, good-neighbor relations with states in Southeast Asia.

Following the Constructive Path

The victory of the January revolution in Kampuchea put an end to the gloomy days of medieval tyranny. Reports of positive changes in the country are coming out of the People's Republic of Kampuchea today. In accordance with the program of the united front and the decrees of the People's Revolutionary Council, genuine democracy is being established in the nation, steps are being taken to democratize all facets of sociopolitical life, production is being put in order, and public health, public education and public cultural services are being restored. The revolutionary authorities have firm control over the situation in the country. The population is enthusiastically participating in all of the work involved in eradicating the heavy burden of the past and firmly establishing the foundations for a new life.

Local organs of authority--people's self-government committees elected by the population--have been created in all provinces. People's militia detachments and subunits of the regular army of the republic have been formed. Mass trade-union, peasant, women's, youth and other public organizations have been revived and are now functioning. The Communist Party of Kampuchea is being reborn on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

The national conference of the united front, which was held in Phnom Penh in April 1979, was an event of great political significance. Conference participants analyzed the state of affairs in the country, outlined their basic objectives in the work of building a new Kampuchea and unanimously approved the statements and conclusions contained in the report of Peng Souvane, deputy chairman of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council. Conference documents stated that the people's revolution had entered a new phase after the clique of traitors had been overthrown--a phase of peace, independence, democracy and constant advancement toward genuine socialism.

The Kampuchean people will face tremendous difficulties along this path because the Pol Pot regime drove the nation's economy to the brink of total chaos and anarchy. By the day of liberation, almost the entire Kampuchean population was actually starving and had no real livelihood. Agricultural production had suffered tremendous damages. Many industrial enterprises had been destroyed or closed. The once-abundant rubber plantations will require serious restorative work. Additional difficulties are now arising from the population's move back to the cities, which were destroyed by Pol Pot's "experimenters."

One of the exceptionally complex problems the revolutionary authorities will have to deal with is the almost total lack of administrative, engineering and technical personnel and specialists in agriculture, public health

and education. As we have already noted, it was precisely these people who were executed first by Pol Pot's cutthroats. By the day of Kampuchea's liberation, there were only two physicians alive in the entire country.

But all of these difficulties, naturally, are of a temporary nature. The new Kampuchea has many loyal friends. It is being resolutely supported by the nations of the socialist community, the liberated countries and the entire progressive world public.

Our nation was one of the first to recognize the People's Republic of Kampuchea. A congratulatory telegram sent by Comrades L. I. Brezhnev and A. N. Kosygin to Heng Sampin, chairman of the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea and chairman of the Central Committee of the United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea, stresses that "the Soviet Union will continue to develop and strengthen the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between our countries and give the Kampuchean people support in the construction of a peaceful, independent, democratic and non-aligned Kampuchea with a socialist course of development."⁷ In his reply wire, Heng Sampin expressed profound gratitude to the people and government of the USSR for their inspiring support of the just cause of the Kampuchean revolution and expressed the Kampuchean patriots' feelings of combat solidarity and the most sincere friendship for the Soviet people.

The victory of the people's revolution in Kampuchea and the establishment of the People's Republic of Kampuchea are of great international significance. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, it was the forces of socialism and democracy that won a victory in Kampuchea, and this is a tremendous gain for the world revolutionary movement.⁸ Kampuchea has returned to the camp of the progressive forces of our day. The Kampuchean people now have a real opportunity to build a new life on the basis of truly socialist principles, the principles of scientific socialism.

The prolonged armed confrontation between two fraternal countries in Indochina--Vietnam and Kampuchea--has come to an end. After the Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Between the PRK and SRV had been signed, agreements on various types of cooperation between the PRK and LPDR strengthened the alliance of the three Indochinese countries even more. The solidarity of the people of Kampuchea, Vietnam and Laos, which is developing on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism and respect for one another's independence and sovereignty, and is an important factor guaranteeing the total and complete triumph of the revolutionary cause in each of these countries.

The collapse of the anti-popular clique which had been creating a crisis situation in Southeast Asia from almost 4 years, radically changed the state of affairs in this region. Real prerequisites were created for the establishment and development of stable relations, based on friendship, mutual trust and good neighborliness, between all countries of the Indochinese peninsula, including Thailand, for the strengthening of processes of detente in Southeast Asia and for the transformation of this region into a zone of peace, independence, freedom, neutrality, stability and prosperity.

There is no question that the event that took place in Kampuchea was unique. This was the first anti-Maoist revolution in the history of the world revolutionary, national liberation movement, the first victorious revolutionary uprising by the popular masses against the essentially anti-popular and antiscientific theoretical schemes and political practices of Maoism and against the reactionary policy of the current Chinese leadership, which was reflected in Kampuchea by the bloody regime of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary.

The strongest possible blow was dealt to Maoism in Kampuchea, demonstrating the groundless, fallacious and adventuristic nature of the so-called "Chinese path" toward "socialism" of the military barracks type, which Beijing propaganda is stubbornly trying to impose on people. The events in Kampuchea proved once again that there is no future in attempts at sociopolitical organization according to the Maoist model. The significance of the victory of the people's anti-Maoist revolution in Kampuchea therefore goes far beyond the boundaries of this country alone and calls for further in-depth study and interpretation.

The events in Kampuchea quite graphically demonstrated that those who associate themselves with the notorious Maoist tenets and the reactionary international activities of Beijing are acting against the vital interests of their people and their nation and will inevitably suffer defeat. The inglorious finale of the Maoist "experiment" in Kampuchea will undoubtedly have a sobering effect on political forces everywhere that still cherish illusions concerning the true role of the Beijing degenerates in the world arena. There is no question that a reassessment of views will also be necessary for those who mechanically persist in regarding the home-bred Maoists, who are now operating in many countries, as revolutionaries. These are most often Chinese agents, from among whom Beijing is training new Pol Pots and Ieng Sarys to carry out its hegemonistic intrigues. This is probably one of the most valuable lessons to be learned from the victory of the people's anti-Maoist revolution in Kampuchea.

FOOTNOTES

1. MATIN, 30 January 1979.
2. NOVOSTI V'YETNAMA, No 4, Hanoi, 1978, p 13.
3. GRANMA, 12 January 1979.
4. Quoted in PRAVDA, 12 March 1979.
5. "An Inquiry into the History of the Vietnamese-Kampuchean Conflict," Hanoi, 1979, p 16.
6. A. Levin, "Narod, kotoryy khoteli ubit'" [The People They Wanted To Kill], Moscow, 1979, p 27.

7. PRAVDA, 10 January 1979.

8. L. I. Brezhnev, "Vo imya schast'ya sovetskikh lyudey" [For the Sake of the Happiness of the Soviet People], Moscow, 1979, p 10.

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'FOUR MODERNIZATIONS': PRELIMINARY PROSPECTS AND REALITY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 52-64

[Article by V. I. Akimov, doctor of economic sciences, and V. I. Potapov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] The First Session of the Fifth NPC [National People's Congress], which was held in February-March 1978, outlined the strategic objective of the Beijing leadership: To turn China into a "great and strong" power by the end of the century. Session documents noted that by the end of the 20th century, China should "approach, reach or surpass the highest world standard for economic indicators" so as to become one of the world's leading nations in terms of national economic development. The attainment of this objective is being closely associated with the accomplishment of the so-called four modernizations--that is, the modernization of industry, agriculture, military affairs, and science and technology.¹

This objective was set forth in general terms at the First Session of the Fourth NPC in 1975, the documents of which envisaged the possibility of "developing the national economy in two steps." During the first stage, covering the period up to 1980, an "independent and relatively integral industrial and national economic system" was to be established. During the second stage, up to the end of the present century, agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology were to be modernized. The First Session of the Fourth NPC requested the PRC State Council to draw up a long-range plan for national economic development, whose fulfillment would establish the prerequisites for the second of these "steps"--making China one of the world's leading nations in terms of national economic development.

The accelerated development of the Chinese economy could be regarded as a positive objective if it was actually aimed at the construction of socialism in the nation, the all-round development of productive forces and the elevation of the Chinese people's material and cultural standard of living.

Experience has shown, however, that the program of the "four modernizations" is serving namely as a means of accomplishing the accelerated militarization of the country, turning China into a strong military power and establishing

a proper material basis for the buildup of military-industrial potential with the aim of "preparing for war." Today the Chinese press is already declaring that the improvement of material conditions for the working public will present an extremely complex problem and that its resolution will take a long time. In other words, the Chinese people are already being prepared to face the fact that the elevation of their financial status will be postponed for an indefinite but lengthy period of time.

The materials of the latest NPC session and the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee (November 1978) quite conclusively proved that the Chinese leadership is assigning priority in its policy to preparations for war. In his speech at this session, Hua Guofeng ordered that "the work of preparing for war be lifted to new heights." The actual purpose of the modernization of industry is clear from statements made by Chairman Ye Jianying of the NPC Standing Committee: "We absolutely must speed up the development of the main branches of industry, with emphasis on steel production, to lay a strong foundation for our defense industry and achieve its greater progress."²

The Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee reaffirmed the "existence of the serious danger of war" and pointed out "the need to strengthen the defense capability" of the nation, which was to be the purpose of the program of "four modernizations." Speakers at the plenum confirmed that the foreign policy line of the current Beijing leadership is aimed at further alliance with imperialist powers, the "expansion of the international united front of struggle against hegemonism" and confrontation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

According to the materials of the 11th CCP Congress, the latest NPC session and the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, "the present leaders of China are conducting a generally unified strategic line within the nation and in the international arena in order to achieve the accelerated development of the national economy and the modernization of the armed forces, thereby creating a more solid foundation for great-power ambitions."³

The "Basic Premises of the 10-Year Plan for National Economic Development in the PRC During the 1976-1985 Period" were discussed for the first time in many years at an NPC session (1978). The Chinese leadership regards these premises as a point of departure for carrying out the entire long-range economic program. "The period between 1976 and the end of 1985 will be the deciding decade," Hua Guofeng said in his report at this session, "in the attainment of the previously mentioned grand objectives."

In accordance with the materials of the session, an independent economic complex is to be created in each of six economic regions (southwest, northwest, central-south, east-China, north-China and northeast). The rate of increase in the output of all major types of industrial products is to be the highest rate since the founding of the PRC, the output of coal is to double by 1985 and the output of steel is to reach 60 million tons. Plans call for a harvest of 400 million tons of grain in 1985. Objectives have

been set in the development of transportation and the modernization of science and technology, which is regarded by the Beijing leadership as one of the main conditions for the reorganization of the material and technical base of industry and agriculture and the re-equipping of the army. The development of China's foreign economic ties, particularly with the developed capitalist countries and their monopolies, has been assigned an important place in plans for the economic development of this country.

Preliminary Plans for the Modernization of Individual Branches of the Economy

The following major tasks are to be accomplished in industry during the "deciding decade" (1976-1985):⁴

1. The acceleration of rates of development in major branches and the even further augmentation of industry's leading role in the national economy.
2. The creation of light industry for the manufacture of a variety of high-quality and inexpensive products and the guarantee of a considerable increase in its per capita output.
3. The construction of developed heavy industry, the further development of metallurgy, the fuel industry, power engineering, machine building and other existing branches on a new technical basis, the achievement of a position among the world's leading countries in terms of the output of steel, coal, petroleum and electric energy, and the guarantee that the petrochemical and electronics industries and other new branches will be relatively developed.
4. The substantial reinforcement of the military industry, which should, by utilizing existing production capacities to the fullest, "energetically develop and master the production of modern types of conventional and strategic weapons of better quality and manufacture them in larger quantities."
5. The guarantee of an annual average growth rate exceeding 10 percent in the gross industrial product between 1978 and 1985. During this period, the rate of production growth achieved during the last 28 years must be considerably surpassed for the major types of industrial products.
6. The smelting of 60 million tons of steel in 1985 and the doubling of the quantity of coal mined.⁵
7. The establishment of large industrial bases: 10 bases in ferrous metallurgy, 9 bases in nonferrous metallurgy, 8 coal bases, 10 oil and gas fields, 30 electric power stations and several other industrial facilities. After the construction of the "120 projects" has been completed, 14 relatively sizable and efficiently distributed industrial bases are to be established in addition to existing industrial enterprises.

In view of the fact that production capacities have been underutilized, as the Chinese press has pointed out, in industry for a long time for a number

of reasons,⁶ the augmentation of production at existing facilities has been judged necessary in the coming eight-year period, particularly in the next three years. In connection with this, plans call for an efficient combination of the utilization of existing reserves, the introduction of technical improvements and the remodeling of existing enterprises with the construction of new enterprises. Specialization and cooperation are to be accomplished on a broad scale (these forms of production organization were severely undermined by Mao Zedong's "Great Leap Forward" and "Cultural Revolution"). The Chinese leadership hopes to "gain time, accelerate speed and economize on investments" in this way.

In the area of capital construction, it was deemed necessary to elevate planning standards, concentrate efforts on major construction projects and strive for high quality in construction work and the rapid formation of "comprehensive production capacities." The importance of the construction and operations of small and medium-sized enterprises was reiterated. All provinces, cities of central jurisdiction and autonomous regions were requested to utilize local resources for the energetic establishment of small and medium-sized coal mines, small electric power stations, open-pit mines and cement and fertilizer plants, to thoroughly reinforce and develop production at small and medium-sized enterprises in ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy and increase the output of chemical raw materials. In contrast to previous years, it is now deemed necessary to include all small and medium-sized enterprises in the state plan, raise the technical and economic level of these enterprises and improve their management. It has been stressed that the requirements of large enterprises must be given primary consideration in the area of material supplies.

Another objective consists in the reorganization of machine building on the basis of specialization and cooperation, work according to a single plan, the standardization, systematization and coordination of products, the manufacture of first-class machines and equipment and higher production standards for the latest complete sets of large-scale and precision equipment.

The following specific tasks have been set in agriculture:

1. During the 1976-1985 period, the annual growth rate of the gross agricultural product should be 4-5 percent.
2. Grain production should reach 400 million tons by 1985.
3. More than 85 per cent of the major types of agricultural operations should be mechanized.
4. The per capita area planted to stable high-yield crops and guaranteed against drought and floods should reach one mu.⁷
5. Around 13.5 million hectares of virgin land should be tilled and cultivated.

One of the main objectives of the 10-year plan is the creation of a "solid agricultural base." The plan stresses the need to "mobilize the entire nation for the all-round development of agriculture." The present Chinese leaders believe that agricultural development should be accomplished primarily through "serious study of the progressive experience of Dazhai," the introduction of scientific farming techniques and the quicker mechanization of agricultural operations. Grain production has been declared the deciding link in agricultural development.

Agricultural development is to be accomplished in two basic ways: through the further improvement of the work of 12 large commercial grain cultivation bases and state farms, which are to triple or quadruple shipments of commercial grain within the next 8 years, and through the improvement of work in regions with poor harvests and a grain shortage. These regions have been ordered to not only provide themselves with sufficient grain in the next 2 or 3 years, but also to grow a surplus.

The development of virgin land according to plan, in such a way that plowland will "increase noticeably" from year to year, has been assigned a definite role in agricultural development. In accordance with the principles of specialization and the efficient distribution of enterprises in regions where natural and climatic conditions permit, bases are to be established for the cultivation of cotton, oil-bearing crops, sugar crops and other industrial crops. These bases are to become the main suppliers of these products.

The need for the comprehensive development of forestry, animal husbandry, ancillary crafts and fish farming is specified in the plan in the most general terms.

Just as in the past, great significance is attached to the encouragement of peasants to participate in widespread capital construction in farming, with emphasis on the improvement of soil and irrigation. The state has taken on the responsibility of building large hydraulic engineering units. Emphasis has been placed on the need to continue the construction of small and medium-sized irrigation facilities throughout the nation and to continue the work of improving the land on mountain slopes, red earth and saline soils.

The stricter supervision of "poor production brigades," so that they might reach the level of rich brigades as quickly as possible, has been recognized as one of the important measures of a social nature.

The Chinese leadership announced an increase in budget allocations for investments in agricultural capital construction and contributions to the fund for agricultural assistance, as well as the "proper regulation" of the distribution of materials and equipment.

In the field of transportation and communications, the need to build railway networks and communications systems meeting the requirements of industrial

and agricultural development was pointed out, as well as the need to convert railway transport to electric and diesel power and to accelerate the development of highway, river, sea and air transport. The plan for 1978-1985 calls for the construction of 6 railway trunk lines and 5 major ports (these trunk lines and ports are among the "120 projects" of capital construction).

As the PRC minister of railways announced, the volume of passenger and freight shipments is expected to double between 1978 and 1985. In addition to the construction of 6 new railway trunk lines, 10 existing lines will be remodeled, including the Beijing-Guangzhou and Tianjin-Shanghai lines. The most crowded lines are to be converted to electric power or be equipped with a second set of tracks. During the period in question, the proportion accounted for by electric and diesel locomotives in total freight shipments is to rise from 13 percent to more than 60 percent. At least 80 percent of all materials handling operations, construction work and road maintenance work are to be mechanized.

Among other types of transport, water transport is being given the greatest attention. Five major ports are now being remodeled or built (Shanghai, Tianjin, Huangpu, Lianyungang and Qinhuangdao). They are to be converted into modern comprehensive and specialized ports. The Great China Canal (Beijing-Hangzhou) is to be remodeled, the necessary work is to be performed on the Yangtze River (cleaning the channel, establishing an automatic dispatcher service, etc.) to increase its freight traffic, and the port of Wuhan is being remodeled and enlarged.

The plans of the Chinese leadership attach great significance to the development of science and technology. Scientific and technical backwardness is to be overcome as quickly as possible.⁸ It has been stressed that this is an essential condition for the rapid development of the economy and the consolidation of the military strength of the nation. Judging by the materials of the All-China Conference on Scientific Development (March 1978), the current eight-year plan for scientific and technical development envisages more energetic research activity in 27 fields, among which priority will be given to agriculture, energy sources, the production of materials, electronic computer equipment, laser equipment, space science and technology, high energy physics and genetic engineering.

The task of "achieving definite success" in several leading branches of science and technology has been set to guarantee a low overhead, abundant and stable harvest, and the comprehensive development of agriculture. The need has been emphasized to "contribute to the technical remodeling of all branches of industry," "the discovery of even larger quantities of mineral resources" and, "in particular, the quickest possible transformation of the appearance of such weak links as the fuel industry, electrical power engineering, mining and transportation."⁹

In the field of energy sources, scientific investigation will focus not only on the development of hydraulic and thermal power engineering, but also on

analysis of the possibilities for the use of solar energy, the energy of winds and tides, and geothermal energy and the possibilities for the development of nuclear power engineering. In the area of the production of materials, China is expected to become a leading producer of vanadium and titanium, and approach or surpass the world standard for the technology of copper, aluminum, nickel, cobalt and rare mineral extraction. All of these materials are known to be of great value in various fields of technology, including the military.

Along with the development of applied studies in science and technology, the objective has been set of "giving full attention to theoretical work in the natural sciences, including such fundamental sciences as modern mathematics, high energy physics and molecular biology."

The eight-year plan for scientific and technical development envisages the growth of the scientific personnel staff to 800,000 individuals, the construction of several modern scientific experimental facilities, the creation of a statewide multisectorial system of scientific and technical research and the development of scientific instrument building.

The specific indicators of the 23-year program for economic modernization which pertained to the year 2000 have not been published in the PRC. All that is known, as has already been pointed out, is that China is supposed to match "the world's leading countries" in terms of national economic development. Some ministries, however, have reported their preliminary plans for the development of several important branches. For example, the PRC minister of the coal industry announced that the objective of this branch is to double coal production within the next 10 years and double it once again by the end of this century. In January 1978, a conference was held to discuss the work of the metallurgical industry; the objectives set forth here was an annual increase of 4-6 million tons in cast iron and steel production which will total 92-138 million tons by the year 2000. In the spring of 1977, a conference in Daqing set the objectives of "building approximately 10 oil fields as large as the Daqing field by the end of the 20th century"¹⁰--that is, according to approximate estimates, of increasing petroleum production to 250-300 million tons.

The approximate plan for the development of electronics industry during the last quarter of our century can be judged from the materials of the All-China Conference to Disseminate the Progressive Experience of Daqing in the Electronics Industry, held at the end of 1977. The long-range plan calls for "acceleration of the campaign to modernize electronics science and technology, the automation of production and management by scientific means to lay a solid foundation for the development of the electronics industry within the next 3 years, the elevation of its general level of development and a sharp rise in this level in its major branches within the next 8 years, the construction of a strong and modern electronics industry and the achievement of the level of the world's leading countries within the next 23 years."¹¹

Possibilities for Carrying Out the Program of the 'Four Modernizations'

The plan to carry out the program of the "four modernizations," this new program of "superindustrialization" or new variation on the "Great Leap Forward," on schedule and on the proposed scale seems absolutely unrealistic. We will attempt to prove this, using such major branches of the Chinese economy as agriculture, electrical power engineering and ferrous metallurgy as an example.

China is encountering tremendous difficulties in the development of agriculture, which is considered to be the basis of the nation's economy, and in the resolution of the food problem. Suffice it to say that the average annual rate of increase in grain yield did not even reach 1.5 percent between 1958 and 1978. According to official PRC statistics, per capita food production in 1977 was the same as in 1955--food production "barely kept up with population growth."¹² The chronic shortage of grain and other types of agricultural products has made it necessary for China to spend substantial currency resources on the purchase of foodstuffs and cotton. For example, China imported 7 million tons of grain in 1977 and 8 million tons in 1978. In 1977 the PRC purchased 160,000 tons of vegetable oil, 362,000 tons of soybeans, 1.6 million tons of sugar, 1.5 million bales of cotton, etc.¹³ Purchases of foodstuffs and cotton cost the PRC 1.5 billion dollars each year.

The projected harvest of 400 million tons of grain in 1985 is unrealistic and beyond the capabilities of Chinese agriculture, which will remain one of the most backward branches of the national economy for several decades. During the next 8 years, it will be impossible to radically transform Chinese agriculture, which, as the Chinese press has had to admit, is based on manual labor and distinguished by extremely low labor productivity, low marketability and a low level of accumulations.¹⁴ The achievement of the planned indicator of grain yield for 1985 will necessitate an absolute increase of 160 million tons or an annual increase of 20 million tons from 1978 on. The annual rate of grain production growth between 1978 and 1985 will have to rise, according to plan assignments, to over 6 percent, which is four times as high as the actual indicators for the last 20 years. It is more probable that the average annual increase in grain yield will be 2-3 percent, which will produce a harvest of 290-310 million tons of grain in 1985. This volume of grain production will only produce a negligible increase in per capita quantity. The urgency of the food problem will be exacerbated by considerable difficulties in supplying the rapidly growing population with animal husbandry products, fish, vegetables and fruit.¹⁵

The completion of the program for the modernization of Chinese agriculture by 1985 will require approximately 1.5 million tractors (calculated in conventional 15-horsepower units)--that is, three times as many as in 1977. Moreover, it will be necessary to dramatically improve their quality, master the production of new models, improve their technical maintenance and replace worn-out equipment with new. This kind of complex task seems to be beyond the capabilities of the Chinese economy in its present state. We cannot forget that

only one-tenth of all plowland in China is now being worked with tractors, and that China's supply of tractors per hectare of plowland is equivalent to only 2.5 percent of the U.S. quantity.¹⁶ It is not at all surprising that the Chinese leadership has had to postpone the deadlines for the completion of mechanization. Whereas in 1975 the objective was to mechanize 70 percent of all major agricultural operations by 1980, the unrealistic nature of this plan was already being announced by the end of 1978. The Chinese press has reported that only "selective mechanization" can be accomplished by 1980, meaning that "some regions might surpass the indicator of the mechanization of manual labor in agriculture by 70 percent and others may not reach this level."¹⁷ The more complex task of mechanizing 85 percent of all major agricultural operations by 1985 is obviously impracticable.

It is not likely that China will be able to cultivate around 13.5 million hectares of virgin land effectively enough by 1985. Estimates indicate that this will require more than 20 billion yuan in capital investments,¹⁸ tens of thousands of powerful tractors, sizable quantities of other modern equipment, large-scale land reclamation and irrigation projects, the construction of new mineral fertilizer plants, etc.

The intensive use of chemicals in agriculture has been accompanied by substantial difficulties in China. The emphasis on the construction of a multitude of small chemical fertilizer plants (they produced 69 percent of the total output in 1976) proved to be unjustified because their products were of poor quality and their overhead costs were too high. In recent years, China has resorted to the purchase of 13 large chemical fertilizer plants abroad with a projected output of approximately one million tons a year each. Seven of them have been opened for operation. According to Chinese data, the 1978 output (between January and the beginning of October) totaled 44 million tons of fertilizers.¹⁹ The fertilizer application dosage per hectare of plowland in China, however, is still low (only one-sixth as high, for example, as in Japan).²⁰

The Beijing leadership's huge military expenditures are the reason for the meager amounts allocated for the needs of agriculture. According to estimates, agriculture accounts for only 5 percent of all state budget allocations. The further development of agriculture will be connected, to a considerable degree, with the promotion of the line of "self-reliance"--that is, through the self-financing of "people's communes" and production brigades and the more pronounced intensification of the labor of hundreds of millions of peasants.

These are the real prospects for the accomplishment of the so-called modernization of Chinese agriculture.

Now we will examine the state of affairs in electrical power engineering in China.

The output of electric energy in the PRC and in several developed countries in 1977 was the following:

Table 1

| Countries | Output of electric energy | | Equivalents to PRC figure, number of times in excess | |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|--|------------|
| | Total, billions of kilowatt-hours | Per capita, kilowatt-hours | Total Output | Per capita |
| World | 7,254 | 1,759 | - | 11.1 |
| USSR | 1,150 | 4,442 | 8.4 | 28.1 |
| United States | 2,300 | 10,609 | 16.8 | 67.2 |
| Japan | 533 | 4,681 | 3.9 | 29.6 |
| FRG | 326.3 | 5,483 | 2.9 | 34.7 |
| England | 289.4 | 5,173 | 2.1 | 32.7 |
| PRC | 137 | 158 | - | - |

Source: "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1977 g." [The National Economy of the USSR in 1977], Moscow, 1978, pp 73-76; PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1978, No 2, p 30.

We can see from Table 1 that the PRC is lagging far behind the United States and the USSR and considerably behind several other countries in terms of the absolute output of electric energy and that its per capita output is only equivalent to a fraction of the output of many other countries. We could add that in 1977 China was 9th in the world in terms of total electric power production, but only 84th or 85th in terms of per capita production. Estimates indicate that the situation is not likely to change substantially by 1985. By this time, the total output of electric power in the PRC, according to estimates, will not reach 300 billion kilowatt-hours--that is, it will be lower than the 1977 figure for the United States, the USSR, Japan, the FRG and Canada. By 1985, England, and possibly even France, will also be producing more electric power than the PRC.

To match even the present average world level of per capita electric power production (1,759 kilowatt-hours), China will have to produce around 2.1 trillion kilowatt-hours in the year 2000 (with a population estimated at 1.2 billion). This means that the total output of electric power stations will have to be around 490 million kilowatts as opposed to the 42 million kilowatts in 1977.

To achieve this capacity, China will have to increase its output of electric energy by an average of approximately 20 million kilowatts from 1978 on and invest around 20-22 billion yuan in this industry annually. For the sake of comparison we will note that in 1978 the increase in the capacity of electric power stations, including imported equipment, was 4 million kilowatts; moreover, this year was judged a year "marked by a substantial increase in power engineering capacities." According to estimates, expenditures on the needs of capital

construction in electrical power engineering in 1977 were approximately equal to 4 billion yuan. It is also of interest that the annual capacity of equipment manufactured in Chinese power machine-building enterprises did not exceed 4 million kilowatts in 1977, and even these capacities were systematically underutilized. Possibilities for importing equipment are also limited.

All of this would seem to suggest that China will not be able to reach even the present average world level of per capita electric power production by the year 2000 and will still lag behind many other countries in terms of this exceedingly important comprehensive indicator.

The situation is similar in ferrous metallurgy.

Steel production figures for 1977 in the PRC and several developed countries were the following:

Table 2

| Countries | Steel production | | Equivalents to PRC figure, number of times in excess | |
|---------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--|------------|
| | Total, millions of tons | Per capita kilograms | Total output | Per capita |
| World | 677 | 164 | - | 3.9 |
| USSR | 147 | 566 | 6.1 | 20.4 |
| United States | 116 | 535 | 4.8 | 19.3 |
| Japan | 102 | 899 | 4.3 | 32.4 |
| FRG | 38.9 | 654 | 1.8 | 23.6 |
| PRC | 24 | 27.7 | - | - |

Source: "Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSR v 1977 g.," Moscow, 1978, pp 62-67, 77.

In 1977 the PRC was fifth in the world in terms of steel production, lagging particularly far behind the USSR, the United States and Japan, and lagging behind several dozen countries in terms of per capita production.

As we have already noted, the projected output for 1985 is 60 million tons of steel. According to official Chinese data, the output of steel in 1978 totaled 31 million tons (production growth was connected with the improvement of general conditions in ferrous metallurgy, which aided in the complete utilization of existing production capacities; in addition, the production output increased at small enterprises producing low-grade steel). This means that the output of steel should increase by 29 million tons between 1979 and 1985, or by more than 4 million tons each year. New production capacities will have to be augmented on approximately the same scale. Part of this increase can also be derived through the improvement of technology and the organization of production and the better utilization of existing reserves. The major way of achieving this increase, however, will consist in the

construction of costly enterprises of the modern type and the radical remodeling of existing large and medium-sized enterprises with a technical level below the current world standard.

Chinese industry is not capable of supplying PRC metallurgy with enough modern equipment to achieve the planned indicators of steel production in 1985. China is encountering its greatest difficulties in the production of rolling and adjusting equipment, high-powered blowers, oxygen equipment, highly productive complete sets of equipment for large blast furnaces, converters, concentration and sinter plants and equipment for the mining of iron ore. Judging by numerous agreements with firms in capitalist countries, China intends to secure a considerable portion of the increase in ferrous metal production by importing complete and incomplete sets of equipment. In particular, the construction of Boshan Metallurgical Combine, which is one of the "120 large projects" envisaged for the 1978-1985 period, began near Shanghai at the end of 1978 with the aid of the Japanese Nippon Steel Corporation. The combine will include two blast furnaces with a net volume of 4,063 cubic meters each and three oxygen converters with a capacity of 300 tons each. All processes will be computerized. The projected output of the combine is 6 million tons of cast iron and an equivalent quantity of steel. The construction work is being performed in two phases and should be completed by 1983.²¹ The construction of the combine will cost 2.5 billion dollars.²²

According to reports in the foreign press, China is negotiating with firms in Japan, the FRG, England and several other countries on the modernization and doubling of production capacities at the Anshan, Benxi and Shijingshan metallurgical combines and the remodeling of the Wuhan and Taiyuan combines. The possible purchase of equipment for two more large combines with a capacity of 6 million tons of steel each in the provinces of Hebei and Shanxi has also been reported. According to the estimates of Austrian economists, the construction of these new enterprises with foreign assistance and the achievement of a steel production volume of 60 million tons in 1985 will require investments of 30-40 billion dollars, which will be, in our opinion, unrealistic for the PRC.

On the whole, considering the impossibility of importing equipment in the required dimensions, the limited capabilities of domestic machine building, the underdeveloped railway and coking by-product industries and the shortage of material and financial resources, we can assume that China will not be able to guarantee an output of 60 million tons of steel in 1985. Preliminary estimates indicate that the PRC will be unable to surpass the present level of steel production in the USSR and the United States, and possibly Japan, in the year 2000. It will not even be able to match the current average world level of per capita steel production.

In carrying out their program of "four modernizations," the current Chinese leadership is placing great hopes on assistance from the developed capitalist countries in Europe, the United States and Japan. The Chinese press has

stressed that the "energetic development of foreign trade, the flexible use of methods and means conventionally used in international practice, the utilization of foreign financial resources and the implementation of progressive technology will all be essential for the reinforcement of economic construction."²³ China has essentially discarded the principle of "self-reliance" in trade and other economic relations with the capitalist countries and has energetically negotiated with the West during the last 2 or 3 years in regard to the possibility of credit and the establishment of joint industrial enterprises and jointly controlled companies in the PRC. Plans have been drawn up to attract American, English, French, Japanese and other foreign capital into the economy on a broad scale. In order to attract this capital, the Beijing leadership, according to the foreign press, is prepared to pass special laws to guarantee the capitalists a profit on their capital investments.

According to reports in the foreign press, China and Japan are negotiating the possibility of cooperation in the development of energy resources in China, including the working of oil deposits in the southern part of the Bohai gulf, the construction of hydraulic power stations and the working of bituminous coal deposits in the provinces of Shandong and Shanxi.

A new type of cooperation with the West, which is being energetically proposed by China, consists in the conclusion of compensatory transactions, as well as the organization of joint enterprises and the joint development of Chinese natural resources. According to the terms of these agreements, China will receive equipment, assistance in its installation and technology, and will pay for this with the products of the enterprises where the equipment will be used. For example, an English-Chinese agreement on cooperation in the working of nonferrous metal deposits in China envisages the delivery of technology and equipment and the financing of extractive operations on the basis of compensatory transactions and technical assistance in geological prospecting work. The proposed working of oil deposits with the aid of Japan in the Bohai gulf will also be conditional on shipments of oil to compensate Japanese businessmen for their expenditures.

These changes in the foreign economic policy of the current Chinese leadership testify to China's reorientation toward the capitalist countries. The Chinese leadership's course is involving China more and more in the capitalist system of division of labor and will create substantial prerequisites for its increasing economic dependence on the leading imperialist states.

China intends to purchase large quantities of machines and equipment in the world capitalist market during the next decade. According to data in the CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, published by the National Council on American-Chinese Trade, these purchases could be estimated at 40-43 billion dollars between 1978 and 1985. Machinery and equipment imports of these proportions will give rise to acute financing problems.

In 1978 a Japanese-Chinese private trade agreement was concluded for a period of 8 years and a sum of 20 billion dollars. According to this agreement,

Japan is supposed to supply equipment for industrial enterprises and the latest technology in exchange for Chinese raw materials, mainly petroleum and bituminous coal. Contracts have been signed for the equipment for a metallurgical combine, which is now being built not far from Shanghai.

There have been reports that a consortium of West German banks has declared its willingness to extend credit to China in the amount of 14 billion dollars, including credit for the construction of ferrous metallurgy enterprises. The possibility of credit is also being discussed with monopolies in other capitalist countries of Europe, as well as the United States. An agreement has been signed with the Paris National Bank, envisaging the extension of credit to China in the amount of up to 7 billion dollars to pay for goods imported from France. According to the estimates of foreign experts, the total credit extended by Western countries to China could amount to around 40 billion dollars. These loans are especially designated--they are extended only to finance purchases of machinery and equipment and cannot be used by China at its own discretion.

Government loans extended by the Western countries could become an important source of financing for individual projects. China has expressed an interest in borrowing money from the Japanese Government's fund for international economic cooperation, which extends credit at an interest rate of 3-3.5 percent as against the bank rate of 7.5 percent. The conclusion of credit agreements will depend on the Chinese leadership's specified sum of indebtedness to the capitalist countries.

Up to the present time, imports, including those from the developed capitalist countries, have mainly been financed through exports. This will continue to be the main source of financing in the future. An article entitled "Foreign Trade Must be Considerably Developed" in RENMIN RIBAO stressed that, regardless of the techniques and means employed in the utilization of foreign monetary resources, it will still be necessary to expand exports to pay for imports. "Exports must be developed vigorously," the article stated, "and substantial foreign currency reserves must be created; only this will provide for the constant improvement of our nation's purchasing power."²⁴ Plans for the expanded production of goods for export stipulate, as the Chinese press has reported, the creation of "export bases and specialized enterprises and shops" and a change in the structure of exports--that is, "in addition to shipments of such traditional export goods as agricultural products and by-products, the products of light industry, textiles, handicrafts and art objects, the proportion accounted for in total exports by industrial commodities, products of the mining industry and durable consumer goods must be considerably augmented."²⁵

Great hopes are being placed on the export of petroleum. A dramatic increase in petroleum exports, however, will necessitate its production in greater quantities, as well as its storage and shipment, which could involve considerable difficulties. The last 2 years have proved this. Petroleum exports

to Japan, which is the main consumer of Chinese oil, amounted to 7 million tons in 1978, as against 6.5 million in 1977. Relatively small quantities of petroleum were shipped to the United States (570,000 tons) and Italy (100,000 tons). In addition to petroleum, other products which are to be shipped out of the country in large quantities for the purpose of expanding exports include coal, iron ore and nonferrous metal concentrates--that is, mainly fuel and industrial raw materials.

China has a substantial negative balance of trade with the capitalist countries of the West, and this balance will increase in the future. As a result of a dramatic increase in imports (around 7 billion dollars) in comparison to exports (around 4 billion dollars), the negative balance in China's trade with these countries rose to 3 billion dollars in 1978 in contrast to 1.1 billion in 1977. The projected large purchases of modern weapons in the developed capitalist countries will substantially increase China's debt.

Naturally, a large debt to the capitalist West will have a negative effect on the future economic development of China. The Chinese leadership will have to institute a strict policy of economy in the nation, primarily at the expense of civilian branches of the national economy, which will inevitably perpetuate the low standard of living of the Chinese workers.

In summation, it should be noted that even under the most favorable conditions, including political stability in the nation and adherence to an economic policy aimed at the augmentation of labor productivity through a return to the methods of economic management that were characteristic of the First Five-Year Plan and the period of "regulation," the PRC economy will, at best, match the Soviet level of the early 1970's. In the field of agriculture, even by the year 2000, China, with its population of 1.2 billion, will be unable to match the average world level of per capita production, not to mention the levels of the world's leading nations, including the Soviet Union. Difficulties in carrying out plans for agricultural development will have a negative effect on the entire program of "four modernizations."

Therefore, in spite of its increased purchases of modern equipment abroad, China will not be among the world's leading, economically developed countries by the year 2000; it will be impossible for China to carry out its plans for the production of major industrial and agricultural products and, as a result, China will still lag behind the Soviet Union in terms of economic conditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (Documents)," Beijing, 1978, pp 42-43.
2. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 19 May 1978.
3. KOMMUNIST, 1978, No 13, p 93.

4. See RENMIN RIBAO, 17 March 1978.
5. Ibid., 4 January 1978.
6. Underproduction amounted to 100 billion yuan worth of industrial commodities and 28 million tons of steel just in the 1974-1978 period (RENMIN RIBAO, 7 March 1978).
7. A mu is equal to one-fifteenth of a hectare.
8. According to the official data of the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, China is 15-20 years behind the developed countries in the practical implementation of many of the latest scientific and technical discoveries.
9. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 March 1978.
10. Ibid., 8 May 1977.
11. Ibid., 7 December 1977.
12. Ibid., 6 October 1978.
13. SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, 5 July 1978.
14. HONGKONG, 1978, No. 9.
15. This viewpoint is expressed in one of the articles in the 12 February 1979 issue of RENMIN RIBAO.
16. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 6 October 1978.
17. RENMIN RIBAO, 12 November 1978.
18. Ibid., 1 December 1977.
19. Ibid., 4 October 1978.
20. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 6 October 1978.
21. RENMIN RIBAO, 20 December 1978.
22. FINANCIAL TIMES, 25 October 1978.
23. RENMIN RIBAO, 4 December 1978.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.

REACTIONARY ATTACK ON RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF JAPANESE CITIZENS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1979 pp 65-75

[Article by V. N. Yereмін, candidate of juridical sciences]

[Text] Contemporary Japanese law has several of the external features of democratism, including a broad array of rights and freedoms that sound particularly appealing to those who are unacquainted with the norm. In fact, however, these rights and freedoms are not reliably guaranteed and, what is more, are restricted by the same legislation, by the interpretations of the law by authorities and bourgeois theoreticians and by the law-enforcement practices of punitive agencies. The infringement of citizens' rights and freedoms is the main tendency in a process which is now taking place in Japanese society and is known as the "reaction in justice" (shihono hando).

Exposing the anti-people essence of the "reaction in justice," Japanese democratic lawyers have stressed that the "crisis in the judiciary is a crisis for basic human rights, a crisis for the constitution and a crisis for democracy."¹

The "reaction in justice" consists of the following facets or elements: the origination and development of politically repressive legislation; the reinforcement of the reactionary nature of the punitive system; extension of the practice of the legal political suppression of democratic forces.

The Origination and Development of Politically Repressive Legislation

A diversified system of criminal-legal and administrative-legal provisions, which are either expressly intended to serve political repressive purposes or have become firmly entrenched in the practice of legal political repression, exists as part of the contemporary bourgeois government of Japan. An analysis of these provisions and their application proves that they are used by ruling circles to encroach upon many civil rights and freedoms.

Japanese lawyers call criminal-legal and administrative-legal normative acts which contain provisions of this type "legislation in the area of public order" (tian rippo). The degree to which Japanese laws and the practice of their application are actually antidemocratic becomes particularly apparent

when we examine the entire range covered by these acts and all of the rights and freedoms they infringe upon. The "legislation in the area of public order" includes, above all, the law on the prevention of subversive activity, which "threatens the constitutional rights and freedoms of assembly, association and collective action" and represents a "gross violation of the principles of punishment stipulated in contemporary criminal law (the impunity of ideas...)." The punishment of individuals and measures against organizations, envisaged in this law, "are a serious threat," according to Japanese legal experts, "to constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of thought and conscience, the freedom of religion, the freedoms of assembly and association, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and other means of expressing beliefs, freedom of scientific activity and the rights of workers to form unions and take collective action." This legislation also includes several articles of the criminal code, the law on petty misdemeanors, the laws on state and municipal personnel, basic criminal law, the law on the protection of defense secrets and the law on the self-defense forces.

"Legislation in the area of public order," which is initiated on the parliamentary level, is supplemented by decrees on public safety (anzen jorei)--normative legal acts adopted by the decision of municipal assemblies. They differ slightly from one territorial administrative unit to another, but in terms of content, all of these decrees have the following common features: the stipulation that permission must be obtained from "public safety commissions," which allegedly central public affairs apart from police activity but which actually often legalize the views of the police bureaucracy by means of their decisions, to hold meetings, mass rallies and demonstrations, or the stipulation that these commissions must be informed in advance that gatherings of this kind will be undertaken; the endowment of police organs with authority over these undertakings; criminal penalties for the violators of this provision. Japanese democratic lawyers have said that "the decrees on public safety, which are intended to make the freedom of assembly and other means of personal expression guaranteed in Article 21 of the Constitution dependent on the regulations of direct police authority, are so much a part of the legislation in the area of public order that their constitutionality is gravely in doubt."

In order to restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens, particularly their right to assemble and demonstrate, punitive agencies employ administrative legal provisions which essentially do not differ from criminal law in terms of content. For example, if the police wished to determine the identity of participants in meetings and demonstrations, learn the organizations to which they belong, examine their personal property, insist that meetings be ended, restrict or prohibit the movement of demonstrators along the street, or break up demonstrations with the aid of physical force, they can find the grounds for this in the provisions of Articles 2 and 5 of the law on the performance of official police duties, Article 2 of the law on the police and Article 7 of the law on pedestrian and motor vehicle traffic.

The first striking discovery in an analysis of politically repressive legislation in Japan is the outright undermining of constitutional provisions in regard to rights and freedoms. In addition to the infringement of rights

and freedoms by means of criminal and administrative law, there are also norms and provisions in the area of criminal trial law which contradict the constitution. For example, although the constitution declares that an individual may be detained (Article 35) and that his property can be searched or confiscated (Article 39), but only on the strength of a court order or at the site of a crime, the criminal trial code has introduced a third variant--"emergency detainment" (Article 210), "emergency search" and "emergency confiscation" (Article 220).

One noticeable tendency in the development of "legislation in the area of public order" is the attempt to repeal or amend--and only for the worse--acts which do not suit ruling circles, as well as the introduction of more reactionary statutes providing broader opportunities for the infringement of rights and freedoms and new provisions worded in such a way that arbitrary interpretation is made possible.

First of all, the reactionary attack on the more progressive norms in the existing constitution should be pointed out. In order to disavow the positive contents of this document, it is declared to be something "imposed" on the Japanese people by the occupation regime.

The second greatest danger, after attacks on the constitution, to the rights and freedoms of citizens is the reform of criminal law being planned by the government. This reform is supposed to center around a revision of the criminal code.

The draft of the new criminal code (1974) contained provisions on conspiracy as a separate type of crime, on industrial spying and the disclosure of professional secrets, on the organization of "mass-scale disorder" as a separate type of crime, on longer deadlines for arrests and broader possibilities for their application. If the criminal code is ratified in this form, these provisions could become a dangerous instrument of encroachment upon rights and freedoms. Representatives of the mass media have repeatedly stressed that the provisions concerning the disclosure of professional secrets and industrial espionage will endanger their freedom to inform the public of the plans of ruling circles.

Taking advantage of cases of airplane hijacking by extremists, the Japanese Ministry of Justice drafted a bill in February 1978, whose adoption would make it possible to dispense with the defense in some types of judicial proceedings, even cases involving crimes which are punishable by execution or life imprisonment. At the same time, Article 289 of the present criminal trial code states that these cases cannot be investigated without the participation of the defense; moreover, Article 37 of the Japanese Constitution declares that "the accused in a criminal case can enlist the services of a qualified attorney under any circumstances." The nature of the projected law as a tool of arbitrary justice is particularly apparent in the section permitting investigation of the case when "the counsel for the defense has left the courtroom after he has been ordered to do so by the bailiff." The broad democratic public of Japan strongly protested this bill.

Attempts have been made to revise the law on the performance of official police duties for the purpose of expanding police authority to take coercive action against citizens and to institute stricter immigration laws for the purpose of expanding the possibility of using them against democratic foreigners residing permanently in Japan.

Reinforcement of the Reactionary Nature of the Punitive System

A powerful police structure has been constructed and is functioning in Japan. It is under the immediate jurisdiction of the prime minister (through the so-called State Commission for Public Security). The most universal possibilities of restricting the rights and freedoms of citizens have been granted to the administrative police, who function on the basis of the law on the performance of official police duties. The vague wording of this law permits, in particular, the suppression of mass public demonstrations by means of militarized police formations--"mobile detachments." The criminal police, who function on the basis of the criminal trial code, are actively used to prepare judicial cases against representatives of democratic forces. The political police (*keibi koan keisatsu*--public security and guard police) conducts secret political investigations.

Numerous judicial trials of political opponents of the monopolistic bourgeoisie in postwar Japan provide the most conclusive description of the role played by judicial agencies in the restriction of civil rights and freedoms. These include the trials of Shimoyama, Mitaka, Matsukawa, Shiratori, Sugo, Suita, Oso, Ashibetsu and others. Judicial agencies, which make up a formally independent system, are actually closely bound to the Ministry of Justice, which is thereby provided with ways of influencing the courts. The broad popular masses are prevented from taking part in the performance of judicial functions, which is largely accomplished through the appointment of judges (in accordance with the provisions of Articles 79 and 80 of the Constitution). The reinforcement of the politically repressive functions of the court provides additional impetus for such forms of "reactions in justice" as "the propaganda of anticommunist ideology among court officials and the establishment of a privileged judicial bureaucracy."⁵

Broad segments of the working public have justifiably concluded that "the court is not in any sense sacred; we cannot say that verdicts are always just."⁶

An important place in the punitive system is occupied by the offices of the public prosecutor. They have special opportunities to restrict rights and freedoms because, according to the provisions of Japanese criminal trial law, only the public prosecutor has the right to press charges. The offices of the public prosecutor in Japan are part of the Ministry of Justice, which aids in subordinating them to the will of ruling circles.

The law on the prevention of subversive activity also envisages measures against organizations, such as "the restriction of activity" and "the order to disband," the decisions on which are made by the public security jury (*koan shinsu inkai*)--a small group formed expressly for this purpose by

the Ministry of Justice. "The fact that the public security jury, which is an administrative organ, can, on the basis of secret proceedings, take regulatory measures against organizations leading all the way to their dissolution, contradicts the guarantee of legal procedural observance specified in Article 31 of the Constitution."⁷

The Japanese democratic press has cited numerous examples of the way in which the political police ("public security and guard police") and the Ministry of Justice's office of public security investigations (koan chosacho) conduct secret surveillance of representatives of progressive forces, illegally arrange for the infiltration of democratic organizations and the homes of their members by their own agents and employees, engage in the secret examination of correspondence, eavesdrop on telephone and other conversations, assign provocateurs to work with the class opponents of the monopolistic bourgeoisie, etc.⁸ It is obvious that it is more convenient for ruling circles to use these methods for the violation of civil rights and freedoms, as they allow them (to the degree that they remain unexposed) to keep wearing the mask of zealots of bourgeois democracy.

A woman police agent was exposed at the municipal Nagoya University in March 1970. She had worked for the office of public security investigations in 1966 and 1967 and for the police from 1967 on. In 1972, cases of espionage against communists, conducted by public security investigation agencies, were discovered in the prefecture of Ishikawa. In April 1973, a parliamentary commission discussed an incident which took place in the prefecture of Shimane, involving an employee of the public security investigation agencies who forced a member of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) into secret collaboration. The same month, another parliamentary commission investigated a case of espionage against the JCP, involving an agent whose direct supervisor was an official of the public security investigation agencies in the prefecture of Yamanashi. In November 1972, the Tokyo Prefectural Committee of the JCP submitted a protest to the director of a public security investigation office in connection with the so-called case of the PS Club, as a result of which an entire "bouquet" of illegal actions on the part of public security investigation agencies came to light, beginning with the coercion of citizens to engage in secret activities against the JCP in the capacity of agents.⁹

The objects on which the "public security and guard police" are collecting information include trade unions, student, youth, women's, cultural and scientific organizations, peace and anti-nuclear associations, societies for friendship and contacts with the USSR and even medical societies.¹⁰ Many of the means by which the political police obtain information "threaten the people's inherent freedoms of speech and conscience, assembly, association and the expression of opinion, the secrecy of correspondence, the right of workers to unite and other basic constitutional rights of the individual."¹¹

In its condemnation of the activities of public security investigative offices, the Japanese democratic public stresses that the official investment of this kind of agency with the right to engage in administrative surveillance cannot in any sense be regarded as grounds for secret political investigation. The public security investigative office "is a completely new postwar agency for

the collection of information, created separately from the police, and it does not have the same right as the police to conduct investigations with the aid of coercive measures, but basically performs espionage activity."¹² Moreover, the actions of investigative offices which violate the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens generally constitute crimes according to Japanese legislation. The so-called investigative activity (chosa katsudo) engaged in by this kind of office "actually represents nothing other than espionage activity involving the secret surveillance of thoughts with the aid of illegal means and methods."¹³

Political investigations among broad segments of the Japanese population are also conducted by special agencies of the Japanese armed services; armed forces personnel are being intensively trained for the violent suppression of mass democratic demonstrations.¹⁴

Secret political investigations of broad segments of the Japanese population represent the focal point of the grossest violations of civil rights and freedoms.

On the one hand, the rights and freedoms of individuals and organizations--the objects of the political investigation--are violated. In February 1977, an agent of the office of investigations and the political police was exposed in the prefecture of Fukuoka. These agencies had forced him, by means of threats, to carry out their assignments against communists. In connection with this, Deputy Chairman Arashiyama of the prefectural JCP committee made the following statement: "The actions of the police obviously violate not only Article 19 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of thought and conscience, but also Article 21, which guarantees freedom of assembly and the right to join unions and express beliefs."¹⁵

On the other hand, the rights and freedoms of the individuals who are forced to engage in espionage are frequently violated. In March 1977, an agent of the office of investigations and political police was discovered working among communists in the prefecture of Tottori. Incidentally, he had begun his anti-communist work as early as 1947, when he became an agent of American counter-intelligence. Admitting that he had spied on the communists, this agent protested his treatment by the police, declaring that he had "been forced to be a spy, with no regard for the rights of the individual."¹⁶

The Expansion of the Practice of Legal Political Suppression of Democratic Forces

The history of the sociopolitical struggle in postwar Japan indicates that the most common means of violating civil rights and freedoms consists in the violation of criminal trial norms by means of the falsification of testimony, the exertion of pressure on individuals under suspicion, as well as the accused and defense witnesses, and discrimination in the proceedings of trials. A comparatively recent example of the falsification of testimony can be seen in the "Sansui denki case," which was essentially a provocative attempt to accuse labor activist Taken Matsuda of narcotics dealing (March 1974).

Investigative personnel who inform the suspect of his constitutional right to refuse to testify against himself (Article 38) simultaneously exert pressure on the suspect by implying that it will be better for him if he does not exercise this right.¹⁷

One example of the infringement of the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens, the unfair and excessively broad interpretation of laws and the falsification of testimony can be seen in the "case of the Ota posters." A young man and his bride put up two posters announcing a meeting of democratic youth. They were seized by plainclothes policemen at the "site of the crime" and brought to trial. Scandalous contradictions in police testimony were discovered during the trial. When the progressive public discovered that the police and the public prosecutor's office had violated the law (particularly Article 4 of the law on petty misdemeanors, which prohibits the misuse of the provisions of this law), it was particularly upset by the violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, which proclaims freedom of expression.

By means of the arbitrary interpretation of legal norms, the lawful actions of democratic forces, aimed at the exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms, are described as criminal actions, and the infringement of these rights and freedoms by the authorities is described as compliance with the law. For example, when a plainclothes policeman was discovered secretly photographing a demonstration in the city of Kumamoto and representatives of democratic forces took steps to stop this disgraceful action, the chief of police said: "What are you doing? I will arrest you for interfering with the performance of official duties"--that is, for a crime envisaged in Article 95 of the criminal code.¹⁸

The police are taking advantage of the absence of precise criteria for defining the limits of so-called policing (keibi), which consists mainly in the use of large police contingents. In December 1977, members of the Japanese Peasant League in the prefecture of Niigata organized a sit-in demonstration in the municipal assembly meeting hall, insisting the governor talk with them in regard to the cancellation of a new procedure for the regulation of rice production, which was encroaching upon peasant interests. Mobile police forces were called into the meeting hall for the first time in the prefecture's history to break up the sit-in. Representatives of the league and the JSP [Japan Socialist Party] declared that the detainment of demonstrators in the hall by police was an unlawful action--a transgression of the necessary limits of "policing."¹⁹

Peaceful mass worker demonstrations have been described more than once by the authorities as actions which fall into the category of the criminal "disturbances" listed in the criminal code. The most famous cases in which these norms were used against democratic forces in postwar Japan have been the Taiwa, May Day, Suifu and Osu cases, when this criminal charge was brought against participants in mass demonstrations protesting unlawful police actions, demonstrators and persons who attended meetings.

The practice of extracting upon civil rights and freedoms with the aid of criminal law and criminal trial law also includes the excessive delay of trials, in violation of the right to due process of law declared in Article 37 of the Constitution. By December 1972, the most famous trials in Japan in terms of length, were 35 judicial trials which had already been going on for anywhere from 8 (one case) to 20 (seven cases) years.²⁰ The sadistic nature of this practice is particularly apparent in the fact that "the individual who has been accused of a crime loses his chances of finding a decent job for the entire period of the legal proceedings, his freedom to travel abroad is restricted and he suffers various other losses of a legal and tangible nature."²¹

This practice is particularly characteristic in cases involving "disturbances." According to progressive lawyers, "the provisions on disturbances violate human rights in two ways: The vague definition of these crimes makes it possible to suppress mass movements and, in addition to this, the application of these provisions calls for the maximum sentence."²² In fact, "more or less large-scale trials involving disturbances always go on for 10-20 years."²³ In particular, the trial of participants in the 1952 May Day demonstration did not end until 1972.

The progressive public has little opportunity to influence the course and outcome of trials by means of mass movements in support of the victims of this arbitrary justice--so-called struggle over judicial decisions (saiban tson), which represents "nothing other than struggle to turn the courts into organs for the protection of human rights."²⁴ The "reaction in justice" is also taking such forms as "attacks on public criticism of judicial decisions and the institution of more rigid trial laws and court-police laws."²⁵ Restrictions are being imposed on the "trial activities of witnesses (for the defense), on the possibility of criticizing judicial decisions and on courtroom spectators."²⁶

In order to exclude the possibility that the expression of democratic views on judicial decisions of a politically repressive nature will take active forms, several normative acts have been adopted which envisage court-police sanctions applying to defendants, courtroom spectators and even persons who are close to the courthouse. Between 25 September 1952 and 31 October 1968--that is, within approximately 16 years and 3 months--provisions for maintaining order in the court were applied 63 times throughout Japan as a whole, but between 1 January 1969 and 31 December 1971--that is, within 3 years--they were applied 418 times.²⁷

Special Powers of Authorities to Restrict the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners and in a 'State of Emergency'

Progressive Japanese lawyers have said that existing legislation in the country gives immigration authorities excessive powers in regard to foreigners, allowing them to restrict their rights and freedoms. The authorities are taking advantage of this to discourage democratic activity by foreigners.²⁸

Democratic lawyers have also been shocked by legalized encroachment upon foreigners' rights, such as the restriction of their physical freedom by means of administrative measures (internment in camps or deportation from Japan), while the physical freedom of Japanese citizens can only be restricted by a court decision. Japanese democratic forces have repeatedly opposed tendentious applications of immigration laws, such as the deportation of activists in movements against the Taiwan, South Korean and South Vietnamese puppet governments, or the practice of extraditing foreigners. The Japanese progressive public has also protested the restriction imposed by the authorities on political activity by democratic foreigners.

On 24 September 1977, the Japanese Ministry of Justice refused to issue re-entry visas to seven members of the All-Japan Federation of Koreans Living in Japan, who were delegated to attend a session of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK. The protest statement issued by the federation said: "The Japanese Government's refusal is an extremely unlawful action, which shows contempt for basic human rights and universally recognized international customs and insults the sovereignty of the DPRK; the Japanese authorities have continued to take an illegal stand by using the basic human rights of Koreans living in Japan as an instrument of bargaining with the Pak Chong-hui clique."²⁹

In an attempt to institute even stricter immigration laws, the Japanese Ministry of Justice published a document on 10 October 1968, entitled "On the Amendment of the Immigration Control Act." On 31 March 1969, the bill for the amendment of the act was submitted to parliament. The bill envisaged broader possibilities for administrative intervention by immigration authorities on the pretext of the investigation of suspected violations of immigration laws. The minister of justice was given the power to establish "points subject to respect and observance" for any particular foreigner, and the content of these points was left to the discretion of the minister. A protest by the general public and some circumstances of the session took the bill off the parliamentary agenda. Ruling circles did not give up their plans, however, different variations of amendments to this legislation were proposed by the government in 1971, 1972, 1973 and 1974.

Resolutely protesting the institution of stricter immigration laws, democratic and liberal representatives of the judicial community in Japan regard this problem as a highly important one from the standpoint of human rights.

Whenever ruling circles in Japan find it expedient and possible, the attack on civil rights and freedoms could be intensified on the pretext of a "state of emergency." "When a state of emergency is announced, constitutional guarantees are fully or partially suspended, and strong dictatorial authority is concentrated in certain organs."³⁰

The Japanese Constitution does not contain any provisions for a state of emergency, but some legislative acts nonetheless envisage measures connected with this. For example, Chapter 6 of the police law lists "special measures

in connection with a state of emergency," in which Article 71 establishes the procedures for declaring a state of emergency throughout the nation or in different regions, and Article 72 gives the prime minister direct jurisdiction over the police force during this time, as a result of which centralization in the police force is dramatically intensified. The punitive system is broadened and strengthened by the inclusion of armed forces, which acquire police powers in connection with the state of emergency (paragraph 1 of Article 78 of the law on self-defense forces). The law on self-defense forces envisages the possibility of such forms of troop action as "marches to maintain public order" at the command of the prime minister, issued either on his own initiative (Article 78) or in response to a request by the prefecture (Article 81); besides this, Article 91 states that in the event of "marches to preserve defense," troops "can take action, if necessary, to maintain public order." The very procedure of declaring a "state of emergency" (by a decision of the prime minister--that is, the executive branch--with only subsequent requests for approval from parliament) is of an anti-democratic nature.

Political and personal rights and freedoms are being steadily endangered by the numerous plans set forth by ruling circles for the creation of a system of emergency legislation with provisions that are much more comprehensive and strict than existing norms in this area. When former Chief Masuhara of the Japan Defense Agency presented a lecture entitled "The Development of Japanese Security And Self-Defense Forces" on 25 July 1967, he proposed that a decree be written up on the institution of martial law, declaring that "it will be necessary to expand the powers of the prime minister and the chief of the Japan Defense Agency in the event of a state of emergency." This proposal was far more than an expression of Masuhara's personal opinion, which can be seen from another statement he made: "We have been discussing this for a long time in the government."

During the course of command staff exercises for the "self-defense forces," the possibility of using more than 100 "special measures" was investigated, including the institution of compulsory labor, the restriction of strikes, compulsory evacuation, the adoption of emergency legislation in the area of civil and criminal law, measures to "maintain public security in government," the expansion of the prime minister's authority and the establishment of military tribunals. A document issued by the Research Bureau of the Japanese Cabinet of Ministers in February 1969, "Policy for 1970 and Its Prospects," stated: "Even if extraconstitutional measures are taken in the event of immediate danger of the subversion of constitutional order, they will be warranted from the legal standpoint as unavoidable exceptions to the rule." It is easy to believe that ruling circles are always capable of describing the actions of democratic forces as a "threat to constitutional order," and it is easy to imagine the forms these "extraconstitutional measures" might take. On 28 July 1973, a report was published by the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party) Council set up to study the "security treaty," in which the members of this Council insisted on the need for the immediate investigation of measures to be taken in a state of emergency.

On 20 October 1977, Fukuda, who was then prime minister of Japan, said the following in answer to a question about wartime legislation in one of the sittings of the House of Councillors: "It is essential that self-defence forces be prepared for emergency conditions. A study of what should be done in a state of emergency would be natural, and the institution of this kind of study on the instructions of the chief (of the Japan Defense Agency--V. Ye.) would be advisable." Commenting on the prime minister's answer, AKAMATA wrote that Prime Minister Fukuda had frankly admitted that work was being done on wartime legislation and that "a concrete study of the matter had been instituted in the Japan Defense Agency on these grounds."¹¹

The resolute protests of the general democratic public in Japan represent the main force preventing the reactionary modification of criminal, criminal-trial, immigration and administrative-police legislation. An active struggle is also being waged in the area of law-enforcement practices.

Ruling circles are actually being assisted in the implementation of their course of further "reaction in justice" by extremists of various stripes--"ultra-leftists," Trotskyists and Maoists. The extremists are assaulting policemen, robbing banks and planting time bombs in corporate buildings. In 1970 and 1973 they hijacked JAL planes, in 1974 and 1975 they organized assaults on the French Embassy in The Hague and U.S. and Swiss embassies in Kuala Lumpur, and in 1973 and 1974 they undertook daring armed raids in Israel and Singapore. Japanese ruling circles and punitive agencies have fastened on these criminal escapades as an excuse to continue and intensify their efforts to institute stricter "legislation in the area of public order" and to apply this legislation against democratic forces.

The bloody interfactional battles (uchi-geba) of various extremist groups allow the police who suppress them to take on the authority of "defenders of the public interest," as a result of which the "public security and guard police have finally acquired permanent 'citizenship rights'" in the commercial press. "Taking advantage of the literally continuous uchi-geba, they have refined their strategy and tactics to an unprecedented degree.... The broader interpretation of laws has also become a daily practice due to the 'horror and brutality' (of the interfactional battles--V. Ye.)."¹² A bill on the possibility of trials with no defense was drafted by the authorities in the spring of 1978, using the hijacking of airplanes by extremists as an excuse. New repressive proposals made their appearance after a handit raid by extremists on Tokyo's Narita Airport, which also took place in the spring of 1978. Therefore, there is a clear connection between the more provocative actions of extremist elements and the politically repressive measures of the authorities.

FOOTNOTES

1. T. Kitsuoka and T. Odanaka, "Tian to zeniken" [Public Order and Human Rights], Kyoto, 1974, pp 35-36.

2. K. Sugawara, "Tendai shakai to iku-ho" (Contemporary Society and the Issue Involving Public Order), Tokyo, 1977, p. 102.
3. T. Kikuchi and T. Matsuda, *Op. cit.*, p. 249. For a more detailed discussion of this law, see L. N. Strydom, "The Japanese Law 'On the Prevention of Unlawful Activity' in the Service of Reaction," *WETTERSTADT UNIVERSITÄT ZÜRICH*, 1972, No. 2.
4. T. Kikuchi and T. Matsuda, *Op. cit.*, p. 269.
5. "Mushoku" (p. *mucho kyo*) (Crime in the Marxist Volume of Law), vol. 1: "Tendai shakai to iku-ho" (Issue of Contemporary Japanese Law), Tokyo, 1976, p. 44.
6. "The Liberties and Rights of the Individual Are Being Threatened" (Editorial), *DAIICHI SHIMBUN*, 27 March 1978.
7. T. Kikuchi and T. Matsuda, *Op. cit.*, p. 149.
8. See, in particular, K. Sugawara, L. One et al., "Kokusan kensaku" (Black Book in the Police - 7 vol., 1972); T. Sugimura, H. Minakata and H. Nakano, "Mushoku kyo to kokusan-kei shita" (The True Image of the Japanese Secret Society), Kyoto, 1966.
9. *DAIICHI SHIMBUN*, 11 October and 5 November 1977.
10. See, in particular, T. Matsuda, *Op. cit.*, p. 51. The authors cite paragraph 1 of the "Complete Series of Police Secret Activities" (Hishi kensaku shuho), presented to the Society for Police Secret Studies in 1967.
11. K. Sugawara, *Op. cit.*, p. 119.
12. "Tendai shakai to iku-ho," p. 411.
13. T. Kikuchi and T. Matsuda, *Op. cit.*, p. 111.
14. See, in particular, V. Buchine and S. Hayashi, "The True Appearance of the Japanese Army," Moscow, 1961, pp. 38-44.
15. *DAIICHI SHIMBUN*, 30 February 1972.
16. *Ibid.*, 19 March 1972.
17. T. Hirakawa, "Tendai shakai to iku-ho" (The Police in Postwar Japan), Tokyo, 1969, p. 79.
18. See K. Sugawara, L. One et al., *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

19. See SHINJI SHIMIZU, 13 December 1977.
20. SHIMIZU 1980, 1979, No. 4.
21. T. Katsukawa and T. Otsuka, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
25. See "Gendai nihan-ho bunseki," p. 434.
26. T. Katsukawa and T. Otsuka, *Op. cit.*, p. 9.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
28. H. Nishizaki, "The Purpose of the New Law on Immigration Control," ASARI JANARU, 1970, No. 8, pp. 19-22; H. Otsuka, "The Recognition of Human Rights Transcends State Boundaries," *Ibid.*, pp. 10-18.
29. ARAHATA, 27 November 1977.
30. T. Katsukawa and T. Otsuka, *Op. cit.*, p. 343.
31. ARAHATA, 27 November 1977.
32. H. Takigawa and A. Isumura, "Uchi-goba. Koon kisha memo kara" [International Battles. From the Notes of Public Security Affairs Reporters], Tokyo, 1975, pp. 21-22.

SHINJI
1980: 1801

SHADOW OF CHINA OVER SOUTH ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (BEIJING'S CALCULATIONS AND MISCALCULATIONS)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 76-85

[Article by S. G. Yurkov]

[Text] Southeast Asia occupies the most prominent place in plans for Chinese expansion. In Beijing, this region is regarded as "lost territory" which supposedly once belonged to China. The Beijing rulers are interfering in the internal affairs of all Southeast Asian states and are setting up their own "fifth columns" there.¹ At the time of his visit to some of the countries in this region in November 1978, Deng Xiaoping refused to offer any guarantees of nonintervention in their affairs by China. The world learned about the consequences of the spread of China's influence to foreign countries from the example of Kampuchea, where the bloody Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique set up a Maoist model society and indulged in excesses for more than 3 years. Military provocations, which later grew into large-scale aggression, were carried out against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which did not wish to submit to Chinese dictates and became an obstacle in the way of Beijing's expansion.

The Chinese "strategists" have also found the countries of South Asia and the Middle East to be deserving of their attention.

Beijing's main objective in South Asia is to surround India with states which will treat it with suspicion and even hostility, so as to weaken and divide this country, which is regarded in Beijing as the main obstacle in the way of Chinese expansion in South and West Asia.

Trapped by their own illusions, the Chinese leaders believe that the exertion of pressure on India and gross intervention in the internal affairs of this country will force its government to make substantial concessions for the sake of normal relations with China. This is why Beijing remained totally deaf for a long time to New Delhi's proposals that relations be redirected into their normal channel and continued to set forth one condition after another. On 14 September 1969, a representative of the Indian Government announced that "India is leaving its door open for negotiations

with China." Beijing did not reply. On 3 October 1969, the Indian minister of external affairs remarked that India was being increasingly threatened by China.

The 1971-1975 period was marked by dramatically increased hostility in Beijing's attitude toward India. The signing of a treaty on peace, friendship and cooperation between the USSR and India in August 1971 particularly irritated the Beijing rulers. They alleged that the treaty was an Indian-Soviet conspiracy directed against China. In connection with the uprising in East Pakistan, the creation of Bangladesh and the war between Pakistan and India in December 1971, India was accused of "expansionism" and "aggression" against Pakistan and was threatened with reprisals in Beijing and from the rostrum of the United Nations, whenever the PRC representative was present. In January 1972, Chinese propaganda began to allege that India intended to organize a "reactionary rebellion" in Tibet; this was categorically denied by the Indian side. In spring 1973, documents pertaining to China's border dispute with India were reissued in China, making claims on Indian territory. A new flood of slanderous materials overtook Beijing at the time of L. I. Brezhnev's trip to India in November 1973. The leaders of the PRC tried to condemn the economic cooperation between the USSR and India and implied that Soviet-Indian rapprochement was a "threat to the security" of neighboring countries.

The Chinese authorities, who are still involved in the nuclear arms race and have repeatedly opposed agreements restricting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, described the Indian nuclear test conducted for peaceful purposes in May 1974 as nuclear blackmail of the South Asian countries and as an act compounding the instability in this part of the world.

From time to time the Chinese authorities have raised the issue of Kashmir; in February-March 1975 they objected to the agreements concluded by Kashmir officials with the central government of India on the inclusion of Kashmir as part of the Republic of India with the rights of a state. An outburst of indignant rage was recorded in Beijing when Sikkim became an Indian state; the Maoists tried to call this a "threat to neighboring countries." Beijing declared that it did not recognize this act. "The Chinese," India's PATRIOT newspaper commented "have addressed India with veiled threats, predicting that the nationalities making up the Indian Union--Naga, Mizo, Sikkimese and Kashmiri--will rebel against the central government. This is supposed to open the eyes of those who are running the politics of our nation. A powerful India, independent in the political, economic and military respects, is seen by China as an obstacle in the way of its chauvinistic plans. And this is the truth of the entire matter."²

Beijing is still training armed agents, sending them to India and taking every opportunity to provoke military actions by the Naga and Miso tribes against the government. An article in RENMIN RIBAO contained a threat of the division of India by means of the creation of the states of Naga, Miso

and Sikkistan.³ The Chinese authorities are urging the pro-Maoist groups of S. Singh, H. Chatterjee and many others to wage armed struggle against the government. In March 1975, presidential rule was instituted in Nagaland, where the political instability is largely due, as a government report to the parliament noted, to "intervention by Chinese agents in the internal affairs of Nagaland."

Between 1972 and 1975 the Indian Government repeatedly invited Beijing to discuss the normalization of Indian-Chinese relations. Beijing, however, continued to intervene in India's internal affairs. For the purpose of exerting pressure on India, Chinese troops fired on an Indian border patrol on 20 October 1975 on a section of the northeastern border of India, killing several soldiers.

As a result of prolonged negotiations, New Delhi and Beijing agreed to exchange ambassadors in April 1976. The Indian ambassador arrived in Beijing in July and the PRC ambassador arrived in Delhi in September 1976. India hoped for an improvement in relations, but it did not come to pass. In connection with this, India's TRIBUNE newspaper stated: "The special relationship between New Delhi and Moscow is not to China's taste."

Some changes in Beijing's position were noted after the March 1977 election in India, when the Indian National Congress suffered a defeat and the government of the Janata Party was formed. It is true that Beijing continued to incite neighboring states against India and demanded changes in India's foreign policy line. In this connection, the HINDU newspaper made the following comment: "India does not want Indian-Soviet friendship to become a stumbling block in the way of the improvement of its relations with China and the United States, but it naturally also does not want extraneous circumstances to weaken this friendship."⁴

Indian commentators pointed out the fact that the initiative of the PRC, which took the form of a visit to New Delhi by a goodwill delegation from the PRC, headed by Wang Bingnan, in March 1978, followed 10 months during which Beijing observed the policies of the Janata Party's Government. Beijing hoped that the new government would denounce the treaty on peace, friendship and cooperation with the USSR, and when this did not occur, it expressed its displeasure and launched several propagandistic sorties against the government of M. Desai. Beijing hoped that the current political situation in India would make it easier to deteriorate relations between New Delhi and Moscow.

India is prepared to gradually improve relations, but it feels, as Wang Bingnan was told by Prime Minister M. Desai, that "the complete normalization of relations will be impossible unless the main unsolved problem--the border dispute--is settled."⁵

At the same time, Beijing's constant intervention in the affairs of Burma, Thailand and Malaysia and its support of antigovernment forces, in spite of the "normalization" of relations between the PRC and these countries, is

arousing mistrust in the Chinese leaders' bows and courtesies. India's BLITZ weekly described the prevailing mood in India in the following way: "Particular interest has been aroused by the news that Beijing has not only not reduced (in the qualitative and quantitative sense) its weapons aid to the hostile Naga and Miso tribes, but has actually begun to offer 'larger subsidies for subversive activities' in India's northeastern regions. Another factor which is seriously alarming our leaders, who are responsible for making policy, is China's growing interest in Sikkim. It is now widely known that Beijing is actively funding one Nepalese group operating in Kathmandu for the purpose of creating disorder in Sikkim by stirring up the traditional intertribal hostility. Forces undermining stability have been more active throughout the northeastern region, particularly in Sikkim, which clearly attests to a secret conspiracy between traditionally pro-American elements and the so-called ultra-radicals.

"Therefore," the BLITZ article went on, "...if we examine China's traditional hostility toward India against this background, it is quite unlikely that any kind of significant advances will be made in the settlement of old differences between the two countries.... New Delhi," BLITZ concluded, "has already made its position clear. This position is that two basic conditions must be met before there can be any significant improvement in relations between India and China.⁶

"Firstly, as Prime Minister Desai has often said, China must take real steps to settle the border conflict with India.

"Secondly, Beijing must change its regional position by replacing its unadulterated hostility toward India with friendship and a desire for cooperation.

"Unfortunately, Beijing is stubbornly adhering to its previous stand on South Asia: Just as in the past, it is trying to depict India as its chief rival and to engineer its own policy toward other countries in the region in such a way as to prevent New Delhi from occupying the position it rightfully deserves on the Indian subcontinent."⁷

At an annual meeting of the army high command on 17 October 1978, Indian Minister of Defense J. Ram announced that China was feverishly arming itself with weapons purchased in the West and was receiving a great deal of support from certain powers. Although India intends to improve its relations with China, it cannot ignore the fact that the Chinese are still intensifying military preparations in Tibet.⁸ On 8 December 1978, J. Ram informed the parliament that China was increasing the combat potential of troops deployed in Tibet in direct proximity to the Indian border. China has been sending its agents to India, stirring up separatist attitudes in several states, training rebels from the Naga tribe and distributing hostile literature in India.⁹

On 12 February 1979, the long-delayed China trip of Indian Minister of External Affairs A. B. Vajpayee began. Calling his visit an "investigative" one, A. B. Vajpayee hoped to make some progress in the settlement of territorial disputes and put an end to Beijing's support of rebels from the Naga and Miso tribes.

It must be said that when the Chinese authorities consented to A. B. Vajpayee's arrival on 12 February, they were already preparing for the 17 February attack on Vietnam. In this way, they were striving to put their guest in a difficult position. Vajpayee had to cut his visit short and returned to India on 18 February.

As for the essence of the talks that took place, although Vajpayee was received by Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping and conversed with Huang Hua, questions of interest to the Indian side did not arouse an enthusiastic response from the Chinese side. Beijing made no promises other than the mutually expressed desire to "settle the border problem." India did not even receive any guarantees that intervention in its internal affairs would cease. The Chinese side also avoided any discussion of the Kashmir issue.

The Chinese aggression in Vietnam underscored the already meager results of Vajpayee's trip, as the UPI AGENCY commented upon the minister's return. "The process of the normalization of relations between India and China," the agency concluded, "has suffered serious damage." On 18 February, the newspaper AMRITA BAZAR PATRIKA reported the following: "There is no need to conceal the fact that this trip was unsuccessful." Secretary General M. Limaye of the Janata Party said in Parliament on 20 February that China, by launching an attack on Vietnam while the Indian minister of external affairs was in Beijing on an official visit, "stabbed the esteemed guest from India in the back."

India condemned China's aggression against Vietnam. Before the entire world is threatened, A. B. Vajpayee said in Parliament on 20 February, the further expansion of the conflict arising from the Chinese troops' massive armed invasion of Vietnamese territory must be stopped as soon as possible.¹⁰ In a joint Soviet-Indian communique, signed as a result of A. N. Kosygin's visit to India in March 1979, the Soviet Union and India demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam.

In an attempt to create a cordon of hostile states around India, the Chinese leaders first put their faith in Pakistan. Taking the difficulties in the relationship between Pakistan and India into account, Beijing made an effort to lure Pakistan into its political web. It took every opportunity to stir up disagreements between these countries and encouraged anti-Indian demonstrations in Pakistan.

When riots broke out in East Pakistan and the military administration began its slaughter, Beijing first played a waiting game and then openly praised the actions of the Pakistani military, although several officials of East Pakistan were closely bound to Beijing. Moreover, the Chinese leaders tried to take advantage of the emotions prevailing in Islamabad and played the role of Pakistan's "defenders." The NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY issued a warning on 4 April 1971 against "the Indian Government's brazen intervention in the internal affairs of Pakistan." Indian policy was discussed in the same vein in a message sent from Beijing to the president of Pakistan.

By supplying the Yakhya Khan regime with weapons, Beijing incited it to take repressive actions which led to the war between Pakistan on one side and India and Bangladesh on the other. When Pakistan and, consequently, Beijing suffered a defeat, the Chinese leaders did everything within their power to impede the resolution of problems, including the problem of establishing relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh, which was related to the problem of releasing prisoners of war. The agreement signed by India and Pakistan in July 1972 in Simla and Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh in February 1974 had a cold reception in Beijing.

In an attempt to keep Islamabad within the orbit of their policies, the Chinese leaders stirred up excitement in Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, striving to prevent the reinforcement of the status quo in line with the armistice. At the same time, Chinese representatives attempted to infiltrate the army, the youth movement and the propaganda system so that they would have some means of influencing Pakistan's policy.

In December 1977, Zia-ul-Haq, head of the new administration, made an unofficial visit to China. Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping confirmed their intention to maintain close relations with Pakistan and spoke of "Pakistan's just struggle for the self-determination of Jammu and Kashmir." In June 1978, Premier Geng Biao of the PRC State Council visited Pakistan. Chinese emissaries urged Pakistan to take hostile actions against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Li Xiannian, who visited Pakistan in January 1979, promised, "just as in the past," to firmly support the efforts of the people and government of Pakistan in the Jammu and Kashmir issue.

At the same time, Beijing was displeased by Pakistan's consent to normalize relations with India, its expansion of ties with the USSR and its support of international detente and arms limitation.

The creation of Bangladesh was interpreted in China as the result of "intrigues" by India and the USSR.¹¹ Beijing objected to the struggle of the population of 70 million for liberation and the creation of its own state. The PRC used its veto power in the Security Council twice in regard to UN membership for Bangladesh and refused to recognize the young republic, even though Dacca had several times expressed its willingness to forget the past and had proposed the establishment of normal relations. Beijing did everything within its power to spoil relations between Bangladesh and India. It frightened the population of Bangladesh with talk about India's "expansionist aims" and promoted the creation of "a great Bengal" in the expectation of creating discord between these countries. At the same time, the Chinese stirred up hatred for the government of Bangladesh in ethnic minority groups. Extremist groups were created, financed and armed by Beijing in Bangladesh; these groups resorted to terror and initiated actions against authority. In May 1974, several pro-Beijing groups formed a "united front"; broader ties took shape between legal and illegal groups. Pro-Beijing agents arranged for collaboration with reactionary religious community forces.

The coup in Bangladesh and the assassination of Mujibur Rahman in August 1975 met with a favorable response in Beijing. The PRC immediately recognized Bangladesh and began to incite unfriendly actions toward India, obviously working parallel with the American CIA.

The head of the new administration, and later the president of Bangladesh, visited China three times in 1976-1978. In March 1978, Li Xiannian went to Dacca. As a result of these visits, the PRC became Dacca's main supplier of weapons. Beijing escalated the dispute between Bangladesh and India over the partition of the Ganges River. Chinese propaganda became more intensive in Bangladesh and pro-Maoist groups became more active (their leaders, M. Tokha and Q. Z. Ahmed, visited China in 1977). Ultra-leftist pro-Beijing groups have often allied themselves with groups on the extreme right to oppose the government.

Beijing is speculating on some difficulties in the relations between Nepal and India and is stirring up anti-Indian feeling in Nepal by hinting that Nepal could rely on China if the need were to arise. A delegation from the PRC, headed by Guo Moruo, said much during a trip to Nepal in February-March 1970 about the PRC's invariable friendship and support for Nepal's just struggle against foreign intervention and in defense of national independence. In January 1971, the Chinese press printed threats addressed to New Delhi in connection with transit and trade difficulties that had arisen between India and Nepal. The Chinese leaders assured a delegation from the national Panchayat which visited the PRC in March 1971 that China and Nepal were good neighbors whose traditional friendship had roots stretching far back into the past and would constantly develop and that this friendship could even serve as an example of relations between states with different social structures. Forgetting about the pogroms staged by local Red Guards in Nepal during the time of the "Cultural Revolution," the PRC leaders constantly reiterated that they were "definitely opposed to great-power chauvinism, which took the form of the humiliation of small countries by large ones and the abuse of weak countries by strong ones."

The talks conducted by Chinese leaders with King Birendra, who visited the PRC in December 1973, were arranged for the purpose of strengthening the Chinese presence in Nepal and weakening this country's political and economic ties with India. They told the King how much they "admired" the boldness with which Nepal was supposedly "boycotting outside pressure." The inclusion of Sikkim as part of India with the status of an associated state was used to frighten Nepal with the Indian "threat."

Although China has made ostentatious statements about its friendly feelings toward the Nepalese Government, it has actually not given up its subversive activity in this country. The Nepalese weekly SAMIKSHA reported at the beginning of June 1974 that a gang of local Maoists, consisting of 18 members, had been routed in one of Nepal's southern regions. After losing all hope of interesting the inhabitants in the "Thought of Mao," the members of this pro-Beijing organization turned to burglary. When one of the leaders of the Maoists in the Lumbini zone was interrogated, he confessed that his gang

had been robbing the local population to acquire funds for underground activity. The weekly reported that the gang had stolen property worth 20,000 rupees. A slightly earlier report told of the trial of a group of Beijing agents who had committed several murders during the course of robberies. The group of M. B. Singh is conducting illegal work with the intelligentsia and student youth; the group of N. Lama has been recruited by the PRC Embassy to exert pressure on the administration and conduct pro-Beijing propaganda; the Naksalite organization is being used for extreme acts, including terrorist actions, against officials. Some of the former pro-Maoist groups renounced their allegiance to China at a conference in Birganja in July 1978, declaring that "Chinese foreign policy now has a reactionary content."

During talks with the prime minister and king of Nepal, who visited China in April 1976 and June 1976 respectively, the Chinese leaders invented stories about the Indian threat and promised the Nepalese statesmen vigorous support in their resistance of "expansionism."

In February 1978, Deng Xiaoping visited Nepal. China promised to build a sugar refinery and paper mill in Nepal. The two sides reached an agreement on air communications. Nepalese Prime Minister K. S. Bista was in China from 27 September through 4 October 1978. The guest and his hosts set forth their views and the Nepalese statesman thanked China for supporting the idea of declaring Nepal a zone of peace.

Chinese assistance to Nepal is conditional on military and political considerations. It is no coincidence that priority has been assigned to the construction of roads, particularly in regions bordering on India. The promised aid from China amounts to 130.4 million dollars but less than 40 million has actually been used.

The policy of the "double day" is being conducted by Beijing in relations with Sri Lanka. China is giving this country some assistance, and each year reciprocal transactions take place--rice is traded for rubber. Externally, Beijing would seem to be treating the government of Sri Lanka with loyalty. In fact, however, Chinese agents are striving to create political instability in the nation, are pressuring party factionists from the Freedom Party toward this end, and are trying to gain control over newspapers, including the mouthpieces of Trotskyist groups. According to reports in the press, Beijing was involved in the March-April 1971 demonstrations by leftist extremist groups which resorted to terrorist actions and even armed assault. The rebel leader, Rohan Wijevira, had Chinese connections. The police found secret caches of weapons. The government announced a state of emergency. The Chinese leadership had to search for a way out of this ticklish situation. The premier of the PRC State Council sent a letter to the prime minister of Sri Lanka in May 1971, offering him a loan in the amount of 150 million rupees (25 million dollars). In reference to the rebel uprisings, the head of the Chinese Government declared that "foreign spies had infiltrated the Guevarist ranks" and expressed satisfaction with the fact that the rebels had been apprehended. Nonetheless, pro-Beijing groups are still operating in Sri Lanka.

In recent years, China's influence in Sri Lanka has diminished noticeably. The normalization of the situation on the subcontinent and the maritime border agreement signed by Sri Lanka and India on 25 March 1976 have reduced Beijing's possibilities for influencing Colombo.

Essentially, China's policy toward the countries in the Middle East consists in attempts to deteriorate their relations with their northern neighbor and to help imperialism construct a belt hostile to the USSR on the southern Soviet border. This is part of the general plan to create a "broad international front" against the Soviet Union. Beijing was quite upset by the April revolution in Afghanistan and the considerable improvement of Soviet-Turkish relations in 1978.

Beijing has long regarded Iran as the key link in its policy in the Middle East. The Chinese leaders would like to see a bloc of rightist regimes in this region, led by Tehran. China encouraged the buildup of Iranian military potential, alleging that this would help to guarantee security in the Persian Gulf. Although Tehran realized that the PRC's possibilities were extremely limited, it nonetheless tried to use China's support in the attainment of its own goals: to turn Iran into an imperialist power and to establish supremacy in the Persian Gulf and in all of Southwest Asia.

Using the excuse that "military presence by the superpowers" would not be tolerated, the shah's government and the Beijing rulers objected to the presence of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean, supported Somalia in its conflict with Ethiopia, expressed approval of Egypt's separate negotiations with Israel and agreed with one another on the situation in the South of the Arab peninsula. At the same time, their positions diverged due to the PRC's negative approach to the issues of international detente, guaranteed security in Asia and disarmament.

For the purpose of increased influence in Iran, the Chinese leaders maintained frequent contacts. Between 1972 and 1978, Iran was visited by Deputy Chairmen of the PRC State Council Deng Xiaoping and Li Xiannian, parliamentary delegations headed by Deputy Chairmen of the NPC [National People's Congress] Standing Committee Wu Lanfu and Deng Yingchao, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs Ji Pengfei and Huang Hua. In turn, China extended invitations to the shah's wife, sisters and brothers, the minister of economic affairs and finance, and trade, cultural and sports delegations.

Beijing was obviously imposing on Tehran when Hua Guofeng, chairman of the CCP Central Committee and premier of the PRC State Council, visited Tehran from 29 August through 1 September 1978. Massive antigovernment demonstrations were taking place in Iran, the atmosphere was tense and it was no time for the shah to engage in diplomatic conversations with a guest from China. Beijing felt that it was important to demonstrate support for the Iranian Government precisely in this kind of atmosphere.

The Chinese leader reaffirmed his approval of Iran's policy in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean zone and advised Iran to give more assistance to Pakistan, so as to keep events there from taking the course they had taken

in Afghanistan. At the same time, taking Iran's views into account, he could not fully express his anti-Soviet feelings and was forced to limit himself to phrases about the "hegemonism and expansionism of the super-powers." No joint communique was adopted and no press conferences with Hua Guofeng were organized, although one had been planned. The visit ended with the signing of an agreement on cultural matters, envisaging informational and educational exchange. In addition, an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation was initialed. The shah of Iran accepted an invitation to visit the PRC. The results of this trip were obviously negligible.

Commodity exchange between the two countries was not sizable--around 60 million dollars. Scientific and technical ties were focused on problems in the prospecting, production and refining of petroleum; Chinese representatives also expressed an interest in the experience in building nuclear power stations.

Beijing was disturbed by the massive demonstrations against the monarchy in Iran and the declaration of people's democratic forces that Iran would withdraw from all military blocs, renounce its pro-imperialist orientation and take a position of nonalignment. At a press conference in Washington on 31 January 1979, Deng Xiaoping said that "the strategic position of Iran is extremely important" and that China could do virtually nothing about events in Iran but the United States, according to him, "should take more vigorous steps."¹² The visitor from Beijing was obviously advocating imperialist intervention in Iran.

China is persistently working toward more active relations with Turkey. Beijing's practical actions have taken two directions: On the one hand, it has tried to make bilateral relations more dynamic and, on the other, it has attempted to enliven Maoist organizations for the purpose of demonstrating the scales of Chinese influence to the Turkish Government and threatened the possibility of internal disorder. Turkey's response to Chinese initiatives has been guarded; the possibility of interaction with Beijing has been admitted in government circles, but only within limits that would not harm relations with the Soviet Union. The two sides have little basis for contact and many differences in their approaches to international affairs. In contrast to the Beijing leaders, who express apologies for war, Turkish Prime Minister B. Ecevit has declared that "the government will conduct a foreign policy aimed not at the escalation of international tension, but at its relaxation and the consolidation of peace throughout the world." Whereas the Chinese authorities are insisting on the development of new weapons of mass destruction, the Turkish Government is appealing for "a ban on military technological discoveries which would threaten mankind." Turkey and China also have conflicting views on such issues as the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the total and universal banning of nuclear tests, the settlement of the Middle East crisis (Turkey supports the idea of a Geneva peace conference with the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization) and so forth.

For these reasons, Huang Hua's visit to Turkey in June 1978 was completely unproductive. The Chinese visitor arrived in Turkey on the eve of Prime Minister B. Ecevit's trip to the Soviet Union. Supporting Turkey on the Cyprus issue, Huang Hua simultaneously tried to imply that there was a "Soviet threat" to Turkey. The Turkish side underscored that it did not see any such "threat." The great success of Ecevit's visit to the USSR and the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement provided more evidence that the Chinese emissary's efforts had been in vain.

Beijing's response to the Turkish Government's reluctance to deteriorate relations with the USSR took the form of more lively Maoist activity in Turkey. The PRC is urging these Maoists to unite; the "founders" of a "worker and peasant party" met in January 1978. But many Maoist groups did not join this "party" and the plan to create a single Maoist center failed. Moreover, the Maoists in Turkey are divided into pro-Beijing and pro-Albanian factions. Although these Maoist groups are small and scattered, they nonetheless constitute a threat to public order because they resort to terrorist actions and commit other crimes. They often ally themselves with rightist extremist organizations.

Chinese-Turkish commercial ties are negligible and have no prospects for development.

As for Afghanistan, Beijing is attempting to push it onto a course hostile to the USSR by creating groups of its own supporters there, striving to exert pressure on the government through intergovernmental relations and urging ruling circles to converge with the Western powers and the SENTO countries. The April revolution aroused a response in Beijing that consisted of covert dismay and the overtly belated (by 11 days) recognition of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Chinese leaders immediately became involved in the intrigues of imperialist states and reactionary forces in Pakistan and Iran, the purpose of which was to create an atmosphere of chaos and confusion in Afghanistan and liquidate the democratic republic. Spreading rumors about the "hand of Moscow" and about the Soviet Union's alleged desire to clear a path to the Indian Ocean, the Beijing rulers urged imperialist powers, Iran and Pakistan to take more resolute steps against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Chinese agents have established contact with counterrevolutionary forces and are trying to supply them with weapons. One terrorist gang arrested in June 1978 was equipped with Chinese automatic rifles. Local Maoists are also organizing sorties. They are advocating struggle against the people's democratic regime in Afghanistan, going so far as to call it a "social-imperialist" government.

The government of democratic Afghanistan is aware of this hostile activity and has assessed it correctly. "We do not wish to name any particular country at this time," N. M. Taraki said in an interview on 21 September 1978, "but we know that some states that were not happy with our revolution are inciting frenzied reactionary and leftist extremist forces against this

revolution. At the proper time, we will make all of this public and will name the country that is interfering in our internal affairs."

Beijing's hostility toward the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was quite graphically displayed when the USSR and the DRA signed a treaty on friendship, good-neighbor relations and cooperation on 5 December 1978. Beijing could not restrain itself and issued an announcement that the conclusion of this treaty supposedly signified the creation of a military alliance which would threaten the security of neighboring states.¹³

In a declaration issued 20 February 1979, the DRA Government condemned China's armed invasion of Vietnamese territory and expressed complete support for the courageous people of this country. It demanded the immediate withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from SRV territory.

In conclusion, it should be noted that Beijing's policy, both in the time of Mao Zedong and under the present rulers, is aimed at sowing the seeds of discord in South Asia and the Middle East, assisting imperialism to retain and strengthen its positions and clearing a path for the spread of the "Middle Kingdom's" influence. But the state of affairs here is developing in directions quite contrary to the expectations of China's leaders. Despite the efforts of imperialist propaganda to depict present-day China as a big but weak infant, the people of South Asia and the Middle East know from experience that Beijing's policy is of a destructive and provocative nature and that it is alien to their wishes and a danger to the cause of peace.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a more detailed discussion of Beijing's policy in Southeast Asia, see PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1978, No 3.
2. PATRIOT, 7 July 1975.
3. RENMIN RIBAO, 31 January 1972.
4. HINDU, 22 September 1977.
5. China has occupied 44,000 square kilometers of land, which India regards as its own, on the border between Xinjiang and Tibet on one side, between Jammu and Kashmir on the other, and also in the central section of the Chinese border. Besides this, Beijing is claiming a region to the South of the so-called McMahon Line with an area of 90,000 square kilometers.
6. BLITZ, 19 March 1978.
7. Ibid.

8. See TIMES OF INDIA, 21 October 1978.
9. PRAVDA, 10 December 1978.
10. Ibid., 21 February 1979.
11. RENMIN RIBAO, 28 April 1971.
12. NEW YORK TIMES, 1 February 1979.
13. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 December 1978.

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ROLE AND PLACE OF OVERSEAS CHINESE IN BEIJING POLITICS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 86-98

[Article by T. M. Kotova, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] For a long time, several objective factors have promoted the maintenance of close familial, economic and political contacts between overseas Chinese and the motherland, and all events taking place in the nation have met with an immediate response in Chinese communities abroad. Political agitation by opponents of existing regimes in China has frequently had a considerable effect on the positions taken by overseas Chinese. The revolutionary activity of Sun Yat-sen represented a factor of this kind in the years preceding the fall of the Ch'ing monarchy. His activity resulted in the growth of revolutionary feelings in Chinese communities and the creation of revolutionary democratic organizations which actively supported progressive revolutionary reforms in China. The overseas Chinese also gave moral support and financial assistance to the Chinese people in their struggle against Japanese militarism. After the Xinhai revolution and the collapse of the militarist (1924-1927) and rightist Guomindang (1948-1949) regimes, however, millions of active counterrevolutionaries, reactionaries, landowners and members of the grand bourgeoisie left the country, and this affected not only the social structure of overseas communities but also their political orientation.

The only enthusiastic response to the founding of the PRC in 1949 came from representatives of the working strata and the progressive segment of the intelligentsia in the Chinese community. From the standpoint of the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie, an alliance with whom was important to the PRC Government for reasons of an economic nature, China was a communist country, although the very fact that an independent and united Chinese State had been established naturally impressed a certain segment of this bourgeoisie. The Chinese overseas bourgeoisie did not begin to cooperate with Beijing until the late 1950's and early 1960's, when Mao Zedong was able to divert the nation from the path of socialist construction and impose a bourgeois nationalist ideology on the CCP.

The role and place of overseas Chinese in the policies of the CCP leadership did not remain the same during different stages of the PRC's development. They depended on an entire set of factors, among which the most important

was the nature of China's internal political development. An important role, however, was also played by the concrete policy of Beijing, which was influenced by various tendencies that existed in the nation's leadership and that were most overtly reflected in the practices of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai.

According to Mao Zedong's approach, the Chinese national bourgeoisie, including a large segment of the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie, was guided more by national than by class interests. For this reason, it could, on the basis of ideological unity, consent to give unconditional support and assistance to China. The role of the economic factor in politics was underestimated and the role of policy as the "commanding force" was overestimated. When Zhou Enlai was implementing Mao Zedong's line, he assigned priority to the economic factor, realizing that an alliance with the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie could be accomplished either through the complete renunciation of the conquests of the Chinese people, which would have been impossible after the victory of the revolution, or through partial concessions from both the Chinese Government and the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie--that is, through definite political compromise. This kind of compromise would require the use of flexible and cautious tactics, temporary retreats, the assessment of internal and external factors, etc.

During the first decade, China's internal political development was primarily influenced by the general line of the CCP, which urged the Chinese people to build a socialist society. This dictated cooperation of a temporary nature with the national bourgeoisie (including the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie), limited to the objectives of the transitional period.

Until 1954, participation by the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie in economic construction in China was dictated by the objectives of the General Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and took place under the slogan of the national unity of all Chinese. Regarding all overseas Chinese as citizens of the PRC, Beijing included them in the population of the country and made an attempt in 1949 to establish direct contact with all of their organizations. The Chinese Government committed itself to "do everything possible for the defense" of the rights and interests of overseas Chinese¹ and immediately "improve their status in the eyes of the world."² They were assigned an important role in state and political construction in the new China: representatives of overseas Chinese took part in drawing up the General Program, and in the system of the National Democratic United Front, their interests were expressed by such parties as Zhigongdang (Justice Party) and, in part, by the Democratic League of China. The political line with respect to overseas Chinese, which was formulated in mid-1951, stipulated the primary objectives of "propaganda of the achievements of the motherland, the new democracy and the Thought of Mao Zedong" and economic and political support of China, and urged the overseas Chinese to fight against the Chiang Kai-shek regime and American imperialism and to promote the elevation of the prestige of their motherland under the slogan of the "great patriotic unity of all Chinese."³

By uniting all foreign Chinese, even those who had formerly supported the Guomindang Government, in this kind of "united front," the Chinese Government hoped, with their support, to solve the basic problems facing the nation--to break through the economic blockade of the imperialist states. At that time, however, the appeals of the Chinese Government were meeting with support and approval primarily among representatives of the working strata of overseas Chinese. The position of the Chinese overseas bourgeoisie and, in particular, the grand bourgeoisie, was colored by the fact that it had close economic ties with the major imperialist powers, shared their hostility toward the PRC and took the economic blockade seriously, even though the program of commercial cooperation being planned in Beijing could have appealed to a certain segment.

From the first days of the PRC's existence, concrete steps were taken to stimulate the flow of cash transfers; according to Beijing's plans, these were to constitute the major portion of the republic's currency reserves.⁴ For this purpose, a special "protective" policy was worked out for relatives of overseas Chinese living in China, and a national economic investment program was approved. It was limited to traditional investments in the construction of schools, hospitals, hotels and residential buildings, the development of the lumber industry, the cultivation of virgin land and the improvement of irrigation systems. In essence, however, statements concerning the protection of cash transfers and the encouragement of investments were in the nature of tactical slogans and were not reinforced by any real concessions to the overseas bourgeoisie, whose savings accounts in PRC banks remained frozen. The conduct of a special policy toward relatives within the country often aroused misunderstandings and dissatisfaction among cadres and party workers, who did not carry out the instructions of the Committee on the Affairs of Overseas Chinese.⁵ The committee had to pick special cadres and teach them to "not advertise" the privileges granted to relatives. During the course of the agrarian reform, despite the fact that "voices were heard demanding no changes whatsoever in regions populated by relatives,"⁶ the PRC leadership renounced its previous decision to "not confiscate" real estate purchased with cash transfers from abroad. As a result, the property of 90 percent of the landowners who were relatives of overseas Chinese was nationalized. A considerable obstacle in the way of winning the trust of overseas Chinese was the already apparent "ultra-revolutionary" extremism of the Maoists, which led to the forcible confiscation of the majority of cash transfers and the coercion of relatives to deposit funds in impounded bank accounts. Relatives in China were virtually in the position of hostages "guaranteeing" foreign currency receipts, which were frequently extorted with the aid of blackmail and threats.

The extremist statements coming from China, demanding the "payment of blood debts" and threatening that the Chinese people would take "decisive and effective measures" to stop the persecution of overseas Chinese who stubbornly propagandized the Chinese revolutionary experience and the "Thought of Mao Zedong," were used to great advantage by the imperialist countries. By stirring up and spreading rumors of the Chinese "threat" and of Beijing's

desire to turn the overseas Chinese into its own "fifth column," they hoped to remove the overseas Chinese from the influence of communist ideas, break up the progressive organizations of overseas Chinese and reinforce the positions of right-wing anticommunist forces in the Chinese communities. Taking this into account, the heads of the committee made an attempt to tone down the ultra-revolutionary atmosphere somewhat by placing greater emphasis on the propagandization of nationalism in Chinese communities abroad.

In 1954 the first Constitution of the PRC legally secured the line of socialist construction in the nation, which was supposed to gradually narrow the bounds of cooperation with the bourgeoisie and transfer capitalist property to public ownership.⁷ The tremendous all-round assistance given to the PRC at that time by the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist community diminished, to a certain extent, the need to attract foreign capital into the nation on the basis of state capitalism. But it was precisely in the mid-1950's, during the period of Mao Zedong's excursions into nationalism, which consisted of the declaration of the "Hundred Flowers" antisocialist campaign and the first attacks on the general line of the CCP, accompanied by the advancement of the idea that conflicts with the national bourgeoisie were of a "nonantagonistic" nature, that a broad program was drawn up in China for cooperation with the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie. In 1955, the advance correction of the class affiliation of almost 95 percent of the landowners who were relatives of overseas Chinese was announced for the purpose of eradicating the "dissatisfaction" of overseas Chinese with the results of the agrarian reform and intensifying the flow of cash transfers.⁸ The same year, the slogan that "the accumulation of currency is the highest of policies" was used as a basis for the new policy toward cash transfers, which were called "the legitimate income of relatives" and the protection of which became Beijing's "long-term policy."⁹ For the broader attraction of the capital of overseas Chinese bourgeoisie regardless of whether they had relatives in China or not, the "Rules of Granting Privileges to Chinese Emigrants Investing their Capital in State Investment Companies of Chinese Emigrants" were ratified in 1957 at a session of the NPC [National People's Council] Standing Committee. A decree of the PRC State Council on this matter guaranteed investors a permanent fixed income on the capital, half of which could be transferred in local currency to the nations where the investors lived, and stated that the capital would remain the legal property of the investors even after the construction of socialism.¹⁰ The sphere of capital application was considerably expanded. Territorial restrictions on investments were lifted, permitting the investment of capital in industry, domestic and foreign trade, banking and insurance, and municipal services. In spite of a number of substantial and unjustified concessions to the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie, this plan for cooperation was completely permissible and partially justified under the conditions of the prolonged economic blockade of the imperialist states even during the transition period, when the government could use foreign capital to strengthen and enlarge the state sector of the national economy as much as possible for the quicker construction of socialism in the nation. The regulations governing investments by the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie, which had strict time

limits, were compiled in such a way as to prevent capital from leaking out of China and from being transferred or bequeathed to others. There is no question that these restrictions, as well as the absence of a class base for cooperation, had a restraining effect on the overseas bourgeoisie and compelled it to take an apprehensive, or even hostile stand in relations with Beijing. It should be noted, however, that China's influence on Chinese abroad increased, and the program for socialist construction attracted a large scientific and technical intelligentsia to the nation.

In 1954 the Chinese Government attempted to normalize relations with neighboring states in Asia on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence and nonintervention in the internal affairs of foreign states by proposing a solution to the issue of the "dual citizenship" of individuals of Chinese origin. According to Chinese statements, individuals with "dual citizenship" had to choose between their PRC and foreign citizenships.¹¹ But China would only recognize the legitimacy of this choice after the appropriate agreement had been signed with the state in question. The Chinese Government's initiative created the necessary conditions for a radical change in the relations between Beijing and overseas Chinese, as they were divided into two categories: citizens of the PRC, who were ordered to "observe the laws of the countries in which they resided,"¹² and foreigners of Chinese origin, who were not under the jurisdiction of the PRC.

The question of granting overseas Chinese the opportunity to renounce their Chinese citizenship¹³ evoked disagreement in the Chinese leadership. In 1955, and even in 1956, the prevailing opinion was that only a select group of overseas Chinese had the possibility of taking foreign citizenship. For example, in an agreement on dual citizenship signed in 1955 with Indonesia, the fate of PRC citizens was not touched upon, but a detailed program was worked out for the reinstatement of Indonesian Chinese as citizens of the PRC.¹⁴ The right of Chinese to regain their PRC citizenship was also mentioned to former Chief Minister D. Marshall of Singapore. In 1956, Zhou Enlai explained the essence of the new policy to Chinese living in Burma and ordered all of those who had taken Burmese citizenship to immediately sever all ties with Chinese organizations in the nation,¹⁵ which cannot be interpreted as anything other than the threat to turn these people into "outcasts," not only in China but also in the Chinese communities in Burma.

By the end of 1956, the approach to the question of citizenship had changed considerably. Overseas Chinese (including citizens of the PRC) were encouraged to become citizens of the nations in which they resided. The presence of this kind of citizenship was already being called a "demonstration of patriotism" in Beijing. The overseas Chinese were encouraged to regard themselves as part of the local population, to study the local language, geography, history and culture, to acquire good skills and to invest capital in industry and agriculture.¹⁶

The question of the future of overseas citizens of the PRC, who could be deported by foreign governments, was discussed at the Fifth Session of the Second NPC, in 1957. Session deputies representing the overseas Chinese

expressed the opinion, in a collective address, that under "favorable conditions" the number of Chinese who would be deported or would wish to return to their native land would be small. This position can be interpreted as a covert appeal for less intervention in the affairs of overseas Chinese or for some kind of limitation of Beijing's declared commitment to "defend the rights and interests" of overseas Chinese. A resolution adopted at the session testifies that China did not intend to renounce the right to "defend" its citizens living abroad and had decided to make preparations for their possible mass repatriation.¹⁷

But this entire program, which was so positive in its format, was accompanied by overt propaganda of nationalist feelings and the idea of the "inviolability of ties with the motherland" in Chinese communities overseas. In order to stir up nationalist feelings, a decision was adopted in 1957 on the establishment of a broad network of academic institutions for overseas Chinese in China.¹⁸

After 1958, when fundamental changes began to be made in PRC domestic and foreign policy, the role and significance of overseas Chinese grew significantly and objective prerequisites were established for closer alliance with the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie. The severance of ties with the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist community and widespread confrontation with the imperialist countries turned economic cooperation with the overseas Chinese into virtually the only way of attracting capital into the national economy. This was particularly important in connection with government measures taken in 1961-1965 to "regulate the national economy" after the grave consequences of the "Great Leap Forward." The measures taken by the Chinese Government in the beginning of the 1960's attested to its intention to turn cooperation with the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie into a permanent factor of national economic development. At an expanded conference of the Committee for the Affairs of Overseas Chinese in 1962, speakers stressed the fact that the capital investments, cash, homes and other property of overseas Chinese would remain their personal property forever.¹⁹ In 1963 a government statute on the provision of incentives to Chinese emigrants for their consent to extend the length of investment periods was ratified. The major tendency in government work became increasingly apparent in its practical activity--a line of convergence with the grand bourgeoisie. Beijing saw this kind of alliance as a "guarantee of successful work with all overseas Chinese." Almost all of the NPC and CPPCC [Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference] seats for deputies representing overseas Chinese were given to representatives of big Chinese capital or the leaders of Chinese communities abroad. In 1960, Chen Qiyu, chairman of the Zhigongdang Party, was appointed to the leadership of the Committee for the Affairs of Overseas Chinese.

The fundamental changes in Chinese policy, which led to the adoption of a nationalist policy line, to a departure from socialist methods of national economic management, to the denigration of the role of the CCP, to the establishment of the Mao Zedong cult of personality and to the struggle

against "Soviet revisionism," were interpreted by overseas Chinese (and particularly the Chinese bourgeoisie) as a possibility of even greater changes in China's orientation and the establishment of a solid bourgeois-nationalist basis of cooperation. These hopes were reinforced by the results of numerous ideological campaigns which did not affect the vital interests of the bourgeois strata but were aimed against the working class and party, trade-union and public organizations in the PRC. Even during the "Cultural Revolution," some Chinese banks in Hong Kong and Shanghai continued to pay overseas Chinese an income at only a slightly reduced interest rate, and permitted the transfer of one-fourth of this income to the nation of residence. The persecution of relatives by the Red Guards came to an end by the fall of 1966, and the news of this was immediately reported by the pro-Beijing Hong Kong press.

We cannot discount the fact that the extremist ultra-leftist methods of Mao Zedong, who demanded unconditional "respect for his ideas" from his allies, must have had a negative effect on the overseas Chinese and must have made them suspicious. Materials published during the years of the "Cultural Revolution" indicate that the leadership of the Committee for the Affairs of Overseas Chinese (which was backed up by the State Council) took steps to "neutralize" this negative influence to some degree. For example, despite the fact that political and ideological work was declared the party's main objective in its work with the overseas Chinese²⁰ and all relatives of overseas Chinese were obligated to take part in ideological campaigns, the committee tried to "isolate" them from the negative aspects of these campaigns. In 1963 a special directive was issued, prohibiting actions intended to "expose" the relatives of overseas Chinese; at the time of the movement "for socialist indoctrination," the relatives of overseas Chinese who lived on cash transfers and individuals whose class affiliation had been corrected in 1955 were not obligated to state their class affiliation. These measures, however, did not have any strong effect on overseas Chinese, as they were not official policy and they only affected a fairly limited percentage of the relatives of overseas Chinese. It must be said that the work methods of the committee and its leadership were fiercely criticized during the years of the "Cultural Revolution" by the Red Guards, which was essentially an expression of dissatisfaction with the practices of Zhou Enlai.

The role of overseas Chinese was not limited to participation in China's economic development. When the PRC Government made the transition to a great-power, chauvinist course aimed at the establishment of Chinese influence in the world, it drew up the first broad-scale program for the utilization of overseas Chinese as a political weapon for the attainment of its goals in the international arena. In the 1960's, the government relied mainly on extremist Maoist organizations and parties, which were encouraged to oppose the international communist and workers movement to dissociate it from the national liberation movement in the developing countries under the slogan of participation by overseas Chinese, along with the local population, in the anti-imperialist struggle, "wherever it might be going on."²¹ The encouragement of overseas Chinese to actually take part in the anti-imperialist, liberation struggle did not enter into Beijing's plans.

According to Chinese declarations, the participation of overseas Chinese in Laos, for example, was limited to "struggle against imperialism" in liberated regions. In South Vietnam, where most of the Chinese community supported the Saigon Government until 1975, the Chinese did not "join" the liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people until 1965, when the South Vietnamese Government was actually threatened by collapse, and even then this participation was only of limited proportions. The active assistance of overseas Chinese in the reinforcement of Beijing's positions in Indonesia, which was supposed to become the PRC's chief ally in its plans for hegemony in Asia, was not in any sense rendered in pursuit of anti-imperialist goals.

During the period of the Cultural Revolution, the overseas Chinese were used as a channel for the direct export of Maoist theories abroad, as a means of openly propagandizing the "Thought of Mao Zedong," distributing booklets of his quotations and Mao buttons and disseminating his criticism of local authorities, as well as a means of organizing unrest, during the course of which Chinese youths would hold demonstrations modeled on the Red Guard riots. It is indicative that the situation became particularly tense in countries with diplomatic relations with the PRC and in countries whose domestic and foreign policy the Chinese Government wished to influence directly.

Mao Zedong's "special line" in the international arena completely discredited the leftist organizations of overseas Chinese. By blindly adhering to Beijing's line, they completely isolated themselves from the international communist and workers movement and from the national liberation struggle of the people in the nations where these organizations were located and turned into secret sectarian groups of conspirators and terrorists.

After the Ninth CCP Congress (1969), the general reorientation of China's political line, the adoption of the line of convergence with the industrially developed capitalist powers and the declaration of struggle against the USSR as the chief enemy of the PRC, which expressed, in concentrated form, Beijing's hostility toward the forces of world socialism--all of this radically changed the basis of China's cooperation with overseas Chinese. This basis became an alliance with representatives of the exploitative strata in Chinese communities overseas, who could, on the strength of their close ties with ruling circles, particularly in the Southeast Asian countries, influence the views of these circles and successfully promote China's foreign policy line. The increased prestige of the PRC in the international arena in the 1970's, which led to the growth of nationalist feelings in Chinese communities abroad and the spread of the idea that the "China era" in world history was approaching,²² objectively contributed to this convergence.

Under these new conditions, the role and place of overseas Chinese were defined by the policy line worked out by Mao Zedong on the basis of the "six characters" ("tougher within," "softer without" and "taking root"), which served as a foundation for the successful waging of the "great struggle" which, according to Mao Zedong, might take the form of racial and ethnic conflicts in the future. All overseas Chinese could become allies of China,

"in spite of their past errors,"²³ and the only requirement was a display of "patriotism." Formally, according to the interpretation of the Maoist leadership, the term "patriotism" meant "support for the socialist fatherland, the CCP, the line of Mao Zedong and the General Program of the CPPCC." The mention of the CPPCC General Program in the collective work "The Motherland and Emigrants," published in Hong Kong by the pro-Beijing Dagong Bao publishing house, confirmed the actual renunciation of the CCP general line for the transitional period by the Ninth CCP Congress--that is, a renunciation of the program for the construction of socialism in the nation. This naturally aroused a friendly response in the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie, which was thereby given the opportunity to participate in China's political and economic construction on a new, bourgeois-nationalist basis.

As a practical step within the country, a few privileges of relatives of overseas Chinese were restored--the policy of "stimulating" cash transfers was revived (the transfer began to be paid out in the full amount and the interest rate on bank deposits by overseas Chinese was raised); the supply of relatives with foodstuffs was improved, restrictions on parcels were relaxed, the work schedule of relatives of overseas Chinese was reduced (sometimes from 25 to 15 work days a month) and incentives were provided for the construction of homes with money transferred from abroad. Despite the fact that an ukase dissolving the investment companies of the overseas Chinese was issued in 1969, by the end of 1969, first in exceptional cases and then officially, individuals whose investments had matured were offered a chance to withdraw their investment shares from the People's Bank, although they were not allowed to take them out of the country in the form of currency. The payment of dividends was resumed in September 1972 and overseas Chinese were promised compensation for the losses they had incurred during the years of the "Cultural Revolution."

According to a decree adopted by the PRC State Council in regard to the relaxation of restrictions on exit permits, the group of persons having the right to submit applications for these permits was expanded. But the actual implementation of this decree vividly corroborated the lack of agreement on this matter in the PRC leadership. Persons who applied for visas were frequently persecuted and openly accused of "bourgeois tendencies." In a number of regions, the population was ordered to launch mass campaigns against "the tendency to emigrate to Hong Kong" and the "three Western tendencies."²⁴ On the one hand, those who wished to leave the country were considered to be displaying "bourgeois tendencies" and, on the other, the only ones permitted to do this were those who "passionately loved their motherland," met the "proper requirements" and had relatives who were citizens of the nations where they permanently resided. All those who left had to promise to maintain constant contact with PRC embassies and consulates in the future. Despite the constant appeal for the "correction of policy," the mistrust of repatriates and the relatives of overseas Chinese was still widespread, and they were regarded as "enemies" and "agents of foreign states."

Within the framework of the policy line aimed at the regulation of intergovernmental relations, several tactical changes were made in Beijing's policy, one of which was the "softer within" directive. This was supposed to convince the

nation that China was prepared to settle the question of the citizenship of overseas Chinese. In public statements, the leaders of the PRC reaffirmed that the PRC did not recognize the status of "dual citizenship" and called upon Chinese living abroad to apply for citizenship in their countries of residence and to observe the laws of these countries. In a practical move, the Committee for the Affairs of Overseas Chinese was dissolved as an "unnecessary" agency.²⁵ In May 1972, the CCP Central Committee and PRC State Council published a joint directive on the "arrival in China of foreigners, foreign citizens of Chinese origin, Chinese students and Chinese emigrants," and in 1973 the equal status of Chinese emigrants and foreigners of Chinese origin who were entering China was canceled. In this way, Beijing hoped to underscore the fact that it drew a distinction between its own citizens and foreigners, regardless of their origins. The nation's propaganda agencies began to use an entire set of terms in reference to overseas Chinese: "Chinese emigrants," "descendants of Chinese" and "foreigners of Chinese origin." According to a joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations, signed in 1974-1975 with Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, the right of overseas Chinese to freely choose citizenship was no longer envisaged. All Chinese with local citizenship automatically lost their PRC citizenship. This made it possible for Beijing to relieve itself of moral responsibility for the behavior of overseas Chinese and the obligation to defend them in times of crisis.

When former Minister of Foreign Affairs Qiao Guanhua spoke before a group of administrative workers in May 1975, he declared that this approach would relieve the PRC of "unjustified worries requiring huge expenditures of energy, resources and finances" and that the presence of overseas Chinese with local citizenship would benefit Beijing, as it would strengthen the economic and political positions of overseas Chinese in other countries.

Therefore, it is obvious that the tactical line of "softer within" is directly linked with the instruction to "take root." For this purpose, overseas Chinese continue to be persuaded that they would remain the "brothers of the Chinese people"²⁶ even if they apply for local citizenship, and that they would be required to "love their motherland passionately," propagandize its "advantages," participate in the social and political life of foreign countries by infiltrating institutions, trade unions and public organizations, and establish a network of pro-Beijing Chinese organizations. According to reports, the Association of Chinese Emigrants "For Peace" had already been established in South Vietnam even before the victory of the Vietnamese people with the direct participation of China. Its line, which is defined by Beijing leaders, consists in living peacefully, gathering strength, waiting for the right moment, uniting the bourgeoisie with the intelligentsia and sending cash transfers and technical experts to the PRC.²⁷ In 1971, a scandal broke out in Singapore which led to the closure of several newspaper offices and the arrest of a group of journalists. During the course of the investigation, it became known that the editor of the EASTERN SUN newspaper had been paid around 7.2 million Hong Kong dollars by Chinese intelligence for hiring its agents. According to a government announcement, the Chinese

authorities had attempted to create a favorable political situation for Beijing by "seizing and utilizing local mass media as one of the most effective ways of influencing public opinion."²⁸

The present leadership's more active work with overseas Chinese is part of the general course of alliance with imperialism and with the most reactionary forces. Beijing now intends to use overseas Chinese in two basic ways: Firstly, it intends to use their economic and scientific potential to carry out the program for the "modernization" and militarization of the economy and secondly, it needs their support for its great-Han hegemonistic policies in the international arena.

As the direct heirs to the expansionist line of Mao Zedong, the present leaders are striving to use more reasonable methods to attain the strategic goals set forth by Mao. This is leading to the rejection of certain orthodox Maoist tenets. With respect to the overseas Chinese, this has taken the form of the rejection of the "tougher without" directive, which was once the main obstacle to winning the trust of overseas Chinese. Now it is not only easier for relatives of overseas Chinese to leave China and take up permanent residence in other countries, but they are even encouraged to do so. Entry regulations have been simplified for individuals of the Chinese nationality who come to the PRC for traditional and national holidays or to visit relatives. All privileges are gradually being restored for relatives, property confiscated during the years of the Cultural Revolution is being returned to them, many are no longer labeled "rightist" and the network of academic institutions for overseas Chinese and "countrymen" from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan is being expanded. In order to "soothe" overseas Chinese, a fundamental amendment has been made in the new Constitution of the PRC, according to which the state will protect the rights and interests of not only Chinese living abroad, but also their relatives in China.²⁹

In the nature of a practical move to corroborate the Chinese Government's intention to offer the overseas Chinese bourgeoisie extensive opportunities for participation in the nation's economic and political construction, a special reference work on investments by overseas Chinese was compiled in Beijing, and plans call for the creation of joint enterprises and "special export zones," where cheap Chinese manpower will be used in foreign enterprises. In addition to Hong Kong, it is probable that Macao will become a zone of this kind, since the Chinese authorities are already planning to send manpower from China to Macao. The question of "unblocking" the accounts of overseas Chinese in PRC banks is being discussed in Beijing, and residents of Hong Kong are permitted to buy homes in the province of Guangdong once again. The Chinese leadership wants to attract the capital of overseas Chinese into virtually all spheres of the national economy. This is attested to by the fact that relatives of overseas Chinese and repatriates working in agriculture, industry, public health, education, transportation and scientific institutions and serving in the People's Liberation Army of China attended the All-China Conference on the Affairs of Overseas Chinese as delegates in December 1978. They were assigned the duty of

"propagandizing party aims and conducting indoctrinational work with friends and relatives abroad."³⁰ China has great hopes for assistance from American scientists of Chinese origin who are becoming part of the U.S. scientific elite and are occupying influential positions in nuclear physics, thermodynamics, semiconductor physics, theoretical and applied mathematics, ballistics, space exploration, astrogeology, complex polymer chemistry and computer science. They are teaching in U.S. higher academic institutions, heading research projects in the laboratories of several companies and working on Pentagon contracts. The noticeable more frequent visits to the PRC by American scientists of Chinese origin attest to the Chinese leadership's desire to make active use of this channel of scientific and military information. All possible means are used to gain control over the Chinese scientists: from the keeping of dossiers and the dispatch of letters containing various promises to the practice of blackmail and the use of family and business ties.

The new stage in the work with overseas Chinese has been accompanied by the reinstatement of organizations in charge of work with overseas Chinese and the organization of conferences and congresses of the All-China Association of Repatriates. The relatives of overseas Chinese, repatriates and "countrymen" took an active part in sessions of the NPC and CPPCC. Two Hong Kong "countrymen" (the millionaire Huo Ying and DAGONG BAO editor Fei Yiming) were elected to the CPPCC Standing Committee for the first time. The resumption of activity by democratic organizations has prepared a place for overseas Chinese in the political life of the Chinese society as well.

Just as in the past, a "patriotic united front" is the formula being used for convergence with the overseas Chinese. All Chinese, including foreigners of Chinese origin who are "connected to China by blood ties," have been called upon to display stronger solidarity and expand the boundaries of this front by means of explanatory work, even with those "who are suspicious of the motherland and oppose it."³¹ At the same time, while China is calling upon all overseas Chinese to join the "broadest international front" of struggle against "hegemonism," it is trying to draw them into the channel of global war against the forces of socialism. Taking advantage of the patriotism of the overseas Chinese and deliberately overestimating their role, Beijing is trying to assure them that their "patriotic positions" will strengthen the security of the motherland and serve the cause of the "maximum isolation and defeat of the main enemies."³²

As we know, the Chinese leadership made an attempt to use the Chinese community in the SRV as a striking force in the political struggle against socialism and for intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Some politicians in Asia who assessed the events in Vietnam confused the cause with the effect, asserting that they were insured against this kind of intervention by Beijing as they would never be conducting socialist reforms. Nonetheless, these events forced many to reassess their attitude toward Chinese policy and attempt to gain some kind of "concrete guarantees" of nonintervention from Beijing. As the Vietnamese experience demonstrated,

however, Beijing does not regard interparty or intergovernmental agreements as an obstacle. In particular, the fact that Chinese are citizens of another country will not impede the use of the overseas Chinese in the implementation of great-power policies. In Kampuchea, for example, there was united action by the Chinese leadership and the former regime of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary; this is why Beijing did not protest the policy of genocide in regard to the Chinese community in this nation. In 1977 and 1978, the Chinese living in the United States and Japan played the role of a "bridge of friendship," conducting active propaganda work aimed at the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States and the signing of a Japanese-Chinese treaty as soon as possible. Chinese diplomatic representatives carefully observed the activities of overseas Chinese, attended their meetings and congresses and made programmed speeches. Chinese diplomatic representatives are now becoming more active in several Latin American countries. In this connection, such nations as Peru, Panama, Venezuela and Jamaica are being mentioned quite frequently in the Chinese press.

The work of the Beijing leadership with overseas Chinese is now being accompanied by more intensive propaganda of great-Han nationalism. The emphasis here is placed on the need for Chinese to preserve their traditions, morals and customs and to study the Chinese language (particularly the Beijing dialect)--that is, to develop a sense of affiliation with the Chinese nationality. At the same time, as the Indonesian MERDEKA newspaper reported, attempts are being made to instill overseas Chinese "with the great-power chauvinist belief of their superiority to other nationalities." Beijing's appeal to the governments of the Southeast Asian countries, expressing the hope that they would "respect" the customs, morals and traditions of the Chinese, and the constitutionally confirmed guarantees of "protection" of the rights and interests of overseas Chinese by the PRC Government are giving rise to apprehension in these countries and are being interpreted as a "challenge." The propaganda of unconcealed nationalism and the appeal for the retention of "national affiliation," which implies "loyalty to and support for" Beijing, testified to China's shift (particularly in Southeast Asia) from a policy of flirtation, which was the main element of the "softer within" directive, to the practice of overt pressure by means of threats to establish a "fifth column" consisting of overseas Chinese in these countries. According to the American CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR of 6 November 1978, "Asian officials are now much more disturbed by the support of Beijing by overseas Chinese than by the support of rebel movements."

In the mid-1950's, the Chinese Government rejected the principle of relationship by blood in the definition of citizenship and allowed overseas Chinese with "dual citizenship" to choose one of them. The right to choose foreign citizenship was later granted to all overseas Chinese, and by the beginning of the 1960's only 40 percent of the individuals of Chinese nationality living abroad were citizens of the PRC. In later years, the practice of applying for foreign citizenship became widespread, and 90 percent of all overseas Chinese are now citizens of foreign countries.

Statements made by Chinese leaders in the 1970's testify that they acknowledge this process and do not regard these individuals as citizens of the PRC. Chinese propaganda has divided all Chinese into "Chinese emigrants" (huaqiao), the descendants of Chinese and foreigners of Chinese origin. The current leadership also adheres to this point of view in its official propaganda. The 3 July 1978 RENMIN RIBAO editorial stated that "China does not recognize the one-sided definition of citizenship in terms of the principle of blood relationship." The same article stressed that the term "Chinese emigrants" signifies citizens of the PRC. "If a Chinese emigrant applies for citizenship in the country where he permanently resides, he ceases to be regarded as a Chinese emigrant, loses his PRC citizenship and becomes a foreigner of Chinese origin" who should be "a loyal citizen of the nation in which he resides." It is precisely in this form that the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY translated this statement into Russian.

Explaining the essence of their policy, the Beijing leaders say that their appeals are addressed to Chinese emigrants, who should "support the motherland and assist it in the work of modernizing the country." If we consider, however, that the number of PRC citizens abroad does not exceed 4 million at the present time and that these individuals represent the least wealthy segment of Chinese communities or new arrivals, it becomes apparent that this group of Chinese, without any solid economic or political positions, cannot be "useful" in Beijing's plans. The appeals of the Chinese leadership are addressed to another segment of the Chinese population--Chinese who are citizens of the nations in which they permanently reside and who represent 90 percent of the Chinese living abroad. Under these conditions, the appeals "to assist the motherland economically and in the struggle against its enemies" can only be seen as direct intervention in the internal affairs of foreign states through the use of citizens of these states for one's own purposes. In order to somehow camouflage the existence of overt intervention, the Beijing authorities resort to deliberate confusion in terminology, and the majority of official announcements still call all overseas Chinese "Chinese emigrants."

It should be noted that in the first Constitution of the PRC of 1954, China assumed the obligation to defend the rights of "Chinese emigrants living abroad." This meant that all Chinese living abroad were regarded by Beijing as citizens of the PRC. The PRC Constitution of 1978, which was adopted after China had officially admitted the presence of foreigners of Chinese origin as well as citizens of the PRC among the overseas Chinese, also states that the government promises to "protect the rights and interests of Chinese living abroad." This means that China still regards all Chinese living abroad as its own "subjects" and that the discussion of problems connected with the citizenship of overseas Chinese with other countries is regarded by Beijing as only a political maneuver. There is no doubt that by continuing to see itself as the supreme "suzeraine" of all Chinese, Beijing is reserving itself the right to intervene in the internal affairs of other states in the event that this might be convenient and necessary for China's own political goals.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Obrazovaniye Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki. Dokumenty i materialy" [The Founding of the People's Republic of China. Documents and Materials], Moscow, 1950, p 49.
2. NANFANG RIBAO, 5 October 1950.
3. RENMIN RIBAO, 14 July 1951.
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7. "The Constitution of the People's Republic of China," Beijing, 1954, p 8.
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12. "Report on the Work of the Government," Beijing, 1954, p 30.
13. Chinese legislation, proceeding from the "blood-tie principle," does not recognize the renunciation of Chinese citizenship even when Chinese apply for citizenship in the countries in which they are residing.
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16. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 February 1957.
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18. Ibid., 3 August 1957.
19. QIAOWU BAO, 1962, No 2.
20. Ibid., 20 January 1959.
21. ZHONGGUO XINWENSHE, 4 May 1965.

22. NANYANG XIANGBAO, 7 September 1971.
23. DAGONG BAO, 1 October 1972.
24. The "three Western tendencies" were admiration for the West, worship of the West and convergence with the West. The struggle against them provides clear proof of the lack of unity on the question of foreign policy guidelines in the PRC.
25. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, vol 82, No 39, 1 October 1973.
26. DAGONG BAO, 1 October 1972.
27. NHAN DAN, 8 September 1978.
28. STRAITS TIMES, 16 May 1971.
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ENGLAND IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

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[Article by A. G. Larin, candidate of philological sciences]

[Text] For many years, Great Britain has occupied a prominent place in Chinese diplomacy in Western Europe. This is not only due to England's authority in European affairs, but also to its prominent position in the total system of worldwide imperialism.

In the 1960's and 1970's the Beijing leaders, behaving in accordance with the principles of their great-power hegemonistic "special course," devoted their activities in relations with London to the objective of putting an end to detente on the European continent, simultaneously hoping to use the achievements of English science and technology for the intensive augmentation of their own military and economic potential.¹ This tendency in Beijing's policy, which was inconsistent with the need for improvement in the international climate in Europe, gave the development of Chinese-English relations a complex and contradictory nature.

The reorientation of Chinese foreign policy and the desire to make use of the imperialist powers as tactical allies motivated the Maoist leadership to accelerate the process of the normalization of diplomatic relations with Great Britain in the early 1970's.

By this time, China had already exchanged ambassadors with France and a few other Western European countries. Diplomatic relations with England, on the other hand, had been conducted on the level of temporary officials only since 1954, even though this was the first capitalist state to recognize the PRC de jure in January 1950.

The slow development of Chinese-English relations was mainly due to the pressure exerted on London by the U.S. Government, which was then conducting a policy that was clearly hostile to the PRC. At the time of the "Cultural Revolution," interrelations between the PRC and Great Britain deteriorated even more after several incidents which were the consequence of so-called Red Guard diplomacy.

As a result of lengthy and difficult negotiations in 1971 and 1972, the two sides decided to normalize diplomatic relations by exchanging ambassadors. China, which had taken a tougher position, was able to gain substantial concessions from England: Great Britain not only severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan by recalling its consular personnel, but also unequivocally recognized the PRC's right to this island. When the other capitalist countries had established diplomatic relations with Beijing, however, the majority had limited themselves to the conciliatory consent to "give consideration" to the views of the Chinese Government which regarded Taiwan as an "integral part of PRC territory" (the "Canadian formula").

In addition to this, in 1971 Great Britain stopped supporting the U.S. proposal that the PRC be admitted to the United Nations only with the consent of a two-thirds majority. The English delegation also objected to the United States' attempts to establish UN representation for the "two Chinas"--the PRC and the Taiwan regime.

London's agreement to make these concessions was motivated by several factors. The British monopolies wished to establish themselves in the Chinese market as quickly as possible to gain an advance on their competitors from other countries. By allying itself with China, England was also striving to gain its favorable attitude toward English interests in Asia, particularly the preservation of the status quo in the last British colony--Hong Kong. Finally, the Conservative Government of E. Heath which was then in power was distinguished by an extremely reactionary domestic and foreign policy and intended to make the most intensive use of the Maoist leadership as a force hostile to the socialist community.

In turn, the Chinese leadership was striving to take advantage of broader contacts with English statesmen to give new impetus to the anti-Sovietism of the Tory leaders and thereby slow down the transition from cold war to a healthy international climate in Europe, which had begun under the influence of the constructive policy and initiative of the socialist countries.

It gradually became apparent, against the background of the development of Soviet-French relations in the spirit of cooperation and the "Eastern policy" of Bonn, that the Chinese leaders were giving England priority over other leading Western European powers by associating the Conservative policy line with their own hope of undermining the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Vienna talks on the limitation of arms and armed forces in Central Europe. China's heightened interest in Great Britain was also noticed by Western observers.²

The Heath Government unequivocally supported the Chinese leadership's pointedly hostile line toward the Soviet Union. Encouraging the Maoists in their territorial claims in the USSR, Home asserted that the Soviet-Chinese border would be an "object of dispute" just as "the future of provinces which are now part of the Soviet Union" but were supposedly once "part of the Chinese empire."³ In an attempt to prevent the normalization of Soviet-Chinese

relations, the British press and politicians, including Home, made provocative statements, alleging that the Soviet Union was "concentrating its troops on the Chinese border"⁴ and so forth.

The aim of turning Europe into the scene of conflicts between states with different social structures was the reason for Beijing's attitude toward the issue of English participation in the European Economic Community, which was one of the central issues in London's policy in the first half of the 1970's. The Chinese hoped that England's admittance to the EEC would accelerate the further integration of the Western European countries and could give it a clearly defined anti-Soviet character. As Western researchers pointed out, the PRC leadership began to regard Great Britain's association with the "big six" as "a valuable contribution to the creation of a strong anti-Soviet bloc on Moscow's western flank."⁵ This is why the Beijing leaders responded enthusiastically to the negotiations concerning Great Britain's admittance to the EEC⁶ and had the most positive comments to make in regard to its official entry into the community in 1973.⁷ In one of his speeches, Deng Xiaoping spoke in the most glowing terms about Heath's actions, saying that he had "resolutely returned England to Europe." "This," the Chinese official said, "is an important action and a propitious one for the struggle against the superpowers."⁸

Moreover, Beijing approved of Great Britain's claims to leadership in the Common Market. "China would like England to play not only a prominent role in the European community, but even the leading role,"⁹ the London press remarked.

There is no question that the main object against which Chinese diplomacy wished to direct the efforts of a "united Europe," with the aid of Great Britain, was the Soviet Union. At the same time, by strengthening ties with Great Britain and encouraging it to join the Common Market, the Chinese leadership was also pursuing another goal: It wanted to force Washington to experience China's growing international influence and thereby motivate the United States to converge with Beijing and make concessions to it.

In line with this goal, Beijing once began to support Great Britain in its differences of opinion with the United States. There was a definite anti-American purpose to several articles in the Chinese press which stressed that London "is persistently striving to unite with the Western European countries to fight against the state of affairs in which the superpowers are intensifying their rivalry throughout the world while the international positions of England quickly disintegrate."¹⁰

Soon afterward, however, the Chinese leadership concluded that in the interest of struggle against world socialism, the integration of the Western European countries should not be accompanied by their diminished participation in NATO. At this point, observers could confidently say that the Maoists were "not very worried about England's ties with America."¹¹

Striving for the maximum consolidation of imperialist forces, the Chinese leaders were particularly pleased by the English prime minister's proposal that the integration of the European capitalist countries progressed to the level of joint "defense of Western Europe" and, moreover, that this be accomplished within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. During Heath's visit in the PRC, Zhou Enlai, according to English journalists, repeatedly advocated the "more speedy" implementation of this idea.¹²

Therefore, from the beginning of the 1970's, Beijing and the Conservative government in Great Britain began to develop a close partnership, encompassing a sizable group of problems and having as its point of departure the common desire of the two sides to prevent the relaxation of international tension, particularly on the European continent.

In the special parliamentary elections of February 1974, the Conservatives, with whom Beijing had "much in common in positions on a broad group of political issues,"¹⁴ were defeated and the Labor Party took over. Under these different conditions, Chinese diplomacy, the goals of which had not changed, had to redefine its attitude toward English Government policy and redistribute its attention between the ruling party and the opposition.

After winning the mandate to govern the country, the Labor Party took advantage of the warmer international climate in Europe to revise its predecessors' policy of impeding detente and adopted a more positive line in interrelations with the Soviet Union. Prime Minister H. Wilson of Great Britain visited the USSR in 1975. This visit was marked by the signing of several documents which laid a basis for productive cooperation by the two countries. The Wilson Government displayed an interest in the success of the all-European conference and the talks in Vienna. In a search for solutions to economic difficulties, the Labor Government announced its intention to cut military spending.

Beijing's hope that England would pull Europe back into the days of the cold war was shattered.

Under these conditions, the Chinese leadership began to concentrate on the Conservative opposition,¹⁵ striving to give it support in the next election race. During his trip to the PRC in 1974, E. Heath, who was still the leader of the Conservative Party, was given a pointedly ceremonial reception. He was given an opportunity to meet Mao Zedong and discuss a "broad range of subjects" with him, and just slightly more than a year later he was invited to return to China and have another "friendly conversation" with Mao. Beijing let it be known that it regarded the head of the Tories as the most worthy leader of the British political world.

This sounded like an overt challenge, aimed not only at the foreign policy line of the Wilson Government but also at its very authority. The result of Beijing's position was a noticeable cooling of bilateral relations. Soon after Heath's trip to Beijing, it was apparent that the British Government had "no special interest" in China,¹⁶ and the Chinese theme almost disappeared from speeches by British Government officials.

After the overthrow of the "gang of four," when the new Chinese leadership had consolidated its positions and began to gradually seek more active relations with the West, it made it quite clear that its sympathies were still on the side of the Tories.¹⁷

The Labor Party reacted to this quite quickly: The news that Prime Minister Callaghan was in no hurry to carry out his plans to visit the PRC appeared in the press. The Chinese leaders, however, were puzzled, according to the English press, by the "carelessness with which Callaghan and his ministers were approaching relations with the PRC."¹⁸

Nonetheless, the Maoist leadership decided a short time later to take steps toward rapprochement with London. Beijing was taking advantage of the complicated international situation to make extensive purchases of modern weapons in Western Europe and deemed it expedient to give more attention to England with its developed defense industry. Great Britain was unexpectedly included in the itinerary of Hua Guofeng's projected Western European tour in 1979. According to the English press, this first aroused "amazement and feelings of embarrassment in White Hall,"¹⁹ but an agreement was later reached on this visit.

As these events developed, the role of Beijing's "favorite" in Western Europe began to be transferred more and more clearly from Great Britain to the FRG: The revanchist aspirations of its ruling circles appealed to the Maoist leadership, which saw them as "combustible material" it might be able to use for the purpose of firing up conflicts in the very center of the European continent.

In addition to all of these tactical moves, Beijing propaganda was waging a constant slanderous campaign to undermine Soviet-English relations. The Chinese press printed provocative material to convey the false impression that Soviet military ships were threatening Great Britain.²⁰ The development of the Soviet merchant fleet was also called a "mounting threat." Even the conflict between England and Iceland over fishing problems (the "cod war") was used by the Chinese press as a pretext for anti-Soviet attacks by interpreting it in line with the "superpower theory."²¹

In an attempt to dissociate himself from the line of the Chinese leadership, Secretary of State A. Crosland for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs felt the need, after his visit to the PRC in 1976, to stress that his feelings about detente had not changed and that England would continue to work toward detente. It is indicative that his entire trip took place in an extremely cool atmosphere. As the London press commented, when the English secretary was in China, he "did not experience the exceptional warmth that Beijing apparently reserved for such statesmen as Sir Alec (Douglas Home) and E. Heath."²⁴

The difference in approaches to this key issue was clearly demonstrated once again when Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua was in London at the end of 1978. In response to his expressed "anxiety" over Soviet policy, D. Owen,

English secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, advised "productive dialog" with the USSR, emphasizing that he did not believe that war was inevitable.²⁵

Another "stumbling block" in the Maoist leadership's interrelations with the Labor Government was the question of Great Britain's role in Western European integration. The Chinese leaders "disapproved"²⁶ of the Labor Government's attempts to revise the conditions of Great Britain's membership in the EEC.

The Wilson Government's decision to put the question of the nation's future status in the EEC to a referendum in May 1975 aroused acute displeasure in China. Commentaries in the Chinese press emphasized the fact that England's inclusion in the community was not coincidental and that the expansion of the Common Market represents, as they put it, "an important way of uniting the Western European states for the purpose of resisting the expansion of the superpowers, particularly the Soviet Union."²⁷

The results of the referendum, which left Great Britain's membership status in the EEC unchanged, relieved those in Beijing. According to E. Heath, they were judged by China as "extremely important" for the "unity and strength of Europe."²⁸ The PRC propaganda system called them "more evidence of the desire of the Western European countries to unite in a struggle against hegemonism."²⁹

Great Britain's participation in the Atlantic Pact was just as vigorously supported by the Chinese leaders. Beijing was pleased to see that the pressure exerted by pact partners was impeding the Labor Government's timid attempts to implement its numerous declarations of cuts in military spending. In an attempt to use this as a channel for the prevention of military detente on the European continent, the leaders of the PRC collaborated with the head of the English Conservatives and expressed their point of view through him: "The maintenance of U.S. armed forces in Western Europe is in the interest of the United States itself."³⁰ Later, however, when the Carter Administration embarked on the further escalation of the arms race (which aroused apprehension in the United States' European allies), the Chinese leadership began to support American plans for the deployment of the latest types of weapons in Europe, assuring England and other Western European states that this was allegedly necessary for safeguarding their security.³¹

It is true that while the Chinese leaders were advocating the reinforcement of the North Atlantic Pact in general and Anglo-American military and political ties in particular, their talks with British statesmen sometimes contained criticism of both "superpowers" (although it was far from equivalent). They were pleased when they heard E. Heath's respond to the statements in China, when he took up Beijing's terminology and made the following demand: "The superpowers must listen when we speak."³² They were equally pleased with a statement made later by M. Thatcher, who, during her visit to the PRC, stressed the need for a "clearer and stronger European voice in world affairs."³³ The desire of English monopolistic circles to limit the expansion of American capital in Western Europe, which was reflected in these

statements, was completely consistent with Beijing's interests: It attempted to make use of this circumstance as one means of exerting pressure on the United States, so as to strengthen its position in the dialog with Washington.

Nonetheless, there is no question that the prevailing tendency in Beijing's tactics is one of promoting the consolidation of the forces of the greatest imperialist powers rather than stressing Anglo-American conflicts. This tendency was most clearly apparent when the new Chinese leadership began to intensify its foreign policy activity. In the beginning of 1977, Li Xiannian set forth Beijing's line in a SUNDAY TIMES interview and expressed the hope that Western Europe "will develop an equal partnership with the United States."³⁴ A few months later, during the next round of talks with E. Heath, Beijing officials described to him, as he put it, a "new world strategy," which consisted in the creation of an anti-Soviet "united front," including Western Europe, the United States and Japan along with the PRC. The British politician (and this conforms to a certain natural pattern) was one of the first Western European statesmen Beijing decided to acquaint with its new theory, proposing it thereby to the West.

The anti-Sovietism of the Maoist leadership has also been the reason for its attitude toward the actions of English imperialism in the Third World. Beijing is striving to help Great Britain and the other European imperialist powers retain their positions in the developing countries for the purpose of limiting the international influence of the Soviet Union as drastically as possible.

China "silently approved," in the words of the FINANCIAL TIMES, of the "defensive five-part alliance" created in 1971, regarding it "as a regional counterbalance to Russian influence." This alliance, which takes in Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore in addition to England, was supposed to consolidate the English military presence in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean. Indications that the Chinese leaders "approved" of the activities of SENTO evoked pleasure in Great Britain.³⁵

Beijing did not make a single critical remark in connection with the English military presence in the Mediterranean, where Great Britain had bases on Malta and Cyprus. It is true that Beijing propaganda eagerly made use of the slogan "The Mediterranean Sea belongs to the Mediterranean countries," but the implementation of this slogan affected Great Britain so little that the English press made the following ironic comment: "From the vantage point of China, historical circumstances have evidently made England one of these countries."³⁶

Beijing also had no objections to Great Britain's military preparations, such as the construction of bases, jointly with the United States, on the island of Diego Garcia, capable of housing submarines equipped with nuclear weapons and serving as an intermediate point in the transport of landing forces from Europe to the countries of the Indian Ocean region.

By manipulating the facts of the development of the anti-imperialist movement on the African continent, the PRC leaders tried to exacerbate relations between Great Britain and the USSR. In one of his conversations with English journalists, Li Xiannian slanderously accused the USSR of planning to "gain control over the Cape of Good Hope."³⁷ The same kind of statement was made by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu Zhan, who declared that the Soviet Union wanted to "get its hands on the wealth of Africa."³⁸

The Beijing leaders' efforts to discredit Soviet policy in the developing countries have met with approval in British imperialist circles. On the other hand, however, the expansionist aspirations of the PRC are creating anxiety in White Hall. Beijing's line of escalating tension in various parts of Asia frequently runs counter to the interests of English capital, which prefers to operate under stable conditions due to Great Britain's modest foreign policy capabilities.³⁹

In the total picture of Chinese-English relations in the Third World, a special place is occupied by Hong Kong (Xianggang), the small British colony on Chinese territory which plays a unique and exceedingly important role in the system of Chinese foreign economic ties and represents a sphere for the closest possible interaction of Chinese and British interests. For the PRC, Hong Kong is a major source of foreign currency, needed by this country to cover its annual deficit in trade with the capitalist countries. At the beginning of the 1970's, Hong Kong accounted for approximately 50 percent of the PRC's total foreign currency revenues. In 1976 and 1977 this percentage declined slightly, but it was still quite high: around 30 percent, or approximately 2 billion dollars in terms of value⁴⁰ (according to other data, the figure could even be 40 percent).

Most of these revenues are the profits from exports of goods made in the PRC to Hong Kong; this figure reached 1.6 and 1.7 billion dollars in 1976 and 1977 in contrast to the 1972 figure of 300 million dollars. This volume of exports to Hong Kong is turning this territory into the PRC's second largest trade partner (after Japan). Other sizable revenues come from tourism and bank deposits.

In the military sense, Hong Kong is absolutely defenseless in the face of China, and the very existence of this colony depends on supplies of food and drinking water from the PRC. "Hong Kong could not survive without co-operation with China," commented the FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW.⁴¹ Any kind of political disorder in the PRC causes the business community in Hong Kong to worry about its future. It is indicative that the stock exchange in Hong Kong fell 20 points as soon as the news of Mao Zedong's death had been announced.⁴²

Holding the fate of Hong Kong in its hands, the Beijing leadership nonetheless believed it would be inexpedient to deprive it of colony status, as it is precisely in this capacity that it has been and will continue to be of the greatest benefit to China. Moreover, to avoid a decline in business activity in Hong Kong, the PRC leaders regularly assure London that it has no reason to worry about the future of this colony.

When the confusion that arose in Beijing after Mao Zedong's death aroused apprehensive feelings in the English colony in 1976, Chinese representatives hastened to assure its administration that the situation in the PRC "would affect neither the status of Hong Kong nor the territorial policy of Beijing."⁴³

The newly established Hua Guofeng-Deng Xiaoping leadership embarked upon a course of more active political and economic ties with the West and made a considerable effort to eradicate all doubts in concerned circles in regard to the future of the colony. In April 1977, Hua Guofeng received a group of Hong Kong journalists and told them that the preservation of English authority in Hong Kong was "in the interest of China."⁴⁴ Under-scoring the firmness of their intentions, the Chinese leaders announced that the "correct political course" they were conducting in regard to Hong Kong and Macao had been worked out by Mao Zedong and was consistent with the instructions of Zhou Enlai.⁴⁵

The objective of stronger ties with Hong Kong was elevated to the status of official state policy. In a report presented at a session of the Fifth NPC, Hua Guofeng included his "countrymen in Xianggang and Aomen" in the "revolutionary united front," and called the development of this front "a major element of the proletarian revolutionary line of Chairman Mao." This thesis made it possible for Beijing to expand its influence in various strata of the Hong Kong population, cooperate when necessary with local authorities and--the main thing--develop various forms of trade and economic ties with Hong Kong, and all without touching upon the issue of the colony's return to China.

Particular significance was attached to the shipment of foodstuffs and raw materials from the PRC to Hong Kong. Minister of Foreign Trade Li Qiang stressed in one of his speeches that the provision of Hong Kong with supplies was a political question as well as an economic matter. "From regions adjacent to Xianggang and Aomen to remote provinces," he said, "all of us everywhere should regard the provision of Xianggang and Aomen with supplies as our duty."⁴⁶

The question of preserving the status of Hong Kong as a territory separate from the PRC but closely connected to it acquired particular significance after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States in January 1979, when the Chinese leadership began to elaborate plans for rapprochement with the Taiwan regime. The Beijing leaders set forth the idea that Taiwan could recognize the sovereignty of the PRC while retaining its economic independence of this nation, in the same way as Hong Kong or Macao. Hong Kong's assigned role as an example to demonstrate the "tolerance" of the Maoists has reinforced its colony status even more.

The political problems in Chinese-English relations are closely interconnected with the economic interests of the two sides.

The Beijing leadership needs Western, including English, equipment and technology to carry out its plans for augmenting the nation's military and economic potential. Great Britain is equally interested in the sale of modern equipment to China. As trade partners, however, the PRC and England are not of equal status due to the rivalry between capitalist countries in the struggle for the Chinese market. The Beijing leaders have repeatedly attempted to make use of this circumstance for the purpose of exerting political pressure on London.

When the normalization of diplomatic relations was being negotiated, Chinese representatives were already "hinting that any diplomatic concessions made by the United Kingdom could give it commercial benefits."⁴⁷ Beijing profited significantly from playing up to the economic interests of Great Britain--it won concessions from London, as has already been pointed out, that were even more substantial than those obtained from other capitalist countries.

Later, at the time of the 1975 referendum on England's future EEC status, the Chinese leadership made another economic blackmail attempt by implying that Great Britain's withdrawal from the Common Market could have a negative effect on Chinese-English trade. On the whole, however, neither the economic nor the political ties between Beijing and England were close enough to provide the Chinese leadership with an opportunity to systematically resort to this tactic.

In an attempt to interest the British monopolies in the development of trade and economic ties with the PRC, the Maoist leaders welcomed the plan to begin a "massive commercial campaign" in the Chinese market immediately after the normalization of diplomatic relations.

But this "commercial campaign" did not take place at that time. Between 1973 and the end of 1977, the volume of trade between China and England did not exceed 325 million dollars a year and even displayed a tendency toward a slight decline: 324.4 million dollars in 1973 and 292.6 million in 1977 (according to data in the CHINA TRADE REPORT). This made it possible for several other capitalist states to overtake Great Britain. Among the Western European countries, with the exclusion of the FRG which constantly maintained its primacy in trade with China, France was also far ahead of England in 1974-1976 (236.7 million dollars in 1973 and 519.2 million in 1976), and Italy had virtually caught up with England.

Progress in Chinese-English trade relations did not become apparent until the end of 1978, when the current Chinese leadership proclaimed the program of the "four modernizations" and considerably expanded its economic ties with virtually all capitalist countries.

In March 1979, the PRC and Great Britain signed an agreement on economic cooperation, stipulating a volume of commodity turnover in the amount of 7 billion pounds sterling during the period up to 1985--that is, approximately the same level specified not long before in a similar document pertaining to Chinese-French trade. The agreement also envisaged the

guarantee of 2.5 billion pounds sterling in credit to China by the English Government. Several extensive bargains were concluded, envisaging participation by British companies in the construction or remodeling of coal-mining, metallurgical, chemical and other enterprises.

The expansion of bilateral trade and economic ties was unconditionally viewed with satisfaction by British business. Some doubts, however, also arose: Could this abrupt reversal in Beijing's relations with the capitalist world turn out to be a short-lived, temporary phenomenon in view of China's shortage of funds to pay for imports and its weak export base due to its backward economy and its own increased demand for fuel, energy and industrial raw materials? Doubts of this kind seem all the more justified when we consider that there have already been cases in the recent past when the Chinese leadership canceled large contracts. For example, an agreement was not reached on the shipment of VC-10 passenger planes to the PRC, even though this question was once the subject of lively discussion by the two sides. There has been no bargain concluded on the purchase of Concorde aircraft either, despite the preliminary agreement reached on this matter as early as 1972, since which time British representatives have repeatedly attempted to obtain Beijing's cooperation in the conclusion of this transaction. "China reserves the right of free choice," announced Minister of Foreign Trade Li Qiang in reference to the acquisition of the Concorde aircraft.⁴⁸

The present agreement on economic cooperation is also not completely satisfactory to English businessmen, who anticipated a more significant sum and also assumed that specific firm contracts would be concluded at the time this document was signed.

At present, the products of various branches of machine building occupy a prominent place among Chinese imports (up to 70 percent). The PRC is purchasing airplanes and aircraft equipment from Great Britain, as well as equipment for the mining industry, metal-cutting tools, devices and instruments, electric power stations with gas turbines, etc.

But Beijing is most interested in the military products of English concerns, particularly technical aviation equipment. For years, the Chinese leadership has looked into the possibility of transactions in this area, ostentatiously displaying its hostility toward the Soviet Union each time and calling upon the West to join in a common struggle against the USSR. In 1973 the Chinese leaders were able to conclude a large (100 million pounds sterling) contract with the Rolls Royce firm for the purchase of Spee aircraft engines and licenses for their manufacture. The transaction was officially called a commercial one, but its actual nature was obvious to everyone.

Earlier, in 1972, almost immediately following the normalization of diplomatic relations, Chinese representatives began to display a persistent desire to acquire English war planes--the vertical-flight Harrier bombers. The Western press candidly reported that these planes would be used mainly

on the Soviet-Chinese border. The English Government took its time in allowing this transaction in the fear that it could endanger the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union.

Striving to make use of the difficulties encountered in the process of detente, Mao Zedong's heirs made an energetic attempt to convince London to reconsider its position. Militaristic circles in Great Britain gave China extensive political and propagandistic support. English Defense Chief Cameron made a trip to the PRC in 1977 to establish closer ties with the Beijing leadership. During this visit, he made crude anti-Soviet statements, to the delight of the Chinese side, declaring that "a common enemy, with Moscow as its capital, stood at the gates of both countries," and openly advocated, in connection with this, an "exchange of experience" in military matters.

In the hope of winning the support of extremely reactionary forces in English society, Vice Premier Wang Zhen of the State Council conducted a series of meetings with top-level statesmen in London in November 1978 to convince them to agree to the sale of military equipment and thereby aid in the creation of a "strong China."⁴⁹ At the same time, in a discussion of trade and economic relations, Chinese representatives "hinted that they could place orders in other locations."⁵⁰

Giving in to pressure from the right, Prime Minister Callaghan announced in January 1979 that England was prepared to begin discussions with the Chinese side on the sale of bombers. It is true that the British prime minister stressed that the development of relations with China would not be accomplished "to the detriment of any other country."⁵¹

In order to soften the impact of this action and to observe the interests of the business community, the English Government decided to make this part of a "comprehensive" and "balanced" transaction, which would also include a large shipment of civilian commodities. But the actual meaning of London's actions was quite apparent to the world public, which is keeping a watchful eye on the attempts of imperialist circles to play the "Chinese card." The danger of aiding in the militarization of China was clearly revealed in L. I. Brezhnev's message to J. Callaghan, in which he stressed that adherence to this course would "complicate the resolution of international problems, undermine the foundations of trust between states that had been laid during the process of detente, open new channels for the arms race and set up additional obstacles in the way of peaceful relations between countries."⁵²

Not one state in the West has followed England's example. Chancellor H. Schmidt of the FRG frankly said that West Germany would not supply China with any weapons whatsoever. In Great Britain itself, prominent Labor Party officials pointedly criticized Callaghan's announcement, calling it hasty and irresponsible. During the course of these debates, which began even before Callaghan announced its decision, many sober voices were heard, warning that any move to assist China in building up its military potential

could have a negative effect on the relaxation of international tension. It was noted that trade in commodities for non-military use represented "a more productive way of developing Great Britain's trade with China than the sale of aircraft."⁵³

The accuracy of this view became particularly evident after the PRC's attack on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which caused all mankind to worry about the preservation of peace. Even the English Government, realizing the serious consequences that could result from Beijing's aggression, voted in favor of the immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnamese territory. On the other hand, however, it did not give up its plan to supply China with combat equipment. At the same time, in view of recent events, the intention to help the PRC gain military strength is now tantamount to aiding and abetting an aggressor, and Beijing quite justifiably interprets this as the encouragement of further adventuristic and provocative action.

The Maoist leadership's attempts to draw London into the orbit of its own hegemonistic policy obviously run counter to the interests of England itself and are inconsistent with the aim of stronger international security.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a discussion of Sino-English relations from 1949 on, see the article by V. P. Lomykin, "The Policy of the PRC in Relation to England," in the collection: "Kitay i kapitalisticheskiye strany Yevropy" [China and the Capitalist Countries of Europe], Moscow, 1976.
2. See, for example, TIMES, 29 September 1973.
3. DAILY TELEGRAPH, 23 March 1973.
4. Taken from Home's appearance in Parliament with the traditional speech on foreign policy issues on 14 December 1972.
5. R. Boardman, "Britain and the People's Republic of China, 1949-1974," London, 1976.
6. See, for example, RENMIN RIBAO, 22 March 1972.
7. Ibid., 5 January and 15 May 1973.
8. Ibid., 26 May 1974.
9. TIMES, 1 November 1972.
10. Ibid., 20 October 1971.
11. DAILY TELEGRAPH, 4 November 1972.

12. Ibid., 30 May 1974.
14. From A. Home's address in the House of Commons on 27 June 1973.
15. See "Kitayskaya Narodnaya Respublika: politika, ekonomika, ideologiya v 1974 g." [The People's Republic of China: Politics, Economics, Ideology in 1974], Moscow, 1977.
16. GUARDIAN, 16 July 1974.
17. TIMES, 11 April 1977.
18. DAILY TELEGRAPH, 18 November 1977.
19. Ibid., 21 September 1978.
20. RENMIN RIBAO, 28, 30 May 1974.
21. Ibid., 15 June 1976.
24. FINANCIAL TIMES, 12 May 1976.
25. TIMES, 14 October 1978.
26. DAILY TELEGRAPH, 25 May 1974.
27. RENMIN RIBAO, 27 May 1975.
28. DAILY EXPRESS, 4 October 1975.
29. RENMIN RIBAO, 9 June 1975.
30. From an article by E. Heath in the DAILY EXPRESS, 4 October 1975.
31. See, for example, RENMIN RIBAO, 2 March 1978.
32. Ibid., 26 May 1974.
33. Ibid., 8 April 1977.
34. SUNDAY TIMES, 27 March 1977.
35. ECONOMIST, 23 June 1973.
36. OBSERVER, 9 June 1972.
37. SUNDAY TIMES, 27 March 1977.
38. DAILY TELEGRAPH, 2 August 1977.

39. English researchers have commented with displeasure on the "foreign policy ambitions of Beijing," the great danger posed by its subversive actions in Asia and its policy of "spreading unrest in the Third World" (see R. Boardman, Op. cit., pp 166, 167).
40. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 24 March 1978.
41. Ibid., 28 March 1975.
42. FINANCIAL TIMES, 29 October 1976.
43. TIMES, 29 September 1976.
44. FOREIGN REPORT, 22 March 1978.
45. HONGQI, 1977, No 10.
46. Ibid.
47. FINANCIAL TIMES, 14 March 1972.
48. Ibid., 30 November 1977.
49. RENMIN RIBAO, 11 November 1978.
50. DAILY TELEGRAPH, 22 December 1978.
51. WASHINGTON POST, 9 January 1979.
52. PRAVDA, 25 January 1979.
53. TRIBUNE, 10 November 1978.

8588

CSO: 1805

JAPANESE ECONOMY: PROBLEMS REMAIN

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 111-120

[Article by Yu. P. Shipov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] The rates of economic development in Japan--one of the three independent centers of contemporary imperialism--are only half as high now as they were prior to the latest crisis in the world capitalist economy. "Whereas the economy previously rushed along at the speed of a racing car, now it can be compared to a vehicle making its way along a road full of pot-holes: The driver has lost all confidence in his own ability and the passengers no longer trust the driver"¹--this is how Japanese specialists metaphorically and quite accurately describe the current economic situation in the country.

When the current state of the Japanese economy is compared to economic conditions prior to the crisis that broke out at the end of 1973, however, it is not completely correct to reduce the problem only to one of growth rates. It is also necessary to consider the existence of significant qualitative transformations and changes in many basic parameters on which the nature of national economic functioning depends at the present time, and on which it will continue to depend in the near future.

The group of changes in external and internal conditions of reproduction, which resulted from the fuel, raw material and cyclical crises of 1974-1975 in combination with the appearance of disparities that had been accumulating during the years of high growth rates, essentially represents a general structural crisis in the Japanese capitalist economy.

In the postwar period, the sectorial proportions of the Japanese economy had been influenced by the old colonial price structure in the world capitalist market, under the conditions of virtually unlimited (within the framework of the requirements of the Japanese national market) opportunities for the acquisition of cheap raw materials and sources of energy. These circumstances promoted the quicker development of several branches of heavy industry with a high percentage of production costs accounted for by raw materials and energy.

The disruption of the colonial price structure as the major consequence of the fuel and raw material crisis eliminated one of the centrifugal forces that had been accelerating growth rates in the Japanese economy and faced the nation with the need for radical reorganization of its industrial structure.

Structural factors in combination with cyclical trends not only led Japan into the most severe economic crisis of the entire postwar period in 1974-1975, but later complicated the recovery from this crisis, prolonged the phase of depression and decelerated the subsequent stage of economic revival. The development of the Japanese economy in the post-crisis period of 1976-1978 can only be described as a period of recovery in an extremely conditional sense, since many traces of crisis remained, such as the huge discrepancy between total supply and demand (in 1977, it was estimated at 20-30 trillion yen while the gross national product was equivalent to around 180 trillion yen),² the underloading of the production system and the consequent presence of a large inventory of surplus capacity, the tense situation in the labor market, the feeble private investment activity in the majority of industries, sluggish consumer demand, etc.

The structural crisis drew an extremely precise boundary in connection with conditions in various branches of Japanese industry--on one side of this boundary were production units requiring high material and energy input, and on the other were branches which were less vulnerable to the rising price of raw materials and fuel, as well as those which had been able to maintain sufficient competitive potential in foreign markets and those with a high export quota (the electronics industry, the automotive industry, the production of various types of materials and equipment for assembly plants, precision machine building and some others).

All Japanese economic forecasts of the period after 1973, which was a transition year in the development of the national economy, were based on the inevitability of structural changes and absolute and relative advances in conditions in various sectors of the economy. It is probable, however, that not one of these forecasts anticipated that these changes would be quite perceptible within such a short period of time--that is, just 3 or 4 years after the peak of the world fuel and raw material crisis.

The majority of experts assumed that the results of these advances would not be noticeable to any considerable extent for at least 10-15 years.

In the beginning of 1977, Japanese Prime Minister T. Fukuda predicted that it would be "the year of the economy." He announced: "The Japanese economy has almost completely recovered from the most severe recession since the oil crisis. The coming year of 1977 will be a time of transition to the new course of stable growth."³

According to the economic scenario invented by the government, large budgetary investments in public works in the first half of the 1977/78 fiscal year (75 percent of the total sum allocated for this purpose for the year

was supposed to be spent during this period) were expected to "speed up the economic mechanism" and establish the prerequisites for recovery and growth, and in the second half of the year (October 1977 to March 1978), when the general demand for goods and services was supposed to increase perceptibly as a result of these concentrated expenditures on public works, business activity as a whole was to pick up this tempo.

But the government overestimated the possibilities of budget allocations with respect to their stimulating role in economic development. The greatest error was made in describing the picture of private investments and personal consumption--the two main components of total demand, as well as the patterns of international payments. After a brief burst of energy in the first quarter, the economy continued its intermittent progression. The final blow was dealt to the government's optimism in October by the dramatic rise in the exchange rate of the yen in comparison to the American dollar. The stagnation of internal demand in combination with the yen spiral forced the government to correct its earlier estimates of economic growth in the 1977/78 fiscal year from 6.7 percent to 5.3 percent. Therefore, the development of economic conditions confirmed that the government had made a major error in estimating the actual potential of the economy by overestimating the possibilities of state measures in the stimulation of the economy under the conditions of the capitalist system.

One of the distinctive features of Japan's economic development in the last 4 years has been the noticeable increase in state (government) activity involving various types of economic measures aimed at the maximum stimulation of business activity in the country. This confirms Lenin's thesis about the "wavelike" patterns of state-monopolistic tendencies--state intervention in the economy becomes more pronounced during periods of economic deterioration and, conversely, this intervention diminishes during periods of economic recovery.

Whereas during the years of previous interruptions in the development of the Japanese economy such measures of government stimulation as the reduction of the official interest rate on loans, the expansion of state demand through the augmentation of budget allocations for economic programs and so forth, permitted the government to influence, within certain bounds, the course of economic events, efforts of this kind are not producing noticeable results in the current situation. The negligible impact of government efforts is not so much due to their one-sided purpose--class interests cause the bourgeois government to assign priority to the improvement of monopoly positions to the detriment of the workers--as to the nature and variety of contemporary problems which Japan has never encountered in the past. The government is simply incapable of solving these problems due to the very nature of the capitalist method of production.

Within the relatively short period of time since the beginning of the crisis, extremely noticeable advances have been seen in the structure of total demand in Japan. This can be judged from a comparison of indicators for the pre-crisis year of 1973 and the 1976-1977 period, which could be

defined as the stage of the Japanese economy's adaptation to new internal and external conditions for the reproduction of the social product.

There is no question that the major change of fundamental importance in the structure of the GNP during this period was the decline in the percentage of private capital investments in machines and equipment--from 20.4 percent in 1973 (in real terms and in 1970 prices) to 15.3 percent in 1976 and to 15 percent in 1977. It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of this phenomenon for the future course of Japanese economic development. Throughout the entire period of high growth rates, investment demand was the leading factor determining the reproductive process. The percentage of productive consumption (private and government) in the Japanese GNP stayed at a level which far surpassed the same indicators in other industrially developed capitalist countries (more than 30 percent, as against 15-20 percent in the United States and Western Europe). The effects of investment demand on all economic activity in the nation are quite substantial and, for this reason, the recent decline in private investments in fixed capital (the percentage accounted for by state capital investments in the GNP has remained virtually unchanged) has largely determined all Japanese economic patterns and the much slower rate of development.

The principal material cause of the stagnation of private investment programs is connected with the sizable discrepancy between existing capacities, or those established prior to 1973, and the real demand for products. Therefore, surplus capacities almost nullified the effects of the mechanism by which one set of capital investments gives rise to the need for more investments. New investments have also been seriously impeded by inflationary processes in view of the rapid rise in the cost of equipment and other construction elements, reducing the effectiveness and competitive potential of new equipment in comparison to existing equipment.

The uncertainty of the current situation and of even immediate prospects for general economic development, compounded by zigzags in market conditions, the rising prices of resources and energy, fluctuations in the exchange rate of the yen and so forth, represent a substantial psychological factor which does not motivate private companies in the slightest to expand capital expenditure programs.

Private capital investments in machines and equipment in 1977 displayed a growth rate of only 2.9 percent over the previous year in constant prices (3.4 percent in 1976 and declines of 13.1 percent and 10.8 percent respectively in 1975 and 1974). Their absolute level was almost 20 percent lower than the maximum level of 1973 (compared in constant prices). But the nature of day-to-day investments and their patterns are more indicative. The slight increase in 1977 was due to higher expenditures on fixed capital by companies in the non-production sphere (an estimated 15 percent), while industrial companies still displayed a tendency toward decreased investments in machines and equipment, estimated at 8-10 percent that year. These "average" indicators conceal the extremely nonuniform, in terms of branches and the time factor, economic activity of private Japanese corporations in this major sphere.

Two peculiarities of the investment process in Japan are characteristic of the current period. First of all, they are "artificial" to some degree: In many branches, new capital investments are not the result of real demand, but of administrative directives issued by the government for the purpose of keeping the total volume of investments at a specific level.

The second peculiarity is connected with the structure of capital investments themselves--only an insignificant portion is being used for the enlargement of existing capacities or the construction of new ones. Most of them are designated for modernization, the replacement of old equipment with new, the introduction of automation equipment, the incorporation of techniques for the conservation of raw materials and energy, etc.

In the last year or two, the practices of scrapping and "impounding" equipment have been widespread in Japan. They have primarily affected branches and individual production units suffering a structural crisis.

In some branches, scrapping results in the absolute reduction of capacities, while in others it leads to the liquidation of outdated and obsolete equipment and its replacement with new and more productive equipment. Since the scrapping of idle equipment is largely financed directly through the state treasury (within the framework of programs of "assistance to branches with a structural crisis"), this process should be regarded as one link in the chain of measures to promote a general upsurge of investment demand in the nation. Compensation for the "temporary withdrawal" of capital from circulation in the form of surplus capacities offers private corporations additional financial possibilities.

The scrapping process has been most widespread in the textile industry, where it is accomplished on the basis of a law governing structural reform in this branch. The reduction in the output of major types of fibers and items is being accompanied by the gradual liquidation of capacities. The government has recommended the scrapping, in the next year or year and a half, of 1.35 million spindles for the manufacture of cotton thread (this is around 12 percent of the existing inventory), 340,000 spindles for wool yarn (around 16 percent), one-fifth of all spinning frames for the manufacture of cotton fabric (the entire inventory in the nation totals 340,000 frames), around 20 percent of the frames for silk fabric (120,000), 30,000 knitting machines (121,000), 16 percent of the inventory of hosiery machines (38,000), etc. The proportion accounted for by state credit in the financing of scrapping programs in this industry would be 95 percent. According to the estimates of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, the realization of these programs will require 50 billion yen in the 1978/79 fiscal year. The total sum of preferential credit which will be extended this year to textile enterprises for various structural reorganization purposes, including scrapping, is estimated at 100 billion yen.

By March 1979, metallurgical companies plan to liquidate capacities for the smelting (primarily by the open-hearth method) of 4.6 million tons of steel a year (at the end of 1976 the annual capacity of open-hearth furnaces was

equivalent to around 30 million tons). Of this total capacity volume, 4 million tons will be liquidated at small and medium-sized enterprises, and only 0.6 million tons at large enterprises.

The same problem is facing aluminum companies. According to the recommendations of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, plans for the first stage call for "impoundment" with the subsequent scrapping, over a period of 5 years, of around 25 percent of existing capacities, lowering their level to 1.25 million tons by 1982 (the figure at present is 1.64 million tons). This program will require allocations totaling 80 billion yen.

The spread of the consequences of the structural crisis to an increasingly large group of branches and the permanent nature of this phenomenon has required ruling circles in the country to work out a common approach to the problem and not be restricted by local statutes aimed at the assistance of one particular branch. In the beginning of 1978, a "law on temporary measures to stabilize certain branches suffering crisis" was drafted by the administration. In submitting this draft to parliament for its consideration, the administration has assigned priority to the relaxation of existing antitrust regulations, the simplification of the process by which so-called "antirecession" cartels are established, and the legitimization and expansion of programs of state financial assistance to individual economic branches, including scrapping financing programs.

On the whole, government policy in the area of capital investments is aimed at the maximum stimulation of internal investment demand both through the augmentation of state expenditures on fixed capital and through various stimuli to increase the demand for elements of fixed capital in the private sector. This course has taken specific form in lower interest rates on credit--in 1977 the official rate was lowered on three separate occasions--down to 4.25 percent, and in March 1978 it dropped to 3.5 percent per annum (the lowest postwar rate), the institution of tax deductions and other privileges in connection with private capital investments, the large-scale financing of equipment scrapping programs through state credit institutions, etc.

One of the results of the continuing difficulties in the economy is bankruptcy, which affects primarily small and medium-sized companies. Although the year of 1977 as a whole was regarded as a year of gradual escape from the economic crisis, in terms of the number of bankruptcies it broke all postwar "records," far surpassing, in particular, the period of most severe recession in 1974-1975. During this year, 18,500 enterprises suffered commercial "fiascos" (18 percent more than the year before and 50 percent more than the average for the two crisis years), with their total indebtedness equivalent to 3 trillion yen (31 percent and 70 percent higher respectively).

The major firms that went bankrupt in that year included Hashihama Zosen (unpaid debts of 43 billion yen), Sagami Zosen (20 billion yen), Mie Shipyard, (16 billion), Nissei Shipping (35 billion), Teraoka Shoji (15 billion), Nambu Iron and Steel (11.5 billion) and others.

When the Eidal Company (structural components for residential construction) went bankrupt in February 1978, it created a real panic in the national business community. In terms of indebtedness, including the debts of the four local branches of this company which also went bankrupt (180 billion yen, or approximately 720 million dollars), this case was the most "impressive" of the entire postwar period. Commenting on the bankruptcy of Eidal, specialists are no longer placing emphasis on the bankruptcy itself, but on the implications of the case--the largest stockholder in this company, the Daiwa Bank, refused to extend it any more credit because the financial status of the client was "unmanageable." This is probably the first time that people in Japan have acknowledged the difficulties being experienced by private banks--this citadel of Japanese monopolistic capitalism.

Banks have played an exceptionally important role in the postwar development of the Japanese economy. Sufficient evidence of this can be seen in the extremely high percentage accounted for by borrowed funds, including bank loans, in the assets of Japanese corporations (in the 1960's this indicator was around 70 percent with personal financing accounting for 30 percent; in other developed countries the opposite ratio is the norm), not to mention other forms of dependence on banks. In 1971-1974 the proportion accounted for by external financing was still on a fairly high level--slightly over 50 percent--but there has been a dramatic decline in the last 2 years: In 1976 bank credit accounted for only 38 percent of the obligations of private corporations. This tendency resulted from the decline in general economic activity, diminished demand in the credit market, sharp cuts in the investment programs of industrial companies, etc.

The Japanese press has compared the Eidal incident to the visible portion of an iceberg in the assumption that the large commercial banks have many enterprises among their clients with highly doubtful credit ratings and bankruptcy possibilities that are only a question of time. At the end of September 1977, the total amount of this kind of "doubtful" credit extended by 13 city banks was estimated at 200 billion yen. This was 9 times as high as the figure for the end of March that same year.

The prolonged stagnation in many branches of industry and other spheres of the economy stimulates processes of monopolization and simultaneously simplifies merger and the formation of cartels, since the concerned institutions, primarily government, are overlooking violations of antitrust legislation. Moreover, in some cases the government itself has recommended the establishment of "antirecession" cartels in industry for the purpose of regulating production programs, exports, the "impoundment" or liquidation of production capacities and so forth.

Another direction taken by the process of capital concentration consists in the reinforcement of commercial ties between Japanese companies and foreign firms. The activities of automobile firms are indicative of this trend. In particular, the conclusion of an agreement between the Toyo Kogyo firm and the American Ford Motor Company has been reported. The same kind of agreement has been concluded by Mitsubishi Motors with the Chrysler Corporation, and by Isuzu Motors with General Motors.

A serious factor impeding the recovery of the Japanese economy from its prolonged depression is the excessively slow revival of another element of internal demand--personal consumption, which accounts for more than half of total demand. In 1977, for the second year in a row, the rate of increase in personal consumption did not keep up with the growth rate of the GNP--3.3 percent and 5.1 percent respectively (in real terms).

This phenomenon, which is important from the standpoint of the entire national economy, has economic as well as sociopsychological causes. On the one hand there are objective factors--the decline in economic growth rates, depression in many branches of the economy, inflationary processes and so forth--and on the other there are the deliberate efforts of monopolies and ruling circles to overcome economic difficulties at the expense of the workers. All of these factors are sharply impeding the growth of wages, increasing partial and full unemployment, lowering the general standards of living for much of the population and thereby limiting the potential of personal consumption as an active element of total demand.

The number of persons employed in the nation in 1977 was 0.4 percent lower than the 1976 figure, including a 1.6-percent decline in the processing industry (1.7 percent in 1976 and 2 percent in 1975). At the same time, however, labor productivity rose considerably in 1977 (12.4 percent). The pronounced intensification of labor is most characteristic of branches affected by the structural crisis. For example, in spite of the reduction in the total number of employed individuals, companies producing metal-cutting tools were able to achieve a 28-percent increase in output per worker in comparison to the previous year, with a corresponding increase of 20 percent at ferrous metal rolling mills and 19 percent at ball bearing enterprises.⁴ The intensive exploitation of workers was not only unaccompanied by even an approximate rise in the wage level, but has even increased the size of the army of unemployed.

In 1977 the average annual number of totally unemployed persons in the nation exceeded 1 million for the first time in the entire postwar period. At the end of December that year the official unemployment figure was 1.11 million, and by the end of 1978 the figure had already risen to 1.25 million. Besides this, Japan has a large substratum of "surplus labor," consisting of 1.5-2 million persons who cannot be included in the first category only by virtue of a few formal characteristics. Whereas a rise in the percentage of elderly unemployed was typical of previous years, particularly 1976, in more recent years the number of unemployed youth between the ages of 15 and 24 has risen dramatically. As the examples of the United States and Western Europe testify, this tendency could give rise to acute social conflicts in Japan.

The budget and taxation policies of the government are not contributing in the slightest to the growth of public income. The state budget for the 1978/79 fiscal year, which the Japanese press christened a "financial structure which throws the needs of the people overboard," assigns the lowest priority to the interests of the working public. In addition to the

fact that the unrestrained escalation of the budget could lead to a new inflationary spiral and a further rise in the prices of goods and services, the income tax cuts promised for so long by the government have been postponed once again, as they have been countless times in the past. According to expert estimates, the tax burden of the Japanese family living on income from employment will be even heavier in the 1978/79 fiscal year. This year the average Japanese family will have to pay 33 percent more tax than in the 1977/78 fiscal year. It is a sad fact of life for the workers that the increase in the tax burden will be greater for families with a lower income level. For example, whereas the family with an annual income of around 5 million yen will pay 20 percent more tax than last year, the low-income family (2.3 million yen) will pay an estimated "increment" of 55 percent.

The sharp reduction in the growth rate of worker income, the tense situation in the labor market and the uncertainty of general economic prospects are affecting the entire way of life of the Japanese working class family and forcing it to take strict economy measures.

The feeble demand in the domestic market has motivated Japanese industry to make a more energetic effort than ever before to gain access to foreign sales markets. During the years of economic recession, foreign sales channels turned into an important safety-valve, absorbing a considerable portion of the output of many industrial branches. From the standpoint of export dynamics in different phases of the cycle--deceleration in periods of recovery and acceleration in periods of recession and depression--the current trends in the development of Japanese exports correspond to processes observed earlier in the economy of this nation. But the absolute and relative indicators of current export expansion, from the standpoint of its effect on the entire course of national economic development, are incomparably higher than in previous periods of recession. The proportion accounted for by exports in the GNP rose to 18 percent in 1977, and to 18 percent in the first half of 1978 (17 percent in 1976, 15 percent in 1975 and 12 percent in the maximum pre-crisis year of 1973, the year of upswing), and its proportional value as an element of total demand⁶ was 6.2 percent in 1977 (5 percent in 1976, 3.5 percent in 1975 and 0.8 percent in 1973).⁷

The "frenzied" activity of Japanese exporters on all continents led to an increase of 19.8 percent in foreign deliveries of Japanese-made goods in 1977 (up to 80.5 billion dollars), and the figure reached 45.6 billion in the first half of 1978. And this was at a time of prolonged general recession in the majority of the capitalist countries to which most of the Japanese exports went.

The export expansion of Japanese goods is based on the fairly high competitive potential still possessed by many types of industrial commodities (automobiles, motorcycles, radioelectronics, precision engineering products, various types of materials and equipment for assembly plants, etc.), the concerted efforts of the state and the monopolies to stimulate exports (expanded crediting by the state Export-Import Bank, improvements in the system of export insurance,

preferential credit terms for the financing of the production of export goods, the wider practice of state "assistance" to the developing countries in the form of commodity shipments, the government-approved establishment of export cartels and so forth), in some cases on open dumping, etc.

The stagnation in the demand for many types of raw materials and fuel, which constitutes the basis of Japanese imports, has been reflected in the expansion of import trade at a slower rate than exports, displaying an annual growth rate of 9.2 percent (up to 70.8 billion dollars).

As a result, Japan's export revenues are now far in excess of its payments for imports. According to customs data, the positive balance of trade in 1977 was 10 billion dollars, and the positive balance of payments was 17.5 billion. Favorable trade transactions have added up to a large positive balance of total payments--7.7 billion dollars. In the first 6 months of 1978 it amounted to 8.3 billion, and payments totaled 12.4 billion. For the sake of comparison, we should note that in 1976 international revenues exceeded payments by 2.9 billion dollars, whereas the balance of payments was negative in the previous 3 years: 2.7 billion in 1975, 6.8 billion in 1974 and 10.1 billion in 1973.

Japan's feverish export activity in the world markets and the growth of its currency reserves have led to consequences of a dual nature: In the first place, the most acute conflicts have arisen between Japan and its main trading partners--the United States, the Common Market and other Western European countries, Australia and the majority of the developing countries. All of them are accusing Japan of using aggressive export practices to solve its own domestic economic problems at the expense of its trade partners, and they are alleging that, as one of the main sources of the U.S. trade deficit, Japan contributed to the decline in the prestige and international value of the main transaction unit in the world capitalist market--the American dollar. The considerable flow of dollars into Japan through trade and other channels led to a sharp decline in the exchange rate of the dollar in the Tokyo currency market and, consequently, to a rise in the exchange rate of the Japanese yen.

Despite government intervention in the currency market, which took the form of buying up huge quantities of U.S. dollars for the purpose of slowing down the drop in the exchange rate of this currency, throughout 1977 and 1978 there was a continuous process of the actual revaluation of the yen and devaluation of the dollar. Since 1971, the exchange rate of the dollar in relation to the yen has "eased up" by approximately 45 percent.

In accordance with the workings of the currency mechanism, a rise in the exchange rate of national currency results in worse competitive conditions for the exports of this country. It is precisely this fact that is producing extreme anxiety in the Japanese business community over the fate of many export goods, the competitive potential of which is not in question as a result of the continuous revaluation of the yen.

The flow of Japanese goods into the markets of the United States, Western Europe and many other developed countries was not accompanied by equivalent imports of goods from those countries by Japan. As a result, Japan had a huge positive balance in its trade transactions with just the United States and the Common Market in 1977, equivalent to 7.3 billion dollars and 4.5 billion respectively, and corresponding figures of 5.2 billion and 2.1 billion in the first half of 1978. Naturally, under the conditions of prolonged economic recession in these countries, this developmental tendency in commercial exchange cannot fail to give rise to acute friction between partners. In addition to the tendency toward restraint in the United States and Western Europe in regard to imports of many Japanese goods, these states have demanded that Japan provide them with equal opportunity for the sale of their goods in the Japanese market, lower customs barriers and relax restrictions of a non-tariff nature which have built an "invisible" wall to block the access of commodities of foreign manufacture, particularly finished industrial items, which account for only around 20 percent of Japanese imports (40-50 percent in the Western countries).

Western specialists have recently begun a thorough investigation of the problems connected with the slow growth of sales of imported finished items in Japan. As a result of their research, it has been learned, for example, that Japanese importers collect from 51 to 63 percent of the import cost of motor vehicles from the customers, which makes the domestic retail price 139 percent higher than the price of a similar domestically produced model. The situation is approximately the same in the sale of imported beverages, sporting goods, chocolate and many other commodities.

Other obstacles include the complex system of tests to verify the quality of foreign commodities, the priority assigned to commodities of domestic manufacture by state purchasing organizations, the pronounced dependence of the distribution network on local industrial and financial groups (it is virtually impossible for foreign commodities to penetrate the retail network of trade enterprises, which must, as a result of this dependence, reserve most of their shopping area for Japanese-produced goods), etc.

As a result of a series of Japanese-American trade negotiations conducted on the government level at the end of 1977 and the beginning of 1978, Japan had to make several commercial and political concessions, including the lowering of duties on 318 items (effective 1 April 1978), the expanded import of some goods, for which the total import sum of 3 billion dollars was set, including concentrated uranium, grain, nonferrous ores and others, the expansion of the system for the government financing of imports, the relaxation of some non-tariff restrictions, etc.

But the negotiations between the two countries were not limited only to trade problems. According to the Japanese press, Japan has probably never before encountered demands so unprecedented in relations between two sovereign states, in which one nation gives another "recommendations" concerning the goals and means of its economic development. During the course of these

negotiations, the American side insisted on high rates of Japanese economic development in 1978 so that Japan could become one of the "three locomotive" (along with the United States and the FRG) pulling the world capitalist economy out of this critical recession. Pointing out the unprecedented nature of the very fact that economic stipulations were made on the level of diplomatic negotiations in such a complex and unpredictable atmosphere, Japanese specialists declared that the state budget approved for the 1978/79 fiscal year was not drawn up according to the instructions of Prime Minister T. Fukuda, but in line with "U.S. commands."⁹

It was precisely under the pressure of "external circumstances" that the government made its plans for economic development in 1978, envisaging an unrealistically high, in the opinion of the overwhelming majority of business circles and experts, growth rate for the GNP during this period--7 percent in real terms. The stipulation of this growth rate under the conditions of prolonged stagnation in domestic demand, the depressive state of branches affected by the structural crisis, the growing positive balance of payments and the rise in the exchange rate of the yen was called a "political decision" by the Japanese press.¹⁰

Just as in 1977, priority in government economic measures was once again assigned to excessive growth in the part of the state budget envisaged for the financing of public works. While the total increase in budget expenditures will be equivalent to 20 percent, the increase in allocations for public works will be 27 percent. In order to cover these huge expenditures, the government is resorting to the issuance of bonds on an increasingly broad scale, 30 percent more than in the previous fiscal year, and the proportion accounted for by these in total budget income has risen 34 percent (32 percent in the 1977/78 fiscal year, counting the supplementary budget). At the end of March 1979 the national debt promised to rise to a level unprecedented for Japan--over 40 trillion yen, or a sum exceeding the annual state budget.¹¹

Not one private research organization in Japan shared the government's "optimism" in regard to the prospects of economic development in the nation in the 1978/79 fiscal year (April 1978-March 1979). They criticized not only the absolute figures of government estimates, but also the specific measures the government intends to implement for this purpose.

Not long before the fall of his cabinet, T. Fukuda announced that "1978 will be a period of search for ways of escaping depression, and the country might finally emerge from its tunnel." There are few people left in Japan, however, who still believe in the possibility of the nation's rapid recovery from the economic recession.

FOOTNOTES

1. JAPAN TIMES, 3 January 1978.

2. DAIYAMONDO, 1 January 1978.
3. JAPAN TIMES, 26 December 1977.
4. DAILY YOMIURI, 25 October 1977.
5. ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 22 December 1977.
6. The percentage accounted for by the difference between total exports and total imports in the GNP.
7. Calculated according to TOYO KEIZAI TOKEI GEPPU, 1978, No 4, p 16.
8. DAILY YOMIURI, 10 November 1977.
9. ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 28 December 1977.
10. JAPAN TIMES, 19 December 1977.
11. Ibid., 24 December 1977.

8588

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FALSIFICATION OF THE HISTORY OF RESEARCH ON THE CENTRAL TIAN-SHAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF JUSTIFYING BEIJING'S TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON THE USSR

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[Article by V. Ye. Irinin]

[Text] The spot east of Lake Issyk-Kul', where the Soviet-Chinese border crosses the central section of the Tian-Shan, is the location of the highest altitudes and largest glaciers of this great mountain system in Asia. More than 20 of the mountains in the Central Tian-Shan are over 6,000 meters high. Among them the two highest peaks are Pobeda, with an altitude of 7,439 meters, and Khan-Tengri, with an altitude of 6,995 meters above sea level.

The Central Tian-Shan range is largely inaccessible and ends in steep cliffs on the north, overhanging the broad valley of the Tekes River, which flows from the USSR into China, and on the south, above the Kashgarian Plain, making its highest peak clearly visible from these locations: Khan-Tengri from the north and Pobeda from the south. In the west, the central range gradually descends into the basin of Lake Issyk-Kul', and in the east its snow-covered peaks extend beyond the Muzart Pass, where a crude footpath connects the Chinese city of Aksu with the valley of the Tekes River.

The two highest peaks in the Tian-Shan range were thought to be one for a long time. It was given the name "Khan-Tengri" in China. Those who looked at these mountains from the north saw the northern Khan-Tengri (altitude "6995"), while those who were viewing the mountains from the south saw the southern Khan-Tengri, or the highest peak of the Tian-Shan (altitude "7439"), which was later called Pobeda Peak.

Not one European geographer came to the Tian-Shan until the second half of the 19th century. People in Russia and Western Europe had only heard Chinese reports of the high snow-covered mountains east of Lake Issyk-Kul'. The explorers of ancient China, who had already ventured into Central Asia before the beginning of our era, could see, and must certainly did see, Pobeda Peak from the environs of the city of Uchturfan and from several locations south of this along the road to Kashgar, where the view of Pobeda Peak is not obscured by other mountains.

After the conquest of Central Asia by the Ch'ing empire in the 18th century, Chinese publications containing new data on the western lands appeared in the area now known as Xinjiang. It was at that time that the first more or less reliable maps of this territory were drawn under the supervision of the European Jesuit missionaries then serving the Ch'ing empire.

Many of these works were translated and published in a number of Russian and Western European editions at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th. They were used as a basis in Russia and Western Europe for the compilation of the first non-Chinese maps and geographical descriptions of Central Asia.

Until the time of the explorations of P. P. Semenov and N. M. Przheval'skiy, however, the geography of Central Asia was not so much a geography of eyewitness accounts as of hearsay, composed of rumors and assumptions--"geographical conjecture," according to the apt definition of A. Humboldt.

Information about the Central Tian-Shan was also meager, largely unclear and contradictory. Chinese maps of the 18th and 19th centuries miscalculate up to 100 kilometers or more in longitude and up to 30 kilometers in latitude in situating the mountains of the Central Tian-Shan with the Uchturfan region to the south, from which the highest peak of the Tian-Shan (Pobeda) was clearly visible. The group of high snow and ice covered mountains of the Central Tian-Shan (Xue-shan, Bing-shan, Tengeli-shan and Khan-Tengeli)¹ were located by Chinese authors sometimes to the west and sometimes to the east of the Muzart Pass, with a mountain range leading away from them to the southwest, which was given the names Savabtsi and Kokshaal-tau. But which of the peaks was the highest and where and how it was situated remained unknown.

The planned researching of the Tian-Shan began in the second half of the 19th century. Here are the major milestones of this research.

In 1857, Russian scientist P. P. Semenov was the first geographer to see the northern Khan-Tengri. He saw it from the Kashkator Pass on the south-east: "The mountain Khan-Tengri, lightly ringed with a wreath of clouds, rose up, a steep and quite sharp pyramid, at least 6,000 or 7,000 feet above the 20⁰ or so snow-covered peaks surrounding it, up to an altitude of 24,000 feet,² and its beauty was absolutely indescribable when the rays of the sun caused the snow covering the entire group to glitter."³

There is no question that Semenov saw the northern Khan-Tengri, but he was not able to determine the more or less precise location of the peak. He miscalculated its altitude by 300 meters.

Semenov believed that the peak of Khan-Tengri, as the highest peak of the Tian-Shan, was the top of a gigantic mountain system from which several ranges stretched to the west and southwest. The quantity and exact position of these ranges were unknown at that time.

In 1864-1869, Russian geographers N. A. Severtsev and A. V. Kaul'bars explored the Central Tian-Shan. They saw the northern Khan-Tengri from a great distance and therefore did not try to determine either its altitude or its geographical position.

The map of Central Tian-Shan with a scale of 25 versts to the inch (1:1,050,000), compiled by N. A. Severtsev according to the findings of previous sightings of the 1856-1869 period, depicts the Khan-Tengri region as a "blank spot," in which only the peak itself is noted, approximately in the location determined by P. P. Semenov in 1857. The notation next to the symbol depicting the peak on the map says: "Mt. Khan-Tengri (Karagol-bas), up to 24,000" (7,300 meters).

Khan-Tengri is also mentioned by A. V. Kaul'bars in his works on the geography of Tian-Shan. "West of the Muzart Pass," he wrote, "is the highest peak of Khan-Tengri, which is also the name that has been given to an entire section of this range. Incidentally, this name is unknown to the Kirgiz (mountain) people and is used only by the Chinese.... The northern slope of the Khan-Tengri range is visible from the Tekes valley...while we have reliable information about the southern slope."⁴

The following are some of the results of the studies of the Khan-Tengri region prior to 1870.

All three researchers saw the northern Khan-Tengri, and this is all they could have seen because they were observing it from the north;

The approximate geographic location and altitude above sea level (7,300 meters) of the northern Khan-Tengri were determined, with miscalculations, respectively, of 16 kilometers to the southwest (on N. A. Severtsev's map) and +300 meters of altitude; they still believed that the northern Khan-Tengri was the highest peak of the Tian-Shan and the crowning summit of a system of mountain ranges stretching to the west;

It was learned that the name "Khan-Tengri," which was well known in China and Europe, was unknown to the local inhabitants of Russian territories--the Kirgiz and Kazakh people;

Nothing new was learned about the southern Khan-Tengri and the southern slope of the Central Tian-Shan;

The entire Khan-Tengri region, just as before, remained unexplored and was depicted on maps as a "blank spot" with the peak of the northern Khan-Tengri in its center.

In 1882, the Russians took a topographical survey of the southern outskirts of the Central Tian-Shan from the Xinjiang side, from the region of the Muzart Pass near the city of Aksu and Uchturfan near Bedel' Pass and determined the position of Khan-Tengri in relation to these cities.

Modern topographical maps testify that altitude "6995" cannot be seen from this region, and only altitude "7439" is visible. Consequently, only the southern Khan-Tengri, which is now called Pobeda Peak, could have been recorded in the survey of 1882, and later in a widely known map of that time--the Russian map of Central Asia with a scale of 1:4,200,000 (100 versts to the inch). This map, with the necessary corrections, was published in 1884 and 1886.

In 1886, an expedition of the Russian Geographic Society, organized for the study of the Khan-Tengri mountain group, conducted an investigation under the supervision and with the participation of I. V. Ignat'yev and A. N. Krasnov. The findings of this study were published in 1887-1888.⁵

The group of I. V. Ignat'yev could not penetrate the center of the alpine zone, but made the rounds of the edges of the "blank spot" from the north and later from the east along Chinese territory through the Muzart Pass. This group saw the northern Khan-Tengri from several points to the north on the rare days in the rainy summer of 1886 when the peak was not obscured by clouds. Each time, the members of this group only saw its upper portion, visible above the mountains in front of it. The topographer Aleksandrov, who was calculating the route taken by the group, was not able under these difficult conditions to precisely determine the geographical position of the peak and ascertain its precise altitude, which had been approximately set at 24,000 feet, or 7,300 meters, by P. P. Semenov.

A. N. Krasnov saw Khan-Tengri from the south, from Chinese territory, near the city of Uchturfan, in July-August 1886. He wrote: "The snow-covered Sary-Yassy range (Sarydzhaz) cannot be seen at all from Turfan (Uchturfan),⁶ and only Khan-Tengri is visible. Apparently, these ranges are obscured by a closer range."⁷

Now we know that Krasnov could only have seen altitude "7439," or the southern Khan-Tengri (Pobeda Peak), from Chinese territory. But he believed that he was looking at the same peak first seen by P. P. Semenov in 1857 and viewed by Ignat'yev from the north--that is, the northern Khan-Tengri (according to current data, altitude "6995").

An analysis of A. Bol'shev's "Maps of the Tian-Shan Range West of Mt. Khan-Tengri," which were attached to Ignat'yev's report, indicates that the absence of precisely calculated points of reference⁸ did not allow Bol'shev to satisfactorily coordinate the measurements of the 1886 expedition with the findings of the 1882 survey conducted from the Aksu-Uchturfan zone. On his map, the peak of Khan-Tengri is 35 kilometers away from the actual position of the northern Khan-Tengri and more than 50 kilometers from the actual location of Pobeda Peak, or the southern Khan-Tengri.

From Myn-Tur Pass, Ignat'yev should have seen the peak in the southeast, but on the map it is depicted east of the pass. It looks as though the mountain that was seen was not the northern Khan-Tengri, not the peak discovered by Semenov in 1857, and certainly not the southern Khan-Tengri,

but an entirely different peak. But Ignat'yev's notes proved that he saw the peak discovered by Semenov. His description--"the picturesque view of peak Khan-Tengri, rising above the entire snow-covered Mustag and its other mountains in the form of a triangular pyramid"⁹--corresponds to the shape of altitude "6995."

On A. N. Krasnov's map, Khan-Tengri is depicted approximately in the same place where the northern peak should be located. Apparently, Krasnov corrected his data on the location of the southern Khan-Tengri in accordance with the findings of P. P. Semenov and N. A. Severtsev.

The 1886 expedition confirmed A. N. Krasnov's observation that Khan-Tengri Peak was visible from Chinese territory near the city of Uchturfan. The "blank spot" on the map of Central Tian-Shan became somewhat smaller after the expedition's discovery of the North and South Inyl'chek, Mushketov and Semenov glaciers, but the publication of A. Bol'shev's map confused the issue of the location of Khan-Tengri even more.

In the summer of 1899, a Hungarian expedition headed by G. Almaszy visited the Central Tian-Shan to hunt and collect zoological specimens. The expedition was guided by the map drawn up by A. Bol'shev as a supplement to I. V. Ignat'yev's report, and concluded that three mountain ranges, and not only the two depicted on Bol'shev's map, stretched to the west from the mountain system of Khan-Tengri. But the location of Khan-Tengri Peak was not clarified.¹⁰

In 1900, an Italian expedition headed by Cesare Borgese set off for Tian-Shan to climb some of the mountains, including Khan-Tengri Peak if conditions permitted. When they reached the crest of the range near the Kashkator Pass, the travelers "were quite amazed to see a higher peak on the horizon almost due south, and not to the west, as they had been led by their map to expect."¹¹ In this way, the expedition discovered the error in the location of the northern Khan-Tengri on A. Bol'shev's map and, in order to obtain conclusive proof of this, decided to travel all the way to the peak itself by going around the mountains closing it off from the north. But this expedition was unable to clarify the position of the peak on the map.

In 1902, an expedition headed by V. V. Sapozhnikov was conducting geographical studies in Central Tian-Shan and saw the northern Khan-Tengri from the northwest, from the environs of Myn-Tur Pass, in clear and almost cloudless weather, which made it possible to photograph the peak and calculate its precise altitude. According to V. V. Sapozhnikov's calculations, the altitude was 6,950 meters.¹²

Sapozhnikov's observations confirmed that the location of the northern Khan-Tengri on Bol'shev's map was incorrect, but did not clarify it.

In 1902 and 1903, a German expedition headed by G. Merzbacher, specially equipped to work under alpine conditions, was able to define the structure of the Central Tian-Shan mountains in two summers and considerably reduced the size of the "blank space" on the map.

The expedition approached the Central Tian-Shan from all four directions and penetrated far into the interior of unknown mountain groups along river valleys on Russian and Chinese territory. It discovered new ranges, mountains and glaciers, took surveys and measured altitudes and took around 2,000 photographs of mountains and glaciers and panoramic photos of ranges.

In order to calculate the precise location of Khan-Tengri, Merzbacher made out several routes from the north, west and south, guided by a Russian map with a scale of 40 versts to the inch (1:1,680,000), on which the northern Khan-Tengri, according to the findings of I. V. Ignat'yev's expedition of 1886 (and according to A. Bol'shev's map), was erroneously located 25 kilometers to the northeast of its actual position.

Naturally, no Khan-Tengri Peak was found in the location specified by A. Bol'shev. Instead of this, the expedition discovered other snow-covered peaks here, one of which had an altitude of 6,300 meters and was later called the "Peak of 100 Years of the VGO" (All-Union Geographic Society); this was taken to be the main juncture of the Central Tian-Shan ranges. The peak was located at the crest of the meridian expanse, first mapped by the expedition, and it was precisely through this spot, according to the expedition, that the line of the previously established Russo-Chinese border should run.¹³

Studies from Chinese territory, conducted from the region of the cities of Aksu and Uchturfan, were less successful. They were conducted in April-May 1903 at a most unfavorable time, when the air in Kashgaria was dusty and visibility did not exceed 5-10 kilometers, while the mountains surrounding the Kashgar basin from the west and north were constantly covered by dense clouds. It was precisely for these reasons that Merzbacher did not see the southern Khan-Tengri, although he came quite close to it on the Savabtsi glacier (around 30 kilometers away from the peak) and visited a number of other locations from which the peak is generally quite visible from August through October.¹⁴

During explorations from the west, the expedition conclusively determined the exact location of the northern Khan-Tengri and calculated its altitude and geographic coordinates.

All of Merzbacher's predecessors saw only the top of the peak, which rose above the Sary-Yassy range to the north, and not one of them saw the entire mountain. It was also assumed that the mountain was located at the juncture of huge mountain ranges stretching out to the west.

Merzbacher moved from west to east along the South Inyl'chek glacier through the middle and almost to the end of the "blank space," discovered a glacial lake at the lower end of the North Inyl'chek glacier, which was later given his name, and ascertained that the northern Khan-Tengri was not an alpine juncture, but that it was the crowning summit of a short lateral range stretching to the west from the border range between the North and South Inyl'chek glaciers.

The geographic location of the peak, according to the expedition's calculations, was 6 kilometers too far to the southeast, and its calculated altitude of 7,200 meters exceeded the actual figure by more than 200 meters.

The southern Khan-Tengri was never mentioned by members of the expedition, and nothing is said about it in the expedition's reports. Nonetheless, it was later established that the members of the expedition saw it from the west (from Russian territory), photographed it and published the developed photographs.¹⁵ It is true that in this picture the southern Khan-Tengri does not appear to be as high as the northern Khan-Tengri. This is probably why it did not arouse any particular interest when it was seen from the west and north.

The first Russian state topographical surveys in the Central Tian-Shan in 1912 added almost nothing new to available information.

The surveys were plotted with a scale of 2 versts to the inch (1:84,000). In view of the difficult conditions of alpine locations, only the northern Khan-Tengri and the mountains north and west of it were mapped. The region of the southern Khan-Tengri was not surveyed.

An altitude of 32,777 sazhen, or 6,984 meters, was assigned to the northern Khan-Tengri in this survey.

Therefore, pre-Soviet studies of the Central Tian-Shan established that it was traversed by a high mountain range running from the north to the south, which Soviet mountain-climbers later called the Meridian Range; that the northern Khan-Tengri was not part of this range, but of a short lateral range stretching to the west--that is, not along the Russo-Chinese border, but 12 kilometers west of it, on Russian territory. It was precisely here that the border had been drawn, for example, on the map of Central Tian-Shan attached to the abovementioned article by A. Mekh in ZEMLEVEDENIYE magazine in 1907. An indissoluble contradiction would seem to have arisen: If the border ran along the mountain range, as stipulated in the Kashgar Protocol of 1882, it cannot satisfy one of the other requirements of the protocol--to pass through the highest peak of the Tian-Shan, the mountain of Khan-Tengri.

The researchers of the Central Tian-Shan who penetrated the range from the north in a search for its highest mountain peak, took it to be the peak with an altitude, according to current data, of 6,995 meters, which they called Khan-Tengri. The expedition of Merzbacher in 1902 and 1903 confirmed this. It appeared to have explored the entire region sufficiently and, as was thought at that time, had determined that all other peaks were not as high. At that time, no one knew as yet that there were two peaks which were being called "Khan-Tengri" and regarded as a single peak, and that the border which ran along the crest of the range could not have passed through the northern peak, but through the southern and highest one.

The exploration of the Central Tian-Shan went on for 55 years and ended with a major geographic discovery in 1943: Soviet topographers and mountain-climbers who were conducting a geodesic and aerial photographic survey discovered a peak with an altitude of 7,439 meters (initially calculated at 7,440) on the Soviet-Chinese border then depicted on maps according to the data of the Merzbacher expedition. The previous contradiction was then completely and conclusively resolved: The border did run along the crest of the range and through the highest Khan-Tengri summit of the Tian-Shan (Pobeda Peak).

Here is what one of the members of this survey force, V. I. Ratsek, wrote about the discovery in an article entitled "Pobeda Peak": "When we delve into the history of Tian-Shan explorations, we can ask an extremely interesting question: Was this altitude of 7,440 meters not called Khan-Tengri in the past?

"The first explorers could more easily have seen the crests of the Tian-Shan mountains from the south, from which location the peak discovered by Soviet researchers in 1943 should have stood out clearly from the mountains surrounding it. It is possible that it was this peak to which the local inhabitants gave the distinguished name 'Lord of the Heavens' (Khan-Tengri).

"Explorers coming from the north could see the panorama of Tian-Shan ranges from Naryn-kola and Boyan-kola. From here, the entire Sary-Yassy range is visible, crowned by a separate peak with the characteristic features of a regular pyramid. Seeing this peak, standing out so clearly among the rest of the mountains, they indisputably could have taken it for Khan-Tengri, the name of which came down to our time through the centuries, while the actual Khan-Tengri (altitude '7440') was hidden behind the northern mountain ranges.

"Altitude '7440,' which was discovered in 1943-1944, is the main peak of the Tian-Shan system....

"This peak," V. I. Ratsek later goes on, "was discovered and its altitude was calculated at the time of the Great Patriotic War, at a time when our victory over the enemy had already been ensured and required only the final blows which were dealt to the enemy by the courageous Red Army in 1945.

"For this reason, this gigantic peak, the second highest in the Soviet Union, should serve as a monument to these great victories and bear the distinguished name of Pobeda Peak."¹⁶

Soviet topographers who calculated the precise location and altitude of the highest Tian-Shan peak, simultaneously expressed their own opinion that it had been called Khan-Tengri in China for a long time. It is true that Pobeda Peak is quite visible from the Aksu-Uchturfan-Kashgar road, which had been used for a long time by Chinese conquerors and merchants moving westward. It was precisely this mountain that was seen in 1882 from Chinese territory and was first placed on the map by Russian topographers. It was

Pobeda Peak (Khan-Tengri), and not another mountain, that Russian explorer A. N. Krasnov saw in 1886 from the region of the Chinese city of Uchfuran.

Taiwan cartographers settled the question of these two Tian-Shan peaks in a unique way: In an Atlas published in 1964, they depicted both Khan-Tengri with its altitude of 6,995 meters and New Khan-Tengri with its altitude of 7,439 meters.¹⁷

Taiwan cartographers did not mention the name "Pobeda Peak" in their Atlas. They did not want the word "Pobeda"--this symbol of the Soviet people's great feat in the struggle against German fascism and Japanese militarism--to be perpetuated on the Soviet-Chinese border.

Beijing cartographers, who initially depicted both Khan-Tengris on their maps,¹⁸ later acknowledged the existence of northern Khan-Tengri and nullified the southern peak, "covering" the discovery of Soviet topographers. On the map of China with a scale of 1:4,000,000, which was published for the 19th time in the PRC in December 1971, peak "7439" is not shown at all, and only altitude "6995"--that is, the northern Khan-Tengri--is included. Pobeda Peak is not designated on a 1975 map either.

But this was not all that Beijing did. On 31 July 1977, RENMIN RIBAO reported that on 25 July at 1531 hours Beijing time, ten men and women from a Chinese mountain-climbing team "completed the first successful ascent of the highest Tian-Shan peak--Tomur--and raised the five-star flag at the summit of Mt. Tomur, on the territory of our motherland....

"On 30 July at 1315 hours Beijing time," the report went on, "17 mountain-climbers from a second detachment made another successful ascent of Tomur." The newspaper maintained that the region of Tomur Peak "has been Chinese territory since antiquity" and set forth several arguments to this effect.

The first argument was the following: "Written Chinese historical sources say that...Han and T'ang emperors in the region of Xinjiang...founded administrative agencies, sent officials to this zone, billeted troops and carried out the colonization of border territories by migrants from military settlements."

Even if we assume that all of this is the truth, does it really mean that the border of the lands then seized by China in Central Asia was west of Pobeda Peak and that the Central Tian-Shan was then Chinese?

The second argument was that "vast regions to the south and north of Tian-Shan and to the east and south of Lake Balkhash were officially included in the body of our multinational motherland."

This argument "allows" Beijing to regard as Chinese territory a large part of Kazakhstan, all of the Uzbek and Tadzhik SSR's, and even North Afghanistan, since it, after all, is also located south of Tian-Shan.

We know that the court historians of the Chinese emperors characteristically included all lands as part of China as soon as they learned of their existence. For example, the territory of China was "expanded" northeastward all the way to the Amur and regions north of this river, southeastward to Indonesia and westward to the Caspian Sea; China's vassal territories included Russia, England, Holland and a number of other countries. Naturally, if it is declared that both Asia and Europe were Chinese at some time in the past, then the region of Pobeda Peak could not be any exception.

The third argument was that "famous Chinese poet of the T'ang era Li Bo was born in the city of Suiye.... In his verses, he frequently described the remarkable scenery of Tian-Shan."

We will not worry about whether Chinese poet of the T'ang era Li Bo (701-762) actually sang the praises of the "remarkable scenery of Tian-Shan" in his verses. The essence of the matter lies elsewhere. The reader is being told that since a Chinese poet was born in the city of Suiye and sang the praises of the Tian-Shan mountains in his verses, then the city and the Tian-Shan must have already belonged to China at that time.

Reports of Li Bo's birthplace have been contradictory. Chinese sources mention at least two other places where he was born: the Qinglian district of Sichuan Province and the city of Tianshui in Gansu Province.¹⁹

They must know about this in Beijing and, for this reason, a man called Liu Dajie decided to settle the matter. In order to reinforce the shaky argument of Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda, he wrote the following: "When Li Bo was 15 years old, his father moved to Sichuan. Li Bo grew up in Sichuan and thought of it as his native province."²⁰

If we believe what Liu Dajie has to say, Li Bo could describe the beauty of Tian-Shan on the strength of the impression it made on him before he was 5 years old. Let us assume for a moment that this could be true. It still does not prove that the region of Pobeda Peak belonged to China at that time.

These are the arguments which substantiate, according to RENMIN RIBAO, China's inalienable right to the Soviet territory near Pobeda Peak.

In a report from Urumqi on 31 July, the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY announced that the altitude of Tomur Peak was 7,443.8 meters and mentioned some of the details of the Chinese mountain-climbers' ascent of the peak. This report again stressed that the mountain-climbers were the "first to climb the highest mountain of the Tian-Shan system--Tomur Peak."

A NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY report of 5 August from Urumqi again alleged that Tomur Peak was on Chinese territory and set forth the same arguments: "As early as the Han and T'ang dynasties, administrative organs were established and troops were billeted in the region of Xinjiang" and the "great Chinese poet of the T'ang period Li Bo was born in the city of Suiye" and glorified the fantastic and majestic scenery of Tian-Shan more than once" in his poems.

On 25 August 1977, a mass meeting was held in Beijing's Shoudu Sports Center in honor of the Chinese conquerors of Tomur Peak. The meeting was attended by Deputy Chairman Li Xiannian of the CCP Central Committee and other CCP and PRC leaders. The next day, on 26 August, the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY informed the world of this meeting and underscored the following: "Tomur Peak is located in our nation...and the ascent of Tomur Peak by Chinese mountain-climbers will be of great significance for the protection of the sacred territory in the outlying districts of our motherland." The NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY unequivocally stated that "Tomur Peak...is located in the Aksu region (China's Xinjiang-Uigur Autonomous Region), which has been the sacred territory of our country for ages."

There is no question that Tomur Peak is Pobeda Peak, or the southern Khan-Tengri. According to Soviet calculations, the altitude of the peak is 7,439 meters, and according to the Chinese it is 7,444 (rounded off). A difference of 5 meters is not very significant. The Soviet figure was calculated from the level of the Baltic Sea and the Chinese calculations were made from the level of the Pacific Ocean on the Chinese coastline. Moreover, the height of the peak in relation to points in a network of precise altitudes could only be calculated by means of geodesic surveys, and an error of a few meters is therefore quite permissible. All of this is clear. But something else is not clear at first glance: Why is the highest mountain of the Tian-Shan system now called Tomur Peak in China? Why have none of the numerous Chinese publications reporting on the ascent of this peak by Chinese mountain-climbers mentioned the universally recognized name "Pobeda Peak" or another name that was known for so long in China--"Khan-Tengri Peak"? After all, the Chinese are well aware that the highest peak of the Tian-Shan was discovered by Soviet topographers and mountain-climbers in 1943. It was then that they calculated its precise location and altitude, and in subsequent years Pobeda Peak was climbed by many other Soviet mountaineers. Why was it necessary for Beijing to discover something that had already been discovered 34 years ago and is now world-renowned? Why was it necessary to call the conquest of something that had already been conquered a pioneer feat?

The essence of the matter does not lie in Beijing's geographic incompetence, but in the fact that Beijing is using this method to fabricate "disputed areas" on the Soviet-Chinese border and territorial claims on the Soviet Union.

Beijing has informed the entire world that its territorial claims on the Soviet Union are allegedly based only on Russo-Chinese border treaties and that it is supposedly working toward strict and precise adherence to these treaties. The Soviet Union has always firmly adhered to precisely this principle, and if Beijing's words did not diverge so much from its deeds, nothing else would be needed for the successful settlement of border disputes between the USSR and the PRC.

In the Central Tian-Shan mountains, the border is defined by the Kashgar Protocol of 1882 as running along the alpine crest through the highest Tian-Shan peak, Khan-Tengri. Later, however, it turned out that there were two peaks called "Khan-Tengri" and, for this reason, if the protocol is to be strictly observed, the border would have to run through the particular Khan-Tengri that is the highest point in the Tian-Shan system--that is, through Pobeda Peak, or the southern Khan-Tengri. The main consideration here is not this, however, but the fact that Pobeda Peak could only be seen from the south, from Chinese territory, particularly the region of Aksu and Uchturfan, from which members of a Russo-Chinese border commission saw it in 1882; and they not only saw it, but also drew the line of the established border through it.

At some point, however, Beijing began to interpret border treaties with the Soviet Union not on the basis of their spirit and letter, but in line with its anti-Soviet policy. This is why Pobeda Peak (southern Khan-Tengri) is not designated on contemporary Chinese maps, and the line of the Soviet-Chinese border in this region has been moved far into Soviet territory & now passes through the northern Khan-Tengri.

To lend strength to this story, Beijing decided to "rediscover" the highest mountain in the Tian-Shan system, consigning the already known geographic names of "Pobeda Peak" and "Khan-Tengri Peak" to oblivion. This action was apparently taken for the purpose of implying that only the northern Khan-Tengri was always known, while the southern Khan-Tengri (Tomur Peak, according to the false story invented in Beijing) was not discovered until 1977. For this reason, the Soviet-Chinese border should pass through the northern Khan-Tengri.

In Beijing they naively believe that such primitive falsifications of the history of Central Tian-Shan explorations will aid them in casting doubts on a document regulating the line of demarcation of the Soviet-Chinese border in this region.

FOOTNOTES

1. The name used most often in European geography is "Khan-Tengri," meaning "Lord of the Heavens" in Mongolian.
2. Approximately 7,300 meters.
3. P. P. Semenov, "Istoriya poluvekovoy deyatel'nosti Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva 1845-1895" [The History of the Russian Geographic Society's Half-Century of Activity, 1845-1895], pt 1, St. Petersburg, 1896, p 268.
4. A. V. Kaul'bars, "Papers on the Geography of Tian-Shan," ZAPISKI ROGO PO OBSHCHEY GEOGRAFI, vol V, St. Petersburg, 1875, pp 269-270.

5. See I. V. Ignat'yev, "Preliminary Report on the Expedition to Study the Khan-Tengri Mountain Group," IZVESTIYA RGO, 1887, vol XXIII, No 2. The report was accompanied by "A Map of the Tian-Shan Range West of Mt. Khan-Tengri," compiled by A. Bol'shev on a scale of 15 versts to the inch (1:630,000) on the basis of the findings of routing surveys of the 1886 expedition and surveys of previous years; A. N. Krasnov, "History of the Development of Flora in the Southern Part of the Eastern Tian-Shan. With a Map Compiled by A. N. Krasnov," ZAPISKI RGO PO OBSHCHEY GEOGRAFI, vol XIX, St. Petersburg, 1886.
6. The names in parenthesis are those now used in Soviet maps.
7. A. N. Krasnov, Op. cit., p 81.
8. The erroneous basis of Chinese maps was used (the crude astronomical calculations of 18th-century Jesuits).
9. I. V. Ignat'yev, Op. cit., p 15.
10. See A. Mekh, "The Khan-Tengri Mountain-Mass," ZEMLEVEDENIYE, 1907, bks I-II, p 3.
11. Ibid., pp 4-5.
12. See V. V. Sapozhnikov, "Ocherki Semirech'ya" [Semirech'ye Essays], vol I, Tomsk, 1904, pp 121-124.
13. See "Karte zu Merzbacher Reisen in mittleren und ostlichen Tian-Shan 1902/03 und 1907/08," Munich, 1908, No 3.
14. The southern Khan-Tengri was seen at precisely this propitious time by Russian topographers in 1882 and by A. N. Krasnov in 1886.
15. See Merzbacher, "The Central Tian-Shan Mountains," London, 1905.
16. VOPROSY GEOGRAFI, No 1, Moscow, 1946, pp 83-90.
17. "Atlas of the Republic of China, Vol 2. Xizang (Tibet), Xinjiang and Mongolia," 2d ed, May 1964.
18. For example, in the 1953 edition of the map of China with scale of 1:6,000,000.
19. See V. S. Ol'gin, "Expansionism in Beijing's Border Policy," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1973, No 1, p 42.
20. Liu Dajie, "The Class Position of Li Bo and His Artistry as a Poet and Song-Writer," XUEXI YU PIPAN, 1975, No 11, p 43.

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BEIJING: POLICY LINE OF PROVOKING WORLD WAR

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979, pp 131-140

[Article by A. G. Apalin]

[Text] China's piratical attack on peaceful socialist Vietnam completely revealed the aggressive essence of the Beijing leadership's great-power, hegemonist policy. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev remarked, "it is precisely this policy that now represents the most serious threat to peace throughout the world."¹ China's unprecedented aggression is the most convincing proof of the complete groundlessness of the line of reasoning set forth by Maoism's apologists concerning the "positive" changes in the views of the current Chinese leadership on questions of war and peace. The words and deeds of the Beijing leaders have clearly shown that they have gone much further in their resolution of this question than the founder of their reactionary doctrine--Mao Zedong.

This problem is the subject of the article published below.

Mao Zedong's statements about war and peace, which represent a concentrated form of the general views of the Chinese leadership on this score, are well known: "War evolves into peace, peace evolves into war. Peace is the other side of war. A time of no hostilities is a time of peace.... War is a specific form of policy. It is an extension of policy; policy is also a kind of war." "War," the theoretical organ of the CCP Central Committee, HONGQI magazine, stated in October 1965, "tempers the people and advances the course of history."² This doctrine of war has not only been inherited by the new, post-Mao Chinese leadership, but has even been developed further. "We believe," PRC Minister of Defense Xu Xiangqian wrote in the August issue of HONGQI for 1978, "that in a class society, war is a normal phenomenon in the relations between the two worlds. War is an extension of policy and it is also an extension of peace."

The policy line of preparing for war and provoking war has essentially always been the national doctrine of Maoist China. It permeated all PRC foreign and domestic policy in Mao Zedong's time and is still permeating this policy under the present Chinese leadership. It is closely connected with the features that are typical of the current stage in China's development.

The political situation in the PRC is still acute, unstable and largely contradictory. Conditions in the country are still largely determined by the struggle over unresolved problems concerning the program and guidelines for further national development. The contradictory nature of the fundamental objective needs of China and the political plans of its leadership is becoming increasingly apparent. The Chinese ruling clique is still a breeding ground for new conflicts which will erupt in the next few years. This is particularly evident from the dual process that is taking place in the PRC today. On the one hand, and this was demonstrated at the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee (December 1978), Maoism is being concealed more and more under the cover of Marxism-Leninism; on the other hand, the nationalist aims of Maoism are being coordinated even more closely with the centuries-old traditions of great-Han chauvinism, which means that Maoism is acquiring even sharper outlines of social chauvinism and that Beijing's expansionist goals are being camouflaged by means of socialist slogans and speculations on the prestige of socialism. The efforts of the PRC leaders to consolidate society on the ideological basis of Maoism, however, are not producing the result desired by the present regime. The very fact that the PRC leadership cannot and will not transcend the bounds of Maoism signifies that new difficulties and crises will arise in Chinese society.

One of the characteristic features of today's China is the more prominent role played by the army. Since the political structure in China is largely founded on the army as a basis of support for the military bureaucratic regime, the ideas and doctrines of military leaders are essentially of decisive significance in political planning. The increasingly prominent role played by the army in the life of Chinese society not only reflects the balance of power in the nation but also constitutes a factor which largely determines basic foreign and domestic policy guidelines. "Our army," people in China frankly say, "is the chief weapon of the proletarian dictatorship. Whether it is a question of class struggle in the international arena or of class struggle within the country, the army is invariably the chief weapon."³ "The people's army, armed with the Thought of Mao Zedong, as well as technically advanced weapons and ammunition," they say without a trace of doubt, "will be like a flying tiger, invincible throughout the world."⁴

The Chinese leadership's efforts to strengthen people's militia units have also been placed at the service of the doctrine of preparations for war. An all-China conference on the people's militia was held in Beijing from 20 June through 11 August 1978. At this conference, the main objective was quite openly admitted: The militia must be regarded and constructed as an integral auxiliary force of the regular army, as a "military force which will not require military uniforms and combat rations from the state,"⁵ as well as a militarized labor force in the production sphere and a repressive organ to "deal with class enemies." Stirring up war hysteria, the army

newspaper JIEFANGJUN BAO wrote that "each of our 800 million individuals must be able to fire a rifle and fight."

Therefore, Mao's insistence on "preparations for war," which has been inherited and constantly reaffirmed by the current Chinese leadership, is not a utilitarian mobilization appeal used to stimulate economic development, as some of the apologists of the thesis of "de-Maoization" in China maintain, but a reflection of the policy of militarizing China and an element of the doctrine of preparation for war.

The Chinese leadership has worked out an entire system of "theoretical concepts and doctrines" to serve as ideological substantiation of Beijing's line of escalating tension in the world right up to the provocation of a new world war. These include the Maoist definition of the present era, the thesis about the "disappearance of the socialist camp," the idea of dividing the world into "three worlds" and the set of "arguments" concerning the "illusory nature" of detente and the "inevitability" of a new world war.

The thesis about the "disappearance" of the socialist camp has obviously been set forth to cancel out the worldwide historic significance of the victory of the socialist revolution in the USSR, to "sanctify" the denial that the worldwide socialist system is a deciding factor in the development of mankind, to apply the natural tendencies of imperialism to the Soviet Union and worldwide socialism and to depict the socialist world as a "new imperialist force," more dangerous than the old brand of imperialism.

All of this was also needed by the Chinese leadership to justify the line of provoking escalated tension in the world. According to the Chinese interpretation, the current state of affairs is not acquiring the nature of a historical new stage marked by confrontation between the two systems, or by the fact, in V. I. Lenin's words, that "the two camps are now quite consciously opposing one another on the worldwide scale,"⁶ but is, rather, a continuation of the imperialist struggle for spheres of domination and subordination. Since Beijing's opinion is that no fundamental changes have taken place in the balance of power and that socialism as a bearer of peaceful policy does not exist, the dominant feature of this era "naturally" becomes precisely the escalation of tension, with another world war as its most probable consequence.

In the last years of Mao Zedong's life, Beijing noticeably intensified its propaganda of the "inevitability" of a new world war, the breeding ground for which was supposedly represented by the two superpowers and, above all, the Soviet Union.⁷ Unequivocally declaring its loyalty to the "revolutionary foreign policy line of Chairman Mao Zedong," the new leadership of China has been conducting a line, from the very beginning, aimed at convincing the Chinese people and world public opinion that world war has become the main issue on the international agenda. The very first major foreign policy statement which proved the continuity of Beijing's course--the interview granted by Vice Premier Li Xiannian of the PRC State Council to French journalists on 2 November 1976--laid stress on the following: "We say that

war is inevitable."⁸ "Sooner or later, on a minor or major scale, either conventionally or nuclear war will break out"; under present conditions, "there can be no lasting peace"; war "does not depend on the will of the people"--these statements were made by Chairman Hua Guofeng of the CCP Central Committee in his accountability report at the 11th CCP Congress in August 1977. "Factors of war are obviously gaining strenght, and the danger of world war is seriously threatening the people of the world more and more," he said in his report on the work of the government at the first session of the Fifth NPC [National People's Congress] on 26 February 1978. "A new world war can only be postponed; it cannot be avoided," PRC Minister of Defense Xu Xiangqian predicted at the end of July 1978. Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] Yang Yong discussed the expectation of "large-scale nuclear war in the near future" in his article published in RENMIN RIBAO in December 1978.

Just as in Mao Zedong's time, Beijing is now stubbornly alluding to the "inevitability" of war in the international arena, including the United Nations. "War is the interval between two peaceful periods," PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua said at the 32d Session of the UN General Assembly (1977). "Continued fierce competition between the two superpowers will unavoidably cause peace to grow into war at some time. This does not depend on the will of the people." Some kind of "obvious signs of mounting factors of war" were announced by Huang Hua at the special session of the UN General Assembly on 29 May 1978.

The thesis concerning the "inevitability" and "usefulness" of a new world war has become the object of fundamental theoretical research in China. On 1 November 1977, RENMIN RIBAO contained a lengthy article entitled "The Theory of Chairman Mao Zedong on the Division Into Three Worlds--A Tremendous Contribution to Marxism-Leninism." This publication, as well as the RENMIN RIBAO article of 18 January 1978, represented the "latest word" in the substantiation of China's current great-power, chauvinistic foreign policy line. An analysis of these articles proves that a doctrine of war was actually set forth in the pages of RENMIN RIBAO. "The danger of war is threatening the people of the world more and more seriously"; "factors of war are obviously gaining strength at the present time"; "under present conditions, a lasting peace is impossible and a new world war is inevitable"--these are the basic premises of this doctrine.

Along with the thesis concerning the "inevitability" of war, ideological formulas have also been invented by the Chinese leadership to substantiate their attempts to prove that war is good for people. Ever since the time of the 11th CCP Congress, there has been increasingly loud propaganda that when war does break out, the people of the world will be in a "convenient" and "favorable" position. Beijing went even further in an article in the 1 November 1977 issue of RENMIN RIBAO on the Maoist theory of the "three worlds." It suggested that there was nothing bad about the fact that war would break out, since "in the course of future wars in various parts of the world...the people of different countries will be provided with extensive opportunities to organize war against aggression" and the people of the world

"will completely destroy the instigators of war (according to Beijing terminology, the USSR and the United States) after prolonged united effort"--that is, war will be used as a means of attaining the great-power chauvinistic objectives of the Chinese leadership in connection with the annihilation of its political opponents.

In an attempt to depict world war as something good for the people, the Chinese leaders are trying to prove that any sacrifices this war entails will be warranted. "The sacrifice of a small part of the population," GUANGMING KILAO once wrote, "will result in the security of the entire population, the entire state and even all of mankind; temporary deprivations will be followed by prolonged, or even eternal, peace and good fortune." Carried over by militarism, Su Yu, member of the Standing Committee of the CCF Central Committee Military Council, even resolved to announce in August 1947 that "we are prepared to make the greatest national sacrifices for the sake of making a worthy contribution to the cause of human liberation." However, the general went on, this will not be a simple task, as it will involve "the destruction of other nationalities and states as well." "Our strategy and tactics," he declared, "consist in killing people" and "the complete destruction of enemy manpower." This, Su Yu stressed, is "our decision on the question of war."

Some people in the West who have drawn the proper conclusions from Maoist propaganda have tried to explain Beijing's adherence to the thesis of the "inevitability" of war and the militaristic line of the "threat" presumably presented by the Soviet Union to China's security.

But these "explanations" are obviously lies from beginning to end and are being speculated on by the Chinese leadership and its NATO supporters. The Beijing leaders' present insistence on war is a reflection of their traditional great-power chauvinistic ambitions. As we know, in the second half of the 1950's, Soviet-Chinese relations were still of a friendly nature and no one in Beijing even imagined that there was any kind of Soviet threat. It was precisely at that time, however, that the Maoist approach to current international relations began to gain strength, as well as Maoist ideas about the restructuring of this system for selfish purposes by means of war. It was precisely at that time that the Chinese leaders tried to exert pressure primarily on the Soviet Union to force it to renounce its policy of peaceful coexistence and have a head-on confrontation with the United States. It is unlikely that anyone will now deny that the militaristic doctrine of Maoism was then developed on the pretext of the "threat" that China might be attacked by the United States. A look at Chinese newspapers from the early 1960's conveys the impression that the United States was expected to attack China at any moment. Now the picture is different--the Chinese population is being convinced that the USSR wants to "enslave" and "destroy" China.

It is also quite clear that imperialist propaganda, which created the far from realistic image of a China "interested in peace" in collaboration with Beijing, is also, again in collaboration with Beijing, spreading the absurd

idea of the "Soviet threat" to the entire world.⁹ This combination of exaggeration with the concealment of China's belligerent policies through the denigration and distortion of the truly peace-loving policy line of the Soviet Union did not come about by coincidence. Anticommunists of various stripes, fearing that the peaceful advance of the Soviet Union and world-wide socialism would have undesirable results for imperialist militarists, welcomed Beijing's militaristic line, which is convenient for them, but have been forced by the increasingly strong tendency toward detente to camouflage this line, in conjunction with the Chinese leadership, and to divert the world public's attention from it, as well as from their own policy of aggression and war. The thesis of the "Soviet threat" to the West and to China is being used by imperialist circles and Beijing to justify their own arms race and their mutual support of the militaristic policy.

At this time of China's increasing exposure and self-exposure in the world arena as a preacher of new world wars and an executor of instigative and provocative policy, the Chinese leadership is trying to allege that it has never advocated a new world war and that its statements about its "inevitability" have only been acknowledgments of an objective fact.

A "slight" change has been apparent approximately since the summer of 1977 in Beijing's notorious stereotypes, such as "war is inevitable"; "how preparations for war should be made"; "be prepared to fight"; "How preparations should be made for a war against aggression" and "be prepared to fight against aggression." But this does not change the essence of the matter. In the first place, the entire world knows that no one is preparing to attack China; in the second place, Beijing has simply taken into account the wave of indignation aroused by the openly militaristic policy line of war and has added the little words "against aggression" to its previous formulas.

Beijing has performed equally interesting tricks with its "schedule for war." Propaganda intended for the Chinese people asserts that "large-scale war will break out soon." In an article composed on the occasion of the 51st anniversary of the founding of the PLA, PRC Minister of Defense Xu Xiangqian admonished the Chinese to make serious preparations for "impending broad-scale nuclear attack or sudden invasion." But the rest of the world is hearing something else. Taking the mood of the international public into account, Beijing is dodging the issue by issuing statements such as the one made by Li Xiannian in 1977: "We are not saying that war will erupt now, but it is inevitable." The same ruse was resorted to by Wulanfu in an interview granted to the Italian ANSA AGENCY in October 1978, when he declared that world conflict was "inevitable, sooner or later," but this does not mean that the war will break out "tomorrow or the day after tomorrow."

But does the "postponment" of the "inevitable war" actually add anything new to the Beijing platform? No, because Beijing makes the postponment of the war conditional on several factors. These are aimed, on the one hand, essentially at the realization of its true ambitions: To escalate international tension and undermine anything that might aid in the actual prevention of war and, on the other hand, at the creation of conditions under which the

entire world will have to act according to Beijing's recipes and in pursuit of the Chinese leadership's goals. These are primarily "material and organizational preparations," which means, in Beijing's language, the continuation of the arms race. Moreover, this is an objection to the policy of "pacification," as the policy of international detente and the policy of disarmament are called in Beijing. In addition, the "policy of pacification" is slanderously depicted by Beijing as a policy which "can only bring war closer." "We," Hua Guofeng stressed in a speech presented at festivities commemorating the 29th anniversary of the PRC, "are against pacification."¹⁰ Thirdly, this is "reinforcement of the antihegemonist struggle in all areas," envisaging, above all, the creation of the notorious "united front" for struggle against the Soviet Union, which Beijing has now declared, without a trace of embarrassment, not only the main "source," but also the "main perpetrator" of a new world war. The inevitable war, Wulanfu said in the abovementioned ANSA interview, "can only be postponed by an alliance of the Third World countries with the industrial nations of Western Europe and Japan." At the time of his visit to the United States and Japan in February-March 1979, Deng Xiaoping called for the construction of an anti-Soviet bloc, which would take in the United States, Japan, China and the Western European countries. This condition for the "postponement" of war is supposed to do more than any other, according to Beijing's calculations, in escalating tension in the world right up to the point of military confrontation.

Another aspect of the thesis concerning the "postponement" (but not the prevention) of war is equally important. According to KYODO NEWS AGENCY reports, Deng Xiaoping said, in a conversation with a delegation of former senior officers of the Japanese self-defense forces on 7 October 1977, that "China hopes that peace will be maintained until the end of this century," but that "war will still be inevitable" after this time. The same idea was expressed by Deng Xiaoping in a talk with Thai journalists in the middle of February 1978. The choice of "the end of this century" as a deadline was not accidental. It coincides with the deadline for the accomplishment of another task which has been constantly stressed by the current Beijing leadership--"to turn China into a strong modern power by the end of the century"--or, if we can decode the actual meaning of this objective, to turn the PRC into a powerful militaristic state. The frank public statements of the Chinese leaders are intended to camouflage the essence of Beijing's view. Under the conditions of secrecy, however, the PRC leaders do not conceal the actual purpose of their thesis concerning the "postponement of war." Immediately after his rehabilitation, Deng Xiaoping spoke at the Third Plenum of the Tenth CCP Central Committee on 20 July 1977, making the following frank and cynical statements: "The outbreak of the third world war is inevitable. If the time of this outbreak can be delayed until the end of the century, however, we will be able to seize the initiative and this will be /most convenient/ [in boldface]. For this reason..., we must not diverge from this /main goal/ [in boldface]"¹¹ (emphasis ours).

"Winning time from the enemy" or "racing an opponent"--this is how the matter is stated in the PRC. In other words, what some observers in the West see as a desire for peaceful development is actually a desire to gain time for the modernization of China's armed forces and for the attainment of strategic military strength, without which Beijing cannot expect to carry out its great-power chauvinistic plans.

Beijing, with its chauvinistic great-Han traditions, has characteristically displayed a "superiority complex" in its treatment of other nations, large and small, which "must" comply with the terms set for them by China. It was precisely in this way that Beijing stated the issue in connection with the Chinese-Japanese treaty on peace and friendship and the normalization of Chinese-American relations, and the same undercurrent is present in the Chinese leaders' statements about the Vietnamese question. This trend in the Chinese leadership's foreign policy strategy explains why the PRC did not express the slightest wish to reinforce international order on terms acceptable to all other states in the world. The doctrine of the "inevitability of a new world war" alone represents an open challenge, directed against the basic principles of contemporary international law and the international agreements concluded by the majority of countries in accordance with these principles.

Beijing advocates "faith in the preservation (military--A. A.) of equilibrium, rather than in documents, no matter how wonderful they may be." The Chinese leadership not only believes that it does not need multilateral agreements aimed at preserving the peace (and does not intend to sign any), but has also called major international documents "scraps of paper," whether it is referring to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has been signed by more than 100 countries, the Soviet-American agreement of 1973 on the prevention of nuclear conflict, the Security Council resolution on the cease-fire in the Middle East (October 1973) or the Final Act of the All-European Conference in Helsinki. "At times of acute international conflicts," Beijing cautions, "international agreements and laws are nothing other than mere documents."¹² The present Chinese leadership, which has made no changes in Mao Zedong's doctrine of the "three worlds," a doctrine hostile to the policy of detente and the very idea of maintaining international law and order, stresses that "the key to the postponement of war does not lie in the negotiations and agreements praised by some."¹³

China itself sometimes promises to do something, not to do something and so forth, while the Beijing leadership categorically refuses to reinforce these commitments by means of treaties and rejects all proposals to take part in such forms of commitment universally accepted in international law as international treaties or agreements.

For example, Beijing has demanded that the "two superpowers" (This was quite pointedly stated at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament) "to declare that they will never and under no circumstances resort to threats of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones." At the same time, the Chinese delegation in the United Nations struts its declarations that China will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries. But when the Soviet Union, which insisted on

the non-use of nuclear weapons long before China, not only made this declaration, but also, in response to the appeal of the special session on disarmament, submitted a concrete proposal to the 33d Session of the General Assembly concerning an international convention on stronger guarantees of the security of non-nuclear countries, Beijing immediately objected to this proposal. One reason was its reluctance to be bound by any kind of international legal commitments that might restrict the militarization of China.

The concept of the "inevitability of world war" and the Chinese leadership's stimulation of war hysteria and hatred between nations, including hatred based on racial considerations--the combination of all this cannot be described as anything but ideological preparation for a world war. The principle of prohibiting war propaganda, which has become firmly established in contemporary international law, was affirmed in a resolution of the UN General Assembly on 3 November 1947. In this document, the UN General Assembly condemned "any form of war propaganda conducted in any nation, expressly designed to create or intensify a threat to peace, a violation of peace or an act of aggression." According to this resolution, war propaganda is contrary to the principles of the UN Charter and, consequently the principles of international law in general.

Special laws were adopted in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in 1950 and 1951 to defend the peace; they prohibit war propaganda in any form and stipulate criminal penalties for it. China does not have this kind of law, and the PRC leadership prefers to remain silent on the problem of prohibiting war propaganda. Because Beijing has an interest in war propaganda and in the freedom to make ideological attacks on the process of detente, it objected, as was clear from the position of the PRC delegation at the 97th and 98th sessions of the UNESCO Executive Council (April-May 1975), to the use of the mass media in the interests of lasting peace and mutual understanding and the struggle against war, racism and apartheid. At the fourth conference of ministers of education and economic planning of the countries of Asia and Oceania, held in Colombo from 24 July through 1 August 1978, the Chinese delegate--incidentally, this was the first time a delegate from China had attended this kind of conference--objected to statements in conference documents which referred to the education of people in the spirit of peace, the prevention of war, and disarmament.

The PRC's obvious reluctance to comply with universally recognized international legal norms is based on the foreign policy line that has been consistently conducted by Maoism, the essence of which consists in making China the center of the "world" order. To all appearances, the Chinese leadership believes that Beijing's present economic and military backwardness gives it no opportunity to realize its foreign policy strategy. In the future, when China's positions become stronger and its potential becomes tangible, it will be possible, according to Maoist calculations, to influence the course of world events in directions and forms required for the plans of the PRC leaders. If this should occur, an obstacle might be presented--if China now consents to this--by treaties and international legal documents which might impose restrictions on Beijing's expansionist desires. The

Chinese leadership is essentially in favor of arbitrariness in world affairs and of the creation of favorable conditions for the particular forces that are conducting expansionist and aggressive policies and are preparing to unleash new armed conflicts. Only those who think in terms of aggressive categories can object to agreements and international legal conventions which restrict the arms race and aggression. This has been reaffirmed by Beijing's unprecedented aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The Maoist leadership hopes to compensate for the discrepancy between the PRC's actual potential and its global aims by intensifying contradictions, escalating friction between nations, provoking armed conflicts and sowing discord primarily between the USSR and the United States, the USSR and the FRG, the USSR and Japan and other states. It is striving to create military conflicts for the purpose of involving as many rivals as possible in them, weakening them and taking advantage of this to establish its own hegemony.

The desire to create conflict between the USSR and the United States has always been one of the main strategic goals of the Chinese leadership. Beijing is trying to convince the American public (and this was particularly apparent during Deng Xiaoping's U.S. visit) and world public opinion that detente and the improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union will be useless and will unavoidably lead to fierce confrontations between the two countries. This position differs little from the views of the ill-reputed John Foster Dulles, who was still calling for a tough line in relations with the Soviet Union even as late as 10 February 1974 when he spoke in Chicago: "If the United States," he said, "renounces this line and begins to hope for some kind of compromise with the Soviet Union, war will be inevitable."¹⁴ It was with good reason that the London NEW STATESMAN magazine noted the following in August 1978: "Current Chinese foreign policy owes more to Dulles than to Marx." It is difficult to believe that people in Beijing do not remember the consequences of the Dulles policy.

Beijing is implying that military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States is inevitable by remarking that "the struggle between the two hegemonistic powers will ultimately be settled by force of arms" and that "the conflict between them cannot be completely settled by peaceful means."¹⁵ "As the struggle intensifies," P. R. Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua said on 29 May 1978 at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament, "they will certainly conflict."¹⁶

The Beijing leadership, acting like an incorrigible provocateur, is shouting at all crossroads about the inevitability of a "fight" between the "two super-powers" and is even admitting that "a new war will undoubtedly bring mankind tremendous suffering."¹⁷ Moreover, the Chinese leadership is attempting to implement its plans to provoke military confrontation between the USSR and the United States by making frank declarations, such as the one made by PRC Minister of Defense Xu Xiangqian, that, if war breaks out between the two powers, "we would be in a convenient position."¹⁸

In addition to propagandizing the thesis that "the conflict between them cannot be completely resolved by peaceful means," Beijing is doing everything possible to frighten the United States, for instigative purposes, with the threat that the Soviet Union will "beat" the United States in their "global competition" and that U.S. efforts to build up weaponry "look pale in comparison" to Soviet efforts. It is for this reason, as the PRC minister of foreign affairs put it in a conversation with one American delegation, that the United States should realize that "the time has come to reconsider things" and to "put an end to the policy of pacifying the Soviet Union" if it "wants to postpone the outbreak of the 'inevitable' war between the two superpowers and then win this war."¹⁹

On 1 January 1978, RENMIN RIBAO wrote the following in an edifying tone, but one calculated to arouse chauvinist feelings: "In the face of a Soviet worldwide offensive and its accelerated build up of weaponry, the United States must make a choice: It must either look the danger in the eye and take effective measures to counteract it or convey the impression of 'peace' and suffer defeat if a war should break out." At a banquet in Beijing, held in connection with the China visit of Z. Brzezinski, the U.S. President's national security adviser, at the end of May 1978, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua discussed the need, as he put it, "to oppose the policy of pacification" and conduct a policy of "force in answer to force" in the face of the threat of "social imperialism." "The hegemonism that appears so formidable," the PRC minister of foreign affairs assured his American partner, "will ultimately turn out to be nothing but a paper tiger."

These inflammatory phrases are, word for word, the same as those used by the Chinese leaders in the late 1950's and early 1960's in discussions with the Soviet Union. In relations with American imperialism, they thought, as was mentioned above, "force must be answered with force." In this process, the Maoists, on the one hand, slanderously accuse the USSR and the CPSU of "cowardice," "fear of American imperialism" and "attempts to pacify the aggressor," while on the other, they call the United States "a paper tiger that will fall apart at a single nudge." In the past, the Chinese leadership tried to push from one end--to push the Soviet Union into conflict with the United States, but now Beijing is pushing from the other end--to incite the United States to conflict against the USSR, but with the same goal--to provoke a confrontation of a global nature to Beijing's advantage. In a sense, Beijing is encouraging the United States and the other imperialist powers to "be bolder" in the unleashing of war. According to the KYODO NEWS AGENCY, in a meeting with a group of Japanese parliamentarians at the beginning of September 1977, Deng Xiaoping announced in an inflammatory tone that the United States is capable of starting a world war, but "is not bold enough to do this." Japan, he went on, "has neither the courage, nor the ability nor the strength to risk starting a war." And only, according to him, "the Soviet Union is prepared to provoke a world war." The remarks made by Deng Xiaoping to American journalists on 27 November 1978 were in the same vein.²⁰

By pushing the United States into a fierce confrontation with the USSR and assuring Washington and the other capitalist states that China is prepared to "unite" with them against the "common enemy"--that is, against the USSR and the fraternal countries of the socialist community (this implication is made particularly clear in the statements of Chinese leaders in connection with the normalization of Chinese-American relations)--and that China will assist those who "wage resolute struggle" against the Soviet Union,²¹ the Beijing leaders are not concealing the fact that they regard the United States, just as the entire West, as a temporary ally. It was precisely in this context that the issue was stated in Hua Guofeng's report at the 11th CCP Congress in August 1977, in the RENMIN RIBAO editorial of 1 November 1977, intended to "substantiate" the Maoist foreign policy doctrine of the "three worlds," and in the article by PRC Minister of Defense Xu Xiangqian in the August 1978 issue of HONGQI magazine, in which he appeals for action "from a position of revolutionary strength" first against the USSR and then against the United States as well. On 28 September 1978, RENMIN RIBAO unequivocally declared that "the population is now preparing for war against the opponent now arousing its anger and hatred." "This is social imperialism, and later imperialism." This is something that should be considered by those who love to play the "Chinese card."

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 3 March 1979.
2. HONGQI, 1965, No 10.
3. Ibid., 1978, No 2.
4. GUANGMING RIBAO, 20 January 1977.
5. RENMIN RIBAO, 28 September 1978.
6. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 40, p 245.
7. RENMIN RIBAO, 7 October 1975.
8. FIGARO, 3 November 1976.
9. RENMIN RIBAO, 2 January 1979.
10. Ibid., 1 October 1978.
11. BACKGROUND OF CHINA, 17 May 1978.
12. RENMIN RIBAO, 5 August 1975.

13. Ibid., 1 November 1977.
14. Quoted by K. V. Kiselev, "Zapiski sovetskogo diplomata" [Memoirs of a Soviet Diplomat], Moscow, 1974, p 311.
15. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 November 1977.
16. A/S--10/PV. 7, p 57.
17. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 November 1977.
18. HONGQI, 1978, No 8.
19. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 21 November 1977.
20. WASHINGTON POST, 5 December 1978.
21. HONGQI, 1978, No 8.

8588

CSO: 1805

IMPORTANT DOCUMENT FROM THE HISTORY OF SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 141-146

[Article by Professor M. S. Kapitsa]

[Text] Sixty years ago, on 25 July 1919, the Soviet Government issued a special declaration addressed to the people and governments of North and South China. The declaration set forth the principles this government proposed to lay at the basis of relations between Soviet Russia and China. The declaration played an important role in the development of relations between the two countries and served as the basis for the Soviet-Chinese agreements signed in May and September 1924.

The first international act of the Nation of Soviets, born of the October Revolution, was the Decree on Peace. The same document proclaimed the right of national self-determination. The appeal addressed to working Moslems of Russia and the East of 20 November (3 December) 1917 declared: "Our banners bear freedom for the oppressed people of the world."¹

The Soviet Government attached great significance to the construction of a new relationship with China--the largest semicolonial country. The instructions of the NKID [People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs] to the workers of international sections of local soviets in Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Chita, Irkutsk, Omsk and Tashkent stated: "We must stress the fact that we are laying the cornerstone for absolutely new relations with the people of the East and that their salvation from the dangers of seizure, violence and lawlessness by Japanese-European capitalists and oppressors will be accomplished in close unity with the people of socialist Russia."²

Soon after its formation, the Soviet Government tried to initiate negotiations with the Chinese mission in Petrograd concerning the establishment of friendly relations between the two countries on the basis of complete equality. It offered to annul all treaties it considered to be unjust: the Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1896, the Beijing Protocol of 1901 and all Russo-Japanese agreements concluded between 1907 and 1916 which pertained to China. In connection with these treaties, tsarist Russia was given concessions on the Chinese Eastern Railroad construction project, including right-of-way

privileges, it was paid compensation in connection with the "Yihetuan" rebellion in 1901, and the spheres of Japanese and Russian influence in China were delineated. A general treaty between Soviet Russia and China was suggested as a substitute for all of the agreements. A special commission drew up proposals concerning the withdrawal of Russian troops from the right-of-way strip and advocating the operation of the railroad on a mutually advantageous basis.

The Soviet proposals aroused the interest of the Beijing Government. But it did not believe that the Soviet regime in Russia would last long and did not want to establish relations with the new Russia until the great powers had done this. When the great powers recalled their ambassadors from Russia and initiated armed intervention against it, China recalled its envoy in March 1918 and broke off negotiations with the Soviet Government. Moreover, the Beijing authorities concluded an agreement with Japan in March-May 1918 on military cooperation against Soviet Russia, made bandit raids on our country along with the other 13 states and took part in the imperialist intervention. North-east China turned into a refuge for Russian counterrevolutionaries; White Guard units were formed there and raids on Soviet land were made from there.

Progressive representatives of the Chinese people, on the other hand, welcomed the October Revolution. One of the greatest friends of the Nation of Soviets was Sun Yat-sen, whom V. I. Lenin called a revolutionary democrat full of nobility and heroism.³ In a conversation with Japanese and Indian journalists in the spring of 1918, Sun Yat-sen advocated the recognition of Soviet Russia by Asian states and the propagandization of the conquests of the October Revolution in the press in these countries.⁴ Professor Li Dazhao who later became one of the organizers of the Chinese Communist Party, was an outstanding propagandist of the gains of Great October. "The Russian Revolution of 1917," he remarked, "signifies not only a change in the consciousness of the Russian people, but also a change in the consciousness of all mankind of the 20th century. Just as the first tung leaf that falls from a branch predicts the approach of fall, the revolution in Russia predicts great new events. Although Bolshevism was invented by the Russians, its spirit is the spirit of total arousal in the heart of 20th-century man."⁵ "The Russian Revolution of 1917," Li Dazhao stressed, "is a signal for world revolution in the 20th century."⁶

The devastation of Kolchak's troops by the Red Army in summer 1919 and the gradual expulsion of White Guard and interventionist armies from Siberia provided opportunities for direct contact with China. Above all, the Soviet Government wanted to establish contact with progressive elements in Chinese society who were calling for struggle against imperialist domination and were searching for an ally in this struggle.

On 25 July 1919 the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars issued a declaration addressed to the people and governments of North and South China. "Soviet Russia and the Soviet Red Army, after 2 years of fighting and after incredible effort," the declaration stated, "are moving East through the Urals, not for violence, not for enslavement and not for conquest.... We are bringing people

salvation from the oppression of foreign bayonets and the oppression of foreign gold, which are smothering the enslaved people of the East, including and above all the Chinese people. We are bringing aid not only to our working classes, but also to the Chinese people." The message stressed that "each nationality, great or small, wherever it may be located, whether it has always lived an independent life or has been made part of another state against its will, should be free in its internal life and no power should suppress it within its own boundaries by force."⁷

The declaration mentioned that the worker and peasant government had once declared null and void all secret agreements with which the tsarist government, along with its allies and by means of violence and bribery, had enslaved the people of the East, particularly the Chinese people, to benefit Russian capitalists, Russian landowners and Russian generals. At the same time, the Soviet Government proposed negotiations with the Chinese Government to annul the Treaty of 1896, the Beijing Protocol of 1901 and all agreements with Japan covering the period between 1907 and 1916—that is, negotiations to return to the Chinese people everything that had been taken away from them by the tsarist government, either alone or in collaboration with the Japanese and other imperialist powers. Before the Manchurian railroad had been returned to the Chinese people, the declaration went on, Japan and other powers had seized it for themselves, had invaded Siberia and had even forced Chinese troops to help them in this criminal and unprecedented robbery, while the Chinese people, Chinese workers and peasants, could not even learn the true reasons for the raid on Manchuria and Siberia by European, American and Japanese predators.

Now the Soviet Government was again addressing the Chinese people for the purpose of opening their eyes. It reaffirmed its decision to refuse all reparations for the Boxer Rebellion, because, according to the reports it had heard, these reparations were collected by the imperialist countries to satisfy the whims of the former tsarist envoy in Beijing and former consuls who had been divested of their authority long before but were still deceiving the Chinese people with the aid of Japan and other powers until the Chinese people had to drive them away as frauds and swindlers.

"The Soviet Government," the declaration stated, "is canceling all special privileges and closing all Russian trading posts on Chinese territory. No Russian bureaucrat, priest or missionary should dare to interfere in Chinese affairs, and if he commits a crime he will be judged fairly in a local court. There should be no power and no justice in China other than the power and justice of the Chinese people."⁸

The Soviet Government expressed its willingness to agree on all other matters with authorized representatives of the Chinese people and to put an end, once and for all, to all acts of violence and injustice committed against China by former Russian governments in collaboration with Japan and the allies. It remarked that the allies and Japan were doing everything possible to ensure

that the voice of the Russian workers and peasants would not reach the Chinese people this time either. The imperialist predators who had ensconced themselves in Manchuria and Siberia would have to be done away with before the Chinese people could regain everything that had been taken away from them.

In conclusion, the declaration stated that if the Chinese people wished to become free like the Russian people and escape the fate prepared for them by the allied powers in Versailles with the aim of turning China into a second Korea or a second India, they would have to realize that the Russian people and the Russian Red Army represented their only ally and brother in the struggle for freedom.

The Soviet Government offered the Chinese people, as personified by their government, an opportunity to establish official relations and to send their representatives out to meet the Red Army.⁹

Not one foreign government had addressed China with this tone of respect and friendly concern. China had never encountered a declaration of this type in its interrelations with the imperialist powers. It set a precedent which threatened to destroy the entire system of imperialist domination in China.

The Soviet Government addressed the Chinese people and governments of North and South China because there were two centers and two governments in this country. The authority of the Beijing Government extended over an indefinite territory, fluctuating depending on the generals who controlled it at any particular time. The Canton Government controlled the territory of South China.

The Soviet Government took steps to make this appeal known to China. On 3 March 1920, J. D. Janson, authorized representative of the NKID in Siberia and the Far East, sent the declaration to the Chinese consulate in Irkutsk with the request that it be forwarded to the Beijing Government and that its contents be communicated to the entire Chinese population. The consulate was requested, on behalf of the RSFSR, to draw the attention of the Beijing Government to the need for immediate peace talks and the practical resolution of all issues touched upon in the appeal.¹⁰

The Beijing Government sent copies of the text to local authorities, but it officially denied the legality of the Soviet Government's appeal. It still assumed that the Nation of Soviets would not last long. In addition, it was afraid that acceptance of the Soviet proposals would arouse the displeasure of the allied powers.

The government of South China was experiencing a severe crisis at that time. Ever since Sun Yat-sen had left this government, it had been controlled by militarists. It is true that General Chen Jongming, who actually headed the Canton Government, disguised himself as a liberal and sent V. I. Lenin a

letter in which he declared that the entire Chinese population was filled with exceptional gratitude for the efforts of the Soviet Government. "The new China and the new Russia," he wrote, "will move ahead hand in hand, like good and affectionate hands."¹¹

Broad segments of the Chinese population responded to the Soviet Government's appeal with fervent sympathy. Public organizations, including the Association of Press Workers, the Association of Students, the Society of Commercial Groups for National Salvation, the Labor Alliance, the Association of Industrialists and others, sent telegrams to the Soviet Government, expressing gratitude for its policy of friendship and equality in relations with China, and declared that the Chinese people were firmly determined to fight for the establishment of friendly relations with the RSFSR.¹²

Chinese workers expressed their desire to fight, shoulder to shoulder with the workers, peasants and Red Guardsmen of Russia under the banner of humanitarianism and justice, against the division of society into classes and for grand worldwide unity.

"We know that your revolution is aimed at restoring the rights of workers for the purpose of achieving the happiness, genuine freedom and equality of mankind," a telegram sent by Chinese trade unions stated. "The peasants, workers and Red Guardsmen throughout Russia are our favorite people in the world."

The Association of Trade and Industrial Groups wrote the following: "We cannot contain our happiness after receiving the note from the worker and peasant government of Russia. The confused reports in the Chinese and foreign press have not given us an opportunity as yet to learn the truth about the situation in Russia. When we read the Russian note today, we sensed that it was overflowing with truthful and humane phrases. All people in all countries of the world who stand for brotherhood, justice and humanity must agree with this. We are even more certain that the Chinese people, with the exception of a group of extremely thickheaded and rotten bureaucrats, militarists and politicians, wish to walk in hand with the Russian people."¹³

The telegram from the All-China Association of Students said: "On behalf of students throughout the nation, we are expressing our sincere feelings for the citizens of Russia, whom we hold dear, and the republican government they have set up. Your great act marks the beginning of a new page in the history of the world revolution; it has aroused our sincere admiration. We will certainly make an all-round and unanimous effort within the nation to promote the official restoration of friendly relations."

Expressing its satisfaction with the appeal of the Soviet Government, the Association of Press Workers stressed the following in its wire: "On behalf of the Chinese public, we most sincerely thank the people of the RSFSR. We hope that the people of China and Russia will, under the just banner of liberty, equality and mutual understanding, in a strong friendship and through concerted effort, put an end to international oppression and the differences between states, nationalities and classes."¹⁴

"Our profound gratitude to your government for its note cannot be expressed in words,"¹⁵ a group of Chinese parliamentarians wrote.

Representatives of 29 academic institutions met in Beijing to discuss the appeal of the Soviet Government and demanded that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs send a goodwill message to the government of the RSFSR. It was decided that all students in Beijing academic institutions would address an appeal to the Soviet Government for the speedy implementation of the principles set forth in the address of the Council of People's Commissars, as this would allow China to demand the cancellation of all unfair treaties. The gathering called upon the Beijing Government to conduct a friendly policy toward Soviet Russia, with public approval.

The progressive Chinese press had an impassioned response to the appeal of the Soviet Government. All of the major newspapers printed editorials saluting the declaration of the Soviet Government and demanding that the Beijing Government establish friendly relations with the Soviet Republic. The magazine XIN QINGNIAN wrote: "Dawn is approaching from Russia, casting its rays on the dark Orient. A friendly hand is being held out to us. We will hold out our hand in return, without hesitation." The newspaper of the Shanghai Association of Students, XUESHENGXIEHUI RIKAN, expressed the views of Chinese student youth in the following statement: "We believe that if we merely send telegrams to Russia and publish the declaration, we cannot gain a thing. The Russians are not fond of meaningless words on paper. They have placed great hopes on us, and we must achieve success in the struggle for freedom. It is only in this way that we can pay off our debt to the Russians and our debt to ourselves."¹⁶ "Our newspaper, on behalf of all citizens, announces," Tianjin's YISHI BAO wrote, "that it acknowledges the declaration of the worker and peasant government. Good relations must be established immediately between the citizens of these two countries."¹⁷ "No words can express the profound feelings of joy with which we hail this note,"¹⁸ the Shanghai newspaper JIUGUO RIBAO remarked.

In the spring of 1920, the XINQI PINGLUN weekly printed two long articles on the appeal of the RSFSR Government. The magazine commended this appeal and interpreted it as a sign of friendship and unselfishness.

The Beijing rulers began to worry. The Ministry of Internal Affairs distributed a memo to local authorities on 28 April 1920, expressing alarm in connection with the response aroused in China by the appeal of the Soviet Government, proposing strong control over the activities of public organizations and press and discouraging the publication of statements in favor of the establishment of friendly relations with the RSFSR.¹⁹

The appeal of 25 July 1919, along with the Soviet Government's note of 27 September 1920, later lay at the basis of the Beijing agreement on the general principles governing the resolution of issues between the USSR and China, signed 31 May 1924, and the agreement signed with the authorities of Northeast China on 20 September 1924, which became part of the Beijing agreement.

It would seem that everything was quite clear, but the appeal of 1919 was nonetheless the object of falsification more than once. Even when the clarification of certain sections of the Soviet-Chinese border was being negotiated in Beijing, the Chinese representative tried to develop the thesis that Soviet Russia, in V. I. Lenin's time, had supposedly expressed its willingness to renounce virtually all Russo-Chinese treaties.

This falsehood is refuted by Soviet Government announcements made before and after the 1919 appeal, which clearly specified the particular treaties it was willing to annul and replace with new ones. We have quoted several of these statements. In addition, here is an excerpt from a report presented by G. V. Chicherin at the Fifth Congress of Soviets in July 1918, in which the program for the development of relations with China was set forth in its entirety. "We have informed China," G. V. Chicherin said, "that we are giving up the tsarist government's conquests in Manchuria and are restoring the sovereign rights of China to this territory, through which a major trade artery runs--the East China Railroad, the property of the Chinese and Russian people, a project that absorbed many millions of the people's money and therefore belongs only to these people and to no one else. Furthermore, we believe that if China compensates the Russian people for the money they invested in the construction of this railway, China can redeem it without waiting until the date specified in the contract it was forced to sign. We have recalled all of the military guards sent to consulates in China by the tsarist government and the Kerenskiy government to support the arbitrary dictates and lawlessness of old Russian officials. We agree to deny the extraterritorial rights of our citizens in China, Mongolia and Persia. We are prepared to refuse all reparations imposed on the people of China, Mongolia and Persia on various pretexts by the former Russian government. We only hope that these millions of the people's money will be used for the cultural development of the popular masses and for the cause of the convergence of Eastern and Russian democracies."²⁰

Progressive people in China welcomed the prospect of the establishment of new relations with their northern neighbor, which had become an important factor in the liberation struggle of the Chinese people. Sun Yat-sen wrote in a special manifesto that the "Russo-Chinese agreement is totally consistent with the principles of equality and mutual respect for the sovereignty of both states."²¹

FOOTNOTES

1. "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [Soviet Foreign Policy Documents], vol 1, Moscow, 1957, p 25.
2. Ibid., p 111.
3. See V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 21, p 402.

4. See S. L. Tikhvinskiy, "Sun' Yatsen" [Sun Yat-sen], Moscow, 1964, p 222.
5. XIN QINGNIAN, 1918, No 5, p 448.
6. Ibid., p 438.
7. IZVESTIYA, 26 August 1919.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Foreign Policy Archives of the USSR, f 212, c 101, d 12, sh 6.
11. VESTNIK NARODNOGO KOMISSARIATA INOSTRANNYKH DEL, No 1-2, 15 March 1921.
12. See Qiao Xizhen, "The History of Diplomatic Relations Between China and the USSR" (in Chinese), Shanghai, 1951, pp 7-8.
13. "Materials on the History of Sino-Soviet Relations" (in Chinese), Beijing, 1950, pp 63-64.
14. Ibid., pp 65-66.
15. Ibid., p 66.
16. Ibid., p 71.
17. Ibid., p 69.
18. Ibid., p 70.
19. Historical Archives in Nanjing, PRC, File of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Beiyang Government, c 4013, d 4013.
20. G. V. Chicherin, "Stat'i i rechi po voprosam mezhdunarodnoy politiki" [Articles and Speeches on International Political Issues], Moscow, 1961, p 59.
21. Quoted by S. L. Tikhvinskiy, Op. cit., p 323.

8588

CSO: 1805

ANTI-IMPERIALIST 'MAY 4TH' MOVEMENT OF 1919 IN CHINA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 147-157

[Article by V. P. Ilyushechkin, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] The popular anti-imperialist "May 4th" Movement of 1919 was an important milestone in Chinese history, marking the transition made by progressive forces in the country to conscious and systematic struggle for liberation from foreign imperialist oppression. It took place in an atmosphere of political and military domination by warring feudal militaristic cliques, which had total control over the government on the central and local levels after Yuan Shikai's death in 1916, frequently served as the obedient agents of various imperialist powers and did everything possible to hamper socioeconomic, political and cultural progress in China.

The movement arose under the direct influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia and stemmed from several factors of the complex and contradictory internal life of the nation. The chief factors were the relatively rapid development of Chinese national industry (primarily light industry and the extractive branches) and the accelerated growth of the national bourgeoisie and working class during World War I in connection with the slight diminished economic expansion of Western powers in China. This intensified and deepened the conflicts between the Chinese people and their oppressors--foreign imperialism and internal feudal and militaristic reaction.

The same kind of influence was exerted by the mounting aggression of the Japanese imperialists, who were striving to extend and consolidate their influence in China while the Western powers were occupied with war in Europe. In the fall of 1914, they seized German concessions in Shandong--Qingdao port and the Jiaozhou-Jinan railway with all of its enterprises--and established military control over this province. In May 1915 they forced the government of Yuan Shikai to accept the notorious "21 demands," which gave Japan the most extensive economic and political privileges in China. In 1917 and 1918 the Japanese imperialists were granted various concessions and advantages in exchange for the loans they had extended, on crushing terms, to the mercenary Beijing Government of Duan Qirui. This gave them even broader and stronger economic and political influence in China.

The aggressive policy of imperialist Japan, which threatened to turn the country into a semicolon, naturally aroused the indignation and opposition of progressive forces in China. For this reason, the May 4th Movement was directed primarily against the Japanese militarists and the national traitors in Duan Qirui's clique who were associated with them.

Prior to the events of 4 May, the workers movement in China was still in the embryonic stage. The relatively small Chinese working class, which had only come into being in the second half of the 19th century, differed from the proletariat in the capitalist countries in the fact that it was still unaware of its specific class interests. It not only lacked its own political party, but it did not even have any modern trade unions and was ideologically influenced by the Chinese bourgeoisie and supported its political demands. The traditional type of labor organization that existed at that time was of the local shop nature; the members of these organizations frequently included employers, who had considerable influence on the activities of these organizations. The strike struggle of the workers had not developed to any significant extent by the time of the May 4th Movement and was generally held within the bounds of economic demands. Some isolated political demonstrations by the Chinese workers, however, such as the strike which was organized, on the instructions of bourgeois circles, in Tianjin in October 1916 to protest the seizure of the Laoxikai region in that city by French colonizers, testifies that the idea of struggle against the foreign imperialists who were oppressing their country was not alien to Chinese workers, that they were prepared to take an active part in this struggle.

The creation of the necessary conditions for the birth of the anti-imperialist May 4th Movement was also fostered to a considerable extent by the ideological and political failures of the old brand of Sun Yat-sen-ism, which had previously served as the banner of progressive and democratic forces, and the formation of new democratic forces in the country, particularly those which had acquired strength under the influence of the liberating ideals of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Because the old brand of Sun Yat-sen-ism lacked a consistent, clear and precise anti-imperialist and antifeudal program and did not look to the broad popular masses for support, it lost all of its political capital after the bourgeois revolution of 1911-1913 and could not show the people the way to achieve liberation from the oppression of feudal militaristic cliques and foreign imperialism. The conspiratory Chinese Revolutionary Party founded by Sun Yat-sen after this revolution was essentially a group of conspirators and politicians who were isolated from the people, and all of Sun Yat-sen's attempts to gain support from southern militarists in the struggle for power failed.

New democratic forces came into being without the aid of Sun Yat-sen and his party. An important role in this process was played by the propaganda activity of XIN QING NIAN magazine ("New Youth"), which began to be published in September 1915 in Shanghai by progressive members of the intelligentsia with the most active participation by former CCP founders Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, as well as a classic figure in Chinese literature, Lu Xin. The magazine

propagandized the idea of rejecting the old feudal ideology of Confucianism and the need for the bourgeois democracy, modern science and a new democratic culture. These ideas became quite popular with the intelligentsia, particularly student youth. The Great October Socialist Revolution gave progressive elements in China tremendous assistance in their propaganda of democratic and anti-imperialist ideas by showing all oppressed people the right way to free themselves from oppressors. Under the influence of this revolution, Li Dazhao began to take a scientific socialist stand and propagandize Marxism in China. By the beginning of 1919 the number of democratic periodicals also increased, including the newspaper MEIZHOU PINGLUN ("Weekly Review") edited by Li Dazhao, the magazines WOMIN ("People"), LAODONG ("Labor") and XIN CHAO ("New Tide") and others.

The propagandization of the ideals of democracy and national independence gained particular strength after the end of World War I in November 1918 and the beginning of the Paris Peace Conference. The Chinese public associated the latter with the most optimistic hopes and expectations, which were stimulated by the demagogic "Fourteen Points" of U.S. President W. Wilson. Under the influence of this demagoguery, the Chinese public expected the Paris Conference to help China restore its sovereign right to the former German concessions in Shandong and to put an end to the claims made on them by imperialist Japan, particularly since China had supported the Entente during World War I and had officially been at war with Germany. But these hopes and expectations were unwarranted: At the end of April 1919, the peace conference bosses decided to transfer the rights to the former German concessions in Shandong to imperialist Japan.

This decision aroused an outburst of indignation primarily among Chinese students and was the immediate cause of the mass anti-imperialist May 4th Movement of 1919. According to a previous agreement reached by students from various academic institutions in Beijing, 5,000 university and secondary school students gathered in Tiananmen Square on 4 May 1919 and shouted the following slogans: "We will defend our national sovereignty!", "Restore our rights in Shandong!", "Renounce the 21 demands!", "Punish national traitors!" and others. Appealing to the people to support all of these demands, the participants in the mass-meeting then turned toward the embassy quarter to address a protest at foreign governments against the unjust decision of the imperialist powers and the organizers of the Paris Conference. Military guards at the American Embassy, however, blocked their access to this neighborhood. Then the demonstrators, in a fit of anger, decided to avenge themselves against the chief national traitors, who had once signed several grossly unfair agreements with Japan. They set fire to the house of one of these traitors--Beijing Government Minister Cao Rulin and assaulted Zhang Zongxian, Chinese ambassador to Japan. Police details hurried to the site, broke up the demonstration and arrested and gave savage beatings to more than 30 of the demonstrators.

This first large-scale political demonstration in Chinese history became the beginning of a massive anti-imperialist movement which was later given the

name of the "May 4th Movement." It went through three stages of development. The first lasted until the beginning of June 1919 and was a time during which the anti-imperialist movement essentially did not go beyond the bounds of student demonstrations; it was centered in Beijing and its main force was Beijing student youth. During the second stage, which only lasted a week, from 5 through 12 June, the center moved from Beijing to the nation's largest commercial and industrial center, Shanghai, where a united front of students, petty urban bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie and workers supporting student demands spontaneously coalesced. The third and final stage of the movement lasted from 13 June to the beginning of July 1919 and mainly took the form of a petition campaign: various organizations and urban population strata petitioned for China's refusal to sign the Versailles Peace Treaty as a symbol of protest against the decision made at the peace conference to transfer the rights to the former German concessions in Shandong to imperialist Japan.

On the day after the demonstration of 4 May, university and secondary school students in Beijing cut their classes to protest police brutality and the arrest of their comrades and demanded that the Beijing Government cancel the "21 demands," annul unfair treaties, refuse to sign the Versailles Treaty unless the question of the former German concessions in Shandong was settled in China's favor, and punish the national traitors Cao Rulin and Zhang Zongxian. On the next day, the Associated League of Students from Higher and Secondary Academic Institutions in Beijing was formed and became the leading center of the anti-imperialist movement in the capital. Its program of action included points concerning the organization of agitation and propaganda groups in all of Beijing's higher and secondary academic institutions, as well as "volunteer brigades for the protection of rights in Shandong."

Although the Beijing students soon returned to their classes after their arrested comrades had been released from prison into the custody of university and school administrations, their agitation on the streets of the capital did not cease and, in fact, became even more pronounced in response to repressive actions by authorities. On 19 May they resumed their strike, under the leadership of their league, insisting that the government repudiate the points in the Versailles Treaty concerning the transfer of rights to former German concessions in Shandong to Japan, punish national traitors and repeal police actions against students and call upon the public to support these demands. At the same time, the league began to engage in more intensive oral and written agitation and propaganda within the population.

Following the example of the Beijing students, student youth from other cities and various strata of the urban population became increasingly involved in the anti-imperialist movement. Student rallies, mass-meetings and demonstrations were held in many cities in support of the demands of the Beijing students; their participants were frequently attacked and arrested by the police. Local associated unions of student youth were formed on the Beijing model and took on the responsibility of supervising anti-imperialist agitation within

the population and the boycotting of Japanese goods. Mass-meetings of merchants, workers and representatives of other population strata took place in Shanghai, Jinan, Guangzhou and several other cities in support of the student demands. At some enterprises in Shanghai and Jinan--apparently with the participation of Chinese businessmen--gatherings of workers were held to promote the boycotting of Japanese goods and leaflets appealing for this boycott were distributed. The Chinese bourgeoisie had the greatest interest in this boycott. The same kind of gathering, involving several tens of thousands of workers, was organized in Beijing on 11 May by the local organization of the Shandong Province Labor Union. As a sign of solidarity with the student demands, dockworkers in Ningbo, Shanghai and Xiamen refused to unload Japanese ships. But these mass demonstrations by various strata of the urban population in support of the student demands were still rare.

The situation changed considerably at the beginning of June, after the Beijing Government complied with the Japanese authorities' repeated demands for resolute measures to stop the anti-imperialist movement by intensifying police repression. In response to this, Beijing students escalated their agitation in the streets. Then the police arrested around 1,000 Beijing students. On 5 June, the Beijing united league of students appealed to all population strata, newspaper editorial offices and public organizations, calling upon them to oppose police brutality and support the just anti-imperialist struggle of student youth.

The mass arrests of students aroused indignation in the urban population strata. In Shanghai, merchants closed their shops and stores on 5 June in response to the appeal of the Beijing student league and began a solidarity strike in support of the anti-imperialist demands. Several thousand workers in textile factories belonging to Japanese capital stopped working at the same time, and by that evening the number of strikers had reached 20,000. The active moves made by the Shanghai merchants and workers turned Shanghai into the main center of the anti-imperialist movement, it became much more massive and militant and rose to a new and higher level.

The next day, the strike movement was joined by the workers of many other Shanghai enterprises, most of them belonging to foreign capital, including enterprises of the Anglo-American and French streetcar companies, the Anglo-American tobacco company and others. Strikers at the Qiluzin plant built a metal tower on which they hung the following signs: "We will not forget our national disgrace!" and "Arouse the people!" They held mass-meetings and made an appeal, which stated: "The failures of our foreign policy have given rise to a crisis in the nation and profound indignation in the public. Students are going on strike and addressing the public and the merchants with appeals to strike in support of their demands. We cannot remain uninvolved at a time like this, and we are therefore calling a strike this very day and will act in concert with the students."² The same type of declaration was made by workers at the Ruili plant.

On the same day, workers in several branches, calling themselves representatives of the Workers Party, signed an appeal which reflected, on the one hand, the initial signs of the arousal of the Chinese proletariat's class awareness and, on the other, the strong influence of the anarchist ideas and beliefs that were widespread at that time in China.

This document stated: "We are of the opinion that the workers must arise, creating small sectorial organizations at first and then uniting in one large organization. The first step should consist of demonstrations by workers in different branches, the second should be a general strike, and the third step will be a battle in which hundreds of thousands of workers, with no thought of their own safety, will fight against the inhumane authority of the powerful."

Labor meetings and demonstrations took place in the city under the following slogan: "We, the workers, will act in concert with students and merchants." In several places, confrontations took place between the Chinese public and the Japanese living in Shanghai, which were provoked by the latter, and demonstrators were attacked by the police and the military guards of the International Settlement and foreign concessions. These attacks were accompanied by beatings, arrests and even the murder of some participants in anti-imperialist demonstrations. This reflected the overtly hostile attitude of the foreign imperialists toward the May 4th Movement.

The strike movement in Shanghai continued to grow for days, until the number of workers participating in it, according to incomplete data, reached 60,000-70,000. The workers of electric power stations, the post office, the waterworks and several streetcar companies were talked out of striking by the students, who feared that the cessation of work at these enterprises would have an extremely negative effect on the life of the city's inhabitants. Workers at some other enterprises limited themselves to issuing a warning that they would call a strike within the next few days if public demands remained unsatisfied. The strikes in Shanghai, in accordance with the law of the chain reaction, aroused considerable confusion in the economic life of this city, the nation's largest commercial and industrial center, and inflicted significant damages on Chinese businessmen as well as on foreign companies in China. Japanese firms, however, were particularly suffering from the strikes and from the boycotting of Japanese goods.

Soon after the Shanghai merchants and workers went on strike, merchants in Nanking, Tianjin, Xiamen, Ningbo, Wuxi and several other cities, ricksha drivers and stevedores in Nanking, dockworkers in Jiujiang, miners in Tangshan and railroadmen in Changxindian also called strikes. But the main center of the strike movement was still Shanghai.

As we have already noted, a united front of the intelligentsia, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie and the workers spontaneously coalesced on the very first day of the strikes in this city. It took the form of an organization on 6 June at a mass-meeting of representatives of

various population strata, where the Shanghai United League of students, merchants, pressmen and workers was founded and a committee was elected to supervise the mass anti-imperialist struggle of this league. Meeting participants approved an appeal to the public, calling upon the people of the nation to fight harder against the signing of the Versailles Treaty and for the dismissal of national traitors from their positions in the Beijing Government. The authorities were warned that merchants would refuse to pay their taxes if the demands were to be satisfied.

The Shanghai alliance of representatives of various population strata became the leading center of the anti-imperialist movement and was used as a standard of comparison for all other local associations of students, merchants and workers, established in Beijing, Tianjin and other cities. Members of the grand bourgeoisie, who headed local chambers of commerce and other associations of merchants and industrialists and who had considerable influence in the cities, played an important role in these organizations of the united anti-imperialist front. In essence, they largely determined the activities of the leagues. On the very first day of the strikes in Shanghai, representatives of the local grand bourgeoisie hastily made a special announcement to assure foreigners living in this city that the popular movement was of a purely domestic character, that it was not directed against them and that "no violence of any kind" would be tolerated. The grand bourgeoisie was trying to restrict the anti-imperialist movement within the framework of actions benefiting it, such as the boycott of Japanese goods and the propaganda of domestic goods, opposed the expansion of the worker strike movement and, at a number of enterprises, tried to talk the workers out of a strike.

The petty and middle bourgeoisie, largely dependent on the grand bourgeoisie and trying to measure up to it, turned out to be under its ideological control and supported its moderate line in the united leagues, including its position on the strike issue. Although the workers went on strike to support the demands of the students and merchants, bourgeois and petty bourgeois circles were far from delighted by this support. The bourgeoisie assigned the workers the role of an auxiliary, "rear force," intended only to support and supply the struggle of the "frontline forces"--the merchants and students. On the one hand, it wanted the support of this massive "rear force" and, on the other, it was afraid that it might lose control over the workers. This dual position was reflected in several articles and memos printed at that time in Shanghai newspapers expressing the views of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. For example, the NINGGUO RIBAO editorial of 9 June stated that although strikes at enterprises are sometimes necessary and warranted, the workers of Chinese enterprises should not have gone on strike in this particular situation, as these strikes were threatening the development of national production and the interests of Chinese businessmen, were putting the workers themselves in a pitiful financial position and were endangering public order, which was "most alarming." Each day the strikes were reducing the profits of the bourgeoisie, and this naturally motivated it to stop the strikes as quickly as possible.

The movement was still being led by student youth, but most of the students had to rely on the bourgeoisie as the only real force which had to be taken into account by the Beijing Government. As the May 4th Movement developed, its ideologists began to diverge and the struggle became more intense. Such bourgeois ideologists as Rǐ Shì, Fú Sínian and Luó Jialun aligned themselves with feudal militaristic reaction and demanded that all strikes and other mass demonstrations come to a halt. Although democratically inclined ideologists of the middle and petty bourgeoisie, such as Sun Yat-sen and his followers, sympathized with the popular uprisings, they continued to underestimate the significance and role of the popular masses in the political struggle.

As for Li Dazhao and the few other representatives of the progressive intelligentsia who were moving toward Marxism under the influence of the revolutionary events in Russia, the development of this mass anti-imperialist struggle made them even more certain that the liberation of China from the domination of foreign imperialism and internal feudal and militarist reaction could only be achieved through revolutionary struggle by the broad working masses under the banner of Marxist ideals. This provided a new and powerful stimulus for the propagandization of these ideals in China. Li Dazhao's article "My Marxist Outlook" was published in the May issue of XIN QINGNIAN, and most of the other articles in this issue also pertained to Marxism. Translations of the works of K. Marx and articles on Marx, Marxism and Soviet Russia began to appear more frequently in various progressive periodicals.

The Chinese workers displayed determination and selflessness during these strikes. Although they were still ideologically influenced by the bourgeoisie, they sometimes displayed a certain degree of independence. Strikes at factories and plants were frequently called in violation of employment agreements. In their appeal to the Shanghai Main Chamber of Commerce of 10 June, representatives of the workers stated that "in view of the fact that the protectors of national traitors would seem to have declared war on their own people, their worker-countrymen, filled with rage and indignation, will act in concert with students and merchants" and carry on the struggle even if the merchants agree to resume trade.⁴ But the workers were quite poorly organized and, on the whole, had not escaped the ideological control of the bourgeoisie as yet. It is true that along with shop and local organizations of the traditional type, which were heading the worker demonstrations at enterprises, such organizations as a Chinese labor union, a workers party and others began to spring up. These, however, were extremely small, had almost no connection with the working masses and lacked a precise class and political platform.

On 11 June, at the initiative of the Chinese Labor Union and the League for Assistance in the Development of Chinese Industry, a huge workers' meeting was held, where the creation of an all-China labor union was proposed. This organization was to lead a nationwide workers' movement, take measures to ensure the financial support of strikers by employers and persuade all workers to unite their efforts. For the sake of implementing the demands of students,

merchants and workers, it was also proposed that labor demonstrations be organized and "direct action" be taken--that is, a general strike--and if this did not bring about the desired results, public nonrecognition of the Beijing Government was to be announced, funds were to be collected for a struggle against the government and troops were to be encouraged to rebel and punish national traitors. The appropriate resolutions were adopted in connection with all of these proposals. Meeting participants elected a committee of 12 representatives to lead the strike struggle and to maintain contacts with student and merchant organizations.⁵ It must be said that the platform of action adopted at this meeting was much more militant than the program of the students and bourgeoisie, who were alarmed by the "direct action" of the workers.

To a considerable degree, it was precisely this alarm and the losses resulting from the strikes that motivated chambers of commerce and other Chinese bourgeois organizations to insist that the Beijing Government make some concessions to mass demands, so that, as the 7 June telegram of the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce noted, "to soothe the spirit of all citizens and restore order throughout the nation."⁶ On 9 June, representatives of the Shanghai grand bourgeoisie informed the government through Beijing banking circles that the further development of this strike movement would result in a financial crisis in the nation. The next day, the Tianjin Main Chamber of Commerce informed the government in a rush telegram that unrest was brewing among the several hundred thousand Tianjin workers, and that this unrest might take the form of dangerous riots if the authorities did not give in to public demands. A leaflet was being distributed in Beijing itself, demanding that the government not agree to the transfer of rights to the former German concessions in Shandong to Japan, annul all unfair agreements with Japan, exile all of the chief national traitors from Beijing, including President Xu Shichang, leader of the Anfu militarist clique Duan Qirui and others, and guarantee all citizens freedom of speech and assembly. The leaflet stated that if the government did not heed the public demands, "students, merchants and workers would have no other alternative but to take direct action for the purpose of making radical changes."⁷

The Beijing Government was incapable of coping with the growing popular movement and therefore had to listen to the insistent warnings and admonitions of representatives of the grand bourgeoisie. To alleviate public indignation, it issued orders on 10 July concerning the resignation of the national traitors hated most by the people, Cao Rulin, Lu Zongyu and Zhang Zongxiang, from their positions in the Beijing Administration of their "own accord."

Bourgeois circles immediately used this concession as an excuse to stop the strikes. For example, the local chamber of commerce in Shanghai resolved on 11 June to halt the strike of merchants and trade personnel on 12 June. The same day, specially selected student groups walked through the streets carrying signs which said: "Mission accomplished, let us resume trade." The workers of most of the striking Shanghai enterprises, with the exception of Japanese textile mills and other enterprises jointly owned by Japanese and Chinese capital, halted their strikes at the same time. Strikes in many other cities also ended.

This was the end of the second stage of the May 4th Movement, which was distinguished by the widespread development of the merchants' and workers' strike movement. During the third stage, which lasted until the beginning of July, no mass actions in the form of strikes and street demonstrations were taken. The campaign to boycott Japanese goods and propagandize domestic goods was still being waged energetically in various cities, and anti-imperialist gatherings and meetings were attended by representatives of various urban population strata. On 16 June, the all-China Student Association, uniting all student leagues, was founded. The Chinese United Workers Alliance was also founded in Shanghai, but it was weak and short-lived.

The main slogan of the participants in the May 4th Movement during the third stage was the demand that the government and its delegations at the Paris Peace Conference refuse to sign the peace treaty for the reason that it contained articles restricting China's national sovereignty. This demand was made by student groups and other public organizations and it was invariably included in the resolutions adopted at gatherings and meetings of representatives of various urban population strata. Demands of this kind were constantly addressed to the Beijing Government and its delegates at the Paris Peace Conference. Part of this process was an extensive campaign to persuade the government to take the views of the popular masses into account.

The Beijing Government and its delegates in Paris were taking a hesitant stand. On the one hand, they were being pressured by Japanese imperialists and their Western allies and, on the other, the government was afraid that all of the demonstrations and strikes would be renewed. It issued contradictory instructions to its delegates in Paris, and hesitation and conflict were apparent within the government itself. Three days prior to the signing of the treaty, the Chinese delegation announced that it would only sign the treaty with a proviso stipulating China's nonrecognition of articles pertaining to former German concessions in Shandong. On 28 June, however, on the day scheduled for the signing ceremony, the Chinese delegation in Paris was barracaded in its quarters by a mob of Chinese workers and students who were temporarily living in Paris and who kept the delegation from attending the ceremony. That same day, the delegation gave in to the pressure of its anti-imperialist countrymen and announced that it would not sign the Versailles treaty.

A few days later, this news spread through China and aroused deep pleasure in the Chinese public as the second important achievement of the May 4th Movement, won through persistent struggle. In view of the fact that the main objectives of the movement had been attained, it ended on this note.

The May 4th Movement, which was launched for the purpose of defending the national sovereignty and national rights of China against encroachment by Japanese imperialists, had a clearly defined anti-imperialist character. In terms of its composition and its class content, it was a bourgeois democratic movement. Its participants came from various urban population strata:

student youth, the intelligentsia, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie and the workers, who were as yet unaware of their class interests and were ideologically and politically influenced by the bourgeoisie, supporting its political demands. As for the broad masses of the Chinese peasantry, they were disparate, backward, downtrodden and unorganized, they were as yet uninvolved in conscious political struggle and they did not take part in the anti-imperialist May 4th Movement.

The main slogans and goals of this movement were fairly limited--the restoration of China's sovereign rights in Shantung, which had been seized by force by Japanese imperialists, and the dismissal of persons from Beijing administrative posts who had discredited themselves in the eyes of the public by making unscrupulous bargains with imperialist Japan. The stubborn struggle of the participants in the May 4th Movement, which lasted almost 2 months, had fairly modest direct results: three of the national traitors who were most hated by the people were removed from their positions in the Beijing Administration "at their own request" and the Beijing Government was forced to refuse to sign the Versailles Peace Treaty, which was encroaching upon China's national rights.

The historic significance of the mass anti-imperialist May 4th Movement, however, goes far beyond the bounds of its limited immediate results. This movement, which came into being largely as a result of the powerful revolutionizing influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which marked the beginning of a new era in the struggle of people throughout the world against all forms of national and social oppression, reinforced this influence on a tremendous scale, and this, in turn, considerably changed the nature and content of the Chinese people's liberation struggle. The movement became a turning point in the development of the revolutionary movement in China, in its evolution from the bourgeois movement launched by relatively small groups and individuals for the extremely limited purpose of reinstating the 1912 Constitution in its entirety, into a democratic movement of the broadest popular masses for the liberation of the country from the domination of foreign imperialism and internal feudal and militaristic reaction.

The May 4th Movement attached particular significance to the further guidelines and prospects of the liberation struggle in China and it considerably increased the interest of progressive elements in the country in the heroic revolutionary struggle of the people of Soviet Russia, in its foreign policy and in the internal revolutionary reforms carried out under the leadership of the Bolshevik party. The Chinese people were particularly impressed by the Soviet Government's rejection of all the privileges acquired by the tsarist government on the strength of treaties with China, as well as by its policy of peace and friendship with all countries and peoples and its willingness to render assistance to oppressed people in their struggle for their own liberation. Progressive representatives of the Chinese intelligentsia began to take a much greater interest in the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, under the banner of which the victorious October Socialist Revolution had been accomplished in Russia. Progressive people in China saw these ideals

and the experience of the Great October Socialist Revolution as a powerful weapon in the struggle for the liberation of their country from the oppression of internal reaction and foreign imperialism. The increasingly broad and systematic spread of Marxist-Leninist ideas in the nation began with the May 4th Movement. The movement created the necessary conditions for the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in June 1921, for the liberation of the working class from the ideological and political control of the bourgeoisie and for its evolution into an independent political force.

The May 4th Movement, which first acquainted the popular masses with conscious political struggle against China's imperialist oppressors and their militaristic puppets, marked the beginning of the Chinese workers' broad and energetic participation in this struggle. It promoted the spread of the idea of direct action by the popular masses--in the form of political strikes and other mass worker demonstrations--as one of the major means of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle. After the May 4th Movement, this means began to be used more and more in the people's political struggle against foreign imperialism and internal reaction in China. The development of this struggle, the founding of the CCP and the constantly increasing influence of the Russian people's victorious revolutionary struggle all had a tremendous effect on Sun Yat-sen and his supporters, motivating them to reassess their views and their program and set forth a precise and clear policy line of overt struggle against the domination of foreign imperialism and feudal and militaristic reaction with the support of the broad popular masses and in conjunction with the USSR and the CCP.

The anti-imperialist popular May 4th Movement, during the course of which the united front of the intelligentsia, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie and the workers first came into being, provided powerful impetus for the spread of the idea that anti-imperialist and antifeudal unity was an essential condition for the success of the Chinese people's struggle for national liberation, and this, in turn, became one of the prerequisites for the creation of the united revolutionary front of workers, peasants and the urban petty and national bourgeoisie in 1923-1924, based on cooperation between the CCP and Guomindang and later assisted the CCP in its successful implementation of the united front policy during various stages of the Chinese people's democratic revolution.

In short, the May 4th Movement had a profound effect on the history of the Chinese people's liberation struggle and gave birth to stable anti-imperialist traditions, which played their role in ensuring the victory of the people's democratic revolution in China. The present leadership, however, is consigning these traditions to oblivion. Moreover, it has modified them and has betrayed the fundamental national interests of the Chinese people by allying itself more and more closely with the most reactionary forces of foreign imperialism and by fanning the flames of hatred and contempt for the Soviet Union, which, for many years, gave the Chinese people a tremendous amount of unselfish assistance in their revolutionary struggle and in

the economic construction following the founding of the PRC. No matter how subtly the present PRC leadership conducts its treacherous policy, it will not be able to make the Chinese people forget their noble traditions of struggle against foreign imperialism and national traitors--traditions born of the May 4th Movement. This policy will never be trusted and supported by the broad working masses in China.

FOOTNOTES

1. The number of employees increased from 680,000 in 1915 to 1.1 million in 1919 just at enterprises owned by Chinese national capital. See Liu Likai and Wang Zheng, "The Workers Movement in China in 1919-1927," Beijing, 1957, p 7.
2. "Selected Historical Papers on the 'May 4th Movement' in Shanghai," Shanghai, 1961, p 293.
3. Ibid., pp 642-643.
4. See "Papers on the Patriotic Movement of May 4th," Beijing, 1959, p 846.
5. Ibid., p 472.
6. Ibid., p 299.
7. Ibid., p 948.

3588

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PROBLEM OF TRANSLATING AND INTERPRETING A TEXT

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[Article by N. T. Fedorenko, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The history of the interrelations between various cultures testifies that the process of learning about foreign literatures, particularly the work of Chinese literary masters, was mainly accomplished through translations into other, usually European, languages.

It is a universally accepted fact that each nationality has developed its own unique relations and interconnections with mankind, with past and present literature and with close and distant neighbors. Each nationality has its own experience in, and history of, artistic translation, although its place in the national culture and its interrelationship with original works and linguistic material depend on general tendencies. The art of artistic translation in our nation, however, has never reached the dimensions and degree of development we are witnessing now. Under the conditions of the Soviet order, artistic translations became a matter of statewide significance, reflecting the vital interests of millions of people: Russians and Ukrainians, Belorussians and Georgians, Armenians and Uzbeks, the Kirgiz and Azerbaijani people and other nationalities which first acquired the possibility of exchanging their literary treasures only after the October Revolution.

Literature, as a means of obtaining a social comprehension of the world and as a means of human communication, has long attracted the interest of people by its uniqueness, the originality of its artistic decisions, its variety of styles, descriptive means and narrative tones and its distinctive linguistic features.

It is hardly necessary to prove that national literatures could not have developed productively without any acquaintance with the best examples of the most outstanding artistic experience accumulated by mankind or without a study of the achievements of the worldwide literary process.

It is also obvious that the aesthetic achievements of mankind could not be summarized or assessed in full without consideration for the natural features and laws governing the development of the literature of individual nationalities--large and small. Marxist-Leninist aesthetic thought gives all possible consideration to the fact that the spiritual creations of any nationality are the property of all mankind and that national isolation and restrictions are becoming a thing of the past--the national literatures are combining to make up a single body of world literature.

The direct acquaintance of foreign writers with Chinese literature in its original form is an extremely rare phenomenon due to the acknowledged difficulties involved in learning the system of characters. We are referring here to European and other overseas writers rather than to the Japanese, Koreans and Vietnamese, for whom Chinese characters have been traditionally intelligible.

On the other hand, the penetration of the Chinese literary world by foreign literatures, particularly Russian literature, has mainly taken place by means of translations into Chinese rather than the Russian original. As far as we know, the Chinese authors whose works were influenced by Russian writers were not fluent in Russian, at least not enough to read the works of Russian writers in the original. We could say that among all the various ways in which the literary works of various nationalities enter the complex "circulatory system" of world literature, the translation is the most common and most significant channel. The interconnections, mutual influence and interaction of various literatures, the comprehension of foreign literary works and their popularization are accomplished precisely through translations and because of them.

It is the distinctive feature of Chinese poetry, just as, apparently, of any other poetry, that the translator must remember that "the relationship between the original and the translation is the same as the relationship between the work and its execution in another form; and the constant factor in this process is not the accomplishment of the original's unity of form and content, but the concretization of this unity in the mind of the reproducer--that is, to put it simply, the total impression or total effect on the reader."¹

Characters, L. Eydlin writes in "Chinese Classical Poetry,"² helped Chinese poetry to acquire scope--"lines end, but thoughts are unlimited"--and gave the reader considerable freedom of interpretation. And not only the reader, but also the translator, who makes his own decision as to which of the words signified by the character is the most essential. This freedom that is afforded to the reader is confined, however, to the rigid framework of the internal composition of the Chinese poem, its beginning, developments, reversals and denouement. Due to the character's lack of "strict connections"--that is, due to the fact that it can be expressed in many words, rather than one single word, capable of conveying its meaning, the translation of Chinese poetry could appear to be easier than any other kind of

translation. All that it takes is to learn how to read characters, to examine each character in turn, to enter the multifaceted culture of past millennia and delving into the words and thoughts of poets whose souls live on in the verses being translated.

The translations of Chinese fiction by V. M. Alekseyev could be mentioned in this connection. They are truly amazing because his unique knowledge allowed him to delve deeply into the multitude of meanings expressed by each character written by a learned Chinese individual, the guard protecting the ancient knowledge of a number of generations. In addition to this, they are originals, and this is why they reflect the personality of the translator who had the combined talents of a serious scholar and masterful writer.

The principle of my translation, V. M. Alekseyev remarked in his work "Shedevry kitayskoy prozy" [Masterpieces of Chinese Prose],³ consists in the distribution of translated words, chosen for their artistic features and eloquence, in rhythmic groups which directly reflect the Chinese original, although the monosyllabic nature of the Chinese language naturally means that it cannot be expressed in the same number of syllables in the Russian language, which is polysyllabic.

A word-for-word translation, V. M. Alekseyev added, is incapable of conveying the tonal interplay of parallel lines, and a rhymed translation usually means deviation from the text. In the proposed type of translation, everything that exists in the original must be expressed, and the translator is left only with the job of distributing painstakingly selected words among rhythmical groups.

The translator of a Chinese work is always faced by an extremely complex task: to reproduce the composition of the Chinese poem, its masterful brevity, its parallelism, its alliteration and the actual composition of the verses as it is perceived by the living repository of the Chinese language, containing a variety of ancient terms, archaic phrases and so forth. All of this requires exceptional talent and a tremendous amount of work from the translator.

But the talent of the translator, L. Eydlin says further on in the work mentioned above, consists precisely in conveying the works of a foreign literature in his own language while preserving its poetry and its ideas and thereby making it part of the literature of his own people. A translation has never been identical to an original, because it is in another language, governed by its own laws, including the laws governing the thinking of a particular nationality, and because the individuality of even a great poet is supplemented by the individuality, no matter how modest it might be, of the translator, on whose labor the achievements and losses occurring in the translation process will depend.

When poetry is being translated, omissions are inevitable, and often the loss is quite significant. We can only speak of the degree of the loss--whether it is greater or lesser. It is hardly likely, however, that national linguistic uniqueness can be translated in its entirety. Strictly speaking, we can only observe the degree to which poetry did or did not cross the linguistic barrier in the "Shijing" ("Book of Songs"). Would it be possible, for example, to deny the "magic" of the intonation or harmony?

The poetic lines of the "Shijing," an ancient Chinese work of the 11th-9th centuries B.C., are truly musical and have their own unique melodic intonation. The melody is an organic part of the ancient songs in the "Shijing" and constitutes their very soul. It permeates the entire verse composition and the entire structure and cannot be conveyed in approximate tones or any kind of nonuniformity or rigidity. In this case, arbitrary interpretation is impermissible. The art of reliably conveying the original acquires primary significance here. On what basis should this harmony be constructed? After all, alliteration unavoidably disappears, while tender and mournful tones are lost in combination with strong and persistent symbols. Considerable differences in the rhythm of words, in the quantity of syllables and in the narrative tone itself are inevitable. Can intuition and poetic feelings be preserved? After all, the writers of the songs in the "Shijing" had their own ideas, differing from ours, about sounds, melody and intonation. In the Chinese language, a single word can have several different meanings if it is pronounced in a different pitch, depending on the musical tone, of which there can be up to nine even in modern Chinese. It is precisely these tones which are almost unnoticed by foreigners in conversation that are of the greatest significance for the Chinese ear. Therefore, we are not referring simply to tonal nuances, but actually to independent phonetic units, difficult for the European ear to discern, but having an absolutely definite meaning and significance. Moreover, there are countless numbers of monosyllabic words--homonyms which are pronounced identically and which can only be understood in character form or in the context of speech.

When a Chinese poetic text is being translated into Russian, verbal nuances, poetic melody and the narrative tone unavoidably undergo changes. It would seem, however, that it is hardly necessary in general to imitate or copy foreign prose styles. But the attitude, intonation and the very spirit of the original must be preserved along with the direct transmission of meaning. In other words, the concept of translating accuracy naturally takes in the peculiarities and all the wealth of literary ideas and forms. This includes all significant components--terminology, musical tone, descriptive style and metrical structure.

We know, for example, the degree to which B. Pasternak immersed himself in his translations of Georgian works, which constitute an important period in his writing career. Moreover, he admitted that this translating work aided in a better interpretation of his own writings. This brings to mind some of Pasternak's verses, addressed to Paolo Yashvili:

Without knowing your verses,
But loving the source,
I needed no words to understand
Your future word for word translation.

The most important thing, here, in my opinion, is "loving the source." After all, it would seem that the whole secret of artistic translation consists precisely in the very attitude, in the penetration of the spiritual sense and creative nature of the work. For this, however, the translator must know everything about the literature that the author himself knew. Can this be accomplished without a knowledge of the language? Can it be accomplished if the translator does not personally experience the artistry of the Chinese word and Chinese poetry? Can the translator simply work from a word for word translation?

A knowledge of the language of the original is naturally of tremendous benefit and a great advantage. In fact, we regard it as a self-evident fact that the works of Shakespeare, Goethe, Schiller or Dickens should be translated by individuals who are fluent in the languages used by these literary masters. This has been confirmed by the quality of the integral professional expertise of literary translators, in addition, naturally, to a knowledge of the major themes of the writer's works.

It is true that the opposite can also occur. Sometimes outstanding translations are made from a word for word rendition. The best example of this is generally thought to be V. Zhukovskiy, who did not know ancient Greek but translated "The Odyssey" and translated Firdausi from the German translation by Ruckert. Another example is S. Lipkin, with his masterful translations from Navoi or his marvelous "Manas," composed from a word for word rendition.

Naturally, other examples could be cited of the amazing artistry of translations written by individuals who did not know the language of the original and relied only on word for word translations. This is certainly a positive phenomenon: masters take on the resolution of extremely difficult problems. But these translations, I can unequivocally say, are quite rare, or, more precisely they are the exception to the rule. And this is perhaps the same kind of exception as the gift with which these translators have been endowed. This is probably one of the mysteries of the literary art and the noble art of translation.

It does seem, however, that a knowledge of the original language does not hurt the translator under any circumstances, even V. Zhukovskiy himself. In any case, there is much more reason, in our opinion, to prefer that the translator of artistic literature know the language of the original and do his work without a word for word translation.

The actual resolution of this problem is naturally connected with major complexities. There is no question, however, that it is precisely this method which is the most productive and promising. It is obvious that masters should be translated by masters in the field of translating.

The aesthetic charm of the songs of the "Shijing," particularly "Guofeng" and "Xiao ya," is related to the folkloric tradition of poetic means and modes of expression. These simple songs arouse the trust and sympathy of the reader with the purity and sincerity of the feelings they express.

This seemingly "guileless simplicity," however, conceals all of the depth and difficulty of the transmission of poetic songs in not only a foreign language, but a language of a different time and a different set of historical realities. The numerous attempts by Chinese philologists and poets to translate "Shijing" into modern Chinese have not been crowned by any noticeable success. They have merely conveyed the meaning of the songs. They retell the plot and provide some idea of the content of the poetic songs, but they do not indicate the means by which the plot and content were given artistic form. In essence, this interpretation has deprived "Shijing" of its poetry, its verbal artistry, its metaphorical language, its stylistic structure, its internal composition, its melody and so forth--in short, all that makes this work unique and original and determines its aesthetic value.

The translation of "Shijing" into European languages has been the object of particular attention and effort on the part of many foreign sinologists and authors. The first attempts date back to the last century. Translations of this work are extant in the Japanese, English, French, German, Russian and other languages (Legg, Strauss, Couvrair, Jennings, Lin Yutang and others). This work is still going on today. More and more new variations and interpretations of "Shijing" are constantly being published; all of them differ from one another in some way, but they largely only repeat their predecessors. Moreover, they not only repeat the successes, but also their numerous distortions of the text and arbitrary interpretation of the meaning of works, frequently arising from a misunderstanding of the Chinese original or even from ignorance in general; they repeat gross errors and obvious distortions, the wilful substitution of the translator's own fantasies for the original and so forth.

Of the existing European editions of "Shijing," a special position is occupied, in our opinion, by the translation of famous Swedish sinologist B. Karlgren, who must be given the credit for conducting an in-depth study of this work and writing what can be regarded as the standard translation.⁴ This work, however, is of a purely philological nature. Karlgren was the first to present a scientific interpretation of the ancient Chinese text of the "Shijing," reconstruct the original characters, study the grammatical structure and phonetic system of the language used in the songs and odes of the "Shijing," and restore their ancient tone and the poetic, rhythmical and stylistic peculiarities of the poetic ode and the ancient Chinese literary art. Karlgren's work, which has been called a tremendous scientific contribution, marked the beginning of a new stage in the study of "Shijing" and other definitive works of Chinese literature.

Nonetheless, B. Karlgren's work, despite all of its philological value, is only a word for word translation and, consequently, does not in itself represent a final solution to the problem. Just as any other literal translation, it does not give us a complete understanding of the "Shijing," which is interesting to us as far more than merely an ancient Chinese work. In addition to the extremely valuable historical and ethnographic information, news and factual data about social life and material and spiritual culture we can obtain from this source, the "Shijing" is a collection of poetic odes and a repository of the Chinese people's artistic creativity. For this reason, it is of outstanding aesthetic value above all. But it is precisely this side of the "Shijing" that has not been touched upon by Karlgren and has remained a mystery. His word for word translation, just as any literal translation, does not shed any light on this facet of the work and leaves the job of poetic translation to others.

As a sinologist, B. Karlgren simply did not ever intend to write a poetic translation of the "Book of Songs."⁵ This transcended the bounds of his scientific study and required not only an interpretation of an ancient Chinese text, but also a poetic gift, with which he, as he himself admitted, had not been endowed. He was aware that his standard translation might arouse the interest of literary masters who would take on the job of lending a poetic tone to his rendition. It has already been 30 years since Karlgren's translation was published, however, and his hopes have not been realized as yet, even though the work itself serves as a reference which is constantly used by all those who study the "Shijing," and some poetic versions of songs and odes based on his word for word rendition have already appeared. It is true that these only represent glimmers of light, reminiscent of a "vague and half-forgotten dream," and the European reader will apparently have a long time to wait for the happy moment when the Swedish sinologist's work and the literary art are fated to meet.

Excessive optimism would hardly be warranted in this case, if for no other reason than the fact that Karlgren's rendition is utterly word for word and primitively literal without the slightest trace or sign of the artistry and metaphorical vision constituting the organic essence and very soul of the poetry in the "Shijing." It is precisely for this reason that this rendition is not likely to inspire or engender truly poetic work that is worthy of embodying the aesthetic originality of the "Shijing." Another reason that it would be difficult to believe this is that the very artistry of translation is made improbable when the living fabric of the work is torn, when the content is mechanically ripped away from its artistic form, which is, strictly speaking, the only thing that makes poetry poetic. This is not a suit of clothing that can arbitrarily be changed according to personal taste, the whims of fashion or the weather.

We know that there are staunch opponents of what is called the analysis of interpretation of poetry. They say that poetry should not be analyzed, but that the individual should read it, sense it, feel its strength and beauty and perceive it more with the heart than with the mind--after all, poetry is largely born of the heart and is addressed to it. And this is certainly true.

But can we deny the role and significance of conscious thinking in poetic writing and in the assimilation of literary works? No, certainly not.

The poetic lines of the "Shijing" have the kind of charm which, we believe, does not allow them to be analyzed separately. It is impossible to analyze them by examining their different components. They do not exist apart from their internal harmony. The charm of these songs does not lie in specific elements, but in their total melody. And this makes them inseparable. They are similar to a single entity. And the time factor is always present. All of this naturally requires a special approach to the poetry of the "Shijing" and to its translation into foreign languages.

The translation must have as much vital strength as the original. Flaubert is the one who talked about the "internal strength of style," which, "like the earth," supports the literary work. The meaning awaiting us in an ancient text is sometimes only revealed after great effort. We see it as something locked in itself, in the very context, as something mysterious for us, for our view of the world and for the comprehension of our contemporaries. But someone once said that when daylight makes a monster visible, it ceases to be a monster, because anything that has a face is recognizable, and anything that becomes recognizable can be subdued. The art of translation is an art which requires action, and it must be creative action. Naturally, it also requires competence.

Even the greatest artist of our era would not presume to "bless" an original work simply with the euphony or quality of his own poetic touches. An exacting author will naturally want his translation to preserve its national uniqueness even after it acquires artistic importance in his own nation. Only a person who feels indifferent about his own native literature and his own creativity can cold-bloodedly sacrifice the "elusive substance" of the original for the sake of exotic diversions and his own popularity. The art of translation does not call for rephrasing, but for the reincarnation of one poetic verse as another. Only the poetry itself, its power, its mystery and its inherent magic can convey the passions, feelings and spirit of the artists who created the musical world of the "Shijing."

One of the translator's important duties, according to Delisle,⁶ consists in ensuring that each excerpt produces the same results produced by the original author. Anyone who decides to translate a work takes on a debt and the obligation to pay it, in the same amount if not in the same coin.

Englishman A. Walley, who was studying the original manuscript of the "Shijing" at almost the same time as his Swedish colleague, approached the work with totally different creative aims.⁷ Although the first edition of his translation was published in 1937, even before Karlgren's translation, Walley never felt the need to make even slight changes in later editions of his work. Karlgren's interpretation was not fully or unconditionally accepted by Walley. He had serious reasons for this.

For example, Walley remarked in the foreword to the second edition of his translation that "while I was working on this new edition, I had the advantage of being able to constantly refer to the literal translation and annotations of Professor Karlgren, published in 1942 and 1946. In many cases, after weighing the evidence, I could not agree with him, and in some cases I was absolutely certain that he was mistaken."

Therefore, Walley not only disagrees with Karlgren on how certain phrases should be expressed or translated but also on the preferable type of translation--poetic or literal. In this connection, we should recall S. Marshak's observation, which was just as paradoxical as it was apt: "It is impossible to translate poetry. Each case is exceptional."⁸

The problem of choice is one of the "eternal categories." It has constantly arisen in our literature and in foreign literatures. The "Shijing" did not escape this fate. What is preferable: a translation or a crude decoding of the characters, a literal rendition which eliminates the poetic middleman but gives credit to the "originality" of the original. Quite unexpected opinions, enthusiasms and extremes are sometimes revealed in the arguments over this problem.

For Walley, who studied the "Shijing" for a quarter of a century, a literal translation was absolutely out of the question. The issue of a poet middleman with no knowledge of the written characters did not arise for him. He himself had a poetic gift and his artistic translation is sufficiently eloquent proof of this. Our attention has been aroused by something else: Walley largely concentrates on the imperfections of Karlgren's work and reveals numerous errors in this word for word interpretation of the melodic text of the "Shijing," not to mention errors in the approach used by the Swedish sinologist. Walley's criticism is quite significant, since Karlgren's standard translation is regarded by many researchers as a scientifically approved rendition.

These considerations and comments provide grounds for some general statements. It has been discovered that the mere knowledge of the language, its characters, its grammatical structure and its phonetic system are not at all enough for the translation of a poetic work. This did not lead, in this case, to the most important results: inspired accuracy in the transmission of the original, because something extremely important lies behind the characters and lines. In addition to scientific methods and "technology," emotional experience, a poetic sense and a creative talent are also necessary. The only way of recreating a poetic work in a literary translation, therefore, consists in conveying not so much the meaning or content of the text as in using the text as a basis and an aid in recreating the multifaceted world of the work of art, the entire historical, ethnographic, psychological and aesthetic complex which makes up each ode and constitutes the "Shijing" in its all-encompassing form.

Walley made an interesting comment in regard to his feelings about the "Shijing." In 1913, when he first began to read the works of the "Shijing" in the Chinese original and in the translation by French sinologist Couvrair, Walley's attention was aroused not by the documents of the historical past themselves, but by the songs, which he regarded "only as poetry and, strangely enough, perhaps more as music than as poetry." Although he gave these ancient works the tones of the Beijing dialect, embellished in some spots by Couvrair's "antique pronunciation, this fashionable product of pseudo-archaeologism," all mistranslations and errors were overshadowed by the "new and lovely melodies" of the songs. The text of the "Shijing" sounded "like the lines of Homer, which were meant to be sung, despite all of the barbarous ignorance with which we perform them." After studying the "Shijing" for 25 years, Walley wrote: "The songs are no longer incomprehensible to me.... I believe that I understand them quite well, and they have become, because of their unique importance as documents of the ancient metrics of ritual mythology, a fund of research which far transcends ancient China. And they have never lost their initial appeal for me. Their music, which is probably totally different from that which accompanied my initial discovery of them, has been with me through all of my readings and re-readings. Moreover, during the last 3 years, when the text was with me at all times, the vast quantities of linguistic, botanical, zoological, historical and geographical problems with which the translation of this kind of work must deal never robbed the songs of their novelty. And I believe that some part of my delight with them, despite the absence of rhyme, the comparatively colorless translation and the formal meter, will make its way to the reader of my translations."⁹

Walley's remarks are extremely noteworthy. The music and melody of the verses in the "Shijing," their alliteration and harmony are based on their own natural tendencies and stem from their unique architectonics. The atmosphere of the "Shijing," as true poetry, is a natural one. The sounds of the songs in this book are like the exhalation of breath in singing.

Strictly speaking, it is virtually impossible to transmit the musical elements of foreign speech. Actually, the sounds can only be approximated in the translator's language. The most talented translators are generally more successful in conveying the concealed meaning of the original. The melody is unavoidably lost: it is replaced by another set of elements which are characteristic of the speech into which the work is being translated. But even this process requires extraordinary artistry.

The translator could be compared to the conductor, who does not write music but only performs it. He has only four means at his disposal: louder, softer, faster, slower. Everything else is in the score written by the composer. Nonetheless, people like Paganini and Toscanini, who seemed to be composing music, are born. When he constructs a phrase, the translator performs many of the functions of a conductor with an excellent knowledge of not only the nature and characteristics of each instrument in the orchestra, but also of all the refinements of composite nuances, variations and accord--everything that gives the conductor absolute authority.

Rhythmically organized and measured speech, as we know, represents one of the most important features of the musical basis of poetry and all literature. Rhythm is inherent in natural phenomena and the natural movement of the realities surrounding us.

Rhythm is present in the very depths of the essence of the universe. It is close to the "language of nature" (Tyutchev) and music of the world (Blok). Pushkin called poetry the "union of enchanting sounds, feelings and thoughts." According to Mayakovskiy, rhythm is the "basic force and the basic energy of the verse." Rhythm frequently plays an extremely important part. The depth and power of ideas depend on it. It conveys distinctive speech patterns.

Poetic or versified speech is a tonal phenomenon. This is particularly significant in the study of the melodic poetry of the "Shijing." The written form of the language does not convey the multitude of tonal nuances, melody and euphony.

This calls for particularly strong artistic penetration of space and time, of the atmosphere of the remote and unique national realities depicted in the songs of the "Shijing," the writers of which seemed to have sensed the color and tone of words. What language, what style and what terminology can express all of the diversity and variety of poetic lyrics in the "Shijing"? The song lyrics are part of the song and can only be discussed in their relationship to the music. In lyrical poetry, special significance is attached not only to the meaning of words, but also to their sound, their linguistic harmony and their composition.

The tempo of the poetic speech of the "Shijing" represents realization of the tonal possibilities of the word. This means that any change in tempo is a definite part of intonation patterns and an element related to the system of pauses, the length of the lines and the melody.

When the verse structure of the "Shijing" is studied, tonal repetitions, the constant repetition of words and characters, are discovered. There is no question that the repetition of words is one way of intensifying expression, intonation and the melodic patterns of speech, or, according to current terminology, the expressive assessment of information. The repetition of words is also one of the compositional elements of poetic speech.

We know that the structuralists and neoformalists who are modernizing standard metrics are ignoring the national basis of versification, eliminating the distinctive features of poetic speech and arbitrarily categorizing elements of rhythm and meaning by separating the phenomenon from the intonation of the verse, and separating the intonation patterns from semantics.

Obviously, the poetic speech of the "Shijing" has its own nature and characteristics, different from those of vocal, prosaic or conversational speech. Phonetic, rhythmic and intonation-syntactic relations overlap in the tonal structure of verse. The tonal quality of verse is conveyed in the pronunciation, in which the nonobservance of pauses, incorrect intonation and the wrong tempo distort the tonal aspects of the verse.

In the songs of the "Shijing," we frequently find a lyrical motif rather than analytical thoughts about time. The lines in these songs are related not so much by meaning as by melody: tonal coordination, rhythmic reversals and so forth.

The language of the songs in the "Shijing" does not always convey a precise visual image. It is often somewhat vague and incomplete. But it would be useless to dissect its lyrical structure into its separate components or to disassemble and reassemble the necklace of metaphors and similes. Here, maximum lyricism is accompanied by maximum simplicity, which cannot be dissected. It is a process of painting with sounds.

The question of the relationship between the musical rhythm and poetic rhythm--since they are almost inseparable here--is an extremely difficult one.

The question of the relationship of the poetic and musical rhythms is also related to the expression of thoughts, which, in the *ci*, is constructed on the basis of the ambiguity of each word in the text. In poetic speech, each word does not always have only one meaning. In addition to the fact that the word stands for its natural meaning, it can also acquire extraordinary and unexpected overtones, nuances and shades of meaning. Unpredictable dimensions of meaning and barely discernible intonations can come into being depending on their position in the phrase, on the words surrounding them, on the text itself and on the rhythmic and musical structure. All of these generic peculiarities have aroused the attention of Chinese researchers of various eras. We know of the earliest work on the vocal art, written by poet and musician Zhang Yangyou (13th-14th centuries), "*Ci yuan*" ("The Origin of the *Ci*"), where different facets of the theory of song writing and the vocal art are examined with the lyrical poetry of the *ci* as a basis.

The high art of word usage is inherent in the very nature of Chinese poetry in all of its generic diversity. The stylistic wealth of Chinese poetry is also organically interconnected with this. This is the reason for the unique role and functions of the word in the poetic context: On the level of meaning, the same word or character can be understood, read or interpreted in a different way if it is not examined separately or in isolation, but as part of the general tonal and poetic structure and style, as part of the author's ideological and metaphorical design.

Oral folk art gave the genre of the poetic song the significant feature that distinguishes the works of many outstanding Chinese poets: a feeling for words and the ability to find and assimilate precise and vivid words from folkloric linguistic elements.

It is precisely in common speech and in folklore that words acquire polish and their final form. The outstanding masters of the Sung ci--Su Shi, Li Yu, Li Qingzhao, Liu Yong, Xin Qiji, Ouyang Xiu and many others who took what they could from the storehouse of folkloric literary art--were profoundly aware and highly appreciative of the wealth and charm of folk poetry and its natural beauty and strength.

It is a self-evident fact that the art of translation is always creative, and not the fruit of totally unrestricted and arbitrary interpretation. Nonetheless, the "translator's will" is reflected in many ways: Translation is arbitrary in those cases when the work is "poeticized" with no regard for the original and in those cases when a literal rendition is accomplished by "turning the text inside out," "word for word," with no concern for the total aesthetic import of the poetic original. Neither "artistic" nor "scientific" arbitrariness in the art of translation can be justified by any authority. The translation and the original must be comparable on all levels. If the relationship between levels of the translation and original is violated, the vital structure of the work of art is destroyed. Karlgren's monosemantic approach and his literal decoding of the "Shijing" lose sight of the main element of the work--its poetry. The "Book of Songs," an inspired creation of the people's poetic genius, was deprived of the breath of life and consequently lost all of its aesthetic value in his interpretation. No artificial methods in the form of "poetic" finishing touches can breathe life into the soulless literalism of his rendition.

In an artistic translation, the essence and the aesthetic aspect--the questions of what must be expressed and how--are virtually of equal significance. For this reason, the objectivity of criteria should apply equally to the approach to the work, the method of translation and the evaluation of interpretive skill. Neither the contrasting of one with the other nor any kind of preference in this field can have positive consequences. Any attempt to achieve results through compromise or the substitution of one for the other gives rise to the danger that the translator's subjective feelings and tastes will prevail.

Experience has dispelled all doubts--and we have tried to prove this, using the specific example of Karlgren's interpretation of the "Shijing"--that a translation of a poetic work is not likely to be of full value when the desire to convey the meaning overshadows the desire to recreate its artistic uniqueness, or when the translation is essentially invalidated by an obsession with its poetic features. This, in fact, is the very "focal point" of the art of translation and the source of uneasiness for writers and philologists. We know that F. M. Dostoyevskiy, just as many other Russian classics, worried that all "that is national for us or characteristic of us by choice (and, consequently, all that is truly artistic)" might not be "comprehensible to Europe" (and, in particular, to the Orient, we could add).

A firm reply could probably now be given: To a considerable degree, this has become comprehensible, although, naturally, not absolutely in all cases, since genius creates genuine works of literary art with no parallel. The genius of the writer calls for genius from the translator. Otherwise, there would be a multitude of geniuses among multilingual translators, as great as Pushkin and Shakespeare, Homer and Qu Yuan, Du Fu, Li Bo and others. As yet, this has not happened. And their poetic genius remains unique even in their national literatures, within the bounds of their linguistic elements, not to mention foreign literary art. Ideally, the translator should be equally knowledgeable about his own national literature and the literature he has chosen to translate if he wishes to truly recreate these works in a foreign language.

Naturally, this should not set up obstacles in the way of literary translations. And none of these have actually been set up. We are referring to something else. This entire discussion has one message: Translation is an art that is just as exalted and complex as artistic creativity itself.

It would be difficult to say, at least if the current level of translating artistry is objectively assessed, that artistic translations, even the most talented, are completely free of, for example, the individual poetic taste of the translator. The "translator's soul," particularly when we are dealing with Oriental, and especially Chinese, poetry, is sensed by us to one degree or another in the translated work, particularly if we are dealing with a gifted individual.

Another question which should be our main concern is whether the "soul of the author" is expressed in translations of Chinese poetry, particularly in its classical forms. We can say with almost complete certainty that even if it is expressed, it is not expressed fully. It is difficult to establish dimensions or a scale of measurement here, but some achieve this to a greater degree than others, and sometimes the "soul of the author" disappears completely. For this reason, there are frequent cases in which a kind of "vacuum" arises in a translation, if the "creative individuality" of the translator remains "imperceptible" or, as pointed out above, the "translator's soul" reigns supreme.

In Soviet and foreign literature this is sometimes called an individual "reading," a poetic "version," a "variant," a "free translation" and so forth. The essence of the matter, naturally, does not lie in the terms. Everything depends on the degree of creative participation: where and how the personality of the translator makes itself apparent. Much depends on the way in which the original is read and the accuracy and depth with which the translator has penetrated the author's context and sensed the spirit and internal structure of the original. These are, so to speak, subjective aspects.

A great deal, however, depends on objective factors: the potential of the expressive and descriptive means of the native language, which do not always

coincide with or correspond to these means in the works being translated, the richness of verbal speech, linguistic uniqueness and the degree to which the translator can use these with accuracy and talent.

The first attempts to translate the "Shijing" into Russian were made by Academician V. P. Vasil'yev as early as 1882. His work, however, was never completed: Only a small section of the translation was published in printed form, and most of it remained, and almost forever, in manuscript form, and an unedited manuscript at that. Vasil'yev's translation did not win any recognition. It was, unfortunately, far from perfect and had neither a scholarly interpretation nor literary merits to its credit. According to Academician V. M. Alekseyev, "the translations of V. P. Vasil'yev were even worthless as literal translations, if these insufficiently literary word for word renditions can even be categorized in this way."¹⁰

Obviously, V. P. Vasil'yev was unable to comprehend either the historical content or the uniqueness of the "Shijing," and it is not likely that he was even prepared to do this. This why the psychological, moral and emotional atmosphere of the original is completely distorted in his translation, not to mention the aesthetic side of the work, which naturally is absolutely inconsistent with the art of literary translation. His translation does not contain any evidence of even the slightest concern for the linguistic and formal features of the original. This kind of arbitrary treatment of a great poetic work is even more difficult to justify when we consider that V. P. Vasil'yev praised the work highly in his book about the "Shijing," saying, in particular, that the songs in the "Shijing" expressed the social and political ideas, thoughts and reflections of the people. He also stressed that the songs and verses in the "Shijing" tell us much more than any dissertation about the daily life of the people because they clearly and vividly express the thoughts and feelings of the people and all of their concerns in this extremely remote era of Chinese antiquity.¹¹

In addition, V. P. Vasil'yev's work is also significant because he was the first to display any initiative in acquainting the Russian reader with the major classical works of ancient Chinese poetry. This alone was an important service in the history of our nation's sinology.

The verses and songs of the "Shijing" aroused lively interest in progressive Russian people, writers and translators. By the early 1860's, a translation of one of the poems in the "Shijing" had already been published in Russia. It was written by revolutionary democrat M. Mikhaylov. The poem is distinguished by the indirect perceptions, naivete and lyrical sincerity that are characteristic of many works in the "Book of Songs," particularly the "Guofeng" ("Morals of the Kingdom"):

My handsome one, my fine one
Wears an astrakhan caftan;
His slim waist is belted
With leopard skin.

Games are boring without him;
 When he rushes into battle—
 He fears no one,
 "There are many like this!"
 Yes, there are!
 But I do not need any of them!
 My handsome one, my fine one
 Wears an astrakhan caftan;
 His slim waist is belted
 With leopard skin.
 All my thoughts are of him alone—
 Day and night...
 He is gentle, he is brave...
 "There are others like this!"
 There are others!
 But I do not think about the others!

Despite all of its merits, this cannot be called a translation of the poem in the strict sense of the term. The poet has diverged too much from the Chinese original, which was probably inaccessible to him. This is the reason for the "astrakhan caftan" and the "leopard skin," which have been taken by the translator from a totally different national and ethnic context and are not Chinese realities.

In prerevolutionary Russia, sinologists were also studying some of the songs of the "Shijing" in translations from Western European languages, since the Chinese original had apparently been inaccessible to the translators. Naturally, these translations were quite far removed from the actual tone of the poetic works in the "Book of Songs."

The first poetic translation of the "Shijing" into Russian directly from the ancient Chinese language was written by Soviet sinologist A. A. Shtukin.¹² The publication of this valuable work, which was compiled with ample knowledge and professional skill, filled a large gap in our orientology and represented an important event in the study of China's ancient artistic culture. Shtukin's poetic translation is one of the best translations of the "Book of Songs" ever written in any language. Academician V. M. Alekseyev, who read Shtukin's manuscript of the translation, had the following to say about it: "The literary heritage of the East is much more difficult and limited of access to us than the literary heritage of the West, which we can derive from even the most elementary word for word translations. The poetic talent of A. A. Shtukin is absolutely indisputable and his sinological erudition reinforces these poetic elements and, what is more, his style in the most decisive manner."¹³

By bringing us closer to the "Shijing," this great work of ancient Chinese artistic culture, the translator indisputably tried to rise to the level of the original when he interpreted the text and attempted to obtain a precise understanding of the original, pursuing the goal of a comprehensive and

accurate disclosure of the multifaceted world of people of a remote era. This job, however, is extremely difficult. It requires a great deal of scientific erudition and creative application. The amazing lyrical force of the folkloric songs in the "Shijing" and the frenzied passions of their composers and singers can sometimes be incredibly expressive with the aid of only the most modest descriptive means. The internal world of these simple farmers, their mentality and their feelings about reality, due to the unique talent displayed in these verses, are presented to us just as fully as the internal world of the intellectual heroes--"cayunzi"--of the "top" Chinese classical works.

In this connection, we must take interest in more than mere cognitive considerations. The job of revealing the poetry of the "Shijing" means that domestic literature is made richer by the inclusion of new, previously unseen worlds, new images and colors, sounds, intonations and tones. It was precisely for this reason that A. A. Shtukin, as we see it, put his knowledge of the Chinese text and his understanding of its folk basis to work, coordinating them with his own perceptions of the original characters, the laws governing poetry in his native language and his own creative experience and personal poetic sense.

But does everything in the original lend itself to interpretation and transmission: Where are the "permissible" limits? What is within the "power" of the translator? To what degree is his creative "presence" allowed? Shtukin does not avoid "difficult" situations, he does not give up the search and he frequently achieves success. Not all of his finds and solutions are of equal value. Not all of the problems are completely solved. There is much that is "enigmatic" in the original itself, which has come down to us with errors and distortions arising during the process of the endless rewriting of the text, with "blank spaces" and with omissions. Chinese philologists have been decoding and interpreting the "Shijing" since the time the work appeared. A colossal amount of literature has grown up around the "Book of Songs," numerous schools of commentators have made their appearance, hypotheses and doctrines, various interpretations and versions--each more fantastic than the others--have multiplied. This has essentially complicated, rather than simplified, the work of the researcher and translator.

Some Chinese sources arouse suspicion in the translator. They are too obviously unreliable and their interpretation of the text is too artificial. We know that far from all of the commentaries by Chinese scholars and literary experts are founded on the factological basis of the text of the "Shijing." For this reason, they frequently contain diametrically opposed interpretations of the same songs, poetic lines and individual characters. The commentaries by Confucians are obviously tendentious, as they were pursuing their own ideological, moral and ethical goals and were using the "Shijing" as their own canonical classic.

There is a great deal, however, that deserves the attention of the researcher and translator, who naturally have the right to choose and make their own

decisions and who could not get along without them since the positive experience accumulated by Chinese philology over many centuries must be taken into account. This was precisely the approach taken by A. A. Shtukin in his interpretation of the text of the "Shijing."

Freeing the "Shijing" of various Confucian incrustations by hacking his way through the "dense thickets" of tendentious commentary, the author of the Russian translation regarded the "Shijing" not as part of the Confucian doctrine, but as an earlier work of Chinese poetry, testimony to the genius of folk literary art. For this reason, the "Shijing" was seen by him as an entire group of problems of a social, ideological and aesthetic nature in China's historical progression through the ancient and medieval eras.

When he translated the "Shijing," A. A. Shtukin used the modern reading and pronunciation of Chinese words and symbols, proceeding from the fact that the work still lived in China in precisely this form. Pursuing a poetological goal, the author of the translation did not believe it was necessary to go back to the ancient Chinese phonetic structure and reconstruct the pronunciation which was used in the remote time when these songs were composed. Naturally, this was not the only possible approach and it may not even have been the best of all possible and probable approaches. Here A. A. Shtukin disagrees with Karlgren who restored the ancient phonetics of the Chinese language. But Karlgren was trying to recreate the authentic sound of the "Shijing" and was not pursuing any poetological goals. A difference in goals, therefore, called for different solutions. In both cases, there are significant deviations from the original, and we must bear this in mind when we compare different translations. This fact naturally points up the relative nature of the results.

In one area, however, Karlgren and A. A. Shtukin completely agree: Both of them chose to translate the work into the contemporary form of their own language. If we bear in mind the persons for whom the translation was intended, and A. A. Shtukin intended precisely for the contemporary Russian reader, this approach can no longer be called consistent. This is all the more true since the accurate transmission of the sound of the ancient Chinese language, in which the poetry of the "Shijing" was composed around 3,000 years ago, would call for a Russian language equivalent. It is hardly likely, however, that the resolution of this problem would bring us any closer to the main goal.

Without considering the phonetic and terminological authenticity of the Chinese and Russian languages of these long bygone days, there were other major difficulties the translator had to face in finding the proper expressive means in their contemporary form. Where could he find the appropriate terminology in the contemporary Russian language to translate the ancient poetry of the "Shijing" and to establish, for example, spiritual and often intimate contact with the singers and composers of the songs, written about their own heroes with their profoundly folk ideas about self-sacrifice, the power of oaths and mercy, with their obsessions, mystical beliefs, oracular magic and so forth?

The translator who chooses to work on the text of the "Shijing" has no right to limit himself only to a certain part or to choose only those sections which are accessible to him or which he is able to transmit. He must recreate the total picture, the total unique world of this era. To do this, he must endow his translation with what we could call the "spirit of ancient Chinese life" by striving for conclusive, inspired accuracy in his interpretation. He must adhere to the form of the original, since the music of the songs in the "Shijing" is organically interwoven into the poetic text and is inseparable from the Chinese rhythms. The failure to observe this would immediately deprive the translation of the melody of the "Shijing," its lyrical, psychological and internal rhythmic structure.

There is no question that much of the work does not coincide with our beliefs and established concepts. In a certain sense, this is a "confrontation" between two linguistic and aesthetic entities. For the translator, it is most important to understand the Chinese basis and the uniquely Chinese system of artistic perception. It would be wrong to adapt everything in a translation from the Chinese to the likes and dislikes of the foreign reader. This would result in deviations from the original substance and distortions of the truth itself, which is, in the final analysis, more significant than any convention.

The verbal and metaphorical composition of the song "Blooms on a Vine" (II, VIII, 9), for example, is noteworthy. The poem consists of three quatrains. The poetic structure seems quite simple. The terminological structure is amazingly simple. The expressive means are extremely modest. The basic theme of this song is "nature and man" and their profound interdependence. The subject matter is a comparison of phenomena in the surrounding world to the feelings of the man. The candid perceptions, emotional nuances and guileless expression of feelings that are characteristic of the singer make the song sound sincere, convincing and charming.

The first lines focus attention on living nature, its metamorphoses and the colors produced on its palette. The "landscape" mode is characteristic of many poetic works in the "Shijing." Our song presents a vivid picture of blooms on a vine, which are fated to blossom one day but later "turn dark yellow." The lyrical beginning of the verse is complicated by the introduction of elegiac tones. The theme is developed by means of a personal narrative, which gives the melody a dramatic tone.

The singer moves from his external perceptions of natural phenomena to the expression of his own thoughts and feelings. Spiritual progression creates a visual impression: "Oh, how my heart is grieving sorely, My heart has been wounded severely by grief." Here the mournful feelings are underscored, but the reason for them has not been revealed as yet. In the two concluding lines of the second quatrain, the profundity of the singer's grief is stressed: "It would have been better if I had not been born into the world, If I have to suffer a fate like this." The interconnection between natural

phenomena and the vicissitudes of human existence constitutes the light motif of the entire work, but the main idea is only revealed at the very end, at the culminating point.

In the third and last quatrain, we learn the reason for the singer's grief:

The sheep has a big head,
But the net has caught only the stars;
I know: even though people are eating,
I see so few who are full!

These lines require elucidation. They reveal the symbolic conventions of ancient Chinese folklore. The head of the sheep is big precisely because its entire body is emaciated as a result of hunger. The net has caught only the stars reflected in the water, instead of the fish it was supposed to catch. Besides this, the word "vine" sounds like "tiao" in Chinese and is associated with a "mouse's tail."

It is indicative that the first two lines of all three quatrains of "Blooms on a Vine" describe nature and its creations while the third and fourth lines describe the internal world of the man. This also reflects one of natural laws governing the internal structure of lyrical verse in the "Shijing."

This natural law is apparent in many, but not all, of the works in the "Book of Songs." But the metaphorical dynamics, the transition from descriptions of scenery to depictions of an individual's feelings about the world, is quite frequently seen in the "Shijing," particularly in its folkloric works. For example, in the poem "Reeds and Sedge are Blue, Blue" (I, XI, 4), all of the beginning lines describe the reeds and the sedge, as well as accompanying phenomena:

1. "The reeds and sedge are blue, blue. The white dew has thickened into frost."
2. "The reeds are blue and the sedge is green, They are still wet with deep dew";
3. "Glimmers of green can be seen in the blue of the reed, The white dew is glistening again."

In the poem "I See, in the Distance, Hemp" (I, VI, 10), the landscape motif varies in all three quatrains:

1. "I see, in the distance, hemp rising behind a gently sloping hill";
2. "There in the distance, behind a gently sloping hill, wheat can be seen";
3. "There is a plum tree in the distance behind the gently sloping hill--the plum tree will have to grow up all alone."

In the song "I Have Someone Who is Dear to Me" (I, V, 1), all three parts of the verse begin with the same line, which is repeated without any changes whatsoever, while the second line changes in all three cases and introduces new colors and motifs: 1) "Admire these curves on the bank of the Qi! Which are so magnificently dressed in green and thick bamboo"; 2) "Admire these curves on the bank of the Qi! The water is dressed in turquoise and green bamboo"; 3) "Admire these curves on the bank of the Qi! How thick the green bamboo is on a bed of matting."

The "Song of the Girl Picking Plums" (I, II, 9), in which the profound inter-connection of living nature and the internal world of man is particularly graphically portrayed, is beautiful in its lyricism and emotional mood:

The plums are already falling in the garden,
The fruit is more scarce now.
Oh, for him who seeks me there,
There will be no better moment, believe me.
The plums are already falling in the garden,
Not even a third of them remain.
Oh, for him who seeks me so,
The time has come to meet with me.
The plums have fallen in my garden,
Carefully I place them in my basket.
He who seeks me and loves me so
Should tell me about this in the garden.

In this song, just as in several other works, the natural law of folkloric verse we mentioned above is quite clearly revealed. Here we find the alternation of themes, the landscape mode and the rhythmic refrain. In contrast to other works in the "Book of Songs," however, this verse perhaps contains the most graphic description of the "finality" of a natural phenomenon and the "integrity" of the heroine's feelings. It is precisely this that is the leitmotiv of the entire work. This dual tone gives the song lyrical charm and compositional harmony.

In some cases, A. A. Shtukin did not translate the names of trees and grasses into Russian. The author only translated these names into Russian when they would evoke a familiar image, although this affected the tonal repetitions in the poetic text. Besides this, the Chinese names of types of vegetation were sometimes retained because they gave the song a special hidden meaning. All of this naturally constitutes a deviation from the original, which must be taken into account when we read the translation.

But this does not mean that we should reconcile ourselves to the losses. They must be compensated for adequately in the translation according to the laws of creativity, in accordance with the same principles that make up the basis of the original, and not in violation of these principles or in spite of them. Here much depends on the artistry of the translator and his ability to "enter" the world of the original and replace the "untranslatable" with a compensating portion of his own talent.

But this does not justify excessively smooth writing, which is usually the result of indifference on the part of the translator and disregard for the reader. This also applies to stylization for the sake of stylization, which tends to make speech artificial and cold. We are referring to the anemic type of smooth writing which is devoid of individual originality, the author's stamp, intonations, verbal nuances and so forth.

It is necessary to plunge into the very heart of the work being translated, into the hidden essence of the characters, into the inner thoughts of the author, which are not immediately discernible and are sometimes only decoded after a great deal of labor. It is precisely this kind of critical analysis that we see as the job of the translator and interpreter of the Chinese text. All of this must naturally be combined with the most precise observance of details, intonations, terminology and the stylistic peculiarities of the writer. Then the translation becomes poetry. The thoughts and feelings of the original are revealed. Reciprocal thoughts and feelings are aroused in people's hearts, as well as profound empathy. If, Nikolay Zabolotskiy once said, a translation from a foreign language does not sound like a good Russian work, the translation is either mediocre or bad.

This is a truly complex job, requiring creative collaboration from the translator and the same kind of inspiration with which the author himself was filled. It calls for more than the knowledge of philologists and expert readers of Chinese characters. It also calls for artistic talent, which was the only way that Lu Xin's works could have come about. In the style of the artist, it is not the general that is of the greatest significance, but the particular--inherent in only one specific individual.

And these give rise to our objective--the fullest and most accurate transmission of the ideological meaning of the original in combination with truly artistic, rather than literal, precision in the verbal means of expression, the recreation of the author's particular style and the preservation of the concrete uniqueness of the translated work as a single entity. In other words, the artistic translation should express the creative will of the author, which has taken material form in the text of the original, in contrast to commercial and official translations, which are connected with informational objectives.

Our sinological literary studies owe a great deal to Mikhail Basmanov, who must be given credit for analyzing the ci genre of the Sung era and writing numerous translations from the original Chinese lyrical poems of such outstanding poets as Su Shi, Li Yu, Liu Yong, Li Qingzhao, Xin Qiji and others. He must also be given credit for several collections of poetic translations of the Sung poets.

M. Basmanov, who spent many years studying the Sung ci was a professional sinologist who was fluent in the Chinese spoken language and written characters. But it takes more than the mere knowledge of the Chinese language and characters to read ci poetry. It requires much more. This

is a picturesque world of ideas and symbols with all of the characteristics of traditional artistic metaphor. This is why it is necessary to ponder and penetrate the inner essence of the text, composed with stylistic vigor. It is necessary to vigorously plunge into the process it records, for the purpose of comprehending it in the original form in which it appeared under the influence of the time and national and social realities. In addition to everything else, this also requires literary talent and a poetic gift. In M. Basmanov, we find the rare combination of an orientologist and poet.

In the ci poetry, just as in literature in general, the type is connected with the prototype by means of a word, or a character, which performs an expressive or descriptive function. Here the word acts as a mediating link which is, to some degree, abstracted from reality. The word reveals the author's perception, his personal outlook or something he has discovered. Consequently, this could be called the author's vision, which has been subjectively transformed, mediated by reality and brought to light. Something similar occurs with sound in music or color in painting. L. Leonov once wrote: "The true work of art, and the true work of literature in particular, is always an invention in terms of form and a discovery in terms of content."¹⁴

The translation of ci poetry into the Russian language, just as any other, requires particular skill. The unique nature of this genre and its organic relationship to music creates exceptional difficulties in translating the entire unparalleled original into a foreign language. Here the translator is constantly facing the danger of disappearing in a "foreign fog." We are happy to say that M. Basmanov was able to escape this danger in his translations. He was able to do this because he learned the poetic secrets of the ci genre.

The translator of ci poetry must have a researcher's eye--he must see through all screens, examine the actual structure of the ci and discern their meaning and stylistic features.

Basmanov's translation represents a search for an equivalent rather than a surrogate. The translator must do more than convey meaning and form; he must also transmit inspiration by means of inspiration, and images by means of images. "It is necessary to convey," V. Zvyagintsev said, "thoughts, images and moods and, if possible, the charm of the verses being translated. Naturally, the musical outline of the poem and its dimensions should also be conveyed as much as possible."¹⁵

The general rule of the translator is "as literal as possible and as free as necessary." But freedom here is only permissible when and if the meaning of the original can only be conveyed with the aid of deviations from the literal. Pushkin made the famous statement that a word for word translation can never be accurate.

M. Hasmanov has proved to us that the translation can and should be as viable as the original. But the translator of an ancient Chinese poetic text will have great difficulty in revealing its meaning. It appears before him as something within itself, within the very context, as something mysterious to us, to our view of the world and to the comprehension of our contemporary. Here Flaubert's words about the "internal strength of style," which, "like the earth," supports the literary work, come to mind.

In addition to everything else, impeccable literary taste is one of the essential conditions for professional skill and for the art of literary translation. No degree of brilliance, Bryusov said, can compensate for a lack of taste.

In a comment directed against the formal approach to translation, P. A. Vyazemskiy said more than a century ago: "The Anacreon cannot be translated into prose, but it is also impossible to translate it into verse. In the first case, you dry out a flower which has enchanted us with its color, brilliance and freshness; in the other case, you wish to transfer this freshness, this brilliance and these colors to paper with a pencil. But Horace still lives in the French translation, no matter how the prose writer Bate tries to suffocate him. The fact is that the poet experiences his thoughts and feelings, but the beauty and splendor of their external frame can only be fairly judged by contemporaries."¹⁶

This is probably a good time to recall N. I. Gnedich's words: "It is easy to paint, or rather to repaint, Homer's verses with the colors on our palette, and they will seem more fashionable, more splendid and more to our taste; but it is incomparably more difficult to leave them Homeric, just as they are, neither better nor worse. This is the duty of the translator, and the work he has undergone is not easy. Quintilian understood this...it is easier to do more than the same."¹⁷

FOOTNOTES

1. I. Levyy, "Iskusstvo perevoda" [The Art of Translation], Moscow, 1974, p 129.
2. See L. Eydlin, "Kitayskaya klassicheskaya poeziya" [Chinese Classical Poetry], Moscow, 1975, pp 9-10.
3. See "Vostochnyy almanakh" [Oriental Almanac], No II, Moscow, 1974, p 495.
4. B. Karlgren, "The Book of Odes," Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, Stockholm, 1950.

5. Karlgren's very theory was indicative. He believed that "the contemporary Chinese language essentially has no grammar, and this makes it extremely concise and scant and makes grammatical analysis ineffective. To understand the Chinese text, it is necessary to understand the Chinese soul." Here Karlgren tends to recognize a sixth sense, "which almost instinctively reveals the true meaning of each phrase to us" (B. Karlgren, "The Chinese Language. An Essay on its Origin and History," New York, 1949).

This theory, which has met with concurrence from contemporary Western linguists is not confirmed by the actual state of the Chinese language. The story about the lack of grammar in the Chinese language has disappeared into the realm of legend. Numerous works by Chinese and Soviet philologists refuted this thesis long ago, just as all of the talk about the intuitivism, mystical inscrutability, irrationalism and other idealistic ideas of this kind about Chinese characters and the spoken language.

6. See INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA, 1959, No 1, p 188.
7. A. Walley, "The Book of Songs," Translated from Chinese, Grove Press, Inc., New York, 1960.
8. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 31 May 1962.
9. A. Walley, op cit.
10. V. M. Alekseyev, "Prerequisites for a Russian Translation of the Chinese Ancient Canonical Book of the 'Shijing' ('Poetry')," IZVESTIYA AN SSSR, OLYA, 1948, vol VII, No 3, p 271.
11. V. P. Vasil'yev, "Translation and Interpretation of the 'Shijing' (Pt 1 'Guofeng')," in the book: "Kitayskaya khrestomatiya" [Chinese Anthology], No III, St. Petersburg, 1882.
12. "Shijing," Moscow, 1957.
13. V. M. Alekseyev, op cit., p 272.
14. L. Leonov, "Literatura i vremya" [Literature at Time], Moscow, 1964, p 282.
15. "Khudozhestvennyy perevod. Vzaimodeystviye i vzaimoobogashcheniye literatur" [Literary Translation. The Interaction and Mutual Enrichment of Literatures], Yerevan, 1973, p 396.
16. P. A. Vyazemskiy, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol X, St. Petersburg, 1886, p 6.
17. N. I. Gnedich, "Stikhotvoreniya" [Poetry], Leningrad, 1956, p 316.

COMMUNIST-INTERNATIONALIST, LOYAL LENINIST (COMMEMORATING THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF WANG MING'S BIRTH)

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[Article by K. V. Shevelev, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The history of the Chinese people's heroic struggle for national and social liberation is indissolubly connected with the name of Wang Ming-- prominent figure in the Chinese Communist Party and international communist movement, who spent his entire life defending Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, fought to his dying day for friendship between the people of China and the USSR and for close cooperation between the CCP and CPSU, resolutely opposed various opportunistic currents in the CCP and mercilessly exposed the true nature of the theory and practice of Maoism.

Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu) was the son of a teacher. He was born on 9 April (23 May) 1904 in Jinzhai in the Liuan district (now Jinzhai) of Anhui Province. After graduating from the agricultural institute in Liuan, he enrolled in the preparatory division of the Wuchang Higher Commercial Institute in 1924. In Wuchang Wang Ming became acquainted with Marxist literature and began his revolutionary activity. In 1924 he joined the Socialist Youth Alliance of China, and in 1924 he became a member of the CCP. In 1924 and 1925 Wang Ming edited the progressive student publications WANGUANG and YUWAN QINGNIAN XUEHUI HUIKAN and published his own first articles in them, calling upon youth to struggle for national renovation. In the summer of 1925, Wang Ming took an active part in demonstrations by Wuchang students in support of the anti-imperialist "May 30th Movement" in Shanghai, which marked the beginning of the national revolution of 1925-1927.

At the end of 1924 Wang Ming went to the Soviet Union to continue his studies. He later wrote that the success of revolution in China would be unthinkable "without research into all of the aspects of the triumphant revolutionary experience of the USSR."¹

Wang Ming studied at the Sun Yat-sen University of Chinese Workers, where many talented organizers of ideological, political, agitation, propagandistic, cultural, educational, military and policy work in the CCP and the revolutionary movement received their training.² Wang Ming was one of the university's most gifted and industrious students.

In the spring of 1927, he was sent to China with a group of Chinese and Soviet comrades headed by P. A. Mif to assist the CCP in the organization of short training courses for commanders and political workers for the revolutionary army and in the establishment of a daily press organ for the party.³

In April-May 1927, Wang Ming attended the Fifth CCP Congress and took part in the work of the congress secretariat.

When Wang Ming worked on the editorial board of the CCP Central Committee's weekly XIANGDAO, he published several articles on the problems of the Chinese revolution, which was then living through a crucial period.

In one of these articles, Wang Ming underscored, basing his statements on corresponding Comintern decisions, that the struggle for proletarian supremacy and a non-capitalist future in China could not be carried out without winning the support of the broad popular masses. "This is the problem," he wrote, "and it must be concretely resolved."⁴ In connection with this, Wang Ming criticized some CCP leaders who were suppressing the development of the worker and peasant movement and were refusing to actively conduct a policy corresponding to the aspirations of the underprivileged worker and peasant masses.

In his appeal for more far-reaching revolutionary reforms, Wang Ming proposed the further satisfaction of the requirements of the working class and the resolution of the agrarian problem. Under the conditions of impending counter-revolution, Wang Ming also stressed the need to arm the workers and peasants. "Only properly armed workers and peasants can secure revolutionary gains," he emphasized, "and only the defeat and devastation of reactionary armed forces will make the achievements of new revolutionary history possible."⁵

In spite of allegations made by Maoist historians, Wang Ming continued to attach great significance to the military factor in the Chinese revolution.

When he returned to the Soviet Union in August 1927, Wang Ming resumed his studies at Sun Yat-sen University. In 1928 he was given a Comintern assignment to translate the book "Vooruzhennoye vosstaniye" [Armed Revolt], compiled by the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, into Chinese and wrote a preface to the work. This work summarized the combat experience gained from worker revolts in several countries, including China. It was specially published for the delegates of the Sixth CCP Congress, held near Moscow in the summer of 1928. This book aroused the interest of Zhou Enlai and other congress delegates and, on the orders of the CCP Central Committee, was republished in Shanghai.

Wang Ming played an important part in the preparations for the Sixth CCP Congress, which analyzed the situation in China and outlined party objectives stemming from these new conditions.⁶ At the request of the congress presidium, Wang Ming criticized, in his report, the factional activities of the Jiangxi-Zhejiang student group in Moscow. From the reports presented at the congress

by Qu Qiubo, Zhou Enlai and other delegates. Wang Ming learned of Mao Zedong's ultra-leftist views and militaristic manner. The term "Mao Zedong-ism" was already making the rounds in the party at that time.

In February 1929 Wang Ming returned to China. Under difficult underground conditions, made necessary by savage Guomindang terror, he worked in the Eastern Raykom of Shanghai, the Jiangsu Province Party Committee, the communist faction of the General Council of the All-China Labor Federation and the propaganda section of the CCP Central Committee. At different times, Wang Ming edited the HONGQI (1929) and LAODONG (1930) newspapers and, along with Zhou Enlai, NANZHEN magazine (1931).

In 1930 Wang Ming resolutely opposed the petty bourgeois, nationalist and adventuristic platform of Li Lisan, who was the actual head of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee at that time.⁸

Ignoring the judgments and recommendations of the Comintern, Li Lisan and his followers, including Mao Zedong, interpreted conditions in China at the beginning of 1930 as an overtly revolutionary situation and demanded the commencement of uprisings and strikes throughout the nation. They also intended, "for the sake of the victory of the Chinese revolution," to provoke a world war between the imperialist powers and the USSR and to artificially accelerate worldwide revolution. Li Lisan and his supporters were even prepared to sacrifice the Soviet Union "in the interests of the Chinese revolution."

Wang Ming criticized Li Lisan's platform, which could have severely harmed the CCP and the revolutionary movement in China and the rest of the world. But the Li Lisan leadership refuted this criticism, accused Wang Ming and his followers of "rightist inclinations" and "factional activity" and imposed harsh disciplinary penalties on them. Wang Ming, however, staunchly defended the just cause. His fight with the Li Lisan group displayed not only his personal courage, but also his theoretical and political maturity. His principled views advanced Wang Ming to the position of one of the most authoritative CCP activists at a critical time for the party.

Taking Wang Ming's great services to the party into consideration, the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth CCP Central Committee (January 1931) elected Wang Ming, at the suggestion of Ren Bishi, a member of the Central Committee, a member of the Politburo and a secretary of the CCP Central Committee.

In February 1931, Wang Ming completed his work on a book entitled "The Struggle Between Two Lines,"⁹ in which a great deal of space was devoted to a discussion of the struggle against the Li Lisan group and the exposure of its social roots and opportunistic essence. Without mentioning Mao Zedong by name, Wang Ming was already criticizing his errors by that time.¹⁰

The basic problems of the Chinese revolution were also analyzed in the book. In terms of the depth and breadth of this analysis, Wang Ming's book is unparalleled in Chinese party literature. It was republished several times

(including editions published in Yanan in 1940 and Beijing in 1957) and was, for many years, considered by the CCP to be the correct explication of party policy.

In the fall of 1931, Wang Ming returned to Moscow. Between November 1931 and November 1937 he represented the CCP in the Communist Internationale. Between 1932 and 1943 Wang Ming was a member of the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee, from 1932 through 1935 he was a member of the Political Secretariat of the Comintern Executive Committee, and from 1935 through 1943 he was an alternate member of the Secretariat of the Comintern Executive Committee.

For 6 years, Wang Ming took part, along with prominent figures in the international communist movement, in the collective ideological, theoretical and political work of the Comintern and in the scientific summarization of revolutionary experience, including the experience of the Chinese Communist Party. He also took part in the preparations for the historic Seventh Comintern Congress, where many outdated and incorrect tenets were revised and the international communist movement was provided with new horizons.

On 7 August 1935, Wang Ming spoke before congress delegates on "The Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial and Semicolonial Countries and Communist Party Tactics." In particular, he pointed out imperialism's frontal attack on the colonial and semicolonial people and the mounting universal discontent and indignation in these countries, which were creating the prerequisites for the establishment of a united anti-imperialist front of the general public. He discussed the intensification of conflicts between the colonial and imperialist bourgeoisies and the appearance of national revolutionary groups in reformist parties and of schism in some of them and saluted the heightened prestige of the working class and its parties. Wang Ming talked about the revolutionary uprisings in several colonies and semicolonies, stressing the tremendous influence of Great October and the successes of socialist construction in the USSR on the development of the revolutionary movement throughout the world.

The speaker paid special attention to the situation in China in connection with the spread of Japanese expansion. He criticized the sectarian errors of the CCP leadership, particularly those committed at the time of the Shanghai defense of 1932 and the Fujian events of 1933-1934. These errors, in Wang Ming's opinion, stemmed from the fact that "many of our comrades did not understand and still do not understand the new state of affairs in China. They do not understand that the question of an anti-imperialist united front in China must be stated in a new way."¹¹

With a view to accumulated experience and the existing state of affairs in the country, the speaker advised the CCP to develop even further "the tactic of the anti-imperialist united popular front, gradually achieving the boldest, broadest and most powerful scope of this movement, so that the Chinese people might unite as quickly as possible for a common struggle against imperialism and for the salvation of their motherland."¹² In other words, the struggle for the united anti-imperialist front was advocated from above as well as from below.

Wang Ming acquainted congress delegates with the basic tenets of his "Appeal Addressed to All Countrymen to Resist Japan for the Sake of National Salvation," he had written the night before. This document, in accordance with a resolution that was passed, was published in the name of the CCP Central Committee and the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic and entered history as the "address of 1 August." In this address, the CCP called upon all parties, political and military groups without exception, including Guomindang Army units, to stop the civil war and unite for the purpose of resisting Japanese aggression and creating a national defense government made up of representatives of various political, military and other groups, as well as a united command staff and a single anti-Japanese army. The national defense government program included demands for resolute struggle against aggression, the confiscation of the land and property of Japanese invaders and national traitors, improvement of the material living conditions of workers and the granting of democratic freedoms to the public.¹³

The publication of this document marked the beginning of a new stage in the CCP's struggle to set up a united national anti-Japanese front with all other political and military forces in the country which were willing to resist Japanese aggression.

A conference of CCP delegates was held in Moscow on 25-27 August 1935. Wang Ming presented a report entitled "How the Decisions of the Seventh Congress Should Be Implemented in China." The basic premises of this report were set forth in his article called "The Struggle for an Anti-Imperialist United Front and the Current Objectives of the Chinese Communist Party." The author noted that the CCP was faced with the urgent need to encourage involvement in the national liberation struggle by "the broadest segments of the public, not only truly revolutionary, politically aware and honest elements, but also, at least temporarily, all hesitant allies and sympathizers from different strata and classes of Chinese society." The possibility of creating a united front even with Chiang Kai-shek was not excluded, if he would "actually stop warring against the Red Army and point his weapons at the Japanese imperialists."¹⁴

On the instructions of the Secretariat of the Comintern Executive Committee, in November 1935 Wang Ming took an active part in the drafting of new documents intended to accelerate the creation of a united front--the Address of the CCP Central Committee and the Appeal of the Red Army of 25 November 1935.

The work performed by the Comintern and the Chinese delegation headed by Wang Ming was particularly significant since the leadership of the CCP Central Committee and most of the communists taking part in the Northwestern campaign were isolated from the nation's main regions, had no contacts with the Comintern and did not know about the tremendous changes that had taken place in international and internal politics.¹⁵

It was not until 25 December 1935, after hearing the decisions of the Seventh Comintern Congress and the recommendations of the conference of Chinese delegates, that the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, including Mao

Zedong, adopted the "Decree on the Current Political Situation and Party Objectives," which spoke of the need to establish a united national anti-Japanese front. This document, however, continued to regard the Chiang Kai-shek group as one of the main enemies, along with the Japanese aggressors. Besides this, the Politburo decision of 25 December also contained errors of a rightist opportunistic tone, which was reflected, for example, in the willingness of the CCP leadership to open party membership to "all persons desiring to fight for the aims of the communist party, regardless of their social origins," the statement that "the party is not frightened by the infiltration of its ranks by even a few opportunists" and so forth. This approach carried a serious threat of the CCP's degeneration into a petty bourgeois party, both in terms of social composition and in terms of ideology and policy.¹⁶

In July 1936, the Secretariat of the Comintern Executive Committee met under the leadership of G. M. Dimitrov to discuss the platform of the united front in China. After hearing Wang Ming's critical report, the Secretariat commended the activities of the CCP as a whole but directed the party's attention to the need to correct and develop several fundamental tenets of the united front tactic and to overcome leftist sectarian and rightist opportunistic errors. In an article published in August 1936, Wang Ming frankly stated that "communist must not equate the Guomindang and Chiang Kai-shek with the Japanese invaders, since the main enemy of the Chinese people is the Japanese fascist militaristic clique, and the struggle against this clique must take precedence over everything else. Besides this, we cannot regard the entire Guomindang and all of its troops as allies and accomplices of Japanese imperialism. It is clear to the Chinese Communist Party that effective and serious armed resistance of the Japanese invaders will necessitate participation by Guomindang troops or an absolute majority of these troops."¹⁷ As Wang Ming stressed, the CCP should therefore work toward the cessation of hostilities between the Red Army and Chiang Kai-shek's forces and reach an agreement with them on struggle against the Japanese invaders. "In the political sense," Wang Ming wrote, "the united anti-Japanese national front should represent an agreement reached by the CCP, the Guomindang and other organizations, based on a common political platform but with the preservation of total political and organizational independence."¹⁸

Wang Ming's works which were published in the *COMMUNIST INTERNATIONALE* magazine in 1935-1937 specified and clarified the strategic and tactical principles worked out at the Seventh Comintern Congress as they applied to Chinese conditions, which was of tremendous value to the CCP in its adaptation to new conditions and its criticism of the ultra-leftist insistence on broader civil war, which was characteristic of Mao Zedong and his followers.¹⁹

Wang Ming's energetic and purposeful struggle for a stronger and broader united national anti-Japanese front contributed to the success of CCP work in an atmosphere of nationwide resistance to Japanese aggression. It is not surprising that Wang Ming's multifaceted activity in the Comintern was highly commended in the decisions of an expanded conference of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee in December 1937, in the thesis of the CCP Central Committee, adopted on 19 April 1938, and in other party documents.

After his return to China in November 1937, Wang Ming, in his capacity as a member of the Politburo and secretary of the CCP Central Committee, supervised the work of several regional bureaus, sections and commissions of the CCP Central Committee. He based his work on Comintern directives concerning the need to "firmly and consistently conduct the policy of the united national anti-Japanese front and do everything possible for the thorough consolidation of this front, as the most important condition for victory over the Japanese militarists."²⁰

When he was the head of the united front section of the CCP Central Committee in 1938 and 1939, Wang Ming simultaneously supervised the work of the Central China (Changjiang) Bureau of the CCP Central Committee in Hankou, and later in Chongqing. This bureau was set up to reinforce party work in Guomindang territory, escalate partisan warfare in Central China and fight against pro-Japanese, conciliatory and anticommunist elements for the purpose of closer cooperation with the Guomindang to resist the aggression of Japanese imperialism. The activities of this bureau, the members of which also included Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu and others, represented a significant counterbalance to the "special" line of the Yanan group of Mao Zedong, who was, incidentally, making an earnest effort to pass himself off as an ardent advocate of the united front in the expectation that the Comintern would support his candidacy for the position of CCP Central Committee secretary general.

Because of Wang Ming's great prestige among party members and the public, Mao Zedong had to take him into account and tried to win him over to his own side. But nothing came of this so Mao Zedong then chose Wang Ming to be his chief target in his struggle against the Comintern and all communist internationalists. Mao Zedong used every available means to fight against Wang Ming in his attempt to usurp leadership in the CCP and propagate the "Chinese version of Marxism."

At the time of the so-called movement for the correction of style (1941-1945), Mao Zedong and his followers tried to discredit Wang Ming, Bo Gu, Luo Fu, Zhou Enlai and many other CCP activists by inventing the story of the "two lines of Wang Ming"--the "leftist opportunist" line of 1931-1934 and the "rightist opportunist" line of 1937-1938. Mao Zedong tried to use his criticism of Wang Ming to camouflage his attempts to denigrate the historic role played by the Comintern and many outstanding CCP leaders in the elaboration of the general party line of the 1920's and 1930's. Disguising his nationalist platform, Mao Zedong brazenly gave himself credit for all successes in the theoretical generalization of the nature of the Chinese revolution, its driving forces, the strategy and tactics of revolutionary war, the construction of the army and the soviets, the united front tactic, etc. At the same time, he tried to blame others for his own errors and crimes, hoping to pass his line off as the only correct and infallible one in all stages of the Chinese revolution.

In his memoirs, Wang Ming shows how Mao Zedong attempted, during the course of the "movement for the correction of style," to destroy healthy forces in the CCP, change its ideological, theoretical and organizational principles

and turn the party into an energetic spokesman of the "Thought of Mao Zedong." Mass reprisals against dissidents were widespread during this campaign.²¹

As a result of all this, internationalist forces were weakened and forced to retreat, but the Maoists were not able to completely destroy them. At the Seventh and Eighth CCP congresses (1945 and 1956), Wang Ming continued to be elected a member of the CCP Central Committee. After the Seventh CCP Congress, Wang Ming headed the Office of Political Research, and then the Judicial Commission of the CCP Central Committee. After the founding of the PRC, he headed the work of the Commission for Legislative Proposals of the Central People's Government. He was also quite active in the Chinese-Soviet Friendship Society as one of its founders and administrators.

The facts testify that Wang Ming continued to fight against the "Thought" and policies of Mao Zedong. In March 1949, for example, at the Second Plenum of the Seventh CCP Central Committee, Wang Ming made a speech in which he exposed the true reasons for Mao Zedong's renunciation of the socialist revolution and socialist construction in China.²²

Mao Zedong, in turn, did not stop persecuting Wang Ming. In his concluding speech at the Second Plenum of the Seventh CCP Central Committee, he reproved Wang Ming for his continued refusal to recognize the "Thought" of Mao Zedong. A summary of Mao's concluding speech, which was later distributed to party members for discussion, included a paragraph entitled "How to Help Comrade Wang Ming Correct His Errors."²³

On 16 March 1949, Mao Zedong confronted Wang Ming with "confessions" extorted from Bo Gu, Luo Fu and Yang Shangkun by means of blackmail and threats and demanded that Wang Ming write a similar "confession with a triple denunciation"--that is, a denunciation of Wang Ming, a denunciation of the others (Bo Gu, Luo Fu, Yang Shangkun and others) and a denunciation of the Russians--the All-Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and the Comintern. But Wang Ming resolutely refused to comply with Mao's demand. "I not only refuse to write it, but I also refuse to read anything of the kind," he replied.²⁴

Later, at the insistence of Mao Zedong, the Third Plenum of the Seventh CCP Central Committee adopted a special "Decision on Comrade Wang Ming" on 9 June 1950, demanding that he write a "confession" and submit it to the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee.²⁵ But Mao Zedong never did see this "confession."

Wang Ming went to the USSR for medical treatment in February 1956 and, with the deepest interest, kept track of the successes of the PRC's workers in the construction of socialism. He was increasingly disturbed by the negative aspects of the "special" course of Mao Zedong and his group.

Wang Ming did not conceal his critical opinions of the "Thought" and practices of Mao Zedong. "In the late 1950's and the early 1960's, with his adventurous policy of the so-called 'three red banners,'" Wang Ming wrote, "Mao

Zedong brought the cause of socialist construction in China and the national economy to the verge of catastrophe, led the Chinese people into a life of incredible difficulty, misery and poverty and thereby discredited the ideals of socialism in the eyes of the international public. Since the beginning of the 1960's, with his anti-Leninist, anti-Soviet, schismatic and subversive activity, he has imposed considerable harm and danger on the world socialist community, the international communist and workers movement and the anti-imperialist struggle of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America.... In this way, he has rendered a great service to American and other imperialists and is also endangering the fundamental interests of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people."²⁶

Wang Ming stressed that it was no coincidence that the "'Thought of Mao Zedong,' just as Mao himself, have become a symbol of error and falsity, a symbol of poverty and misery, a symbol of barbarism and savagery, a symbol of obscurantism and counterrevolution in the eyes of the Chinese people and the workers of the entire world."²⁷

In his works entitled "On the Events in China" (1969), "Lenin, Leninism and the Chinese Revolution" (1970), "Half a Century of the CCP and the Treachery of Mao Zedong" (1975) and several articles, Wang Ming exposes the true purpose of the anti-Leninist, antisocialist, anti-people, great-power, nationalist "Thought" and political course of Mao Zedong and discusses the harm he has inflicted on the Chinese people, the CCP and the international communist movement.

In a description of the rabid anti-Sovietism of Mao Zedong and his followers, Wang Ming correctly wrote that this anti-Sovietism, just like a mirror, reflects Mao Zedong's struggle "against Marxism-Leninism, the socialist countries and the communist and workers parties (including the Chinese Communist Party), against the anti-imperialist movement and world peace. He uses anti-Sovietism to win approval and sympathy from the imperialist powers, particularly the imperialists in the United States and reactionaries in all nations."²⁸

In his works of 1969-1974, Wang Ming also assigns a prominent place to his exposure of Maoist falsifications of the history of the CCP and the Chinese revolution, reveals the ideological, theoretical, historical and social roots of Mao Zedong's treachery and expresses profound faith in the inevitable collapse of Maoism.

Wang Ming's life and work represent a vivid example of unshakeable loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, a model of selfless service to the Chinese people, of principled struggle for the socialist development of China, for the friendship of the Chinese and Soviet people and for the unity of the international communist movement.

FOOTNOTES

1. (Chen) Shaoyu, "An Enquiry Into the Severance of Diplomatic Relations Between England and Russia," XIANGDAO, 8 June 1927, No 197.
2. See G. V. Yefimov, "From the History of the Communist University of China's Workers," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1977, No 2, pp 169-175.
3. General Secretary Chen Duxiu of the CCP Central Committee rejected these proposals at the time in the belief that they were premature.
4. (Chen) Shaoyu, "An Enquiry Into the Prospects of the Chinese Revolution and the Problem of Hegemony in the Revolution," XIANGDAO, 15 June 1927, No 198.
5. Ibid.
6. See A. M. Grigor'yev, "An Important Milestone in the History of the CCP," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA 1973, No 2, pp 99-111.
7. Wang Ming, "Fifty Years of the CCP and the Treachery of Mao Zedong," Moscow, 1975, p 137.
8. For more about the struggle against Lilisan-ism, see A. M. Grigor'yev, "The Comintern and the Revolutionary Movement in China Under the Soviet Banner (1928-1930)," in the book: "Komintern i Vostok" [The Comintern and the Orient], Moscow, 1969, pp 328-345.
9. When the second edition came out (1934), the book had a new name--"The Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the CCP."
10. See Chen Shaoyu (Wang Ming), "The Struggle for the Further Bolshevization of the CCP," Moscow-Leningrad, 1934, pp 125-132 (in Chinese).
11. Wang Ming, "On the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonial and Semicolonial Countries and Communist Party Tactics," KOMMUNISTICHESKIY INTERNATSIONAL, 1935, No 25, p 31.
12. Ibid., p 32.
13. "Appeal to All Countrymen for the Resistance of Japan To Save the Motherland" (leaflet printed in Chinese). See also, KOMMUNISTICHESKIY INTERNATSIONAL, 1935, No 33-34, pp 106-111.
14. Wang Ming, "The Struggle for an Anti-Imperialist United Front and the Current Objectives of the Chinese Communist Party," KOMMUNISTICHESKIY INTERNATSIONAL, 1935, No 33-34, pp 11, 16.
15. Existing documents at the disposal of historians, including the decisions of the CCP leadership of 8 January and 5 August 1935, completely refute

the statements by Maoist historians that the conference in Zunyi (January 1935) supposedly set forth a new policy line--the line of creating a united anti-Japanese front (see A. S. Titov, "the Conference in Zunyi," *PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA*, 1975, No 4, pp 104-115).

16. See K. V. Kukushkin, "The Comintern and the United National Anti-Japanese Front in China (1935-1943)," in the book: "Komintern i Vostok," p 357.
17. Wang Ming, "Fifteen Years of Struggle for the Independence and Freedom of the Chinese People," *KOMMUNISTICHESKIY INTERNATSIONAL*, 1936, No 14, pp 88-89.
18. *Ibid.*, p 88.
19. For a more detailed discussion, see K. V. Kukushkin, *Op. cit.*, pp 353-375; A. M. Grigor'yev and A. B. Reznikov, "G. Dimitrov and the Problems of the United Anti-Imperialist Front," in the book: "Georgiy Dimitrov--vydayushchiysya deyatel' kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya" [Georgiy Dimitrov--Outstanding Figure in the Communist Movement], Moscow, 1972, pp 279-285.
20. "Decree of the Secretariat of the Comintern Executive Committee on the Chinese Question. 10 October 1937," in the book: "VII kongress Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala i bor'ba protiv fashizma i voyny (Sbornik dokumentov)" [The Seventh Comintern Congress and the Struggle Against Fascism and War (Collected Documents)], Moscow, 1973, p 472.
21. For a thorough discussion, see Wang Ming, "Fifty Years of the CCP and the Treachery of Mao Zedong."
22. *Ibid.*, pp 150-151, 157-158.
23. *Ibid.*, pp 151-152, 155.
24. *Ibid.*, p 152.
25. *Ibid.*, pp 152-153.
26. Wang Ming, "Lenin, Leninism and the Chinese Revolution," Moscow, 1970, pp 23-24.
27. *Ibid.*, p 24.
28. Wang Ming, "Fifty Years of the CCP and the Treachery of Mao Zedong," p 181.

CONTACTS BETWEEN UNIVERSITY OF ST. PETERSBURG AND ORIENTAL INSTITUTE IN
THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 180-182

[Article by A. A. Babintsev]

[Text] The article by P. Ye. Skachkov, "On the Borderline Dividing the Centuries,"¹ contains information about the activities of the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok in connection with the training of Sinological personnel. The subject of this report will be the Oriental Institute's instruction in the Japanese language.

The University of St. Petersburg was the first Russian higher academic institution to offer courses in the Japanese language. The Japanese language began to be taught in its School of Oriental Languages in 1970, but the Department of Japanese Literature, for several reasons, was founded much later, in 1898. A year later, on 21 October 1899, the Oriental Institute was opened in the young Far Eastern city of Vladivostok, and one of its departments was a department of Japanese literature.

The need to found an academic institution in one of the nation's Eastern centers for the study of the languages, history, economics and culture of people in the Far East and for the training of the necessary personnel was dictated by the complex international situation in the Far East, the economic development of the Russian coastal zone and the expansion of contacts with neighboring states. When the plans for this academic institution were being discussed, a decision was made, at the suggestion of S. Yu. Vitte (then minister of finance), to found an Oriental institute in Vladivostok, and a decree to this effect was ratified on 24 May 1899.

Four years later, in 1903, the institute held the first of its commencement exercises. This rapid organization of normal academic processes and minimization of the organizational period became possible because Russia had Orientalists with a scientific pedagogical background, including experts on the Far East, and this attested to the maturity of Russian Orientology and to its ability to develop both intensively and extensively.

During the first years of the Oriental Institute's existence, its staff was made up primarily of graduates of the University of St. Petersburg. On 9 July 1899, A. M. Pozdneyev, doctor of Mongolian and Kalmyk literature and professor in the School of Oriental Languages of the capital's university, was appointed director of the institute. From the day the institute opened, its professorial staff included A. V. Rudakov and P. P. Shmidt (Chinese and Manchurian literature); and, somewhat later, teaching positions were filled by G. V. Podstavin (Korean literature), Ye. G. Spal'vin (Japanese literature), G. Ts. Tsybikov (Mongolian and Tibetan literature) and N. V. Kyuner (history and geography). Courses in law and economics were also taught by graduates of the University of St. Petersburg, N. P. Taberio, N. I. Kokhanovskiy and N. N. Dmitriyev. It can be said that the formation of this faculty, not by means of accidental choice but by enlisting the services of a relatively homogeneous group of individuals from the same large scientific center, as was done in this case, produced positive results.

Information about the activities of two Russian experts on Japan, Yevgeniy Genrikhovich Spal'vin (1872-1933) and Gennadiy Ivanovich Dolya (1876-1931), can be used to illustrate the interconnection between two subdivisions of Japanese area studies in Russia at the beginning of this century.

Feliks-Yevgeniy-Leopol'd Spal'vin was born in Riga and moved to St. Petersburg in 1891, where he enrolled in the university's Law School but transferred to the School of Oriental Languages 3 years later. He graduated from this school with a first-class diploma in Chinese-Manchurian-Mongolian studies in 1898. His Chinese language and literature teachers were D. A. Peshchurov, A. I. Ivanovskiy and V. P. Vasil'yev, he learned the Manchurian language from A. I. Ivanovskiy and the Mongolian language from A. M. Pozdneyev and K. F. Golstunskiy, and studied the history of the Orient with N. N. Veselovskiy. In his second year he began to attend Japanese language classes taught by Kurono Yoshibumi and mastered the European languages. When the Department of Japanese Literature was opened in the School of Oriental Languages in 1898, the university sent Ye. G. Spal'vin to Japan for professorial training.² He left in 1899, but he did not return to the University of St. Petersburg because he was offered a professorial position at the Oriental Institute.

In Japan, Ye. G. Spal'vin persistently perfected his fluency in spoken and written Japanese and studied various Japanese language teaching aids. He worked out his own ideas about Japanese grammar, prepared the necessary lecture courses and collected numerous reference works on various aspects of Japanese area studies. At that same time, Ye. G. Spal'vin was buying Chinese and Japanese type for the institute's printing office, buying 1,445 rubles' worth of books on Japanese area studies and searching for a lecturer in the Japanese language "from among the indigenous natives."³ While he was in Japan, Ye. G. Spal'vin met the great Japanese writer and translator Futabatei Shimei, which is attested to by a photograph in a book by Ye. G. Spal'vin, entitled "Yokome-de mita Nihon" ("An Outsider's Look at Japan") and published in 1931 by the Tokyo Shinchosha Publishing Firm.

On 8 August 1900, the office of the governor-general of the cis-Amur zone informed the Oriental Institute that Ye. G. Spal'vin had been authorized to take on the duties of a professor from 1 July of that year, and on 18 August he first attended a meeting of the institute conference (academic council).⁴ His first lecture, entitled "A Review of the Fundamentals of the Japanese Language and Literature," was presented on 2 September 1900, the text of the lecture was printed in IZVESTIYA VOSTOCHNOGO INSTITUTA and was published in a separate edition.⁵

From the 1900/01 academic year on, Ye. G. Spal'vin was the chief instructor in the second, third and fourth year courses of the Japanese-Chinese division (the Japanese language was not offered to first-year students), he wrote and published several Japanese language teaching aids and wrote articles on many aspects of Japanese area studies for publication. His weekly teaching load was 5 lecture hours in the 1900/01 academic year, 11 hours in 1902/03, and 17 hours in 1904/05. In addition to teaching classes, Ye. G. Spal'vin participated actively in the work of the institute library and publishing department (he served several times as the institute librarian, particularly in 1900-1902--the period of the most intensive collection of books for the library), he was a member of the library auditing committee, he edited many institute publications and he was the head of the institute printing office, where texts were printed in Russian and in seven foreign languages; in terms of the quality of printing in Oriental typefaces, this office was considered to be second only to the printing office of the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. In 1902 and 1904 Ye. G. Spal'vin temporarily served as the director of the Oriental Institute (after the retirement of A. M. Pozdneyev in 1903, D. M. Pozdneyev, also a graduate of the University of St. Petersburg, served as director in 1904-1906, and at the end of 1906 the position was taken by Professor A. V. Rudakov).

Ye. G. Spal'vin must be given the credit for organizing the teaching and learning of the Japanese language and other subjects in Japanese area studies at the Oriental Institute, and he did this almost completely on his own, since the School of Oriental Languages then offered a solid general scientific background but could only provide negligible practical skill in the Japanese language, while the Oriental Institute had always pursued the following goal: "The study of languages and all other courses in Orientology must be of a purely practical nature at the institute, whereas the scientific and theoretical study of the Orient has been predominant in Russian science up to now."⁶ In reality, however, this purely practical goal of the institute was not sustained, and significant scientific works were written and famous Orientologists were trained within its walls. The Japanese experts in the first graduating classes included V. M. Mendrin (graduated in 1907), the author of exceedingly important studies and translations in the areas of Japanese history, language and literature and later a professor at the Oriental Institute; A. N. Petrov (1907), the first man in Russia to study the Japanese workers movement; and G. G. Ksimidov (1908), who made an extremely interesting study of the history of contemporary Japanese literature. All of the works mentioned above represent a contribution to the study of Japan in our nation and have retained their scientific value in our day.

After the first commencement exercise of 1903, the next one was delayed by the military operations that began in the Far East in 1904 and was not held until 1905. This year's graduates included G. I. Dolya, who enrolled in the institute in 1900 after graduating from the Stavropol' Seminary (students came to Vladivostok, where the only higher academic institution east of Lake Baykal was located at that time, from all parts of the nation: In particular, V. M. Mendrin from Khar'kov, A. N. Petrov from Kazan' and G. G. Ksimidov from Tiflis). G. I. Dolya completed the course of study in the Japanese and Chinese Department with outstanding marks and went to work for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In St. Petersburg, he was invited to teach classes in the Japanese language in the School of Oriental Languages at the end of 1908. G. I. Dolya accepted the offer and began working part-time for the university on 1 January 1909.⁷ At first he taught 8 hours of classes a week, but in the 1910/11 academic year the figure rose to 14 hours, and the next year he was teaching 18 hours a week. G. I. Dolya read the most diverse texts with his students: Primers in beginning classes, and samples of classical and contemporary fiction, newspaper clippings, sorobun, kambun and excerpts from the works of outstanding Japanese educator Fukuzawa Yukichi in more advanced classes.⁸ In 1910 G. I. Dolya edited a work by famous English expert on Japanese affairs B. H. Chamberlain, "Mojji-no shirube," and published it with the title "Practical Introduction to the Study of Japanese Literature" (only the first part was published).

There is an extant manuscript of the graduation thesis written by 4-year student N. N. Konrad, which he composed in the summer of 1911 in Tokyo and submitted to the school on 7 December of the same year. G. I. Dolya's evaluation, "very good," was written on the title page on 17 January 1912.⁹

G. I. Dolya did not complete his last academic year at the University of St. Petersburg because of a job transfer to the Russian Consulate in Mukden in January 1912. In view of the fact that his departure would put the School of Oriental Languages in a difficult position, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs complied with the school's request and postponed G. I. Dolya's departure for his new place of employment "to Easter vacation."¹⁰

Therefore, G. I. Dolya, who was taught at the Oriental Institute by Ye. G. Spal'vin, a graduate of the University of St. Petersburg, taught at this university himself for around 3 years, and one of his students, N. N. Konrad, was to become the head of the Soviet School of Japanese Studies.

FOOTNOTES

1. PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1975, No 3.
2. See the State Historical Archives of Leningrad Oblast (GIALO), f 14, op 3, d 15706, st 108; d 28376, shs 64-79; op 1, d 10139, sh 1.

3. See IZVESTIYA VOSTOCHNOGO INSTITUTA, vol 1, Vladivostok, 1900, pp LVII, 40; Appendix to vol 2, pp 92-93. At the beginning of the century, Japanese lecturers Maeda Kiyotsugu, Kawakami Hideo and Matsuda Mamoru were invited to come and teach the Japanese language.
4. Ibid., vol 2, p 1.
5. A copy of one edition, which is stored in the Oriental section of the Science Library of Leningrad University (code 0-II 3160), is signed by the author. This is one of the few extant autographs of Ye. G. Spal'vin.
6. IZVESTIYA VOSTOCHNOGO INSTITUTA, vol 1, p 5.
7. See "Handbook on the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok for 1909," Vladivostok, 1909, p XXII; GIALO, f 14, op 1, d 10254, shs 2, 6.
8. GIALO, f 14, op 3, d 15804, sh 30.
9. GIALO, f 14, op 6, d 1474-bis, sh 1.
10. GIALO, f 14, op 1, d 10254, shs 26, 28.

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CSO: 1805

FROM THE MEMOIRS OF A SOVIET SPECIALIST

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 183-189

[Article by L. N. Kutakov, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] I was given the opportunity of learning about the life of the Chinese people at a time when the USSR and China had the friendly relations of good neighbors. In 1955 I received an invitation to come to the PRC as the chief adviser of the director of the Beijing Diplomatic Institute. Several Soviet specialists in the areas of international relations, Soviet foreign policy, government and law, economics and the history of China were supposed to come with me (N. N. Inozemtsev, A. M. Dubinskiy, V. A. Maslenikov, V. I. Menzhinskiy and N. A. Sidorov).

The Soviet people have always had great affection for the Chinese people, who fought against foreign interventionists and mercenary reactionary cliques for many years. During those years, we were wholeheartedly overjoyed by the triumph of the Chinese revolution and the successes of people's China and sincerely wished to help the Chinese people build a new life and develop their economy, culture and science. People's China also needed diplomatic personnel to protect its socialist, or what were supposed to be socialist, interests in the international arena.

Because my position as vice-chancellor of the science division of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations had given me some experience in the training of diplomatic personnel and the organization of scientific work, I agreed to go to China although this disrupted my personal plans: By that time I had gathered all the material I needed for a doctoral dissertation and my book on the diplomatic history of the Russo-Japanese war was being prepared for publication. The career plans of my colleagues were also disrupted, but this did not stop us. We felt that it was our duty as communists and proletarian internationalists to give the Chinese people the help they needed.

Our departure was rushed. The Chinese side requested that our arrival coincide with the opening of the Diplomatic Institute. After quickly packing my things and leaving my family in Moscow, I flew to Beijing. At that time there were no jet passenger liners, the flight therefore took almost 24 hours

and we were unable to arrive by the time the institute opened. No one met us at the Beijing airport.

On the next day, however, I was received by Zhang Wentian, alternate member of the Politburo of the (CP Central Committee and first deputy minister of foreign affairs, who was once the first PRC ambassador to Moscow. During the war against Japan, he held high positions in the CCP leadership and PLA [People's Liberation Army] command.

Zhang Wentian's office was furnished in the old Chinese style: Dark low armchairs, beautifully inlaid mahogany screens and a lacquered and expertly painted table. The usual green tea was served. Zhang Wentian, a solidly built man of average height, dressed in the high-collared jacket usually worn by Chinese officials, welcomed me cordially, inquired about my flight and asked questions about my work and my family. The conversation was businesslike and friendly. Zhang Wentian impressed me as a wise and clever man.

Zhang Wentian later received us several times and listened to our ideas on how the training of diplomatic personnel should be organized. At his suggestion, plans were made to establish a scientific research institute in Beijing as part of the National Society for the Study of International Relations. We worked out detailed recommendations concerning the training of administrative and scientific personnel in the areas of diplomacy and international relations.

Our specialists also worked with maximum efficiency in other fields of science, culture, technology, medicine and education. I later had a chance to visit the Anshan Metallurgical Combine, which had been remodeled with Soviet assistance. Soviet specialists showed me a rolling mill manufactured at the Kramatorsk Plant according to the last word in world technology. The first mill of this series had been turned over to China.

The Soviet specialists were given accommodations in two hotels--in the center of Beijing (not far from what had been the embassy neighborhood) and on the western outskirts.

There was already unrest in the city. A shot was fired at us once, late in the evening when we were riding along an empty street after a lengthy conference. The bullet ricocheted off the side of the vehicle, just grazing it. We were unharmed. We were later told that Chiang Kai-shek's agents had wanted to create an incident by killing one of the Soviet advisers. After this, no matter where we went, a guard sat next to the driver. Soldiers stood at the entrance to the hotel.

The Chinese special services not only protected us, but they also watched our every move. As soon as someone from the embassy or a colleague entered our hotel rooms, a member of the staff would immediately appear and begin to check the heating system with a worried expression, or dust the furniture, straighten the rugs and so forth. We tried to appear oblivious to all of this.

We sensed great interest in every word we said to the individuals (students and instructors) with whom we met daily. This also applied to the lectures I presented on the history of international relations; my audience was extraordinarily attentive. They asked an amazing number of questions (most of them in written form), sometimes more than a hundred! This might have been due to the weak general background of the auditors, who were not acquainted with the materialistic approach to the phenomena of social development and, in particular, international life.

But the chief characteristic in all of these questions, we could see, was a lively and impassioned interest in the latest scientific discoveries and a desire to gain a profound and thorough understanding of historical phenomena and the development of international relations. Many auditors were unaccustomed to viewing the history of international relations as much more than a list of international conferences and diplomatic actions; they had to be taught that it represented all of the economic, political, legal, diplomatic and military connections and interrelations between peoples, states and systems of government, between the main classes, economic and political forces and institutions functioning in the world arena. It was necessary for us to explain in detail, with the aid of extensive concrete historical material, that the socioeconomic factors determining the worldwide historical process also determined the development of international relations, even if only indirectly. Our elucidation of Marxist-Leninist teachings concerning the connection between foreign and domestic policy, the role of the popular masses in history and their role in international relations aroused great interest.

It took a long time for our auditors to understand that the popular masses participated only spontaneously in the historical process and the development of international relations until the proletariat entered the arena of independent class struggle. This testified to the general attitudes instilled by Mao Zedong and his associates in a sizable segment of the CCP and to a misunderstanding of the proletariat's role in the struggle against the bourgeoisie and landowners.

In addition, the auditors were influenced for a long time by the works of various bourgeois authors, which had been widely distributed in pre-revolutionary China, as well lectures by bourgeois professors on Soviet foreign policy, particularly their interpretation of the events of 1939, when the USSR agreed to conclude a nonaggression pact with Hitler's Germany. This pact, as we know, played an important role in preparing the Soviet nation to repulse the fascist German invasion and in ensuring the victory of the Soviet people over Hitler's forces. It was this pact that relieved the Soviet Union of the need to fight on two fronts--in the East against militarist Japan, which had actually already started the war in the summer of 1939 by attacking our ally Mongolia, and in the West against fascist Germany. It took several classes to demonstrate to the auditors the necessity of this act in the interests of the Soviet people as well as all progressive mankind, including the Chinese people, and in the interests of a victory over fascism and imperialism, in Asia as well as in Europe.

It was already apparent in these years that the Chinese leaders were striving to belittle the Soviet Union's role in the defeat of Germany and Japan and exaggerate the significance of the Chinese PLA and partisans in the common struggle against fascism and aggression. This was being accomplished gradually at that time--in confidential documents, at restricted meetings of *aktivs*, in the speeches of some CCP leaders under cover of theses concerning "stereotypes in the study of foreign experience" and "the misunderstanding of some cadres" of the need to combine "foreign" (that is, Soviet) experience with Chinese historical traditions, and so forth.

In the summer of 1956, we chief advisers in Beijing's academic institutions were invited to meet with Yang Xiufeng, minister of higher education. He presented a long and eloquent speech about the importance to China of the experience in Soviet higher education and the USSR's achievements in the training of scientific, technical and cultural personnel. The minister stressed, however, that China had its own traditional system of education and it would be necessary to conform to it and "eliminate foreign stereotypes." It was clear that when the minister spoke of "foreign stereotypes," he was referring to the methods and forms of education used in the Soviet higher school.

It was precisely at that time that oral exams were canceled, even in the social sciences, where the ability to formulate one's thoughts, argue one's point of view and logically develop one's ideas and evidence is of great significance. The ministry decided to return to the old, pre-revolutionary system of written examinations. The 5-point grading system was abolished, and the 100-point system used in the West was restored.

At one point in the spring of 1956, we learned that a party *aktiv* was to be held at the Beijing Diplomatic Institute, with Bo Yibo, alternate member of the Politburo and chairman of the PRC State Planning Commission, as the speaker. We cautiously inquired as to whether we would be able to attend. The acting director of the institute, Li Engchu (the official director was Zhang Wentian, first deputy minister of foreign affairs), talked over with the speaker and we were given permission to attend the meeting.

Bo Yibo looked unpretentious, his behavior was pointedly democratic and he appeared approachable. I was introduced to him. Bo Yibo was well informed about the work of the institute and our lectures (his son was attending the institute). During the course of a brief conversation, we exchanged our views on current international events.

In his report, Bo Yibo ferociously attacked the decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress and statutes pertaining to the assessment of I. V. Stalin's activity and to various forms of revolutionary struggle in the capitalist countries. The speaker objected strenuously to congress directives calling for broader struggle for the implementation of the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence.

When I told comrades from our embassy what I had heard, they were even suspicious at first as to whether I had understood the speaker's words correctly. But there could be no doubt, as an interpreter could not have made such a serious mistake. Moreover, Bo Yibo had made direct references to me in his speech. "There is a Soviet adviser sitting here," he said, "and it would be unpleasant for him to hear this, but I must say it. He should know what people in China think about these matters."

There were other disturbing moments as well: The numerous notes we were handed during classes began to contain more and more questions with a definite concealed meaning, reflecting a desire to denigrate the USSR's achievements in the construction of socialism and doubts about the accuracy of certain foreign policy actions of our party and the Soviet Government.

It was at that time that I was shown a secondary school textbook--"A Short History of Contemporary China," published in Beijing in 1954. Maps in this textbook labeled regions which had been returned to Russia in accordance with treaties signed in Aigong (1858), Beijing (1860) and Chuguchak (1861), territories "seized by imperialists." These lands, as we know, were taken away from Russia in accordance with the Nerchinsk treaty of 1689. One map depicted the areas that are now Burma, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, Nepal, Sikkim, several regions in India and other neighboring states as "territories taken away from China by the imperialists." It appeared that all of this was the reflection of a specific political line.

Soon afterward I was told that the deputy chief of the propaganda section of the CCP Central Committee had made a speech, in which he said that the rate of socialist construction in the USSR was extremely slow, that the USSR was establishing a material and technical basis for communism too slowly, that social development in the USSR was not quick enough and so forth. The speaker's conclusion was the following: China would not repeat the experience of the Soviet Union but would build socialism and industrialize the country by means of surging ahead. This was propagandistic preparation for the so-called "Great Leap Forward," which led to the catastrophic disorganization of the Chinese economy.

In 1958, after I had returned to Moscow, I received a letter from Diplomatic Institute colleagues. Describing their life and work, they wrote: "We are still earnestly studying international relations and are simultaneously smelting steel."

One day in late 1956, on a walk in Beijing, Chinese acquaintances happily told me that a prominent Chinese scientist, mathematician and physicist from America had come to Beijing. According to them, he was one of the three greatest scientists in the world.

In 1967 I presented a series of lectures on Soviet foreign policy at Harvard University (United States). A conversation was arranged with a group of experts on disarmament. The professors who had invited me to come to the university felt that I would be interested in talking to Morton, famous expert on atomic weapons.

The walls of the large room that served Morton as his office were covered with color photographs of atomic explosions, taken from different angles and in different dimensions.

"These are photographs of two Chinese explosions," the professor explained.* "I am working now on a book about China's nuclear potential. Incidentally, I wanted to ask you about something. Yesterday you said in your lecture that the Soviet Government opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But how do you feel about this?" And he pointed to the color photographs.

"The Soviet Union," I answered, "occupies a principled position and does not allow circumstances to change it. We are in favor of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons as a first step. In the broader context, the Soviet Union advocates the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons as the most barbarous type of weapon threatening the future of mankind. Consequently, we cannot approve of these tests either. This is a new and dangerous step in the proliferation of thermonuclear weapons."

"Judging from these photographs," Morton said, "the Chinese are in the initial stages of possessing nuclear weapons. In terms of force, their explosions are similar to the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I think it would take the Chinese just a few more years to develop a bomb and turn it into an effective weapon. The Chinese had also begun research into hydrogen weapons."

"How could the Chinese develop their own nuclear weapons?" I asked. "I, for example, cannot find an answer to this question. Ten years ago I was in the PRC. The general level of scientific and technical development in China, as far as I know, was much lower than in the USSR, the United States or France."

Then I remembered my conversation in Beijing about the Chinese scientist from the United States who had arrived in the PRC.

"Could he have brought the Chinese the secret of the atomic bomb?" I asked.

Morton did not answer right away. He hesitated and then said:

"The fundamentals of creating an atomic weapon, as we know, are no secret. Technology is the issue. It is possible that a Chinese scientist who worked in the United States, at the University of Berkeley, and somehow later turned up in China, could have helped his country create a nuclear weapon."

This discussion was continued a few months later, on the other side of the American continent. In the spring of 1967, I went to Berkeley at the invitation of Professor R. Scalapino, chairman of the National Council on American-Chinese Relations.** Berkeley is a small university town, a satellite of

* China set off its first nuclear explosion in October 1964.

** In addition to scholars, the council also had members who represented the U.S. business community, including D. Rockefeller, president of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and others.

San Francisco, with a population consisting mainly of students, instructors and researchers. The university in Berkeley is an important scientific center of nuclear physics, mathematics and the study of the history and culture of countries of the Far East.

Professor Scalapino, a man of fairly conservative beliefs, tried to limit my contacts only to professors and instructors concerned with problems in the Far East and the Pacific. After one of my lectures, in which I discussed the principles of Soviet policy in the Far East and described Soviet-Chinese relations, I was approached by some members of the audience. Some of them asked me questions and others simply shook my hand and introduced themselves. A tall thin man stood a short distance away, seemingly waiting for something, and then walked up to me and held out his hand.

"John Service," he introduced himself. "I heard that you were in China. If you have no objections, let us have breakfast together. I also studied Chinese affairs in the past. I think it would be interesting for us to talk some more and exchange our views."

Scalapino, who was standing next to me, added:

"John is in charge of the library in our Far Eastern Studies Center.

We agreed to meet the following day. "John Service," I repeated the name to myself several times. "Where have I heard this name? Under what circumstances?" Putting my memory to work, I recalled that the name Service had been mentioned in American newspapers in 1945 in connection with the so-called AMERASIA staff case and in diplomatic documents published by the U.S. State Department in the collection entitled "United States Relations with China."***

American Sinologist J. Service worked in the American Embassy in Chongqing in 1944 and 1945. He actively supported cooperation between Washington and the CCP. Along with other Sinologists--O. Lattimore and D. Davis--he criticized the U.S. Government in AMERASIA magazine for supporting Chiang Kai-shek and ignoring the communists. In March 1945, he spoke with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in Yanan. He went over the head of Ambassador Hurley to send several proposals to Washington on the establishment of close cooperation with the CCP, seeing that its leaders were nationalists who were prepared to fight against the USSR. His proposals aroused the ambassador's indignation. He was recalled from China. In 1950 Service became a victim of the McCarthy persecussions, was accused of "abetting the overthrow" of Chiang Kai-shek and of belonging to a "pro-Soviet group" in the State Department and was dismissed from the diplomatic service. After 7 years during which he took his case from court to court, he was formally reinstated in his position but was then retired. Later, the anti-Sovietism of the Maoists motivated U.S. ruling circles to search for new Chinese policy guidelines. The Maoists

*** "United States Relations with China. With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949," Based on the Files of the Department of State, Washington, 1949.

"proved" that Service had been right and that his judgments and assumptions had been warranted. In 1971 he visited the PRC at Zhou Enlai's invitation. He began to be treated as a hero, a martyr and a winner.

The model and year of the car an American drives represent his calling card, an indicator of his prosperity and social status. Service's old and battered Chevrolet testified to the far from remarkable financial and social status of its owner. His hair was grey at the temples, his face was thin and deeply lined and his eyes were sunken.

The library of the scientific center was small and was located in three rooms, but it contained a collection of the latest publications on Japan and China from most of the countries of the world (England, Japan, France, the PRC, the USSR and others). But this was not the most valuable feature of the collection. The library regularly received microfilms of all materials on China from the American consul-general in Hong Kong: photocopies of provincial Chinese newspapers, records of interrogations of refugees who had escaped to Taiwan from China concerning conditions in the PRC, and so forth. All of these materials were processed by the large staff (up to 300 individuals) of the consulate general.

The small cafe where we settled down was crowded: One group of students, hastily gulping sandwiches or the invariable hot dogs and washing them down with iced Coca-Cola, was having a lively argument about U.S. policy in Vietnam; another group, sitting nearby, was discussing China's nuclear prospects. Soon we were joined by a few more Sinologists who had attended my lecture.

Nodding his head in the direction of the students, one of them said:

"They have good reason to discuss these matters seriously. China has only set off two atom bombs, but considering the discipline of the Chinese and their technical abilities, China could quickly catch up with the other nuclear powers."

"If it had not been for the Berkeley professors," I said, "the Chinese would hardly have been able to develop an atomic weapon so soon."

"You may be partly right," the man answered. "They say that the inventor of the Chinese atom bomb studied at Berkeley and then worked in a Berkeley research center. He was a man of outstanding ability and a great physicist. I do not know the details," he went on, "but in 1956 he was given permission to take a trip to Taiwan. Apparently, he wanted to visit his relatives. From there he escaped to the mainland."

"It is a little odd, or should I say fantastic, story," I commented. "It sounds something like a James Bond thriller. A prominent physicist who works in the field of atomic energy, which is connected with national security, suddenly goes to Taiwan. There could be some explanation for this: After all,

there are American troops there. But then.... The strait between Taiwan and the PRC is patrolled by American ships and planes.

"Thousands of people were guarding the strait. But suddenly a scientist, needed by the United States, successfully crossed all barriers and ends up in Beijing. Some Chinese acquaintances once told me that a prominent Chinese scientist from the United States had arrived in China, but they did not mention that he got to the PRC through Taiwan.

"Is it possible that there were influential people in the United States who had reason to help China create a nuclear weapon?" I asked.

My breakfast companions said nothing, but I felt that their silence was quite telling.

In the spring of 1957 we witnessed a campaign that was organized under the slogan "Let all flowers bloom, let all scholars contend."

All classes were canceled in academic institutions (the Diplomatic Institute, Beijing University, the Polytechnical Institute in Qinhua and others). Establishments were closed. Students and professors, employees and actors, scientists and workers attended mass-meetings. Criticism of any state or party leader (with the exception of Mao Zedong), the political and social order, ideology and the culture of the nation was not only permitted, but even encouraged.

All of the walls in the Diplomatic Institute were covered with "dazibao" and leaflets. Some of the slogans were even anti-Soviet. Once Yang Xiufeng, minister of higher education, came to the institute. When he left the building and headed for his car, he did not recognize it. The windows, doors and roof were completely covered with leaflets, calling the minister a counter-revolutionary, a bureaucrat and an idiot and criticizing the system of examinations and curricula. Was this a rehearsal for the "Cultural Revolution"?

One day we visited Beijing University. A rostrum with a microphone was set up on a lawn in the center of a big campus. Any student, professor or instructor could make any kind of speech, set forth any kind of theory and criticize anyone he pleased in any way he pleased (with the exception of "Chairman Mao"). The Chinese who accompanied us said proudly: "This is our version of Hyde Park."

The Chinese told me that the speeches of the half-educated university youths were full of silly statements, absurd ambitions and "common" ignorance. For example, one speaker declared that after studying all of world history, he had arrived at the conclusion that the world had only three truly outstanding theoreticians: Confucius, Marx and...himself.

There were also "silly statements" like the following: Some professors expressed an openly revisionist view by asserting that Marxism-Leninism was inapplicable in China, that Marx was obsolete and that a new, "purified"

and "renovated" theory was needed. At that time, no one was openly advocating the substitution of the "Thought of Mao Zedong" for Marxism-Leninism. But they were criticizing the fundamentals of socialism, the role of the working class in socialist construction and the significance of the class struggle in history and underscoring the need for special developmental guidelines for China. Territorial claims on the USSR were also being voiced.

We Soviet specialists were disturbed by the antisocialist and anti-Marxist comments. All of us could remember the recent events in Hungary, where antisocialist statements of this kind, inspired and supported by external imperialist forces, had served as the prelude to a counterrevolutionary riot which threatened the socialist achievements of the Hungarian people.

In May 1977, a group of Soviet specialists met with Zhou Enlai. This was the first time I had ever met the Chinese premier. At that time he was around 60: He had a slight physique, a thin and youthful face and a quick and energetic walk. As the son of a landowner who had studied in Europe, Zhou was quite fluent in French and English.

Our first meeting took place at a reception held in a large hall of the Beijing Hotel, constructed after the revolutionary victory of 1949. The reception was attended by more than a thousand people. Zhou and his retinue went around to all of the tables and greeted the guests. Zhang Wentian made several complimentary remarks about me when he introduced me to the premier. The premier asked me in English about my first impressions of the work of the Diplomatic Institute and the amount of time it would take to train young diplomats and teachers of international relations.

In reply, I said that my pupils were conscientious and diligent but did not have a sufficiently broad cultural background or a knowledge of world history and literature. I mentioned that there were no suitable textbooks and so forth.

"You are the one who will write this textbook for us," said Zhou.

"I will try," I replied.****

Zhou Enlai then said that he expected many states to recognize the PRC in coming years and that the nation would need numerous well-trained diplomats and scholars of international relations.

**** I kept my promise. My book "Noveyshaya istoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy (1918-1945 gg.)" [A Current History of International Relations (1918-1945)] was published in China in 1958 by the Renmin Chubanshe Publishing House. It was later used as a textbook in China, the DRV and other of China's neighboring countries. My lectures on the history of international relations from 1918 to 1956 were published for the party, state and military aktiv.

I replied that it was our international duty to help our Chinese friends enter the world arena with Marxist-trained diplomats and experts on international affairs, prepared to defend the interests of China--a great socialist power and a member of the socialist community.

A few days later, the deputy minister of foreign affairs held a luncheon in honor of the advisers at the Beijing Diplomatic Institute. I was told that this was done on Zhou Enlai's instructions. At the table, our hosts frankly expressed some suspicious opinions on the international situation. Conversations with the administrative personnel of the ministry indicated that they were thinking of terms of great-power categories and had a chauvinistic contempt for small countries and nationalities.

Our last meeting with Zhou Enlai began with all of us posing for a photograph with the premier. Then Zhou Enlai made a long speech. He commended the work of the Soviet specialists highly, stressing that China would not have been able to develop so quickly and learn so much about the latest achievements of world science, technology and culture without the assistance of the Soviet people. Without Soviet aid, the premier said, it would have taken us two or three times as long to reach our present level.

We expressed our anxiety over the current "let all flowers bloom" campaign. Zhou Enlai said: "What happened in Hungary cannot happen here. Counter-revolutionaries and their social bases of support--landowners, the bourgeoisie and rich peasants--remained in Hungary after the war. We got rid of all landowners and capitalists in 1949. The possibility of counterrevolutionary demonstrations has been excluded from our China." Zhou Enlai then acknowledged the secret reason for this campaign: "We will know what everyone thinks. This will be useful."

After a short time, we were informed that all of those who had spoken out during the "let all flowers bloom" campaign had been repressed in accordance with the nature of the charges. The "most inveterate" were arrested, others were sent to rural areas for reindoctrination, others were dismissed from their jobs or demoted, etc.

I met Zhou Enlai several times at various receptions. The premier loved to dance and tell jokes. He often attended the Chinese musical theater and concerts by foreign artists. Zhou was always interested in how things were going at the Diplomatic Institute.

After my departure, letters from Beijing informed me that Zhou Enlai visited the institute in July 1957. He made a speech, calling for more vigorous struggle against rightist elements and "foreign stereotypes" in the academic process. On his orders, classes were no longer taught in the theoretical Marxist discipline--political economy, philosophy and the theory of government and law; they were replaced by the "inculcation of socialist awareness." This took the form of oral reports and discussions based on the works of Mao Zedong and materials issued by the propaganda section of the CCP Central Committee. Priority was assigned to the study of foreign languages. It was

obvious that the Chinese leaders had decided to train diplomatic personnel who would not be "burdened" by Marxist-Leninist theory.

The last time I saw Zhou Enlai was in Moscow in 1964, at a reception commemorating the 57th anniversary of October in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

Zhou was extremely gloomy.

The terms he had stipulated for the restoration of party ties between the CCP and the CPSU had been rejected by the CPSU Central Committee. Representatives of the CCP were issuing ultimatums and trying to intervene in our internal party and state affairs.

American Ambassador Coole walked up to the Chinese leader. He proposed a toast to the development of peaceful relations between all countries and nationalities.

Soviet statesmen standing nearby raised their goblets. Zhou Enlai ostentatiously turned away. He put his goblet down on a table.

It has been almost 15 years since that time.

It has been a long time since the Chinese leaders openly made the transition to rabid anti-Sovietism, a policy of cooperation with the most reactionary forces in the capitalist world, and violence and piracy against the SRV. Nonetheless, I often recall the tremendous interest displayed by our pupils and acquaintances, just as all the rest of the Chinese people, in Marxist-Leninist science, in the Soviet people and in their achievements in the struggle for the future and for peace throughout the world.

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BOOK REVIEWS

IMPORTANT REFERENCE WORKS ON CHINA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 190-193

[Review by V. K. Zakamenskiy of the 1975 and 1976 issues of "Kitayskaya Narodnaya Respublika: politika, ekonomika, ideologiya," compiled by a research team from the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] In 1978, two information and reference almanacs were published--the 1975 and 1976 issues of "Kitayskaya Narodnaya Respublika: politika, ekonomika, ideologiya" [People's Republic of China: Politics, Economics, Ideology], compiled by a large research team from the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The authors' intention was to elucidate the major events characteristic of China's development during these 2 years in the areas of domestic politics, economics, foreign policy and culture.

These were difficult years in the life of the Chinese people. In 1975, the struggle at the top of the power structure became more intense prior to the changes in the country's top-level party and state leadership. This was reflected in the results of a session of the All-China National People's Congress (NPC) in January 1975, which represented Mao Zedong's last attempt to reinforce the results of the Cultural Revolution by means of legislation. The congress met after an interval of almost 10 years and the session took place in an atmosphere of absolute secrecy. It was essentially illegal because general elections were replaced by the appointment of deputies by superior party and administrative organs with the formal consent of subordinate organizations.

The session approved the new Constitution of the PRC, which replaced the Basic Law of 1954. This was an attempt to legitimize the results of the Cultural Revolution and all subsequent campaigns, political purges and the ideological brainwashing of the population. The reference work presents accurate evaluations of the basic tenets of the new Constitution, and the authors conclude that the basic law of the PRC adopted at this session "was

intended to make Mao Zedong's policy line irrevocable. It not only legalized the practice of the Cultural Revolution, but also set up formal obstacles to prevent China's return to the course of genuine socialist development and friendship with the socialist countries" (1975, p 49). At the same time, it should be noted that this constitution was, to a considerable degree, the result of compromises reached by opposing factions in the Maoist leadership. It is precisely for this reason that it had to be revised only 2 years later. The Constitution of the PRC is analyzed in detail in the section entitled "The State Structure of the PRC" (pp 34-49).

After the NPC session, the struggle for power on the highest level acquired new scope. In 1976, Premier Zhou Enlai of the PRC State Council, Chairman Zhu De of the NPC Standing Committee and CCP Central Committee Chairman Mao Zedong died. The three highest positions in the Maoist party and state hierarchy, which had been occupied by the same individuals during the entire period of the PRC's existence, all became vacant within a short time. A new power struggle became inevitable. Even the Chinese press had to admit that 1976 was "a quite extraordinary year in party history" and "a year of rigorous tests for the entire party, the entire army and the entire population of the country" (1976, p 78). A more detailed description of the major political events in China on the eve of this change in leadership can be found in the almanac for 1975 in the section on the domestic political situation (pp 50-78).

The continuation of the factional struggle in the highest organs of power is traced step by step in the almanac for 1976. The authors divide it into three stages. The first two were distinguished by "increased covert interfactional rivalry, connected primarily with a struggle for authority and influence on various levels of central and local party leadership" (1976, p 78). This struggle was waged between persons who had advanced as a result of the Cultural Revolution and a group of old party cadres headed by Deng Xiaoping. The rivalry culminated in the fall of the leader of the "pragmaticians" and the rise of Hua Guofeng. The third stage began on 9 September--that is, after Mao's death--and ended with the fall of four "leftist Maoist" leaders--Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan--who were ousted from the political arena of the PRC and arrested. They were labeled the "gang of four" and accused of "taking advantage of the failing health and death of Chairman Mao Zedong" and "displaying an impatient urge to usurp supreme authority in the party and government" (1976, p 83). Later, Chinese propaganda began to blame the "gang of four" for all of the disorder that had plagued the country for the last decade, including the charge that they had created a fascist bureaucratic regime in the country, organized the persecution of old party and government cadres, worked toward the total collapse of the Chinese economy and so forth.

The authors of these reference works correctly note that these events, which had a decisive effect on political life in the country, were accompanied by others that permit us to call 1975 and 1976 years during which the antisocialist process acquired considerable depth in all areas of sociopolitical life in China, they were years of further departure from the socialist course of

development, the even more substantial deformation of the socialist elements of the economic basis, the intensive escalation of the militaristic spirit and the continued poisoning of the Chinese worker's mind with anti-Soviet propaganda.

The authors of the almanacs repeatedly stress that all major events in the nation's political and economic life were connected in one way or another with the increasingly acute power struggle between various groups in the Chinese ruling clique.

When we examine the sections pertaining to China's political life, we cannot help but notice the positive fact that the compilers of these almanacs realized that the publications were reference works which would be used by a diverse group of readers. In this connection, it is extremely significant that they contain such information as lists of the members of the NPC Standing Committee, the PRC State Council and the PLA [People's Liberation Army] supreme command staff (1976, pp 53-56), changes in the membership of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee (p 89), the biographies of the ousted "gang of four" (p 72) and brief biographical accounts for members and alternate members of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, some prominent members of the CCP Central Committee and several individuals in high government posts (p 334).

The most difficult task the compilers of these almanacs had to face was the discussion of issues connected with economic development in the PRC. On the whole, the authors of these sections were successful in coping with this task and correctly assessed the state of the economy and the trends explaining the low rate of national economic development in China.

In 1975, the Chinese economy was in a state of crisis, which was a direct result of the adventuristic economic policy conducted by Mao Zedong for many years. By the end of Mao's life, economic problems had essentially become the deciding factor in the fierce power struggle in the Maoist ruling clique. The pragmatic segment of the Chinese leadership was convinced that China could not achieve the status of a world power by political means and that the efforts of the entire nation would have to be concentrated in the area of intensive national economic development. This was the main topic of discussion at the First Session of the NPC, at which Zhou Enlai set forth, in the most general terms, a program for the economic development of the country up to the year 2000.

Even after this session, however, ruling circles in Beijing could not agree on questions of economic construction, particularly questions pertaining to the methods and means of attaining set goals. In addition to the demand for the widespread use of economic controls to stimulate the national economy, measures were taken to introduce and establish political and administrative methods of economic control throughout the nation, including equivalent distribution, utopian barracks forms of labor organization, and the supremacy of politics over economics. The thesis that "politics is the commanding force" was defended. The eight-category system of wages continued to be criticized, and a simpler system was suggested as a replacement--a three-category scale which ignored the quality of labor. Some textile enterprises in Shanghai even

began to make the transition to the three-category wage scale. The authors of the almanac correctly note, however, that the actual standard was the "more lively use of economic controls and stimuli for the development of production" (1975, p 113), which was a mandatory step, essential for even the minimum stabilization of conditions in the national economy.

Just as in the past, priority in economic matters was assigned to the reinforcement of the military economic potential of the nation through continued attacks on the vital interests of the workers.

The authors of the section on the economy reveal the bottlenecks and unsolved problems in the Chinese economy and point out the disorganizing features of economic management which gave rise to additional complications. In particular, they mention the restrictions on material incentives and coercive practices, as well as worker strikes and sabotage in response to the assault on their vested interests, the disorganization of the transportation system, interruptions in the work of fuel and power engineering branches, etc. Summing up the results for 1975 and 1976, the Chinese leadership frankly admitted that in these 2 years "the national economy did not achieve the success anticipated, and the rate of agricultural development still does not meet the requirements of socialist revolution and socialist construction" (1976, p 109). Therefore, the results of work in industry and agriculture confirmed the fact that the objectives of the first stage of the economic program were not attained.

The information in the almanac reflects the fact that the PRC leaders had begun to toy with the idea of making broader use of the technology of the capitalist countries for economic development in the PRC, although this trend had not become the major one as yet because it was being resisted by the "left."

One of the indisputable merits of the information almanac is the authors' attempt to describe conditions in various branches of the Chinese economy. This provides a more accurate picture of the state of affairs in the national economy. This approach was made all the more necessary by the fact that official data on basic production indicators in China have not been published for almost 20 years.

The section on agriculture deserves special attention. Despite the fact that more than 80 percent of the population is employed in this branch of production, it cannot provide the nation's workers with even their minimum nutritional requirements. Although the rate of agricultural development was low during the period in question, the Chinese leadership continued to defend the policy of "self-reliance" and carried on the campaign for the "Dazhai-ization" of the Chinese countryside. The authors correctly remark that the incorporation of the "Dazhai spirit" is the cause of a basic conflict in agricultural development. On the one hand, there is an urgent need to expand accumulation and consumption funds for accelerated production growth, but, on the other, this is being impeded by the low productivity of peasant labor. The Chinese leadership, trapped by its own economic dogmas, cannot find a way of overcoming this conflict.

For the first time since these almanacs began to be published, the financial system of the PRC is analyzed. The reader of the article on this subject will find an accurate description of the budget, the credit system and monetary circulation. In contrast to industry and agriculture, the author remarks, the financial system of China and the flexible interaction of its basic links--the budget, the credit system and monetary circulation--seems quite stable (1976, p 197).

Just as in previous almanacs, a position of importance is assigned to Beijing's foreign policy activity. In the sections pertaining to this subject, China's international relations with the countries of the socialist community, the developing countries and the developed capitalist states are analyzed. The activities of Chinese representatives in the United Nations, the border policy of the PRC and the issue of Chinese communities abroad are discussed separately.

In these almanacs, abundant factual material is used to demonstrate the process by which Beijing is slipping more and more into imperialist positions on major current issues in international development, to the point of joint statements on such matters as the suppression of the national liberation struggle. In its relations with all states in the world, the Chinese leadership has adhered to a line of struggle against the USSR and other socialist countries and has attempted to convince the capitalist states and, in some cases, even the developing countries to exert more pressure on the socialist countries for the sake of the Maoists' own greed and ambitions. The authors state that this "foreign policy line centers around confrontation with the USSR and the socialist community in regard to all significant issues in international development, primarily the issues of international detente and disarmament" (p 198). The authors also note, however, that Beijing's anti-Soviet and antisocialist ambitions have not had the expected result. The latest upswing in the struggle of peace-loving forces throughout the world, highly commending the actions of the Soviet Union, which is pursuing the goal of lasting peace, has undermined the attempts of the Maoists.

Through the escalation of anti-Soviet and antisocialist activity in the international arena, the Beijing leaders have tried to minimize their divergence from imperialism in foreign policy. Several steps were taken to achieve China's rapprochement with the United States, Japan and the Western European countries. In December 1975, U.S. President G. Ford visited China. Beijing openly advocated the preservation of the U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia, spoke out in support of the American-Japanese military agreement and backed up the United States in its active intervention in European affairs (1975, pp 215-219). In 1976, a vigorous search was conducted for solutions to the Taiwan issue, which was impeding further rapprochement between Beijing and Washington, and the possibility of cooperation in areas related to military production was considered.

In relations with Japan, the Chinese leaders worked toward the signing of a peace and friendship agreement on Beijing's terms--that is, with the inclusion of premises which could be used for anti-Soviet purposes. Trade and economic

ties continued to be developed. In 1975, an intergovernmental agreement on fishing was signed, a Japanese consulate-general was opened in Shanghai and a Chinese consulate was established in Osaka, and high-level Japanese officials made a series of visits to Beijing.

The purpose of Beijing's Western European policy was to undermine detente and drive a wedge into the relations of the Western countries with the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The Chinese leaders protested the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and called for the reinforcement of the aggressive NATO bloc. In 1975, the PRC established official relations with the EEC, FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt visited Beijing and French President Giscard d'Estaing met with Deng Xiaoping. Beijing displayed increasing interest in the acquisition of military equipment, including the establishing of contacts in the area of nuclear power engineering (1976, p 228).

Beijing's policy toward the developing countries was constructed with a view to setting them up in opposition to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

In the sections entitled "Ideology" and "Culture," the reader will find a discussion of basic trends in the ideological struggle in the Chinese leadership, the ideological and political campaigns of that time and the cultural life of the Chinese people. It should be noted that the political struggle of the Beijing ruling clique was directly reflected in the ideological and cultural life of the nation. In the sphere of culture, the authors of the almanacs point out, the destruction resulting from the Cultural Revolution was followed by a slow process of "relative normalization" (1975, p 306).

The appendices of the almanacs contain interesting information: the traditional Chinese calendar, Chinese monetary units and basic units of measurement, and a list of books on China published in the USSR between 1973 and 1976.

On the whole, the authors and the editorial board did a great deal to categorize and elucidate major issues in the development of PRC domestic and foreign policy in 1975 and 1976. Some of the materials transcend the bounds of these years, among which the most interesting are descriptions of different economic regions in the PRC, articles on earthquakes in China, Chinese communities abroad, the status of women in China, etc.

There is no question that these almanacs have become a great help in the study of current events in China. Their analysis and simple narration of these events make them useful not only for specialists, but also for all categories of readers who constantly display a lively interest in the life of the Chinese people.

DIFFICULT PATHS OF CHINESE CULTURE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 193-195

Review by M. Ye. Schneider, doctor of philological sciences of the book "Sud'by kul'tury KNR (1949-1974)" [The Fortunes of Culture in the PRC (1949-1974)], Moscow, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izd-va Nauka, 1978, 382 pages, edited by V. A. Krivtsov (editor-in-chief), S. D. Markova and V. F. Sorokin]

[Text] Severe trials have been the destiny of the Chinese people and their culture in recent decades. In the PRC, literature, art and all culture in general are used by the Maoist leadership in its domestic and foreign policy practices. For this reason, the cataclysms that now and then shake Chinese society have their most destructive effect, in the overwhelming majority of cases, on cultural spokesmen and their works. This was true in Mao Zedong's time, and culture is still being used for speculative political purposes now, by Mao's successors.

It is a widely known fact that the political speculations of Mao throughout his career centered around statements made by ancient Chinese thinkers and writers. He gave them an extremely arbitrary and pragmatic interpretation and made skillful use of them in the struggle against his ideological opponents. This reprehensible tendency toward the arbitrary treatment of cultural traditions has become firmly established in the arsenal of Maoist political means and methods.

In general, one of the characteristic features of political life in the PRC is the constant use of literature and art and related "criticism" campaigns as a weapon in the internal political struggle, particularly the power struggle. As a result of this, the state of affairs in the cultural sphere and literary debates have become a kind of barometer of the general political situation in Maoist China, an indicator of overt or covert processes occurring in national political life.

For example, the fierce internal political struggle that broke out in China in the late 1950's and early 1960's in connection with the failure of the

"Great Leap Forward" and the "people's communes" was reflected in historical dramas by Wu Han, "Hai Rui Retires," and Tian Han, "Xie Yaohuan." The heroes of these plays, "enlightened bureaucrats" and "protectors of the people," try to somehow defend the public and the public interest under the conditions of despotism and dictatorship. The events described, particularly in the first of these plays, appear to be a fairly transparent analogy of the famous speech made by Marshal Peng Dehuai (posthumously rehabilitated, but not until the end of 1978) at the Luzhan CCP Central Committee Plenum in 1959, when he criticized Maoist adventures in the economic sphere. The struggle against Maoism was also reflected in the journalistic works of Wu Han, Deng Tuo and Liao Mosha (the last two were prominent party workers), who were forced by circumstances to voice disguised and yet essentially fierce criticism of Maoist theory and practice. It is not surprising that they were the first victims of the Cultural Revolution a few years later. The revolution actually began with the publication of an article by Yao Wenyuan (one of the "gang of four" arrested soon after Mao's death) in November 1965. The article was inspired by Mao Zedong and contained criticism of Wu Han's play "Hai Rui Retires."

We know that the criticism of Lin Biao at the beginning of the 1970's was accompanied by criticism of Confucius, whose ideas were allegedly being propagated by this prominent PRC statesman and party official. At the same time, an antihistorical theory was set forth concerning the eternal struggle between "Legalists" and "Confucians" in Chinese history and culture, personifying the positive and the negative aspects. The "Confucians"—from Confucius to Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao—were condemned. A 14th-century novel, "The Backwater," was used as a "negative example" in the struggle against Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao in 1975 and against Deng Xiaoping in 1976. The hero of this novel, Song Jiang, the leader of a peasant uprising, was called a "coward" and "revisionist," the spiritual predecessor of Mao's enemies in our day. This was an overt attempt to use the hero of an extremely popular literary work, a favorite with the masses, in the political struggle for the sake of "clearer illustration." It is also not surprising that in the constant campaign of criticism against the ousted "gang of four" that has been going on now for more than 2 years, purely political accusations are always accompanied by criticism of the cultural policy of the "gang of four" and the personal artistic tastes and preferences of each member.

One of the first domestic political actions of the new Chinese leadership was the return at the end of 1976 to the policy line of "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend," first proclaimed by Mao Zedong in 1956 and completely rejected just 1 year later (although it was never officially countermanded). The reaffirmation of this line was obviously made for two reasons: firstly, to discredit the "gang of four," whose activities allegedly imposed considerable damages on the entire Chinese culture (although it is also known that these four acted in complete accordance with the statements and direct instructions of Mao Zedong); secondly, and primarily, the "hundred flowers" line was an extremely convenient form of criticism of ultra-leftist Maoist extremes within, so to speak, the framework of Maoism itself and by

its own means. A Maoist policy more than 20 years old was mobilized for the struggle against the "excesses" of the Cultural Revolution and was set up as a contrast to extreme and destructive tendencies.

The so-called rehabilitation of the victims of the Cultural Revolution, cultural spokesmen (although it is true that this is a selective rather than a comprehensive process), some of their works and even entire periods in the history of Chinese cultural development, is now being witnessed in the PRC. In essence, the Cultural Revolution is being pointedly criticized in many articles in the Chinese press, but its "great significance" is nonetheless invariably pointed out. It should be stressed that despite all of the changes noted in Chinese culture since the death of Mao Zedong, its anti-Soviet purpose has not only been completely preserved, but is also growing more rigid. Contemporary works of literature and art--prose, poetry and drama--serve to stir up anti-Soviet, anti-Russian feelings in the Chinese public and constantly order the Chinese people to prepare for war.

We have attempted here to trace some of the basic trends in Chinese culture up to the present time. Many of the reversals and zigzags in the cultural development of this country up to 1974--that is, during the first quarter-century of the PRC's existence--are the subject of a recently published special study compiled by a team of research associates from the cultural sector of the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences under the supervision of V. F. Sorokin. The major processes in the development of Chinese culture during the period in question are analyzed in the book: its development in line with the socialist course soon after the founding of the PRC; the ideological campaigns of the 1950's, which were primarily directed against the creative intelligentsia; the evolution of the "hundred flowers" course, the workings and progress of the so-called "Cultural Revolution," which caused the culture of these great people to regress decades into the past and, finally, the state of literature, the theater, the cinema and the fine arts during all these years.

This book represents vivid proof of the achievements of Soviet sinology, with its rich tradition of scientifically interpreting and summarizing processes in the contemporary development of Chinese culture.

The book completely reflects the attitude toward China that is characteristic of the Soviet people and, consequently, of Soviet sinology, tremendous interest in, and fraternal sympathy for, the struggle of progressive forces in this country, including forces on the cultural front. By revealing the anti-Leninist essence of the Mao Zedong leadership in the sphere of culture and its hostility toward the interests of the Chinese people, the team of authors were striving to give the proper credit to honest Chinese intellectuals for their efforts to defend the socialist principles governing the development of their culture. The authors of the monograph were invariably guided by their sincere desire to see the revolutionary culture of China reborn and flourishing. Numerous facts and statistics on the culture of the PRC have been literally gathered

bit by bit and are interpreted in the book, cultural processes are analyzed and the truly irreparable damage imposed on this culture by the Maoists is demonstrated.

The authors' objective critical assessment of the literature now being published in Western Europe and the United States on this subject matter is also quite valuable. They have accurately distinguished between a few solid works and those which actually represent repetitions of Maoist propaganda and are of no scientific value whatsoever.

The monograph consists of an introduction, seven chapters and a conclusion. In the first part (the introduction and chapters I-III) the reader will find a discussion of general trends in Chinese culture during the three basic stages in its development. In the second part (chapters IV-VII and the conclusion), the progression of Chinese culture over a quarter-century is described quite thoroughly and its tragic finale is illustrated. The authors display an excellent knowledge of the material and the distinctive features of the literature, theater, cinema and fine arts of China.

The authors do not simplify this process. They see that it has consisted of periods of upsurge and decline. Factual material, which is extremely important in works of this kind, is generous and abundant but it does not overshadow the basic thesis. The authors skillfully demonstrate how Maoism has conducted its harmful and destructive activities, with varying degrees of overtness or covertness, during different stages in the establishment and development of culture. At the same time, authors always depict the actions of opposing forces in the fields of literature, theater, the cinema and the fine arts. It is a pity, however, that the book does not contain some essential sections, particularly a section on music, although it is true that this absence was due to circumstances beyond the authors' control. In general, a reading of the specific chapters arouses feelings of optimism and the certainty that healthy forces in Chinese culture will still have their day. The chapters on specific areas of culture are also valuable because they present a fairly complete and multifaceted picture of the development of Chinese culture during its first, socialist stage, which began after the triumph of the people's revolution in 1949.

The authors of the monograph regard the year of 1956 as a turning point in the development of the culture of the PRC (this was when the line of "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend" was first set forth). It seems to us, however, that the first stage in the PRC's cultural development did not end in 1956, but in 1958, since the evolution of Chinese culture and literature, even judging by the facts presented in the book, testifies that cultural development, with various types of zigzags, pauses and deviations, continued right up to 1958.

It is a pity that the chapter on literature could not have been more complete. The discussion of the development of Chinese poetry is slightly oversimplified.

Not enough is said about the historical drama of the late 1950's in the chapter on the theater. Obviously, much still remains to be done in the analysis of the pernicious effects of the Cultural Revolution on public enlightenment and higher and secondary specialized education in the PRC.

We must repeat, however, that our impression of the monograph as a whole is exceptionally favorable. Moreover, the very fact that this kind of book has been published testifies that the comprehensive study of all facets of contemporary Chinese culture is totally established in Soviet sinology and is developing successfully under the supervision of V. F. Sorokin, and the monograph "Sud'by kul'tury KNR (1949-1974)" is the first fundamental study in Soviet and world science of Chinese culture during an exceptionally complex stage in its development.

8588

CSO: 1805

FATE OF LAO SHE'S CREATIVE LEGACY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 195-197

[Review by A. N. Zhelokhovtsev, candidate of philological sciences, of the book "Notes on Cat City" by Lao She, translated from the Chinese by V. I. Semanov, Moscow, 1977, 2d edition, revised and supplemented, 260 pages]

[Text] People in Beijing have remembered Lao She, have begun to talk about him and are republishing his works. And this is all happening now that the writer has actually been murdered, damning statements have been made about him, his works have been banned and a widespread "criticism" campaign has been waged for many years. It appears that an attempt is now being made to pass Lao She off as an ordinary Maoist. But Lao She's works will not stay within the framework the new Beijing leaders are trying to squeeze them into today.

Lao She was one of the most popular Chinese writers. He won the recognition of the general Soviet reading public as well.

Around 20 of his books have been published in the USSR. Around 500,000 copies of a translation of just one of his fantastic tales, "Notes on Cat City," have been published in our nation. Recently, a new and supplemented edition of this book was published. Soviet literary scholars are writing studies and articles about the work of this Chinese writer.

Lao She died on 24 August 1966. His death was a tragic one. Driven to desperation by Red Guard excesses, he apparently committed suicide. His corpse, as the writer's widow recently remarked in an interview granted to WENYI BAO magazine, was discovered in a pond. His entire body "was completely covered with wounds and the marks of a beating" he had been given by the Red Guards the night before.

The writer was an honest patriot all of his life, he was a courageous defender of the ideals of socialism and a bright future for his people. He made a great contribution to Chinese literature.

Lao She entered the Chinese literary scene in 1926, but he only became famous in the 1930's, after he had written "Notes on Cat City" (1932-1933) and the novels "Divorce" (1933) and "Ricksha" (1935-1939). All of these works have been translated into Russian and are available to the Soviet reader. Lao She was exceptionally active in social work during the war against Japan. He headed an association of writers and playwrights and published anti-Japanese plays and novels. Later, the Maoists made particularly cruel and despicable statements about this stage in his career. In 1946 the writer left China and went to the United States, but after 1949 he immediately returned to his native land. In contrast to many other writers of the older generation, Lao She wrote a great deal in these years after the founding of the PRC, and his works always occupied a central position in Chinese literary life. This was the case when he wrote a play called "Dragon's Whisker" (1950), for which the honorary title of folk artist was conferred on him--the only time it was conferred on a Chinese writer. This was also the case in 1956, when his play "This Cannot Be" was unjustifiably criticized by the Maoists for excessively "realistic" scenes. This criticism proved that there was no room for satire in Maoist China. Then the writer turned to historical themes--he wrote the plays "The Tea-House" and "The Magic Fist," plays for the traditional musical theater. Therefore, while the "Thought of Mao Zedong" was flourishing, despite the atmosphere that was hostile to creativity, the writer continued to work without giving in to depression. But Lao She did not take a passive stand; on the contrary, he resisted Maoism's assault on creative life. In 1961, Wu Han's play "The Demotion of Hai Rui" was published in BEIJING WENYI, a journal edited by Lao She. In spite of its historical subject matter from the time of the Ming Dynasty (16th century), the play touched upon aspects of the internal party struggle within the CCP. It aroused the indignation of Maoists and was personally condemned by Mao Zedong, who saw an analogy between the main hero, Hai Rui, and his political opponent Peng Dehuai. Later, in 1965, Yao Wenyuan wrote an article about this play, after which a campaign was launched for the criticism of Wu Han. This is how the Cultural Revolution actually began.¹

In 1963 Lao She's play "The Magic Fist" was published in a separate edition. It described events which took place in 1900, when the Yihetuan rebels and eight powers intervened in China.

Lao She was the son of a Manchurian soldier of the eight-banner troops, his family lived in the imperial capital of Beijing at the beginning of the century, and it is known that the writer was traumatized in his youth by marauders from the allied troops and that his father died in battle against intervention troops. It is not surprising that the writer was constantly urged to write about "Cossack atrocities." According to the expectations of Beijing propagandists, this kind of testimony from a famous writer, backed up by his personal childhood experiences, should have lent cogency to the anti-Soviet nationalist

1. See V. G. Gradv, "The 'Criticism' of Wu Han--The Eve of the 'Cultural Revolution,'" PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1975, No 1.

campaign that was already being launched on a broad scale in China. The pressure exerted on Lao She was quite strong. If the old writer had gone against his internationalist conscience and historical truth and had led the anti-Soviet campaign with a play alleging that the people's rebellion had been suppressed by the Russian Cossacks alone, as he was ordered to by the Maoist leadership, he would have been forgiven all his past "sins" and might have been proclaimed "an object of national pride," like Guo Moruo, author of anti-Soviet fables.

Lao She wrote a play, but not the one they expected; he wrote a truthful historical drama about the deluded and ignorant people, who were first provoked and then betrayed, and about the reprisals taken against the common people by the allied troops of foreign interventionists, in a conspiracy with the Chinese rich and Manchurian officials. The play did not describe the "Russian atrocities" awaited eagerly by Beijing propaganda. The only thing the Maoists could do when they staged the play was to dress the foreign priest in Orthodox liturgical vestments, although there was absolutely no indication in the text that he was Russian.

Three years later, in 1966, the hostility of the Maoists toward Lao She was even more pronounced. There were substantial grounds for this. Naturally, the main reason was the writer's refusal to sing in the anti-Soviet propaganda choir. Besides this, Lao She did not sever his ties with the Soviet people even in those difficult years and visited the Soviet Embassy in Beijing in the capacity of an active member of the Beijing city Chinese-Soviet friendship society. By publishing Wu Han's play in his magazine, Lao She took a definite anti-Maoist stand in the intraparty struggle. Finally, an old sin was also weighting the scale--"Notes on Cat City."

"Cat City" is pronounced "lao-cheng" in Chinese (mao--cat, cheng--city). If the word "mao" is pronounced in another tone, the title is then "Mao City." Therefore, the word can be given a different meaning with a simple change in tone. It is possible that this was a coincidence: after all, the story was written long ago. In 1954, Lao She came to Moscow with a delegation of Chinese writers and talked with sinologist A. A. Tishkov. "'Notes on Cat City' should not be translated at this time. It would be impossible to rewrite this story, but it would also be impossible to republish the story in its original form--the book might displease someone," Lao She said at that time, and the writer stressed the word "someone."²

The fact that this is one of the most topically significant works of Lao She can be judged from a description of the state of the economy in Cat City, which is quite reminiscent of what is going on in today's China: "Any reform must begin in the economy and must be carried out with integrity. But not one of our officials is a man of integrity or knows anything about economics."

2. A. Tishkov, "'Great Leaps Forward' in Contemporary Chinese Art," *VOPROSY LITERATURE*, 1970, No 5, p 157

All of them see power only as a means of oppression and coercion. But agriculture and industry are in a state of total collapse. When a man comes forward...to construct policy on the basis of scientific and humane principles, he is called a charlatan because otherwise the officials would have to admit their own mistakes. Moreover, even if they admitted them, they still would not understand them.... All I have to do is talk about humanitarianism if I wish to be covered from head to toe with spittle. Any theory that is applied successfully abroad becomes repulsive when it arrives here" (p 117).

"Notes on Cat City" is the strongest protest against narrow-minded chauvinism and nationalism in Chinese literature. This book is hated in China by nationalists of all stripes, whether they support the Guomindang or Maoism.

Now the Maoists are trying to suggest that Lao She was devoted to the "Thought of Mao Zedong." They are blaming his death on Lin Biao and the "gang of four," but are saying nothing about the individual who inspired this persecution and who hated the author for writing "Mao-cheng," for publishing the play about Hui Rui and for refusing to contribute to the anti-Soviet concoction. They are cynically and futilely implying that the dead writer was acting in concert with those who ruined his life.

In China they have decided to publish new editions of Lao She's works--not all of them, but only a carefully selected few: only 5 of his 20 plays, and only 1 of his 10 stories and novels--"Ricksha." But this is not enough to convince anyone, and neither is the photograph in RENMIN RIBAO, depicting Mao Zedong giving a smile and a handshake to Lao She. This picture testifies only to Mao Zedong's hypocrisy and brutality, and not to his paternal concern for the verbal masters of Chinese literature. Lao She died at the hands of Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution because he advocated a bright socialist future for China.

8588

CSO: 1805

POLISH EDITION OF THE 'MODERN HISTORY OF CHINA'

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 197-200

[Review by L. M. Gudoshnikov, doctor of juridical sciences, of a Polish translation of the book "Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya," Ksenrka i wiedza]

[Text] The Polish party publishing house of "Ksenrka i wiedza" ("Books and Knowledge") has published a Polish translation of a famous work by Soviet sinologists, "Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya" [The Modern History of China], compiled by a team of authors from the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences (editorial board: G. V. Astaf'yev, V. N. Nikiforov and M. I. Sladkovskiy (editor-in-chief); authors: V. I. Glunin, A. M. Grigor'yev, K. V. Kukushkin and V. N. Nikiforov). The original work by the Soviet sinologists ended with an analysis of the materials of the Ninth CCP Congress, and the events of 1969 and 1970 were only discussed in the conclusion. The conclusion of the Russian edition was omitted from the Polish edition, which was being prepared for publication in the mid-1970's, with the consent of the Soviet authors, and in its place, a work by prominent Polish sinologist W. Nametkiewicz, "China in the First Half of the 1970's," has been inserted as the final chapter of the book. This chapter covers the decade of the 1970's in PRC history from April 1969 through April 1976. In connection with this, it is interesting to acquaint Soviet readers with the contents of this chapter which supplements the work of the team of authors from the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The study by W. Nametkiewicz consists of the following sections: a) socio-political conditions in the nation after the Cultural Revolution; b) the September crisis of 1971; c) the evolution of PRC foreign policy; d) the beginning of the campaign for the criticism of Confucius; e) the 10th CCP Congress; f) the continuation of the campaign for "criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius"; g) the dazibao wave; h) the NPC session and the new Constitution (1975); i) the campaign for the "study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship" and its consequences; j) the situation in the national economy. In addition, W. Nametkiewicz has written a new conclusion to the work.

The point of departure in W. Nametkiewicz's study is a thorough description of the destructive effects of the Cultural Revolution on all spheres of life

in the Chinese society. One of the most important consequences of the Maoists' adventurist policy in the second half of the 1960's, as the author cogently demonstrates, was the collapse of the entire power structure set up as a result of the people's revolution, particularly the disintegration of the organizational and political system of the CCP. Using concrete facts as a basis, he proves that the Cultural Revolution resulted in the establishment of an unconstitutional military bureaucratic regime in China, with the army as its nucleus.

Nametskiewicz's analysis also conclusively reveals the goals pursued by the military bureaucratic regime of the Maoists. These goals consisted in keeping the Chinese working masses in the strictest obedience and diverting their attention from fundamental problems in national development. An analysis of the material conditions of the workers' life permits the author to conclude that the Maoist policy of terror, on the one hand, and the prolonged staticity of the standard of living, on the other, gave rise to feelings of spontaneous dissatisfaction in the country, which were definitely reflected in the struggle within top ruling circles. The author goes on to thoroughly examine, with the aid of a substantial quantity of reference sources, one of the important episodes in this struggle--the so-called "Lin Biao case" (the "September crisis" of 1971).

In his analysis of the evolution of PRC foreign policy, W. Nametskiewicz assigned priority to the issue of Chinese-American relations. After analyzing materials pertaining to Nixon's visit to the PRC, the author concludes that both the Maoist regime and the U.S. Government indisputably have an inherent desire for political rapprochement, but the actual intentions by which each side was guided differed and even contradicted one another. He also points out the fact that U.S. policy toward China took shape under extremely strong pressure exerted by various tendencies. American ruling circles have been pressured and are still being pressured primarily by extreme rightist and reactionary forces which want to play the so-called "Chinese card" against the USSR. These imperialist circles are essentially striving to make China the object of their political manipulations and are prepared to abet the anti-Soviet policy of the Maoist regime for their own purposes. In doing this, they are underestimating or totally ignoring the possible consequences of the adventurist Maoist policy--consequences which could be extremely dangerous for the entire world. A more detailed analysis of the position of the Chinese side indicates that in the process of rapprochement with Washington, the Maoist leaders were guided primarily by a desire to aggravate relations between the United States and the USSR. The artificial intensification of existing conflicts between capitalist system and the socialist community is seen by them as a means of strengthening Chinese influence in the world. Nixon's trip to the PRC clearly demonstrated that the group of Mao Zedong had resolved to enter into political cooperation with imperialism on an antisocialist and anti-Soviet basis.

Nametskiewicz also analyzes a group of problems that have arisen in China's relations with other capitalist states, as well as with developing and

socialist countries. Summing up the results of this analysis, he notes the following: "There is no doubt that the group of Mao Zedong had already decided to cooperate with capitalism at the time when the ties connecting China with the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist camp were being severed." The author goes on to state that the "Maoists made the establishment of relations of cooperation with imperialist forces one of their long-range policy goals, but they concentrated their efforts primarily in political infiltration of the developing countries and the national liberation movements.... The role of supreme lord and leader of the developing countries was supposed to provide Maoist China with more favorable conditions for political bargaining with imperialist forces." But this variation on political strategy, which was implemented in the 1960's, did not bring about success. Nametkiewicz states further on, and the Maoist rulers made another strategic decision--"they began to establish direct cooperation with imperialism, no longer as the supreme lord and leader of the developing countries, but only on their own behalf." This was a forced decision, the author remarks, "and from the very beginning it provided much less opportunity for the attainment of anticipated advantages. It is completely obvious that imperialist ruling circles quickly realized what China's actual position was in the international arena and understood the motives which had compelled the Beijing rulers to search for ways of cooperating with them. For this reason, these circles tried to persuade Mao Zedong to make as many significant political concessions as possible, offering as little as possible in return. And they absolutely refused to recognize China's claims to world supremacy" (pp 658-659).

The campaign for "criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius," which originally began as an anti-Confucian campaign, is analyzed in detail in two sections of this chapter. In his analysis of the campaign, the author takes care to list all of the characteristics of Confucianism and its role in the history of Chinese society, conclusively proves that the organizers of the campaign falsified historical material, and exposes the primitive nature of Maoist interpretations and the vulgar approach of the Maoists to historical issues. In his examination of various aspects and stages of the campaign, the author accurately describes its initial stage--the attacks on Zhou Enlai and the party and state leaders and military cadres of the older generation who were associated with him. Nametkiewicz traces the course of the campaign and concludes that it was of a dual nature. On the one hand, there was a noticeable tendency to expand the framework of the campaign and, on the other, there was a tendency toward the limitation of its scope for the purpose of reducing its subject matter to a set of economic and production problems. This situation, in the author's opinion, reflected the existing differences of opinion in the Maoist leadership and testified that the Jian Qing group's intensive efforts to expand the framework of the campaign conflicted with the opposite tendency displayed by the Zhou Enlai group. The author also demonstrates how the campaign for the "criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius" was used to stir up nationalist feeling in Chinese society and to escalate anti-Soviet slander.

The author bases his analysis of the 10th CCP Congress mainly on official Chinese documents, primarily the reports of Zhou Enlai and Wang Hongwen. The author reveals the Maoist nature of both records, exposes the falsifications they contain, astutely argues against their antisocialist and anti-Soviet aims and proves that they represented an attempt to arouse chauvinist feelings and great-power ambitions in the Chinese people. In his description of the personnel composition of CCP administrative agencies formed by the congress, W. Nametkiewicz concludes that "the group headed by Zhou Enlai was able to considerably reinforce its position in the power structure" (p 693).

Further internal political developments in the nation are analyzed in the section devoted to the "dazibao wave" of the summer of 1974. It would be impossible to disagree with the author's belief that this "wave" was of an inspired nature. With its aid, W. Nametkiewicz writes, "the extremist faction of Jiang Qing tried to undermine the authority of the more pragmatic group, headed by Zhou Enlai, in the eyes of the popular masses. As a result of this, however, a storm of dissatisfaction and critical remarks about socio-political reality unexpectedly broke out. The spontaneous dissatisfaction of the masses was aimed against the political practices of Maoism. The entire Maoist regime was criticized, and not simply a certain group of officials within the country, as the initiators of the campaign had originally intended" (pp 722-723).

For a short time, this public reaction dampened the struggle within the Maoist leadership. "The public demonstration of mass dissatisfaction," the author writes, "revealed a tendency toward integration in the power structure. But there is a great deal of evidence that the group of Premier Zhou Enlai was able to take advantage of this situation to strengthen its own position on the highest level of leadership" (p 725).

Further on, W. Nametkiewicz analyzes the materials of the First Session of the Fourth NPC [National People's Congress] and, above all, the 1975 Constitution of the PRC. His analysis of the latter led him to the following conclusion: "On the whole, the new Constitution of 17 January 1975 represents a document which reveals the dismal appearance of the Maoist regime. This is a document which legalizes the system of arbitrary rule, lawlessness, terror and disregard for elementary civil rights" (p 732). In his description of the composition of the highest PRC state agencies formed at this session, the author stresses that more than half of their actual administrators are officials who have performed key functions in the army and the public security system.

Continuing his analysis of internal political developments in China, W. Nametkiewicz examines the campaign for the "study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship" and its consequences. The author conclusively proves that this propagandistic campaign marked the beginning of a new stage of almost undisguised and direct attacks by Jiang Qing's group on Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and the cadres of the older generation who rallied round them and

who were constantly gaining more influence in the leadership. The author demonstrates how the implementation of "leftist" Maoist directives led to increased chaos and crisis in the economy and mass-scale worker disturbances which were suppressed with the aid of the army.

The section preceding the conclusion of W. Nametkiewicz's work on the state of the Chinese national economy in the first half of the 1970's represents a continuation of the sections written by Soviet authors and containing descriptions of the economic structure of China in previous periods. The author begins his comprehensive description of the Chinese national economy at this time with an examination of numerous general statistics (for example, data on the size and composition of the population, the structure of national income, etc.). He then investigates the situation which took shape in Chinese industry, paying special attention to the tremendous losses--recorded and unrecorded--incurred by the Chinese economy as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Many of its negative consequences, the author stresses, cannot be precisely recorded or calculated--for example, losses in the training of skilled personnel for industry. Specific data are cited to illustrate the catastrophic decline in national economic growth rates. Nametkiewicz also examines the state of Chinese agriculture in the first half of the 1970's. An analysis of available statistics provides the author with grounds for concluding that the rate of agricultural development was extremely low. The rate of population growth considerably surpassed the growth rate of grain production.

The author devotes a considerable part of this section to a description of the militaristic aims of the Chinese leadership and notes that one of the main reasons for the slow rate of economic development is the excessive burdening of the national economy with defense industry expenditures and the cost of maintaining the largest army in the world. "The intensification of the military efforts of Maoist China," W. Nametkiewicz writes, "undertaken at a time of general industrial backwardness and underdevelopment, is a heavy burden for the entire society.... In essence, the militarization of China is impeding the development of the national economy and is causing its regression.... The only result of this intensive militarization is more pronounced economic retardation and the perpetuation of the semi-starvation existence of huge segments of the Chinese population" (p 769).

In the last part of this section, the author discusses the program of "four modernizations," proposed by Zhou Enlai at the NPC session in January 1975, and contrasts this concept to the actual state of the Chinese national economy. He unequivocally concludes that "all of the experience accumulated in China to date indicates that it is incapable of attaining the goals set by Zhou Enlai. It will not be able to achieve the economic level necessary for the total modernization of industry, not to mention agriculture. Although China is a huge country with unlimited resources and possibilities, this does not mean that these goals will be attained in this century. The long-range plans born of the Chinese leadership's great-power ambitions have no basis in the economic reality of China today" (pp 773-774).

Nametkiewicz's work ends with a comprehensive conclusion. In this conclusion, the author examines Chinese foreign policy and the internal political situation in China during the 1975-1976 period, right up to the beginning of April 1976, including the well-known events in Tiananmen Square, which are interpreted as an anti-Maoist demonstration by the masses. In summation, the author stresses that the social system of contemporary China is distinguished by extreme distortions of Marxism and a gradual process of antisocialist evolution. The harm suffered by spiritual life in the Chinese society has been particularly severe. Nationalism, xenophobia and great-power chauvinism fill the ideological sphere. The principles of authority have been seriously distorted. The Maoist leadership has established a regime of terror, lawlessness and arbitrary dictatorship, which has nothing in common with the ideals of socialism. At the same time, Maoist ruling circles have not openly renounced the terminology and some of the slogans they have taken from the theory of Marxism-Leninism. They are aware of the great prestige of Marxist ideology, which serves the broad popular masses as a symbol of the overthrow of the old order and a change for the better, and they are trying to parasitically take advantage of this prestige.

Another sphere in which these distortions are completely reflected is the foreign policy of Maoist China. "The Beijing leaders," W. Nametkiewicz notes in particular, "are quite openly striving at this time to establish an alliance with imperialist forces on an anti-Soviet and antisocialist platform. In pursuit of their own great-power ideals, they are going so far as to cooperate with extreme rightist and reactionary circles in the capitalist world. In essence, Maoist China has opened a second front, alongside imperialism, for struggle against true socialism in today's world. The spearhead of this attack is aimed at the Soviet Union, which represents the main force of the worldwide socialist system. At the same time, the activities of the Maoists are exceedingly dangerous for all nations in the socialist camp" (pp 822-823).

Nametkiewicz also notes that the adventuristic and voluntaristic policy of the Maoists has led Chinese society into a blind alley in the area of social development. The current situation in China is not stable and it cannot ever be stable.

The Polish translation of "Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya" was published in a large edition--16,750 copies--and immediately aroused the keenest interest in the reading public. Many reviewers have noted that the skillful combination of the fact-filled "Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya" with the comprehensive description of the current state of affairs in this country has considerably broadened the book's circle of readers. The Polish edition of "Noveyshaya istoriya Kitaya" represents an excellent example of cooperation by sinologists in the socialist countries.

AGAINST MAOIST FALSIFICATIONS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 200-204

[Text] An applied science conference was held in Moscow from 27 through 29 March in the Center for Friendship with the People of Foreign Countries to discuss current issues in the struggle against Maoist falsifications in the field of history. It was organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. The conference was attended by prominent Soviet and foreign scholars, party workers and representatives of the public.

Some of those who attended the conference were P. N. Fedoseyev, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Ye. M. Tyazhel'nikov, head of the propaganda sector of the CPSU Central Committee, O. B. Rakhmanin, first deputy chief of a CPSU Central Committee sector, and V. A. Medvedev, rector of the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. The conference was called to order by Academician Ye. M. Zhukov. The introductory speech was presented by K. V. Rusakov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, who warmly greeted, on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee, all participants in the applied science conference, scholars and party workers from Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union and wished them success and productivity in their work.

In his speech, K. V. Rusakov remarked that an intense ideological struggle is going on in the world today over the cardinal events shaping our era. The 20th century is the century of the October Revolution, the century of the establishment of real socialism in a large group of countries. It is precisely today, now that real socialism is determining the course of international development more and more, that its class enemy is making more vigorous attempts to denigrate this system in every way possible and to distort the process of the establishment of international socialist relations.

This campaign involves not only all types of propaganda, but also much heavier artillery--a broad network of scientific research establishments. On the pretext of studying the past history of individual nations and their relations with one another, attempts are being made to find arguments in history to cast a pall over the socialist world and to arouse and justify feelings of overt hostility toward the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Many

bourgeois scholars are engaged in this work, but the Beijing falsifiers of history have displayed particular zeal for this for some time now.

As for the Chinese leaders, their behavior has been extremely cautious and insidious. The distortion of history is being accomplished virtually under the banner of socialist research, and the pseudoscientific product of this work is frequently camouflaged with the aid of Marxist-Leninist phrases. The Chinese falsifiers only take whatever can be adapted to Beijing's current policy from the chronicle of past history. This is also how they utilize China's own rich and complex history.

The historical past is of much more than academic interest to Chinese officials. The Maoist lackeys are, on the one hand, lifting the troubadors of ancient aggressive campaigns, who extolled the robbery of the Chinese Bogdo-Khans, out of oblivion and, on the other, depicting China as a nation "mistreated" by its neighbors, in an attempt to substantiate Beijing's current hegemonistic expansionist policy and to poison the Chinese masses, numbering in the millions, with the venom of great-power chauvinism.

A kind of united front of bourgeois and maoist historiography is taking shape on the basis of the struggle against real socialism. The falsifying activities of the Maoists in the field of history are taking various directions. In essence, the Beijing slanderers are now perfecting their skills at the complete repertoire in which bourgeois anticommunist historiography specializes. The Maoists' attempts to "scientifically" substantiate China's territorial claims on neighboring countries are particularly striking even in this unscrupulous activity. Sinologists know that the fabrication of this kind of "substantiation" has been turned into a conveyor-belt process in Beijing. This work is being done by numerous specialists who have become quite expert in this field. Plump volumes of history--on China's relations with Russia, for instance--are beginning to look as though they have been written in a professor's rather than a Red Guard handwriting. The persons who are now being recruited for this work are learned individuals who have become proficient in distorting, falsifying, misrepresenting and juggling the facts for Maoism's benefit.

This kind of falsification must be conclusively exposed. This requires a great deal of special knowledge and a unique kind of skill. This is the reason for the considerable complication and increasing significance of the responsibilities of scientific and propaganda personnel and the entire ideological front to counteract Beijing propaganda. In this work, scientific excellence must be combined with a principled political class approach.

History, K. V. Rusakov remarked, is full of examples of the tendency of each aggressor to begin preparations for aggression with so-called cartographic warfare, with historical, geographical and other, sometimes camouflaged, justifications for his claims to foreign lands. Beijing, as experience has shown, has armed itself with this method. It is true that the Beijing militarists have already moved from maps and pseudohistorical grounds for their claims to military actions and the overt seizure of foreign territory. The

aggression against India in the late 1950's and early 1960's is not the only example of this.

China's recent armed attack on Vietnam marked a new reversal in Chinese policy: This was already a matter involving the use of armed force on a massive scale by Beijing against a neighboring socialist state for the attainment of the PRC's aggressive goals.

The Chinese aggression--particularly as a result of the covert but indisputable involvement of imperialist forces in this criminal action--created a situation in which the stability of world peace underwent a severe test. Even now, Beijing is still not reluctant to resort to the escalation of tension and armed provocations. This is also attested to by the Chinese militarists' seizure of so-called disputed regions on the Vietnamese-Chinese border and by China's continuous intrigues against Laos and Kampuchea.

We can now ascertain that the aggression against Vietnam did not produce the expected results. China was defeated by the courage and bravery of the Vietnamese people, the solidarity with Vietnam that was effectively displayed by the Soviet Union and the nations of the socialist community, and the widespread condemnation of the invaders by the world public. In short, there is a considerable discrepancy between the great-power ambitions of the Beijing hegemonists and their actual capabilities.

At the same time, the attack on Vietnam shed merciless light on the purpose of Beijing's historical investigations. These investigations are supposed to pave the way for the most widespread expansion by Maoist China. Therefore, this conference and its subject matter are of unconditionally vital political importance.

One of the important objectives of the Chinese exercises in the field of history is to cast suspicions on the principle of proletarian, socialist internationalism, which lies at the basis of relations between fraternal states, and to sow the seeds of alienation between these states. The falsifying approach to history is taken up as a weapon in this field. The past interrelations between countries which now have an established socialist order are depicted by the Maoist falsifiers as an unbroken chain of conflicts. The ties between progressive and democratic forces in Russia and other states are deliberately concealed. Certain events in history in which Russia objectively played a positive role--such as the liberation of the Balkan people from the Turkish yoke--are completely ignored. Why is all of this being done? There is only one answer to this question: For the purpose of at least denigrating the conditions of life today in the socialist community, with its truly egalitarian and truly friendly and fraternal relations between our parties, countries and populations.

And what is the value of the malicious Chinese lies about the Warsaw Pact Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance? We cannot ignore this lie, which has been calculated for masses of poorly informed people. It must be exposed through a disclosure of the true appearance of these authors who are so hostile to the cause of peace and socialism.

And there is also something else. Beijing's aggression against socialist Vietnam gave bourgeois propaganda an excuse for a massive campaign which is intended to prove that socialism, and not only imperialism, can engender war. This kind of ideological diversion must be resolutely repulsed.

The fact is that socialism, neither as a doctrine nor as a system, does not and certainly cannot bear any of the responsibility for the Chinese troops' attack on Vietnam. This criminal attack was initiated and dictated not by socialist ideals, but by Maoism--a chauvinistic, great-power and hegemonistic ideology. This attack reaffirms our conclusion that Maoism means war. It is indicative that the very method of this criminal aggression against Vietnam was borrowed by Beijing from the arsenal of imperialist policy. Even the words used by Chinese leaders to substantiate their aggressive war against Vietnam--"to punish and to teach"--were taken from the lexicon of imperialist, and not socialist, politics.

China's actions in Southeast Asia demonstrate that the current foreign policy of the Beijing leadership is not a socialist policy, but an overtly anti-socialist policy. Aggression has nothing in common with socialism.

In conclusion, K. V. Rusakov again stressed the urgent need to combat Maoist falsifications in the field of history and the urgent need to expose the chauvinistic "investigations" that are now being conducted in Beijing; in other words, he made special mention of the significance and importance of the work that is already going on in the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries and that would, hopefully, be productively developed at the conference.

The struggle of our parties against Maoist ideology and practice, waged in accordance with the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and congresses of other fraternal parties represented at this conference, is being fought in the name of noble goals which will benefit the Chinese people as well. It is dictated by a sincere desire to help China, Chinese revolutionaries and real Chinese patriots put an end to the kind of anti-Chinese, anti-people phenomenon represented by Maoism and its aggressive foreign policy. Anti-Maoism is the slogan motivating the real friends of the Chinese people, the friends of the People's Republic of China.

As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, we would like to see China become a prosperous socialist country. "We are firmly convinced," Leonid Il'ich stressed, "that the genuine national rebirth of China and its guaranteed socialist development can be achieved through alliance and fraternal cooperation with the USSR, the other socialist countries and the entire communist movement, and not through struggle against them."

But until this time arrives, it will be necessary to firmly adhere to the directives of our party congresses on principled and uncompromising struggle against Maoism--one of the most dangerous sources of chauvinism, violence and war.

A report entitled "Maoist Falsifications of the Basic Stages of Soviet History" was presented by Academician A. L. Narochitskiy. He reminded his audience that China's current hegemonistic and expansionist policy had been defined as "the most serious threat to peace in the world and a source of international tension" by L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. The speaker presented an in-depth analysis of contemporary Chinese literature on Soviet history and of the methods used by the Maoists in the falsification of history. He began his report with a discussion of Maoist falsifications of the Soviet period of our history, criticized the unfounded Maoist theories which accused the Soviet Union of degeneration and of a restoration of capitalism and pointed out the tendency to use the slanderous interpretations of Western Trotskyist and social-democratic Sovietology. He thoroughly demonstrated the groundlessness of the loud propaganda campaign launched by Beijing for the purpose of accusing the Soviet Union of struggling for world supremacy and carrying on the colonial policies of tsarist Russia.

In recent years, A. L. Narochitskiy remarked, the Chinese falsifiers of history have set forth a theory on the three periods of contemporary history, in the journal of the PRC's Academy of Social Sciences, SHIZE LISHI ("World History"), which presents a distorted picture of the position occupied by our nation in the contemporary worldwide historical process. The 1917-1949 period is called the first stage of contemporary history--the period during which the confrontation between socialism and capitalism began. Here, an attempt is made to belittle the role of the Great October Socialist Revolution and exaggerate the significance of the revolutionary triumph in China. The successes of the USSR and other socialist countries are ignored, and the thesis is expounded that the period between 1949 and the beginning of the 1960's represented a second stage in contemporary history, a period marked by the prevalence of socialist forces over imperialist forces. The third stage--after the beginning of the 1960's--is regarded as the period of the existence and struggle of three worlds, which has supposedly replaced the period of the existence and struggle of two camps, socialist and imperialist, after the "degeneration of the USSR." This thesis, the speaker stressed, is obviously intended to camouflage the metamorphosis of today's China into a reserve and ally of imperialism, into a dangerous seat of new wars. This theory is connected primarily with a denial of the existence of a worldwide socialist system at the present time.

The speaker then moved on to the Maoists' distortion of the history of Russo-Chinese border treaties and Soviet-Chinese relations, demonstrating that these Maoist falsifications completely deny Lenin's statement about national self-determination as the prime basis for the settlement of territorial disputes in the contemporary era, misrepresent the history of border regions and distort Lenin's interpretation of inequalitarian treaties between capitalist countries and China by declaring that all territorial articles in the Russo-Chinese treaties were inequalitarian and that they were allegedly once denounced by Lenin. The favorite methods of the Maoist falsifiers of history, which place them outside the bounds of historical science, are unscientific and gross vulgarity and the unceremonious distortion of the facts and the meaning of primary sources.

In his report on "Archaeology and Maoism (Exemplified by the Synanthropic and Paleolithic Ages)," Academician A. P. Okladnikov conclusively demonstrated the political purpose of works by Chinese archaeologists, which inevitably leads to various kinds of falsifications. The only positive steps taken by Chinese history and archaeology--in a direction away from archaic traditions--took place in the first years after the establishment of the PRC under the influence of Marxism-Leninism and under the influence of Soviet archaeology. When the Maoists seized power, however, progressive influences were blocked. Archaeology became a tool of Beijing's aggressive policy, aimed primarily against the Soviet Union and against Leninist theory about world history.

Citing concrete facts, A. P. Okladnikov conclusively showed that the hegemonistic philosophy of Maoist archaeologists and their great-power political tendencies and appetites are reflected on the worldwide historical level and not only in their analysis of the synanthropic era. They are also manifested in other areas.

Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences M. I. Sladkovskiy, in his report on "Basic Trends in the Maoist Falsification of History," presented abundant factual material to expose the attempts of Maoist historians and propagandists to falsify world history and the history of China itself in their pursuit of chauvinist goals. He revealed the anti-Marxist and unscientific essence of the "historical corrections" made by the Maoists for speculative political purposes.

A large part of this report was devoted to the exposure of the pseudo-theory of the "single Chinese nationality"--a theory to which Maoists have recently resorted in an attempt to prove that the non-Han nationalities and ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of contemporary China or neighboring states are only "offshoots" of a single family tree--the "single Chinese nationality," the basis of which consists of the Hans. This worn-out theory, which was already being propagandized by Chiang Kai-shek and his followers, has been dragged out into the light once again to substantiate the territorial claims of today's Chinese hegemonists and to cancel out the unique history and culture of many people in the Far East and their centuries-long struggle to preserve their independence. The falsification of history by the Maoists, M. I. Sladkovskiy said, represents a continuation of the Maoists' political struggle against the theory and practice of scientific socialism.

Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences S. L. Tikhvinskiy remarked that the struggle against apologies for great-Han hegemonism is one of the important responsibilities of historical science. In his report, he discussed the Chinese leadership's "shift" in the direction of hegemonism, its regression to the positions of social-chauvinist ideology, which has been reflected in a Sinocentric analysis of historical facts and interpretation of world history. Using abundant factual material containing the historic "arguments" of the Maoists as a basis, S. L. Tikhvinskiy demonstrated that they are discarding the historical principle and are making absurd demands for the restoration of the former borders of past empires (Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, the Grand Moguls, the Ottoman Turks, etc.).

In the works of Chinese historians, great-Han hegemonism has taken the form of unrestrained praise for Chinese cultural traditions and a condescending attitude toward everything foreign. By declaring China the center of all world history and the leading force in the worldwide struggle for the liberation of mankind, the Maoists are openly carrying on feudal China's thousands of years of Sinocentric ideas about the superiority of the Chinese culture, Chinese civilization and the Chinese system of political administration to the culture and civilization of all other people, who are still being regarded as "barbarians."

Other speakers at the conference were corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. I. Krushanov and P. A. Zhilin, academicians of union republic academies of sciences M. K. Nurmukhamedov and B. I. Iskanderov and others. It was attended by scholars from the fraternal socialist countries: Tao Duy Tung (SRV), D. Kosev (Bulgaria), F. Teken (Hungary), R. Felber (GDR), S. Bira (Mongolia), R. Slawinski (Poland), J. Cesar (CSSR) and others.

Vietnamese scholar Tao Duy Tung stressed the fact that the Soviet Union had been supporting the revolutionary cause of the Vietnamese people for more than half a century and that the timely and effective actions of Lenin's nation were now sounding a harsh warning to the Chinese invaders and their imperialist allies. The annexation of Vietnamese territory has long been the dream of Chinese reactionaries. For many years now, Tao Duy Tung said, they have employed perfidious methods to push Vietnam onto the anti-Soviet path chosen by the Beijing leaders and into the struggle against the three revolutionary currents of the present day, and have even gone so far as to betray the interests of workers throughout the world and the Chinese people themselves for the sake of carrying out their own expansionist schemes.

The Vietnamese population of 50 million was tempered in the long war against imperialism, united with the people of Laos and Kampuchea and is now enjoying the passionate support and assistance of people throughout the world, especially in the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries. This population will give any aggressive pretensions on the part of the Chinese reactionary militarists the rebuff they deserve.

Academician S. Bira of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences, in his report on "Maoist Falsifications of Mongolian History and Historical Truth," disclosed the historical roots and character of Beijing's claims on the Mongolian People's Republic, inherited by the current rulers of China from the Chinese militarists and Chiang Kai-shek's forces. He exposed the Maoists' habit of speculating on historical facts and adjusting history to conform to a Sino-centric model. The speaker cited cases in which history had been distorted to substantiate current hegemonistic policies toward the MPR. S. Bira discussed the idealization of aggressive wars by contemporary Chinese historians and their attempts to suggest that these wars played a progressive role and that Genghis Khan "broke down the boundaries between nationalities and restored the great multinational state that had not existed since the time of the Han and Tang dynasties." In this way, S. Bira said, the Chinese

historians are trying to prove that the vast territories conquered by Genghis Khan belonged to China and, consequently, can be claimed by China now. The speaker pointed out the fact that the actions of Genghis Kahn and other conquerors had already been scientifically evaluated in Marxist historiography. He also demonstrated the unscientific nature of other "theories" and discussed cases in which people had struggled for their independence against oppression by foreign conquerors.

While they are distorting historical facts, said S. Bira, the Maoists are also grossly distorting the contemporary history of Mongolia. They have launched a frenzied chauvinist campaign against the MPR and, under cover of this campaign, are engaging in intensive military preparations against the MPR.

S. Bira made several suggestions aimed at the further expansion of the struggle against Maoist falsifications of history.

The reports and speeches of conference participants conclusively proved that the present Chinese leaders are engaging in broad-scale falsification of the history of China and its past and present relations with neighboring states and are distorting the worldwide historical process. They have been particularly malicious in their denigration of the history of nations of the socialist community, particularly the USSR. The purpose of this intrusion into historical science by the Maoists is to poison the Chinese people with the venom of great-Han chauvinism and to justify Beijing's current expansionist course in the international arena by means of pseudohistorical constructions. A departure from Marxism-Leninism, an alliance with bourgeois nationalist ideology and the use of the "methodology" of extremely reactionary imperialist propaganda--these constitute the "theoretical" arsenal of Beijing's falsifiers of history.

Soviet historical science and scholars in fraternal socialist countries have been waging a persistent and principled struggle against Maoist falsifications of history for a long time. They have revealed the total lack of scientific grounds for Maoist interpretations of the entire sum of historical knowledge, beginning with archaeology and ending with contemporary theories of international relations. Pseudoscientific products are now being manufactured on a mass scale in the PRC, the creators of which are shamelessly distorting the history of the international communist and workers movement, misrepresenting and belittling the role of the October Socialist Revolution in the worldwide historical process and the assistance given by the international workers and communist movement to the Chinese revolution, and presenting the history of the CCP and the history of the Chinese people's liberation struggle in a false light. For the purpose of justifying China's alliance with imperialism and simultaneously provoking antisocialist and anti-Soviet feelings in the Chinese people, the history of imperialist aggression in China is being falsified and the history of China's victimization by the imperialist powers--the United States, Japan, England, France and Germany--is being concealed. By arbitrarily changing history, Beijing is trying

to depict Russia as China's "eternal enemy" and to apply all negative judgments of the policy of pre-revolutionary Russia to the policy of the USSR.

The Maoist ideologists are "coordinating" their historical publications with Beijing's diplomatic activity. The modification of the history of China's neighbors--Mongolia, Vietnam, India, Laos, Burma, the Soviet Union and other Asian states--is acquiring a particularly dangerous character in connection with the territorial claims of the Chinese leaders on adjacent countries. Today the Chinese newspapers are even printing "historical" essays to white-wash the Chinese militarists' criminal attack on Vietnam by means of excursions into ancient and medieval history. But Beijing is not giving any consideration to the fact that history harshly punishes both those who forget its lessons and those who try to derive actions from it that are alien to its spirit and its laws.

The conference proved that Soviet historians and Sinologists from Moscow, Leningrad, the Siberian division of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Far East Scientific Center and the Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirgiz and Tadzhik academies of sciences, in close cooperation with scholars in the fraternal socialist countries, are successfully warding off the Chinese falsifiers' expansion in the field of history and are conducting a powerful offensive attack on Maoist ideology as a whole.

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STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 pp 205-206

[Text] On 3 April 1979 the government of the PRC announced that it has no intention of renewing the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which was concluded in 1950 for a term of 30 years, expiring in April 1980, although the treaty itself envisages that it can be renewed by the consent of both sides. In an attempt to justify this hostile action, the Chinese side has resorted to gross lies, which has made it necessary to remind people of the actual state of affairs.

The Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and the PRC was signed at a time when the Chinese people urgently needed assistance and support to defend their revolutionary gains and to solve the problems of economic and cultural construction that were facing them.

Loyally performing its international duties and conscientiously fulfilling all obligations stemming from this treaty, the USSR firmly and consistently defended the interests of the PRC in the world arena from the very beginning and effectively assisted the young people's republic to ward off all attempts at intervention in its affairs by imperialist forces. Soviet military formations sent to the PRC at its request reliably defended this nation against enemy air raids. The existence of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1950 also played a deciding role in preventing overt imperialist aggression against the PRC during the Korean war of 1950-1953, as well as at the time of the so-called "Taiwan crisis" in 1958.

Soviet assistance in the establishment of new branches of industry and the reconstruction of old ones in the People's Republic of China, in the prospecting and working of mineral resources, in the development of scientific and cultural contacts and many other types of assistance were also a result of the implementation of the provisions of the 1950 treaty and the agreements, concluded on this basis, on cooperation between the USSR and the PRC in various fields. This is known to the entire world. All of this aroused profound gratitude and was highly valued by the Chinese side.

Beijing's present unilateral action in announcing the expiration of the 1950 treaty is totally inconsistent with its repeated declarations of willingness to maintain normal intergovernmental relations with the Soviet Union. When the Chinese Government rejected the Soviet Union's 1971 proposal concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the avoidance of force and its 1973 proposal concerning a nonaggression treaty, it explained this rejection by alleging that there was no need for such treaties as the USSR and the PRC already had the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Now, however, the Chinese have decreed that even this treaty will no longer be in effect. All of this, in combination with other steps taken by the Chinese leaders, clearly indicates that they are deliberately conducting a line with the aim of further complicating and undermining Soviet-Chinese relations.

The change in Beijing's attitude toward the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and the PRC--from complete approval and the active implementation of this treaty to its cancellation--is closely connected with the degeneration of the political course of the Chinese leaders, which has gradually begun to be colored more by great-power, hegemonistic aims, contempt for other nations and nationalities and hostility toward everything that leads to the consolidation of peace and international security and is contrary to their plans to establish world supremacy. The degree to which the policy of Beijing ruling circles has become adventuristic and the depths to which they have fallen in their betrayal of the interests of socialism were demonstrated by China's shameful aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

As for the Soviet Union, its feelings about the treaty with the PRC on friendship, alliance and mutual assistance have always been clear and consistent. They stem from the USSR's principled position in regard to the agreements it concludes and the obligations it takes on, all of which it unconditionally observes.

The strength and effectiveness of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1950 consisted in the fact that it expressed the inflexible desire of two great peoples to live in peace and friendship. There can be no doubt that the action taken by Beijing to cancel this agreement is contrary to the desires and interests of the Chinese people.

The Soviet Union has always maintained profound respect for the Chinese people and for their history and culture. There are no objective reasons for the estrangement, not to mention confrontation, of the people of our two countries. No efforts by the opponents of Soviet-Chinese friendship and no attempts to cancel out everything positive that was accumulated during the years of fraternal cooperation between the two countries, to expunge it from the public memory or to build a wall of hostility between the people of the Soviet Union and the people of China will produce the desired results.

The Soviet side declares that all responsibility for the expiration of the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and the PRC must be assumed by the Chinese side. The Soviet Union will naturally draw the appropriate conclusions from these actions by the Chinese side.

IN MEMORIAM: VSEVOLOD SERGEYEVICH KOLOKOLOV (1896-1979)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 2, 1979 p 207

[Obituary signed by the collective of the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] Soviet Orientology has suffered a grave loss. On 18 January 1979, Vsevolod Sergeyevich Kolokolov--peerless expert on the language and the spiritual and material culture of China, the author of numerous scientific works and textbooks, a talented pedagogue and a tireless worker with a fervent love for his native land--passed away after a prolonged and serious illness.

Vsevolod Sergeyevich Kolokolov had a long and full life. He was born 16 (28) February 1896 in Kashgar (Xinjiang), where his father, a Russian diplomat, was working. He spent his childhood in China and it was there that he received his traditional Chinese education and acquired his lifelong proficiency in Chinese classical literature in all of its various genres and China's spoken language in all of its various forms. This was followed by a course of study in one of the most respected academic institutions in Russia at that time--the Tsarskoye Selo Lyceum, where the future scholar perfected his knowledge of the major Oriental languages.

After the triumph of the October Revolution, V. S. Kolokolov served in the Red Army and took an active part in the construction of a new life, including the establishment of one of the first agricultural communes in what was then Tverskaya Province. But he was quite eager to place his knowledge at the service of the young Soviet State, which had begun to establish good relations with the Asian countries and aid the revolutionary movement in the Far East. In 1920, Vsevolod Sergeyevich enrolled in the Oriental Department of the Military Academy of the Workers and Peasants Red Army and, upon his graduation 2 years later, remained there to teach. At the same time, he began to teach at the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies and stayed there for more than 15 years. Soon afterward, he began to work at the Communist University of the Workers of China and Sun Yat-sen University, where he helped young Chinese revolutionaries master the theory of Marxism-Leninism. The scientific career of V. S. Kolokolov also began during these years. He

published (with I. Mamayev) the book "Kitay. Strana, lyudi, istoriya" [China. The Country, Its People and Its History], compiled the "Kratkiy kitaysko-russkiy leksikon" [Brief Chinese-Russian Dictionary] (1927) and wrote a work on the phonetics of the Chinese language.

In 1935, the title of professor was conferred on Vsevolod Sergeyevich Kolokolov, crowning his energetic and productive career as a scientist and educator. Whole generations of Soviet sinologists acquired their knowledge of China, its language and culture from V. S. Kolokolov or his best pupils. A Chinese-Russian dictionary compiled by Kolokolov and published in 1936 was of tremendous help to all of us in our work.

When the Great Patriotic War began, Vsevolod Sergeyevich volunteered for the front and served as a driver, delivering ammunition and foodstuffs to the frontlines under artillery and shell fire. But the war against imperialist Japan was imminent, and V. S. Kolokolov was sent to serve the Soviet Command in the Far East. He participated in the liberation of Northeast China from the Japanese invaders, where he excitedly visited places familiar to him from his childhood and met with the working people of China he held so dear.

After the war, V. S. Kolokolov began to teach again at various academic institutions, including Moscow State University, and in 1949 he began his scientific career at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences and its Leningrad division and continued this work for around 20 years. During this time, his work as a translator, annotator and editor was particularly intensive. The major works he wrote or co-authored with other Sinologists include: the translations of the classic novels "Journey to the West" and "The Triple Kingdom," the book "Kitayskaya klassika v tangutskom perevode" [The Chinese Classics in Tangut Translations], and the as yet unpublished translations of the Confucian canon "Lun yu" and "Mengzi." V. S. Kolokolov also introduced the Soviet reader to the short stories of Lu Xun and works by other representatives of contemporary Chinese literature.

The scholar was distinguished by a rare passion for his work until the last days of his life. The translations he worked on in his last years, of historical documents and works by Chinese authors of the Ch'ing era, played a part in the exposure of Maoist falsifications of the history of Russo-Chinese relations. V. S. Kolokolov, with his lifelong love and respect for the great Chinese people, their history and their culture, always believed that the fundamental interests of the neighboring populations would ultimately prevail over the intrigues of the enemies of Soviet-Chinese friendship.

Vsevolod Sergeyevich Kolokolov is no longer with us, but fond memories of him will always live in the hearts of his students and colleagues, in the hearts of all Soviet Sinologists.

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